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This report describes the steps by which ethnographic literature was explored for cross-cultural differences in the role of language with particular reference to its acquisition and use by children. The exploration is put in the context of ongoing work in the development of a systematic guide to field studies of this sort. A principal effort of the research was to develop an organized set of ethnographic queries for this purpose. Its use is illustrated with regard to an analysis of data from the Ashanti of Nigeria. Explicit formal analysis of rules employed in speaking and acquired by children is a major problem. One approach is exemplified in analysis of data from the Abipon of Argentina. The concepts of "competence" and "performance," as currently used in linguistic theory, are critically analyzed. Some of the problems in characterizing societies as to the role of language are indicated. This document consists of a 16-page introductory section (preface, summary, introduction, methods, findings and results, conclusion and recommendations, references) and seven appended reports: (A) "Societies for Which Data Were Obtained"; (B) and (C) "An Ethnology of Communication Among the Ashanti"; (D) "The Abipones--Ethnography of Speaking"; (E) "Linguistic Aspects of Comparative Political Research"; (F) "Linguistic Aspects of the Concept of 'Tribe'"; and (G) "On Communicative Competence." (Author/JD)

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Cross-Cultural Differences in the Role of Language

An Exploration of Ethnographic Literature

Dr. Dell H. Hymes
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
January 1968

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PREFACE

The major problems of this investigation have concerned the development of information and concepts for the study of sociolinguistic systems (systems of speaking), both ethnographically and in a comparative, or cross-cultural, perspective.

I should like to acknowledge the contributions and commitment of those who were research assistants on the project during all or part of the year: Mrs. Regna Darnell, Helen (Sister Peter) Marie Hogan, Mrs. Virginia Hymes, Mrs. Sheila Seitel, Mr. Joel Sherzer, and Mr. K. M. Tiwary.

I should also like to express gratitude to a number of students who contributed to formal and informal discussions of sociolinguistic problems during the year: Mr. Robert Conrad, Mr. Carl Harrison, Mr. D. K. Jain, Mrs. Elinor Keenan, Mr. Luis Kemnitzer, Mrs. Susan Phillips, Mr. David Thomas, and Mrs. Dorothy Thomas.

INTRODUCTION

A formal introduction can be brief. The nature of the research problem, and the scope of the present report, have been described in the Summary that precedes. The body of the report describes the experience of working on the problem during the course of the project, and the present state of what is an ongoing concern and continuing commitment of the principal investigator and a number of his students. The main theoretical conclusions arrived at during the course of the work are presented in the paper submitted with the Progress Report (7), and the paper that constitutes Appendix G. These conclusions have to do with the heuristic frame of reference, and the concepts of speech community and speech situation, that are necessary for adequate analysis of systems of speaking; and with the reformulation of the concepts of 'competence' and 'performance' that is necessary, if these concepts are to be relevant and fruitful.

The nature of the ethnographic data and its treatment can be seen in Appendix B and Appendix C, as well as in Appendix D, where there is also indicated some of the problems that have been explored in the statement of rules of speaking.

SUMMARY

Cultures may differ significantly in the role assigned to language in education. Differences in beliefs, values, and practices impinge upon the acquisition of language and the transmission of knowledge by means of language. In effect, a language is part of a communicative economy, subject to cultural differences in patterning, just as any other resource; and a child acquires not only language(s), but also a sociolinguistic system comprising attitudes and habits regarding its value and use.

There is at present no systematic understanding of the ways in which cultures differ in these respects. In particular there are not the ethnographic analyses that would permit detailed study of individual cases or development of adequate hypotheses and theories about the nature and acquisition of sociolinguistic systems. Ethnographic data can be utilized to document cross-cultural differences, to identify some of their dimensions, and tosuggest some of the descriptive and theoretical bases for a taxonomy and theory of the variety of sociolinguistic systems that impinge upon education. Such a use of ethnographic data can be an encouragement to field studies, by making salient the existence of the phenomena, and can be an invaluable heuristic input to them.

In the present study substantial data were obtained for 23 societies, and some data for 52 others. The information was organized in the form of a standard set of queries for the ethnographic study of acquisition of competence in speaking. A number of conceptual and analytical problems were encountered in recognizing, analyzing, and comparing data relevant to patterns of speaking, particularly with regard to the notion of 'competence' itself and with regard to formal, or explicit, statement of rules of speaking.

The results include development of a body of ethnographic information, being used in continuing revision of the ethnographic guide, with a view either to its amalgamation with an independent manual being prepared at Berkeley, or its separate publication; analytic training and stimulation of field research plans for three or more students; and some insight into the formal analysis of speaking rules, their cross-cultural dimensions, and the incorporation of analysis of speaking into models of sociocultural systems.

The main recommendation must be the encouragement of field studies, and of the joint training in linguistics and social science prerequisite to them.

METHODS

The research was carried out in a series of steps. The first effort was to accumulate detailed information to demonstrate the existence of cross-cultural differences in the role of language in socialization, as against the implicit, and sometimes explicit, neglect of the existence of such differences. For this purpose, an initial set of notes and queries was derived from two papers by the principal investigator (4, 5). The participants in the project reviewed a sample of the kind of information and analysis wanted, and each chose a culture area in which to specialize. The areas dealt with were Africa, Oceania, North America, South America, and, incidentally, South Asia and Middle America.

The initial queries were used with several ethnographic descriptions and with the Human Relations Area Files. As reported in detail in the progress report, the Human Relations Area Files could not be used for more than a preliminary indication of the existence of relevant material. The categories, and the kinds of information, do not seem to permit the sort of use for cross-cultural investigation in this area that has benn possible with some other aspects of socialization (e.g., work by Whiting and Child, Roberts, and others). It is a reflection of the relative neglect of pertinent information generally in anthropology, and of the lack of appropriate conceptual analysis. It is possible, however, that once detailed studies and a provisional taxonomy and theory are available, that the cross-cultural methods of Whiting, Naroll, and others can be applied to the data in the Files and other existing data to some avail.

After some information had been accumulated, it was organized in the form of a check-list of questions. A primary consideration at this point, and later, was to find instances of contrast between societies. It was found that individual facts did not have much impact, being usually within the range of expectation, although ocaasionally the report that a group did not correct children's speech, or did not appear to use language in the transmission of religious training to children, or even did not on the whole engage much in talk, would challenge aapreconception. The report that the Araucanians valued oratory, trained boys for it, and made it a principal feature of leadership seems unsurprising; so does the report that the Abipon made success in warfare the principal criterion of leadership, a criterion reflected in the training of boys. It is when the two are juxtaposed, and it is noted that in these two more or less neighboring cultures (Chile, Argentina), speaking skills are indispensable to the male role, leadership and success in one, and enter into not a single valued male role in the other, that one begins to perceive the existence of a problem for investigation: on what does this depend? are there other societies of the same two types that agree in other features as well? etc.

In the assembling of information leading to the guide, and subsequent work, a 4x6 card was prepared for each chunk of information, as a sort of 'master file' for each society. Other cards were prepared for each query for which information was pertinent, each such card being referenced to the master card. This procedure was adopted because (a) one statement or paragraph might contain details relevant to several queries, and (b) the intelligent use of details answering a query might require recovering its original context. For purposes of showing cross-cultural differences, a yes or no might suffice, e.g., is there a conventionalized baby talk? Comanche, yes; Hidatsa, no; or, must children speak politely to parents? Kikuyu, yes; Chaga, no. For discovery of the place of a practice or belief in a society, and of underlying patterns, the detail would have to be evaluated in the context in which it was originally stated by the ethnographer.

Having started with the set of queries and examples mentioned, it became possible to envisage a general, systematic set of queries, much more extensive and coherent, built mostly out of the available information, but partly generalizing beyond it. New information continued to be obtained, while the check-list was discussed and revised. While any systematization of questions involves some arbitrary decisions, considerable effort was made to find reasonable, clear ways of stating questions and grouping them. From this work there resulted a mimeographed guide to the area of inquiry, a copy of which was submitted with the progress report.

Once the guide was available, it was used in the investigation of further materials. It was clear that more intensive investigation of a small number of cases was necessary, if much in the way of satisfactory sense of patterns was to be gained. This stage of the work took the form of writing discursive essays on individual groups.

The item by item approach in the initial collection of data was increasingly resisted. It was agreed that the approach was suited to the ethnographic data available in most cases, and to the use of queries to bring out the existence of cross-cultural differences, but that it was frustrating and wanting in two main respects: (a) the queries would not always be easy to apply in and of themselves, and others, not party to the discussions about the data that lay behind them, might have difficulty; (b) it was difficult to detect or bring out the significance or pattering of material. In consequence, it was agreed that the itemized form of the guide would be retained as a way of indexing discursively presented material, but that a revised form of the guide was needed, one which would contain for most questions one or more ethnographic examples, showing the kind and range of phenomena intended by the query, and the character of one or more cultures with regard to that range. It was thought important to do this particularly because the area of research had not usually been investigated, and the fuller form would make it more concrete, patent, attractive, useful to field workers.

A number of discursive essays thus were written, and provided with indexes keying their information to the sections and numbered queries of the guide (see the Ashanti example, Appendix B). At the same time the essay form provided a chance to bring out patterns and relationships. In favorable cases the essay could be built about what seemed a fundamental theme in communicative conduct, e.g., the use of intermediaries, frequently children, and the general demeanor of reticence in communication among the Aritama (Colombia). The determination of patterns and relationships, however, proved to be quite difficult, and not something that could be routinized, but that had to wait upon insight into partial data. At least a second stage of thinking and interpretation was required (see the Ashanti example, Appendix C; this material was in facto revised again and developed in even more extended form). For this stage there was simply not time.

In general, the data did not permit or suggest a move to the use of statistical inference. (Some reasons for this are described in the section on Results and Findings). The methods employed can be said to have consisted simply of diligent seeking and sifting of relevant data in ethnographic literature, as part of a continuing dialectic, or feedback, between information and understanding.

The other principal aspect of method in the project was that of conceptual analysis. Conceptual difficulties proved a continuing and major problem, both with respect to the organization of the materials, and with regard to the use and development of concepts in linguistics and cross-cultural (comparative) research related to languages.

The need to reorganize the guide in terms of a more radical, but more consistent approach to languages as part of speaking was agreed upon after discussion. The first version of the guide provided separate, parallel sections for the analysis of competence in speaking and for the analysis of competence in codes. While some aspects of the study of codes call for special delineation, it became clear (especially through the arguemtns of Mr. Sherzer) that a consistent approach had to treat codes as but one of the several components of a speaking competence as a whole. The frame of reference so developed was used in the remaining portion of the project (it has been presented in two articles (7, submitted with the progress report, and 9, Appendix E)).

Current concepts about linguistics and language abilities played an important part in the weekly working sessions of the group as a whole. The principal investigator took up three aspects of this concern in papers written during the project. Most important for the project is the critical analysis of the notions of 'competence' and 'performance', the conceptual dichotomy central to current linguistic theory (in the sense of transformational generative grammar, and, increasingly, other schools of theory as well). This clarification was important to establishing a common ground for the backgrounds in linguistics and anthropology of the participants in the project. Other conceptual issues and discussions involved the use of language as an instrument in cross-cultural research in relation to local systems of the use and valuation of language; these were taken up in the second part of a paper on the history and present problems of social science study and use of language comparatively (9).

In these papers, and in the recasting of the guide, the essential method, of course, was to develop and apply the ethnographic perspective on language that informs the present project, both by thinking it through and by applying it to relevant data found in ethnographic and social science literature. The method is particularly clear in the systematic analysis and criticism of assumptions in comparative research about the relation of language to the boundaries and transmission of cultures (8).

The method, or heuristic frame of reference, has proven satisfactory in indicating material relevant to the analysis of systems of speaking (being tested in detail, for example, against independent accounts, such as for Burundi speaking conduct). It is, however, only a frame of reference, not in itself a theory or method of analysis, in any operational sense. It succeeds in isolating and relating material presented discursively, and from diverse standpoints, in ethnographic literature, and in providing a starting point for formal analysis and field study.

Some experiments in providing a method for analyzing formally the structure of speech events were undertaken. Such formal analyses are essential, if one is to be able to characterize the tacit knowledge that children acquire as they become competent in the use of speech. It was quite clear that no models or methods presently exist for providing such accounts. Our experiments took the form of adapting the method of rewrite rules used in transformational grammar, together with some use of the notions of marked and unmarked features for the interpretation of speech acts in relation to social roles, in reanalysis of some published accounts of chanting, address, and other behavior. (For application to the ethnographic data on a culture as a whole, see Appendix D). The conventions and notions resulting from these experiments were available only as incidental devices to Mr. Sherzer and myself, the others not having at the time sufficient training in linguistics to feel comfortable in using them. It is clear to us that the development of such methods must be pursued.

RESULTS AND FINDINGS

The results of the work have several dimensions. A considerable amount of ethnographic data has been assembled and organized (substantial data on 23 societies, some data on 52 others--see Appendix A). The general assumption, that cultures differ significantly in the role of language, the patterning of its use, the values and attitudes underlying its use, has been clearly supported. A good many particular contrasts among groups have been found, and the rudiments of the dimensions of a taxonomy of such differences have been glimpsed. In some cases new insight into a culture has been thought to have resulted (e.g., Ashanti, Abipon). A number of problems in the conceptualization and analysis of speech as an aspect of social life have been encountered, and some progress made in clarifying them.

At the same time it is clear that it is not possible to use the data obtained, nor, probably, data of the sort now available in general, for analyses of the detail and depth that would be required to delineate the place of speech in socialization and education in a satisfactory way, either in a given society or in comparative research. It was recognized very early that this would be so, and emphasis was placed upon contributing to the fresh field work that is needed.

There is no concise format, or set of dimensions, in terms of which the many particular observations resulting from the work can be presented here. Some examples of particular contrasts have been given in the section on Methods; others are given below and in the papers appended to this report (Appendixes B, C, D, E, F, G). We have had indication from anthropologists that such material can itself be interesting to those who had not thought to look for it, or to do something with it, if noted. But just this prevalent neglect of such material, which the project was undertaken to help remedy, carries with it the absence of a standard format or scheme for the results of such work, and means that the results can only be suggestive and heuristic at present.

Some of the problems in using existing data, as a basis for characterizing societies, and developing a taxonomy, were reviewed in a memorandum prepared for the working group. (This memorandum and another, analyzing Burundi speaking, are in such rough, informal form, that it was not thought appropriate to submit them with the report; but copies can be provided if wanted). In brief, there exists no standardized terminology for identifying the place of speaking, and of language, in communities, and it is possible at present only to begin to develop it. Characterizations and contrasts that are available in the literature are not clearly distinctive or comparable. A difference in descriptive terms may not reflect a true difference; and a characterization of a society may in fact apply only to one sex, class, or type of situation, its place in the structure of the whole being unknown. One can only suggest initial terminology (voluble : taciturn, elaborated : restrained, etc.) and sketch possible instances, as a heuristic input to further empirical work.

Some examples of the interest and limitations of the available data are as follows:

Certain kinds of phenomena were found to be particularly promising as indications of underlying patterns and values. "Switching", that is, change in one or more components of a speech event while others remain constant, was found to provide invaluable evidence of the hierarchy among components, of the factors which were casually operative. Thus, among the Burundi of East Africa, one example indicated that time and place (setting), degree of formality (scene), message-form and manifestation of attitude, and perhaps topic, could all be regarded as determined by just the relationships between the participants (their social roles as superior and inferior) and the genre or purpose of the speech event, signalled by the superior. Accounts of such switching of some components with others constant were almost never to be found.

Again, the cultural interpretation of the sounds of infants was found to be highly suggestive, a sort of cultural projective test. The widespread concern to interpret the sounds of infants, as manifestations of a separate language, on the part of American Indians seemed clearly to manifest the general solicitude and personalistic approach to children of at least some of them, and the high value of single individuals to small hunting and gathering groups. Not enough cases could be found to make a search for reliable correlates seem worthwhile. The Ashanti view of infants as sharing a separate language that is dangerous, so that an infant must be kept from the room where a birth is taking place, lest it inform the emerging baby how hard life is in their shared code, and the baby not wish to come out - this conception seems to reflect an implicit Ashanti attitude toward speech as dangerous and negative in its consequences when not hedged about by the training, rules, signals, etc., obligatory for adult male public speaking. There seems here something not simply a case of the widespread view of speech as a power, a belief widely shared by North American Indians without the negative affect and connotations among the Ashanti. That the Chaga regard an infant's first 'words' as attempts to set the relatives around it against one another, the Alor as demands for food, and the Wogeo (New Guinea) as attempts to name its relatives--each view seems to match the role of speech in the adult society. Again, one could almost never find information on this point.

The concepts of 'positional' and 'personal' social control, as underlying the development of 'restricted' and 'elaborated' codes, developed by Basil Bernstein (1), were found quite suggestive. Thus, the Wishram Chinook practice of withholding severe socialization training until a child could speak and understand the reason for something, and the correlative belief that a child would do what it was asked when it understood the reason, seem a paradigm of Bernstein's 'personal' social control. The Hopi practice of initiating severe socialization training, including weaning, before two years of age, would seem necessarily to imply that the child could not have reasons explained, but have to conform on the basis on the authority and position of others, an indication of what Bernstein calls 'positional' social control. It seems not a coincidence that the adult religious life of the two communities contrasts markedly, the Wishram Chinook being based upon unique religious experiences of individuals, with nonverbal channels being used to signal an individual relationship with the supernatural, and speech to obtain and, at the end of life, disclose a personal message, whereas among the Hopi, as is well known, individuals participate in socially prescirbed roles in group-oriented ceremonials, often behind masks. At least in the course of the project not enough information to establish 'positional' and 'personal' norms of social control was obtained for most societies. This hypothesis of a link between the modes of control and the adult religious life seems one of the most promising for application of cross-cultural methods of inference, if sufficient data can be obtained.

At the same time, it became clear that the connotations of the terms 'elaborated' and 'restricted' codes would have to be clarified, and the identification of some of these connotations with personal and positional social control rejected. The two dimensions are independent, according to the data found in the project. Thus the ethnographic data on Cat Harbour, Newfoundland indicate a positional social control, including a clear restraint on personal expression in speech (and in other normally scheduled activities); but as if to compensate for this, and to satisfy the great interest in 'news' of any kind, a local institution has arisen, the 'cuffer', which consists of elaborating intense argument over an unimportant detail. One thus has an elaborated genre in a positional setting. Similarly the Iatmul of New Guinea seem almost a paradigm of positional social control and communication, the Arapesh of personal; yet a third type (suggested by Margaret Mead) is that of impersonal traditional social control on Bali. And it is among the Iatmul that oratory is elaborated. Clearly the relations amond modes of social control and modes of elaboration or restriction of speech codes badly need cross-cultural testing and clarification. Bernstein has provided positive hypothesis, the first in the field, and its revision in subsequent work will still be in his debt.

The example shows, again, the need both for empirical and for conceptual work.

The principal single result of the profect is the ethnographically oriented guide toward field study of socialization and education in terms of the acquisition of competence in speaking. The data provide examples and comparisons sufficient to elaborate the preliminary version of the guide at most points. A final version has not been completed, although work in it has continued as part of my research since the formal end of the project, because the material may be joined with the differently oriented manual prepared by Slobin and others (12). This manual is now in its second version. Plans have been made for a summer session workshop at the University of California, Berkeley, in which studentd back from the field would contribute their experience to the further revision of the manual. I have been asked to take part in the workshop, and one of the research assistants on the project, Mrs. Seitel, probably will take part as well. Until the summer, it is not certain whether or not the guide devised in this project should be developed as a wholly independent resource. If it is possible to incorporate it with the other, the economy and efficiency of doing so are apparent. Furthermore, the emphases of the two efforts have been complementary. The Berkeley manual has focussed on techniques for implementing research, and on the study of acquisition of language proper. The guide prepared in the present project does not deal with techniques, but is devoted entirely to conceptual analysis and empirical illustration of acquisition of patterns of speaking. There is some attention to these in the Berkeley manual, but not much, and no use, except as an epigraph, of ethnographic examples.

Two factors affect my own thinking about the merger of the two efforts. One is the belief that acquisition of code competence (language proper) must be treated in the context of the components of speaking competence as a whole (with their interrelation of settings, participants, purposes, channels, styles, genres, and the like). It will be one of the main purposes of discussion with the Berkeley group to persuade them to embed the treatment of code acquisition clearly in the context of ethnographic analysis of speaking as a whole. A second factor is the possible utility of the approach developed in the guide for the study of modes of communication other than speaking. Dr. John Szwed of Temple University has this fall begun to participate in some of the discussions in linguistics, anthropology, and folklore, here, and has consulted our guide in regard to work he has begun on a guide to the study of musical socialization. It may well be that language and music can be approached in essentially the same frame of reference. The data sought in our guide already include the place of speech among other modes of communication, and in some cases the interplay of sung and spoken oral communication is indispensable to understanding the relation of speech to social roles (e.g., the recurrent pattern (Araucanians, Bihar (India)) by which women are excluded from public discourse, and can express themselves only in a manner marked by musical use of the voice).

The work of Alan Lomax, characterizing areal patterns in the structure of musical perofrmance (as to who participates, their positions relative to each other, etc.) suggests that similar patterns might be found for verbal performance; indeed, many of the events to be analyzed would be the same, involving as they do both speech and music. It may be that minor revisions and expansions of our guide will suffice to provide for the place of music in acquisition of communicative competence. This possibility is another factor in delaying the giving of a final form to the guide. Dr. Szwed's work will be in part a test of its general utility in its present form for communicative competence as a whole.

It will be summer before it is possible to determine the outcome on these two counts (merger with the Berkeley guide, incorporation of music). If it does not prove possible to merge the two efforts (Berkeley, Penn), and/or if it seems feasible and desirable to present the guide developed at Penn as more fully a general approach to acquisition of communicative competence, I shall renew my original intention to seek publication of the guide, either as an issue of Anthropological Linguistics, or as a volume in the methodology series edited by George Spindler for Holt, Rinehart, and Winston (to which I have been invited to contribute on this subject).

In the meantime I am continuing to work with the material in relation to a seminar in which several of the research assistants, among others, are participating, in anticipation of the summer workshop at Berkeley, and in relation to Dr. Szwed's work. The research thus is part of a continuing concern, not tied to the particular timespan of the project. Despite some difficulties due to the late start due to late funding, and difficulties in bringing the material to the desired stage, the effort has been productive.

One intellectual dimension of the course of the work seems important to mention. It has to do with the place of the project in the long-term development of thought and research on the subject. The course of work to bring patterns of speaking into awareness as part of linguistics, on the one hand, and as part of the study of socialization and education, on the other, has followed a certain path that becomes clear in retrospect. At the outset a general sociocultural model was employed, the Parsonian model of latent, institutional, goal-directed, and adaptive sectors of a sociocultural system (abbreviated LIGA). The model was used only as a heuristic frame of reference for organizing examples to show the existence of phenomena, and cross-cultural differences with regard to them (4, 5). The model did not enter essentially into the analysis of phenomena. The dimensions underlying it (external : internal (LI : GA), and instrumental : expressive/consummatory (GI : AL) were not made use of, nor was there any theoretical casual or explanatory link between the sociocultural categories and the features of speaking.

In subsequent work the thrust was predominantly to extend the typical linguistic concentration on an autonomous code, and its purely referential use. The felt need was to justify attention to speaking, by showing the interdependence of analysis of the code with analysis of additional aspects of speech; by suggesting the possibility of structural analysis of these aspects, as well as of the code; by arguing the necessity, if one was ever to relate language to social life successfully, of studying language in its use in social contexts. Implicitly the target of persuasion was primarily the linguist, whose analysis of the code suggested modes of analysis of speaking as a whole, and whose analysis was indispensable to specification of linguistic features through the functions of speaking are realized. The necessity of a sociocultural, rather than linguistic, starting point for recognizing and thinking about the phenomena in question was insisted upon from the start. The object of description had to be the communicative resources of a community, in terms of which the nature and role of a given code could be specified. The starting point could not be the isolation of a particualr code, from which vantage point one might later seek sociocultural correlates. Looking outward from the structure of the code, many aspects of the structure of speaking would not be seen; they would come into view only by looking in at the features of the code as organized in the service of sociocultural use. Still, the sociocultural frame of reference remained only a conceptual starting-point and background for envisaging codes in context and cross-cultural differences in their roles.

Need for a model of the sociocultural context, one which might shape statement of the structure of speaking, was not felt. No effort was made to start from the characteristics of sociocultural systems and to specify their consequences for systems of speaking. Some analysis of sociocultural values, patterns, and functions, as manifest in patterns of speaking, was undertaken (especially 6). But the course of inference was always from the analysis of speaking to the rest. Even in rejecting the linguistic code as starting point, one was implicitly accepting it as pivot of one's thinking in a continuing dialogue with linugists.

This unconscious contradiction persisted into the work on this project, which in effect has recapitulated the course of development just sketched. The project began with an effort to amass information, demonstrating the existence and scope of speaking as an object of systematic study, and cross-cultural differences in this regard. From demonstration of detail it proceeded to efforts in integrate material conceptually, as parts of patterns of speaking, and as evidence of sociocultural patterns, values, functions, generally. Some dimensions of cross-cultural contrasts and some linguistically, oriented models of analysis, were explored.

Only eventually, in assessing data and in seeking to infer patterns and state rules, did we arrive at the point of having to try to link language with sociological and anthropological theory, in specific casual or explanatory ways. Beyond the assembling of evidence of contrast arose the question of how to link specifically world view, say, with the structure of particular speech events. The heuristic model of the analysis of speaking provides a place for world view and values under the heading of "Norms of Interpretation". It became clear that one standpoint would be to take this heading as the fundamental one. Discovery and description would remain focussed necessarily on message-form and code use in terms of covariation and interdependence with other components of speaking; but explanation and analysis would have to proceed from world view and social structure. (Test analysis of the Burundi data particularly suggested this view).

5 The absence of a model for placing the analysis of speaking in a sociocultural system came to the fore only after the formal end of the project, but the principal investigator's attention has turned increasignly to this problem. The Parsonian model used unitially as a convenient set of rubrics has been reexamined as an analytic model for relating norms of interpretation (beliefs, values, world view) and norms of interaction to specific features of speaking and the structure of speech event. Two general types of model seem available, one which proceeds from systems of meaning to systems of speression and implementation, as does the Parsonian, by way of systems of interaction and institutionalization; and one which takes systems of interaction and institutionalization as central, as do the Marxian and British social anthropology approaches, regarding systems of meaning and systems of expression and implementation as derivative, or secondary. There is an analogy to current theoretical dispute in linguistics, such that one might refer to the two types of model as parallel to those of 'semantics' and 'authonomous syntax' as competing bases of analysis. Data which seem to weigh for the one or the other are being noted, but existing data do not often permit such an evaluation. One finds incidental facts and occasional generalizations, rather than anything like the detailed reports of events that would permit analysis, or the testing of alternative analyses, of the structure of

speech events and the place of such structure in the sociocultural system. The possibility of deciding among types of models, either generally or in individual cases, and of developing specific models in detail, depends upon field studies undertaken with the goal in mind. Field studies are obviously necessary if the qualitative patterns discernible in existing reports, and the concepts applicable to them, are to be given 'operational definition', and the dynamics of change to be discerned in quantitative relationships.

A result that seems to me of great importance is that the existence of the project has drawn a number of good students into a concern with research in this area. The work on the project became a focus of interest during the year. It contributed to the training and growth of those who participated, and some results of this experience will be forthcoming in the near future. Mrs. Seitel expects to do field work in Tanzania with the Haya, carrying out research conceived in the course of the present project. Mrs. Keenan expects the following year to do field work in Madagascar. After completing a library disseatation this year, Mr. Sherzer expects to undertake a sociolinguistic research project among the Cuna in Panama. Sister Hogan developed her work on Ashanti into what, so far as I know, is the most complete and systematic study of data from a single culture from this standpoint. I expect that her work, and that of Mr. Sherzer on the Abipon, will be publishable in some form.

A further result has been an involvement of the principal investigator in the development of research in education on the part of anthropologists. This involvement has taken the course of participation in a two-day conference, sponsored by the Culture of Schools project, in Washington last May, and of having this experience lead to the taking of an active role, as a new member of the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association, in the efforts to maintain and strengthen anthropological work with regard to education. In this connection I am to take part in a conference on anthropology and education sponsored by the Association with the support of the Office of Education in Miami Beach this May.

I should like to stress these aspects of the project, because the research has had to be frankly exploratory. Some delays and difficulties were encountered and the work was time-consuming, both in seeking out and assembling data, and in developing understanding and insight with which to interpret it. An important part of the value of the work will emerge in the subsequent work of those involved.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study has accomplished these things:

critical analysis of some dominant concepts and modes of thinking that prevent an adequate understanding of the role of language in socialization and language in different societies;

development of a body of ethnographic information on cross-cultural differences in the use of language, particularly with reference to children;

development of a systematic set of queries as a guide to field study of the role of language in socialization and education.

exploration of formal methods and modesl of describing rules of speaking acquired by children, as part of their communicative competence;

exploration of dimensions for characterizing societies with regard to the role of language;

stimulation of three plans for field research;

involvement of the principal investigator in the relations between anthropology and education.

While more can be done with the existing ethnographic literature, and the data accumulated in the course of the project, the greatest need is for field studies in culturally different commungities, devoted to the ethnographic analysis of the place of language and of patterns of speaking. Before the processes, and the successes and failures, of acquisition can be studied adequately, the on-going system of speaking which children are acquiring must be known.

Methods and models for the analysis and interpretation of patterns of speaking, as parts of sociocultural systems, need to be developed.

A major obstacle to the development of adequate models, and to the needed field studies, is the lack of joint training in linguistics and social science. Anything that can be done to facilitate such training will redound to the benefit of our understanding of the role of language in education. A summer institute, devoted to social science training for linguistics, and appropriate training in linguistics for social scientists, would be desirable. Such an institute might be part of the Linguistic Institute sponsored each summer by the Linguistic Society of America, or held at a center, such as the University of California, Berkeley, where training of this sort is being developed.

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APPENDIX A

SOCIETIES FOR WHICH DATA WERE OBTAINED

The societies for which extensive data (relatively speaking) were obtained, and a sketch written, are listed by major geographical area. The areas are chosen for convenience in grouping the societies, and are listed in the following order:

Africa
India and Southeast Asia
Oceania
North America
Middle America
South America

(that is, continental Old World, Pacific, New World). Under each area are also listed societies for which relevant notes were obtained.

Africa

Ashanti (Nigeria)
Chaga (Tanzania)
Dogon (Niger)
Ngoni (Zambia, Malawi)

Notes: Azande, Bambara, Jabo, Kikuyu, Nuer, Nupe

India and Southeast Asia

Bihar (India)
Chrau (Vietnam)

Notes: Hindi (New Delhi), Rajput (Khalpur, Rajastan--a caste grouping), Thai, Toda (India)

Oceania

Abelam (New Guinea)
Iwam (New Guinea)
Kaoka (Guadalcanal)
Manam Islands (New Guinea)
Maori (New Zealand)
Truk (Caroline Islands)
Wogeo (New Guinea)

Notes: Alor, Bali, Busama, Iatmul, Kalinga, Lesu, Manus, Orokaiva, Ponape

North America

Bella Coola (coastal British Columbia)
Hopi (Arizona)
Iroquois (New York, Canada)
Kaska (interior British Columbia)
Navaho (New Mexico, Arizona)
Wishram (Washington)

Notes: Arapaho, Chippewa, Comanche, Crow, Flathead, Havasupai, Ingalik, Koasati, Lakota, Makah, Menomini, Modoc, Mohave, Nootka, Omaha, Papago, Quileute, Sanspoil-Nespelem, Tlingit, Twana, Washo, Winnebago, Yana, Yurok, Zuni

Middle America

Notes: Chan Kom (Mayan), Juxtlahuaca (Mixtecan), Mazatec, Milpa Alta (Nahuatl), Santiago Tetelcingo (Nahuatl), Tzintzuntxan (Spanish), all in Mexico

Chimaltenango (Mayan), Chinautla (Pokomam Mayan), all in Guatemala

South America

Abipon (Argentina)
Araucanian (Chile)
Aritama (Colombia)
San Blas Cuna (Panama)

Notes: Callinga Carib, Cashinaua, Choroti, Goajiro, Yaruro

APPENDIX B

ASHANTI I

An Ethnography of Communication among the Ashanti

Sister Peter Marie Hogan

July, 1967

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Twi, the language spoken by the Ashanti people, is a member of the Kwa group of Niger-Congo languages. The other tribes mentioned in this paper are all West African peoples whose languages are also classified as Kwa (Greenberg 1963).

Birth and Early Infancy:

The act of parturition is accompanied by a certain amount of speech, which according to accounts by Rattray (1923, 1927) and Kaye (1962), is fairly formalized, and at certain points during the course of the labor, instrumental in the accomplishment of delivery. All males are excluded from the room where the birth is to take place, normally the room set aside for washing, while four elderly women acting as midwives assist the mother. They urge the mother to concentrate her energies on the birth of her child with the expression "mia w'ani," literally, "press your eyes, strain." Women in childbirth are always urged to bear their pains with fortitude, and it is considered a great disgrace to cry out. IV B 1,2,3

If the delivery is difficult, the women attempt to remedy this with various medicines administered both internally and externally. Should these fail, the attendants conclude that the woman has been guilty of adultery, a crime for which she will surely die unless she confesses. It appears that the mere pronunciation of the name of the woman's lover is sufficient to insure a safe delivery and recovery. Although one might at first suspect that the exhortations for the woman to confess the name of her lover might merely be a means by which the old women satisfy their curiosity, the impression given by Rattray is that the women sincerely believe that the speaking of the man's name is the only antidote which can mitigate the evil consequences of the adultery. This impression is reinforced by the fact that if the woman fails to disclose the name of her alleged lover, the women address the unborn child, saying, "if your father be so-and-so, come forth," running through a list of possible candidates. The man whose name is being uttered at the actual moment of delivery is assumed to be the father, and presumably it is only the speaking of his name which releases the child from the womb of its mother. IVB1,2,3 IVB5 VI B IVB5

There may also be here a certain expectation that the unborn child is able to understand speech, and in some way knows when the name of its father VI D is mentioned, for the midwives address themselves directly to the fetus when reciting the names of possible fathers. IV B 1,2 VI D

The threats of death at this particular event carry very special weight III A because the Ashanti consider it a great disgrace to die in childbirth. The corpse of a woman who dies in this manner is treated with ridicule and verbal abuse by all the pregnant women in the village. IV B,1,2 They go and cut budding plantain leaves, and entering the compound where the corpse is lying, each points her shoot at it, saying:

> Poom! fa wo musuo ko, wantumi anwo, wantumi anko
> wa ko ato.
>
> Bang! Begone with your evil, you have been unable
> to bring forth, you have been unable to fight, you
> have fought only to die (xxxxxx Rattray 1927:58-59).

As soon as the child is born, the midwives shout, "Hail, so-and-so," at once naming the baby after that particular day of the week upon which it is born. To this name, sometimes referred to as "Nyame's (god's) name," is later added a patronymic, and eventually perhaps a mmerane ("strong-name"), in honor of some great man or heroic deed.

Next, the umbilical cord is cut with a piece of wood, and the women announce the completion of this with the words "Asumasi aba a, tenase," "As so-and-so has arrived, let him (or her) sit down (with us)." ("Asumasi" is the expression used by Rattray to indicate that a proper name is used in the formula under discussion).

Twins are greeted with delight, and when they are born they are put into a basin and carried on a woman's head through town. Other women follow, singing "Wa wo nta, wa wo nta abien," "She has borne twins, she has borne two twins." The first-born is called "ata-panyin," "elder twin,: and the second, "obi wom," "someone is inside." The second has precedence over the first, for it is said that "The first merely has been sent to prepare the way for the second" (Rattray 1916:188).

For the first eight days after a child's birth, the infant is not incorporated into the family. IA The Ashanti say that "when a child is born in this world, a ghost-mother mourns the loss of her child in the samandow (spirit world)." (Rattray 1927:59). During the eight days no one can be certain whether the infant will prove to be a human child, or, by dying during this period, show itself to be merely a wandering ghost. It is never addressed in any endearing VI A terms during this time. Should the baby die before the eighth day, the reaction of its parents is one of anger. The body of the dead infant is whipped, sometimes mutilated, and buried in the village midden heap. Such a child is there- IV B; after referred to as "kuku 'ba," "pot child," after the pot in which the body is frequently buried. After a series of insulting observances engaged in by the parents, the maternal grandmother sometimes performs a ceremony which points up the underlying meaning of these reactiolns. Taking some mashed yams or plantain and eggs, the grandmother and the mother go to the cross-roads of the village and, standing at their junction, the older woman says:

> 'Na owo asamandow gye eto ne nkesua yi di, ye da wo ase pi se wo ma woye aba, ye sere wo foforo. Akoda wokoro gye wo nkesua ko ma aberewa se de obeba bio die a, ontenase.
>
> O Mother who dwells in the land of spirits, receive this eto and eggs and eat. We thank you very much that you permitted this one to come, but we beg you for a new one. And you infant, who are going, receive your eggs and give to your old mother saying: 'Let one come again, but permit it to remain.'

Next, the grandmother feeds the earthly mother, giving her a spoonful of food three times, and the following words are spoken three times:

> Sudie didi 'Kwanso no nnidi me yafuno mu.
>
> Spirit (of a child that has died before eight days), eat on the path, do not eat in my belly.

(Rattray, who reports this ceremony does not indicate who is the speaker of this particular formula, although his translation suggests that it is the mother of the dead child.)

IA IVB1 VI B

For the child who survives the crucial period, the important rite known as Ntetea is held on the eighth day. At one point during the ceremony, the mother dressed in her best attire, with shoulders, breasts, and arms smeared with white clay, bends over the infant, and thanks it for not having caused her death. Normally the high point of the rite is the naming of the infant, although this is sometimes delayed if the person designated to name the child cannot be present on the eighth day.

Both Kaye (1962) and Fortes (1950) report that formerly the bestowal of a name on the infant was performed by the father's sister. Rattray (1923, 1927, 1929) and Manoukian (1950) however, describe this as being done by the father himself, or occasionally by some other member of his ntoro. All authors stress that only a member of the father's ntoro may name the child. The range of names, according to Fortes (1947:177) is quite limited, so that it is common to have four or five people in the same village having identical pairs of names. The father chooses the name for his child, usually from among those of his forbears on both sides. If the paternal grandfather is alive, a male child is usually taken to him to be named after him. A girl is frequently named after the father's mother.

IV B1,2

The child is taken to the member of the father's ntoro whose name he is to bear. The mother places the child on the lap of the namer who spits into the child's mouth, saying:

> Father and god, so-and-so, my child, so-and-so, has begotten a child and he has brought him to me, and I now call him after myself, naming him so-and-so; grant that he grow up and continue to meet me here, and let him give me food.

When the child grows up he is entitled to say, "Asumasi na oto ntasuo gu m'ano m;." "So-and-so put spittle into my mouth" (Rattray 1927:64).

IVB1,

During the naming ceremony, the child is very much the focus of attention among the Ashanti. This is in contrast to the Nupe, who also bestow names on the eighth day after birth. Among the Nupe, the bestowal of the name takes place with only the family present, but tribal markings are incised on

the child's body at the large reception which immediately follows. At this reception IV B1,2
guests ignore the cries of the child. Their behavior is characterized VI C
by much chatting among themselves and enjoyment of the music which is usually
provided, with no heed paid to the one whose naming has provided the occasion
for the celebration.

That the naming of his children is important to an Ashanti father is
indicated by the former practice of men going to war during the course of their IV B1,2,3
wives' pregnancy. Such a man would christen his unborn child by spitting three
times on his wife's abdomen, saying, "If you come forth a male, your name is VI B
so-and-so. If a female, your name is so-and-so."

Approximately two weeks after birth, the child receives his "strong- IV B1
names," Some boys are given special "answer names" by their fathers, in which
the son always responds to his father with a particular proverb or saying.
A son is forbidden to use such a response to his mother unless explicitly IV B4
allowed to by his father.

Communicative Environment of the Infant

The Ashanti refer to the new-born child as "Akoda nga," as distinct from "mota" (embryo or fetus) and "'ba pupro," the child who is already able to crawl. The cooing of the Akoda nga is called "the language of the ghosts," (Rattray 1927:57), and it is believed that this language is intelligible to all unborn babies and new-born infants who have not yet cut their teeth. For this reason the Ashanti take special care that no infants falling within this age bracket be permitted in the room where a woman is giving birth, for such a child might tell the unborn baby about the troubles of this world, causing a long and difficult labor (Kaye, 1962:53).

IA
VIC
VID

Up to the age of three months, all crying is interpreted as the child's expression of hunger, and the immediate response of the mother is to suckle the child. After three months, it is believed that the child might be communicating fear, rage, or some form of physical discomfort as well as hunger. No infant is left crying, for to fail to respond to a crying baby is considered gross neglect. Special efforts are made to prevent the child from crying at night, for this is said to attract the attention of evil spirits. If crying persists in spite of the parents' attempts to comfort the child, the cause of the difficulty is usually identified as a stomach ache, and the child is then subjected to an enema of ground ginger and pepper juice.

IA
VIC

Earliest acquisition of code and speaking competence

With regard to the child's acquisition of code and speaking competence, VIII E none of the ethnographers has reported any special baby language or baby talk aside from the cooing, or ghost language discussed above. VII A Early attempts at speech are enthusiastically encouraged, and parents make efforts to entice infants to repeat words. Kaye reports that anyone near a baby will talk to it. The impression given is that this is more with the intention of having the child repeat one's words, than an exprdssion of a belief that the child can' understand their meaning (1962:169). VIII B When the child first beings to speak, his grammatical mistakes are not considered to be important and all of his efforts are greeted with praise and encouragement.

Learning and Teaching

Although Rattray has noted that it is difficult to find any trace of II A
the systematic training of children (1929:11), he points out that at almost
every hour of their daily lives children are undergoing unconecious instruction,
mostly by a process of observation and imitation. Children are given explicit II B
instruction, however, concerning certain rules of decorum with regard to speech.
In particular, they are taught not to talk about everything they see. That IV A
there is believed to be a natural inclination to do this is indicated by the
nature of the threats with which children are warned to guard their tongues,
and by the fact that the reason given for barring children from the place where
a woman is giving birth is that the young witness might later describe the event
in public. Children are frequently admonished, "If you talk about what you see III A
a chicken will be hung on your lips" (Kaye 1962:170). Similarly, a child who
sees someone with ears or lips cut off, upon asking the reason is told it is IV B3
because of something the person has said. Idle gossip and tale-bearing are IV A
despised by the Ashanti, and a child is early taught not to discuss affairs of
the family or repeat what family members do or say outside the family circle.

On the other hand, this prohibition against tale-bearing does not apply IV B4
within the abusua, and in fact, it is the duty of a nephew to report to his
mother's brother if anyone has spoken or acted against the older man. Children IV B1,2,
are taught the formula with which the legitimate tale-bearer is expected to introduce his report:

Ma san me hwem so na me ka.
I draw a line down my nose that I may speak.

Or,

Nson na esi me hwen so yi, se anyenhima, na me ka.
Ashes lie upon this, my nose, like the white-nosed anyenhima monkey.

Other instruction concerning speech includes admonitions about behavior II B
in the presence of adults. Children are usually permitted to be present when VII A B
their parents have visitors, but they must remain silent unless spoken to. When replying to an adult they are expected to lower their voices respectfully. Children who do not observe these rules of etiquette are required to leave the
room where the adults are assembled. They are taught not to sing or talk at IV B1,
meals, being told that to do so would cause the death of their father.

With regard to other instruction, a large part of a child's training II E
is derived from listening to---and later reciting---the Anansesem, or Spider Stories. These are Ashanti folk-tales featuring Anansi, the spider culture-hero, which serve an educative function, among many others. The tales present to the child many aspects of the Ashanti culture, and point out the norms of behavior which he will be expected to observe. These tales are told by all the adults of the village, and the children have ample opportunity to learn the particular moral which each is intended to illumine. Aside from this, much of the folk-lore, family history, and many of the traditional proverbs are learned from the grandparents of both sexes.

The care of young children falls almost wholly on the mother, and she works hard to provide her children with everything they need. She expects obedience and affectionate respect from her children in return, and it is considered an offense tantamount to sacrilege for a child to show disrespect to his mother. One informant even told Rattray that "if you make your mother weep so that her tears fall on her breast you may...die" (1929:16).

Although the mother has more contact with the children than has the father, still he is not without responsibility in their upbringing. The Ashanti say, "Obarima hye obarima 'ba, na oba hye oba," "The training of a boy should be done
by a man, and that of a girl by a woman" (1929:11). In fact, a male child who III A
is reared by a woman is called "oba 'ba," "woman-child," and is laughed at. IV A
A boy who exclaims Enoe! (Oh, Mother!) in surprise, rather than Agya e! (oh, father!), is called "oba 'ba," and is scorned all his life.

For a girl to exclaim "Agya a!" in surprise, however, is no disgrace. Rather it is admiringly said of her that "n'ani ye den," "her eyes are strong," or she is called "'ba 'barima," a mannish, i.e., brave woman. IV A

TXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Children are not given a great deal of instruction about religious matters, but rather learn about traditional customs and beliefs by attending the various festivals from which they are never excluded. II A

Young children are not instructed in sexual matters, and if a subsequent pregnancy of the mother causes questions from a young child the answers are evasive and fictional. Thus a child who questions his mother's size is told that she has pillows under her clothes, or has eaten too much. When the baby arrives thus unannounced the inquisitive child is told that babies come from one of a variety of sources such as God, the farm, the store, or abroad. Sometimes the child who persists in asking questions will be silenced or smacked. II A

A young boy will usually carry his father's stool for him to wherever he happens to be going. Once they reach the father's destination, the boy sits behind him and listens to all that is said. "Wa te ne kasa,", "listens to his voice," is the Ashanti idiom (1929:12). At these times, the boy is expected to remain silent, listening to the wisdom of his elders. During these and other sessions with his father the older man points out to the boy those to whom he must show special respect: "That man is the chief's soul-washer; That one is a stool carrier." He is taught the names of trees and plants as they walk in the bush, and he is warned to avoid using ntam kese, the great oath of the Ashanti people which will be more fully discussed below, and various terms of abuse. II A VII A II B

Boys obtain a great deal of information about sexual matters in conversations with friends. A boy is specifically warned by his father, however, about the evils of masturbation. II B

Girls, of course, come more into the mother's' province, and are trained II B
under her more immediate supervision. One of Rattray's informants described
her role in relation to her daughter as follows:

> I will watch my daughter's health...lest an obayfo (witch) "get" her. I will give offerings to the obosom (gods) to protect her until she reaches puberty, and promise them a sheep when she does so; I teach her how to play at cooking (nkurobo); how to wash her body; remove sleep from her eyes; soap herself from the head downwards and bathe two or three times a day; how to wash her clothes; respect everyone, be polite, even to a slave.
>
> Tekyerema bedie efa edie esen ahoodenfo.
>
> A woman's tongue gets things more surely than a strong man (1929:16). IV A

In addition a girl is taught farm work, and when puberty approaches she is II C
instructed about the change that will come over her. The mother gives her lessons in personal hygiene and in how to please her future husband sexually.
Although many girls learn about menstruation from their friends, they are also
formally instructed by their mothers about the menstruation taboos they will
be required to observe. The mother also warns her daughter never to call a II B
man "Kwasea," a fool, which is a very serious offence. IV B;

Social Control:

There is a great deal of social control exerted on both children and III A. adults by verbal means. This takes the form of positive responses to good behavior as well as negative ones to bad. Thus children are often rewarded for good behavior or for diligent work. The reward may sometimes be accompanied III B by a penny or a piece of fruit, but the essential element which is always present is a word of praise (Kaye 1962: 142, 198).

If the parent wishes to interrupt the child in the performance of some' III A unacceptable act, he does so verbally with expressions such as "Stop that! III B1,3 Don't say that," "If you do that a ghost will catch you." "The policeman will arrest you." "If you don't stop the doctor will come again and give you another injection." Frequently a person outside the house or room will collaborate by changing his voice and calling, Who is that child crying (or misbehaving)? I shall come there just now if he doesn't stop."

A child whose behavior warrants punishment may be dealt with in one of III B three ways: scolding, slapping the buttocks, or putting pepper or ginger into the rectum or genital area. Serious punishment may be meted out only by the child's parents, or with their permission, by his maternal uncle. Grandparents IV B1,3 and their siblings, who usually lavish affection on their grandchildren, may reprimand them for minor acts of disobedience or impropriety. For more serious disciplinary action they must call on the parents. Older siblings, especially a first-born, may reprimand a younger brother or sister, but they must also bear the responsibility of helping them if they are in trouble.

A father has a small piece of antelope skin for chastising a child on the buttocks for pilfering or speaking abusively. More frequently, however, III B verbal means are employed to maintain discipline, particularly in the first instance of a particular misdemeanor. Lazy children, for example, are tongue-lashed by their father, and only if this does not suffice, they are whacked with the hand or with a stick. Similarly, an older child who persists in crying after repeated attempts to make him stop will be first verbally threatened, IIIB then thrashed, and only as a last resort subjected to a rectal suppository of red pepper and ginger. Threats are in fact the means most frequently utilized to maintain discipline. Thus children resisting correction are threatened with a visit from any one of several frightening persons such as the bogey man, circumcisers, or monsters. The threat of beatings is also used. Children who IV B1,3 are slow to fall asleep at night are crooned and sung to, but if they continue to be wakeful, they too are threatened with bogey men and monsters. A mother will threaten her daughter with the possibility of menstruating for the first time during the daytime, a most unlucky and unacceptable omen among the Ashanti. A child who is seen to be too familiar with someone within a prohibited degree of relationship is warned about 'the little boy who had his head cut off for such conduct,' with the implicit threat that his own head will be cut off unless he behaves as his parents wish (Rattray 1929:13)

Mothers often bribe their children with a promise not to report bad be- III A IV B havior to the father if the disobedient child will now perform whatever service she requests. The most powerful sanction among the Ashanti, however, and this applies to both children and adults, is ridicule (Rattray 1929:372). III A With regard to adults, ridicule is often embodied in stories which are told IV B3 almost every evening when the villagers gather. Here personal names are never used, but animals and other creatures are made to take the roles which the storyteller wishes to have the group examine. With children, however, ridicule is much more overt, and very consciously directed against particular individuals. One type of behavior which never fails to evoke the ridiculing response is persistent enuresis. The father who finds that his child repeatedly wets his IV B1, III A sleeping-mat during the night calls in small children of his own child's age, telling them to come and catch the guilty child, and make him dance a dance called bonsua bono. The child is tied in his mat, taken to the bush, and dressed in nsansono (nettles). Water is thrown over him while his peers sing:

Tworodobia e! wo si wo kete anadwo. III A
Tworodobia e! wo si wo ntama anadwo. IV B1,2,

You wash your sleeping mat in the night, Tworodobia e!
Your wash your cloth in the night.

He is then taken to a family elder and taught to swear that he will not again have an accident at night. This oath is repeated at the village tree. IV B3

In general, it is not expected that younger children will tell the truth, and it is simply taken for granted that children questioned about misbehavior will insist on their own innocence. I A After about age ten, however, a child will be punished for lying. Parents themselves, though, will sometimes ask children to lie for them, having them tell a tax collector that the parents are not at home, etc. IV B1,

Puberty:

No special observances mark the attainment of puberty by boys, but the girl's arrival at this stage is surrounded by ceremony. The onset of menarche is never directly mentioned, but rather is euphemistically referred to in the following ways: IA IV B 1,3

"Wa bo no bara" - The bara has stricken her. (This is said of menarche only).

"Nsa ko n'akyi!" - The hand has gone behind.

"Wa bu nsa" - She has turned her hand.

"Wa kum ese no" - She has killed an elephant.
(Rattray 1927:69).

As soon as a girl becomes aware that she has reached menarche she informs her mother. The mother communicates the news to the villagers by beating an old hoe with a stone or a knife, the signal for all old women to come out and sing bara songs. According to Rattray (1927:69-70), this takes place immediately, though Nketia (1963:53) points out that the preparations required for a Bara ceremony necessitate a time lag here. The bara songs are congratulatory verses sung in praise of the young girl. IV B1,2, IV B3 V D

The mother next takes some wine and spills a little on the ground, praying to the Sky God, the Earth Goddess, and the spirit of the ancestors to protect the girl from all harm. At daylight, the girl appears in the streets in her best attire and ornaments, receiving the gifts and congratulations of all her friends. The Bara songs continue, and later the girl is taken to the river to be bathed. Her loin cloth, together with the sponge with which she has been bathed and an egg are deposited in the river, while the women attendants address the water, asking that the girl be permitted to live.

Upon returning to her mother's house, the girl is seated on a stool while the women dance around her to the accompaniement of donno drums and songs.

IV B 1,2,3
V D

(The donno drums, which will be described in more detail below, are carried under the left armpit and beaten with a stick, and constitute one of the two exceptions to the general rule that women may not touch a drum). Very rarely does a male drummer participate in a puberty rite (Nketia 1963:58).

The characteristic drum tune which predominates during a Bara rite is fixed by tradition so that whenever it is heard from a distance it is automatically associated with this particular festival. The rhythm peculiar to this event is described by the Ashanti in nonsense syllables "dón kátirika dɔ́n kɔ̀n kɔ̀n" (Nketia 1963:57). This particular rhythm is not used in any other context, so that puberty drumming is not only traditional, but it is also distinctive. There is no gong accompaniment, which is otherwise quite common in Ashanti music, and the handclapping which is sometimes heard is relatively sporadic and non-essetial. The most striking characteristic of the drumming is its simplicity. It is therefore easily handled and is performed for the most part spontaneously and voluntarily. There are some individuals who know the music especially well because of their particular interest in and love for the celebration, but there are no puberty bands which make a specialty of performing at Bara celebrations.

While these songs are being performed, those present attempt to convey to the girl some of the functions of womanhood through dancing, gestures, and words. Everywhere, both inside and outside the house, the singing and dancing are interspersed with group shouts of exhilliration and thanksgiving. Frequently there will be a great deal of praise for the father of the girl for his material support of the proceedings, his good relationship with the girl's mother, and for his special spiritual relationship to the girl, based on her participation in his ntoro.

V D

As the ceremony continues, several verbal pleas are made by the older women to the girl. She is exhorted to do nothing which would allow misfortune to follow her attainment of puberty. For five days following the ceremony she is known as a barafo, i.e., a girl in the bara state. At the end of that IV B1,2, time she goes all around the village giving thanks to all who participated in the festivities. If the girl is not already betrothed she is expected to become so after her bara rite is over. She does not receive a new name after puberty, but she is given the title eno, mother, by the children of the village/ I B She will, from the time of her puberty celebration, be required to observe I B.5 several taboos during subsequent menstrual periods. Those related to speech IV B 4 forbid her from swearing an oath, and also prohibit the swearing of any oath IV B3 against her while she is menstruating. The wives of certain craftsmen, e.g., weavers, may not even address their husbands directly when in this condition, but must rather communicate with them through the medium of small children. No unclean woman may sit in court as arbitrator, nor may she touch the talking drums. Rattray believes these taboos to be a reflection of Ashanti V D belief that contact of any kind with a menstruating woman renders powerless IV.B all the magical or supernatural forces otherwise attributed to certain places, persons, spirits, and things. Such contact therefore destroys all man's defences against the unknown and evil powers which constantly threaten him.

Courtship and Marriage

The preferred marriage in Ashanti is that between cross-cousins. Rattray's informants definitely stated to him that the reason for this is the desire to perpetuate certain names. Thus one man remarked, "If my niece does not marry my son, but marries a man not of my ntoro, then I cannot call any of her children after myself or my ancestors" (1927:324).

Young people have opportunities to come to know each other at social gatherings during which youths and girls sing satirical songs against each other, often making up original verses based on traditional poems concerning love, nature, ings, and the gods. When a girl is attracted to a particular boy she makes this known by composing and singing songs in his name during the singing and dancing each evening. IV B

Once a man says, "me pe wo," "I need you," to a girl she refers him to her abusua. After presenting the girl's mother with a series of gifts, he eventually says to the older woman, "I have seen your daughter and wish to marry her." If he is shy, he will always ask someone else to do this for him. If all agree, a series of exchanges between the man and the girl's family ensues. The consummation of the marriage is not marked with any special ceremonies. The wife does not take her husband's name in marriage, and all progeny belong to her abusua.

Every Ashanti couple desires to have children and rear a large family. Polygyny is practiced and there is some competition among co-wives to produce healthy offspring. Although there does not seem to be an undue amount of quarreling among the various wives of any one household, the Ashanti word for co-wife is "kara," which is translated, "the jealous one " (1927:95). Sometimes one will sing derisively to another as they work together, "That child you think you carry in your belly is not a child; its just a tumor" (Lystad 1958:67). Above all, one wife who has successfully borne a child will ridicule a child- IV B 3 III A less co-wive, "Turn to your weeding, you useless, childless woman." This IV B1, ridiculing of a barren person is not restricted to co-wives, however, for childless III A couples are subjected to the derision of society at large. The man who is sterile is vulgarly referred to as "kote krawa," "wax penis," (Rattray 1927: 67), and formerly such a couple had large thorns driven through the soles of their feet after death.

With such an emphasis, it is not surprising that great care is taken by pregnant women to insure a successful course of their pregnancies. It is IV B 4 forbidden for anyone to make any remark about her condition to a woman who is expecting a baby. Should anyone do this, and a miscarriage occur, that person I A is fined as the responsible agent. Both husband and wife should avoid quarreling IV B with each other during her pregnancy, and a husband who habitually argues during this time gives his wife just grounds for divorcing him.

The woman who has many children is honored in Ashanti society, and a I A woman who has brought forth ten is given a public ceremony of congratulation, and may be addressed by special titles. This is in marked contrast to the prac- I B6 tice among the Yoruba whereby the parents deliberately conceal the number of IV A3 children they have. They will never pronounce the number, even in response IV B 4 to a direct question, for fear of being overheard by a disease spirit which may be hovering about, eager to take away the youngest child (Parrinder 1949:21).

Adultery and Divorce

IV B 3

There are several grounds for divorce among the Ashanti, and a few of these have a verbal basis. A man, for example, may divorce his wife if she is inordinately quarrelsome, or if her mother habitually abuses him. Each party may divorce the other for adultery, and if the man can prove his wife's guilt he is entitled to collect damages from her family as well as the bride-price and any other money or gifts given the family at the time of the marriage.

IV B1,2,

IV B3

In order to initiate divoece proceedings, the husband must ascertain from his wife the fact of her adultery. To do this he usually hands her over to her relatives who ask her to swear by the national fetish as to her fidelity to her husband. If she confesses, her family sends to that of the correspondent for compensation. The adulterer's family consult him, and if he acknowledges guilt, he is required to pay a fine. If he desnies having committed adultery with the woman he must state under oath all that he knows sexually of her. If it is discovered that he is suppressing information he is said to be guilty of Nsankyee, "rigid denial," Danquah, who reports this material, does not describe the penalty for this (1928:166-159).

IV B1,2,3

A husband, of course, is not required to divorce an adulterous wife, and frequently he will not do so, but will prohibit her from mentioning or having anything to do with her lover. He will do this by using a strong formula addressed directly to his wife:

> If from today you mention the name of, or speak with, or receive presents from, or have any intercourse with so-and-so, may the national fetish kill you, and may you be arraigned for violating the national oath.
> (Danquah 1928:172).

Frequently the husband will levy such a prohibition not only in the case of proven adultery, but also in relation to anyone who has attempted, however unsuccessfully, to seduce his wife. Verbal attempts to seduce the wife of another are referred to as "asombo," "burning a hole in her eat," and they, together IV B1, 3 with efforts to persuade a married woman to divorce her husband constitute serious offences. In these cases, the husband can swear an oath upon his wife not IV B1,2,3 only forbidding her to have anything to do with the man while the husband lives, but he can also prohibit her from marrying the would-be lover even after the husband's death. Should she violate this prohibition it is the second husband who is considered guilty of a grave sin called "akantamaditwe," committing adultery after an oath has been sworn (Rattray 1929:318).

If a man commits adultery with the wife of one of his slaves, a public IV B1,2,3 ceremony which includes ridicule usually takes place. The master must kneel III A in front of his seated slave, with a sheep across his shoulders. He brings the sheep over his head, and as it touches the ground in front of him, says: "Di bim apeafo," "Yours is a just cause." The slave replies, "Ma gyae, me ka ntam se me som wo se me som wo da da," "I leave it, and I swear the oath that I will serve you as I served before this happened." Everyone then jeers and laughs at the master. If the slave fears the revenge of the master, he says publicly: "Me ka ntam se fa me ko ma Ohene ne gye wo sika, na wa di me ye' mensom wo dio," "I swear the oath that you must take me to the chief, and he will hand you the money you paid for me, for you have eaten my wife and I will not serve you any more (Rattray 1929:38-39).

The term for divorce in Ashanti is "awa 'diegyae," literally, abandonment IV B1,2,3 of the marriage state," but the idiomatic expressions," gyae aware," "to leave off marriage," or "gu no hyiri," "to sprinkle her with white clay," are commonly used. Although the husband is usually the initiator of a divorce, the wife is also free to do this. She does so by addressing her husband, "Gye hyiri gu me," "Here is clay; sprinkle it upon me." When the husband initiates the action he does so by means of a legal formula uttered before witnesses including

IV B 1,2,3,4

relatives of both parties: "I have ceased to cohabit with you." He takes clay and sprinkles the woman's shoulders.

Where alleged adultery on the woman's part is the cause of divorce proceedings, the couple often go before a shrine, and she recites the oath:

> Se firi se me ware wo, se obiape me, me yi asumasi,
> nko a obosom nkum me.
>
> Since I mated with you, if anyone with the exception
> of __________ has ever desired me, do you, o god, slay me.

The husband repeats the oath, saying:

> Se obi ape ne oka ho, 'bosom yi nkum no.
>
> If anyone else besides ________ has committed adultery
> with her, may this god kill her.

Both break an egg on the temple wall and eat (Rattray 1927:101).

Social Life among the Ashanti:

Ashanti are expected to observe certain verbal proprieties in their social interaction. Rhetoric is highly valued, not only in roles and situations involving public or official speech, but in daily communication of an informal sort as well. IV A

Each member of the society must be cognizant of the ways by which he is to show respect to others, and one of these is to greet him properly. It is correct to include in greetings a reference to the special spirit of the other's natal day, so that a man born on Friday is met with some allusion to Afi, a mark of honor and a recognition of his good birth under Afi's protection. IV B1,2,3
Any person of rank, all old people, priests, and priestesses, gods, fetishes, and spirits of the dead are addressed as naná, the term specifically used for grandparents by the Ashanti. These persons in return address subjects and followers and suppliants to whom they wish to show special consideration as nána,' the reciprocal for the first term. These practices contrast with those of the linguistically related Nupe, who always address a person of any rank at all by his specific title and by no other term. IV B1, 3

Within the family certain courtesies are observed which often involve verbal etiquette. Grandparents are always treated with great reverence, as the repositories of the ancient wisdom of the Ashanti people, and symbols of descent continuity. Most especially, the mother's mother's brother is rendered particular respect as he is usually the head of the lineage segment. It is not proper for men to associate informally with their mothers-in-law, and although absolute avoidance does not seem to be practiced, there is a great deal of circumspection in their relationships. Ashanti men often engage in mother-in-law jokes and they are frequently heard repeating well-known sayings on the subject as, "Ase fie yenko," "You don't catch us going to mother-in-law's hut," or again, "Be shy of your mother-in-law" (Rattray 1927:99). IV B3

The relationship with one's own mother, however, is very different. There are many sayings and proverbs which express the individual's attachment to his mother and the general importance of mothers in social life. This importance is of course in part a reflection of the whole social organization and the general feeling expressed in the common saying, "Wo na awu a, wo abusua asa," "If your mother dies, you have no lineage kin left" (Fortes 1950:164). For a man, his mother is his most trusted confidant, especially in intimate personal IVB 1,3 matters. He also entrusts weighty matters to his sister, but never to his wife. His affairs concerning property, money, public life, legal suits, and even the future of his ~~children~~ sister, are discussed with his sister, and she keeps the confidence, telling no one of her brother's business. A man also uses his sister as intermediary with a secret love, knowing that she will never betray him to his wife.

Women have a right to express their views on matters pertaining to lineage affairs freely, and no restrictions are placed on their speech at gatherings IVB1,4 devoted to such discussion. Fortes has reported that one of the most popular topics of conversation among modern Ashanti is the resentment felt by members of both sexes and all stations of life toward the restraints and frustrations which they attribute to observance of the rule of matrilineal descent (1949: 75; 1950:258).

Quarrels are a frequent occurrence within Ashanti families. Nearly IVB1,3 all domestic disputes, including differences with fellow villagers who are not members of one's immediate family are almost always settled verbally. Rattray IIIB has described these arguments as "wordy duels" (1929:329), remarking that the Ashanti are not very prone to come to blows. Quarrels between parents are es- IVB1,3 pecially common, often being conducted openly before the children. The idiom by which settlement of such household arguments is known as "kora kora fie, ama efi awo," "repairing the house so that it becomes dry." A house in which the head is troubled is recognized by his "moody silence," and is known as IVA a "wet house" (Rattray 1929:390).

Disputes between children and parents are settled by consultation of the clan elder or head, which usually ends in propitiation of the offended parent(s) if this is necessary to effect a reconciliation. If it is decided that the parent(s) are to blame for the argument, they may be directed to ask forgiveness of the child either directly or through an intermediary. If the party judged to be in the wrong is an older child, he must apologize through an intermediary, particularly if it is his father whom he has offended. In such a case, pacification, including the offering of a sacrifice may be necessary to prevent the father's totem from bringing disaster on the family. IVB1, 3 IVB3

Ashanti commoners have village associations called mmerante which do not hold regular meetings, but discuss all matters of importance with which the elders deal. The mmerante has a recognized leader or spokesman, the Nkwankwaahene, (from "Nkwankwaa," "young men"). This is not a hereditary office. The Nkwankwaahene is chosen by members of the mmerante, and he is selected for his courage and eloquence. Disputes are submitted for his arbitration, and he presents the commoners' views on any important question to the elders. All public opinion and criticism of the government is expressed by the villagers through this spokesman. IVB1 IVA IVB4

As has been noted above, the Ashanti, particularly abhor tale-bearing. They have four terms to express this kind of gossip: Nsekuru, Nkonkonsa, Mpim, and Nkontompo. Rattray reports that the derivations of the latter three terms are obscure, but Nsekuru probably signifies "words that are like a sore" (1929:327). All apply to behavior which constitutes for the Ashanti the most dangerous and mischievous of offences, which could have grave legal consequences when a case concerning gossip is taken to court. Formerly one convicted of tale bearing was exposed to public ridicule, having his face smeared with charcoal, and being compelled to parade through the village holding between his teeth a live fowl and beating a gong. Gossiping about the chief's private IVB3 IVA IIIA affairs, an offence referred to as Nkonkonsa Kesie, was punished by cutting off the lips. There are no exceptions to the Ashanti ban on idle gossip outside the family, and it is understood throughout the society that someone else's business is never one's own. One should consequently remain silent about what he has seen or heard unless it directly affects him or his kindred. Among the admonitions given to a chief on the occasion of his enstoolment, none is more emphatic than the exhortation, "Ntwe nkontompo da," "Never carry tales." IV B 3

According to Rattray (1929:327), the term "nkontompo" is universally rendered into English by native interpreters as "falsehood" or "lie," but the behaviors to which it is said to apply indicate a basic difference between the western notion of "lie," and that of the Ashanti. The term actually appears to have no relationship to truth or falsity, as can be seen by an examination of some examples of nkontompo given by Rattray's informants: IV B 3

> A man is sitting talking to his friend and in the course of the conversation the former remarks that he has paid four pounds for the cloth which he is wearing, whereas he well knows that the price he gave was two pounds. The friend goes off and later the little son of the owner of the cloth goes to the friend and says, 'You know Father only paid two pounds for that cloth.' That boy is a 'liar' (nkontomponi) and his father would beat him and say, 'You have told a lie.' (Rattray 1929:327).

Asked if it was not the father who was the liar, the informant replied, "No, he had not taken any oath." Similarly, a child who reports to his mother the abusive language in which his father speaks of the mother in her absence is a nkontomponi. A slave who notices that his master keeps gold dust in a certain place, and tells others of this is also a nkontomponi. A man who discovers his sister's child to be guilty of two or three such lies sends the children to the chief for punishment. The ordinary punishment is flogging.

There are also other Ashanti words for "falsehood" or "lie," as is evidenced in some of their proverbs concerned with the subject; The popular expression for truthfulness is "woka nkyene," literally "to talk salt," i.e., to speak well and truly. IV B 3

To have a good name is essential to the Ashanti. They are therefore sensitive not only to the gossip and tale-bearing mentioned above, but they IV B 3 are also extremely so to personal invective. Formerly, public ridicule frequently III A drove Ashanti to suicide, and it remains the strongest sanction in Ashanti law. Personal abuse is almost invariably followed by legal proceedings, and a great percentage of quarrels and lawsuits have their bases in this kind of behavior.

The Ashanti have several terms which signify abuse. Ahoya and nkyisem IV B 3 are often used synonymously, the former being translated as "something that makes the body feel sore," the latter as "words said behind the back." Like nkonkonsa, these terms do not include notions of truth or falsity. In fact, as Rattray puts it, "the greater the truth, the greater the libel" of which the abuser might be found guilty (1929:326-327). A third term, atendidie, refers to certain abusive expressions such as:

Kwasea	fool
Kronfo	thief
*wo'ni	your mother
*wo'se	your father
*wo nana	your grandfather
*wo'ni twe ase	the origin of your mother's privates
*wo se twe ase	the origin of your father's privates
*wo 'samanfo mfa ya ti nwe	May your ancestral spirits chew their own heads
*wo 'samanfo mfo ye nankasa	May your ancestral spirits take their bones (and eat them)
*'kwasea 'ba	child of a fool

(Rattray 1929:326-327).

Many expressions of abuse take the form of maledictions directed against IV B 3 the ancestors. These are classified as sins which must be punished by the living, while personal abuse of the living is treated as a tort. Formerly it was a capital offence for a woman to call a man a fool. To abuse or slander a head chief is regarded as a national taboo. One of Rattray's informants recited for him a list of expressions which would constitute such an offence in relation to the chief. These include those marked with an asterisk (*) above. Any of IV B3 these forms of abuse can be implied by closing the hands, placing the closed V D fists together, and holding up the thumbs. Before speaking these expressions the informant said, "sebe," "pardon." He spoke them in an undertone, and snapped IV B3 IV B1 his fingers around his ears during the recitation (Rattray 1919:310).

An exception to the ban on abuse occurs once every year when all Ashanti IV B3,4 men and women have the freedom to say anything at all during the eight-day Apo ceremony. The word "apo" is derived from the root "po" meaning "to speak harshly." The ceremony is also referred to as "Attenie," "to abuse or insult," and "ahorohorua," "to wash." Early in the ceremony, a crier, beating an iron IV B1,2,3 4 gong, goes around the town calling out:

> The chief says that I am to tell you that upon this Apo festival which has come round you are to celebrate it by abusing him. And during this time if any one of you have a cause of quarrel with any one else, or if your friend should seduce your wife, or some one should insult you, and you do not keep your temper, but lodge a complaint, then you are bound by the oath of Wednesday and of Thursday which make you liable to a penalty of ntano. That is the end.

It is permitted to abuse the king as well as anyone else during this period and bands of women sing songs which ridicule and mock various authority figures. After the eight days everyone's spirits are said to be calmed by the cathartic IV B5 effect of the ceremonies.

The Ashanti spend many of their evenings gathered around a fire, reciting IV C1,2, traditional tales. These tales, comprising droll stories, tales with a moral, and just-so stories accounting for physical characteristics of man and beasts, are called Anansesem, after Ananse, the spider, the Ashanti culture hero who is the predominant figure in the tales. These are not to be confused with historical myths, the sacred and carefully preserved possession of a few chosen IV B3,4 elders. The Anansesem may be told only after dark, except at the funeral of IV B4 some famous story-teller. They are preceded with a public disclaimer as to IV B1,2,3 the truth of their content: "We don't really mean to say so...." Subjects' ordinarily sacred in Ashanti culture, such as the sky-god, lesser gods, fetishes, spirit ancestors, the sick, chiefs, and sex, are treated profanely in the tales. They are replete with beasts, birds, fishes and insects, some of which may be interpreted at face value as elements of genuine beast fables. Many, however, represent persons who are for some reason the object of the story-teller's scorn, resentment or ridicule.

IV B1,2,3
III A

These are never selected at random. Each animal or bird used in this context is cleverly chosen for some particular characteristic or set of characteristics thought to reflect the personality of the person thus ridiculed. Frequently story-tellers take the parts of various characters in the tales, evoking much laughter in the audience. Children are permitted to be present at VII B these evening sessions, and etiquette rules governing the behavior of children in the presence of adults are usually relaxed. Thus, children are encouraged to themselves tell stories, and they are listened to by all.

Loans:

Land in Ashanti belongs to the Ashanti nation, interpreted as meaning strictly speaking, the ancestors of the Ashanti people. The chief is the custodian of the land, overseeing the administration of it by individual propertyholders. No individual, including the chief, is free to alienate land at will. A man who finds himself in great debt may mortgage his land, but the act is accompanied IV B1,3 by an offering of wine and vocal prayer to the ancestors. In fact, nearly all borrowing or lending among the Ashanti is surrounded by certain verbal formulae. A borrower is referred to as okafoni, and the lender as osikani. IV B1,2,3, If there is a surety, he is called abasom. In this instance the borrower takes the surety to the lender who speaks and deals with the surety as if he were the principal. The surety is required to swear an oath that he will repay principal and interest on an agreed date. If the creditor ever approaches the borrower directly for his money, the surety says, "Wa hu wo 'kafo, ko gye w'adie," IV B1,2,3,4 "You have seen your debtor; go and receive that which is yours from him." If, after the surety has declared this, the debtor refuses to pay the creditor, the surety will be relieved of his obligation if he swears an oath against the principal, "Me ka ntam se ko yi me abosom," "I speak the forbidden name that you must relieve me of my suretyship."

Another common way of obtaining needed goods or funds among the Ashanti IV B1,2,3,4 is the pawning of goods and persons. The pawning of anything or anyone must always be accomplished in the presence of two witnesses. An example of how this is done is given by Rattray: One man may say to another, "Ntama ni ehye me, gye ai awowa ma me," "Receive from me in pawn this cloth which I am wearing." The man addressed replies, "Ehyia wo miehe?", "How much are you in need of?" The first replies, "Ehyia me sa yi, wo de ma me, se efehyia so, na mennya, fa no tramma," "I am in need of so much; if you give it to me, and if in a year I cannot get the amount (to repay you), then you may buy it outright" (1929:367). If a girl is pawned to her husband by her abusua, her kinsmen must publicly declare the terms of the transaction. Her husband may not address her in public IV B4 as his pawn, nor may he refer to her as a slave, nor maltreat her in any way.

IV B1,23

Sickness

When an Ashanti falls sick the ancestral spirits are propitiated, and one who recovers from an illness expresses his gratitude to them, "me da samanfo ase," "I thank the spirits." If sickness persists, the patient may consult a priest. If the priest feels that there is but little hope for recovery, he will, as the mouthpiece of the god, inform the sick person; "samanfo ye fwe fwe wo," "the spirits of your ancestors are seeking for you." When it becomes clear that the patient is going to die, those watching with him pour a little water down his throat, supposedly at the moment when the soul leaves the body, with these words, "Asumasi se begye nsu yi nom wo kore yi emma asem biara mima ha, na mma ewo efie ha myina nwo mma," "Your clansmen so-and-so and so-and-so say: 'Receive this water and drink, and do not permit any evil thing to come whence you are setting out, and permit all the women of this household to bear children.'" For relatives to omit this rite is a great disgrace.

Death:

As soon as a person dies a loud wailing lamentation is heard in the house IV B1,3 where the death has occurred. The funeral preparations may not be begun until the chief is notified of the death. IV B4 Word is also carried to other communities, summoning friends and relatives to pay homage to the departed. For members of a great family, the first public announcement of death is made by two gun V D IV B3 shots, but this is an honor not accorded most citizens. Actual performance of funeral rites is limited to members of the deceased's abusua and participation in these is held by Ashanti courts to be conclusive proof of such a relationship. Attendance at the funeral ceremonies is, however, open to all friends and ntoro members.

The body of the dead person is laid on its left side, with the hands IV B1,2,3 usually folded against one cheek. The funeral wailing is now begun: "Agya e!" (Alas, Father), or "Pue en'e!" (Alas, Mother), according to the sex of the deceased. Guns are usually fired at this point. Women and girls are expected IV A3 to cry ostentatiously throughout the funeral observances.

Food is prepared and placed before the corpse with the words, "Wo 'kra IV B1,2,3 akoko ni o," "Here is a fowl for your soul." In the meantime a great deal of noise is provided by firing guns, drumming, dancing and singing. There is a presentation of gifts by family and friends, usually accompanied by speeches. The theme of these is: "Let your family have long life and health. May we get money to pay for your funeral. Do not let any of us fall sick. May the women bear children." Rattray remarks that the mourners believe that everything that is said is heard by the dead (1927:158).

Before the coffin is nailed down by the sextons, "dea ote ayi kete so," "He who sits upon the funeral mat," reckons all funeral gifts and informs the corpse of the total contributions. Then one of the family of the deceased steps forward and addresses the dead:

> Today you go. We have fired guns. We have brought sheep. We have brought cloths. We have made a fine funeral. Do not let any one fall ill. Let us get money to pay for the expenses we have made. Let all the mourners have strength. Life to the chief. Let him beget children. Let all be fertile.

At this point the coffin is closed. The head of the deceased's family now steps forward, holding in either hand a branch of summe, touching the coffin with each branch alternately, and saying, "Asumasi me pae wo 'kra ne yen ntem," "So-and-so, I separate your soul from us." IV B 1,2,3

Before the grave is dug a libation is poured on the spot with the words:

> Asase Ya gye nsa nom. Wo nana asumasi na wawu. Ye be sere wo aha abo amena.
>
> Goddess of earth, receive this wine and drink. Your grandchild so-and-so has died. We beg of you that we may here dig a hole.

On the fourth day after death, which is the first after burial, the family return thanks to everyone who has assisted at the funeral. On the fifth day the sora hut, a rough temporary hut, is built on the outskirts of town. The sixth day after the death is called sora da, the day of rising. A rite is performed in front of the sora hut, in which the chief prays:

> Today with the sora rite we finish your funeral. Come and receive this wine and drink and be gone and rest peacefully. Let no one fall ill. Do not let the chief's eyes become covered over. Let the women bear children. Let nothing evil befall. Let us get money to pay the expenses of your funeral.

After the sora rite the mourners proceed to the cemetery where food is offered to the spirit of the dead person. Afterwards the path to the grave is closed off with vines with the words:

> We have finished your funeral rites, we have finished the sora rites, we have closed the path. It is finished.

Weeping and mourning are not permitted at this rite. The seventh day after death is characterized by music, drumming, drinking, dancing, and visiting. Money donations are made, and a messenger periodically circulates through the crowd announcing the size and source of each contribution. IV B 1, 2, 3 IV A 3

The Ashanti term for widows is "kunafo," i.e., those in a state of kuna, widowhood. They practice the levirate, and upon her husband's death the widow becomes the property of his elder brother, or whoever is his heir. A widow who is not taken by her husband's brother considers the brother guilty of defamation of her character, and may demand a public declaration from him to the effect that she had not been the cause of her husband's death. When she is taken by the heir, the following prayer is addressed by him to the spirit of the deceased man before the couple begins cohabitation. Pouring wine upon the

IV B1, 3

ground, he says: IV B1, 3

> Asumasi, ye se adere bu a, ye bo bi poma m;? nne na wo ye' ye de no ama me, me sere wo fwe me ne no so fwe pa. Ma nkoda yi nye yiye ne ma yen someme; ma menwo'ba, bi nka wodie yi ho.
>
> So-and-so, they say that when a cutlass breaks, they put a new shaft to it; today they have taken your wife and given her to me, I beg you to look well after me and her. Let these children prosper and serve me, and let me beget others to add to your own (Rattray 1929:28).

If the deceased husband has no male heir, the widow is required to meet IV B1, 3 with whoever does have the right to inherit his property and with members of her own abusua. She must give to the heir all the gifts she had received from her husband, saying, "fa sie me," "Take, and look after them for me." The heir takes an egg and hands it to the widow, saying, "Swear by my god so-and-so that if you have been unfaithful to your late husband the god may kill you. The widow is expected to take the oath, throwing the egg on the ground as she repeats the formula. She is then free to return to her own family, and to remarry after the one-year interval.

The full funeral rites outlined above are held only for adults. Their IV B5 purpose is to insure that the name of the deceased will be remembered and honored for as long as the abusua exists. No such ceremonies are observed for children who die before reaching puberty. There is a fear among the Ashanti that to accord proper funeral rites to a non-adult might result in the mother becoming sterile. In addition to this fear, there is a fairly general feeling that a pre-pubertal child, whether alive or dead, is harmless and incapable of participating in forces which are either good or evil It is, therefore, not necessary to give a child an elaborate burial.

The Ashanti almost never refer directly to the death of anyone, prefer- IV B3 ring the euphemistic expression "gone elsewhere" to the more literal "died." One who wishes to refer to the death of someone in his abusua says, "Me se bofuo atu," "My hunter's (canine) tooth has come out," i.e., I have lost a clansman. This avoidance of referring to death directly is particularly marked in relation to important personages, for death and a great man's name may never be coupled. Even in pronouncing these euphemisms, the voice is dropped almost to a whisper.

IV B 3

Special Functionaries:

All of the above material pertains specifically to commoners in Ashanti society. There are some modifications which occur in relation to various special functionaries within the nation, and these will now be discussed in the context of the specific role or function with which they are associated.

Priests:

The Ashanti okomfo or priest is a very important figure in the society. Actually this sacred office is open to both men and women, and priests and priestesses share the same two-fold function: 1) to perform sacrifices to the obosom (gods), and 2) to act as their mouthpieces. The latter, oracular IVA.1.
aspect of the priest's function is extremely important, and it is the priest who is usually consulted at times of illness, misfortune, barrenness, etc. This is in marked contrast to the Ga conception of the priest who in their culture, is never the mouthpiece of the gods, is never in a state of possession, and in fact, would be ineligible for the priesthood if he were. The ga, however, do have mouthpieces of the gods in the form of wo'yei, women chosen IVA.1.
and trained very much in the manner of an Ashanti priest. When possessed these women are able to speak languages of which they are ordinarily ignorant, VA1, 3 V B
such as Twi, Adangme, and Ewe.[1] Both priests and priestesses speak of being "wedded to" and consider themselves the spouses of their particular gods.

Most men who become priests do so because of a discovery that they are subject to spirit possession. Possession is the primary requisite for becoming a priest among the Fanti also. This may be either by a deity (obosom), or by the "little people" of the forest (mboatsia), who are probably very similar to Ashanti fairies (mmoatia) which will be discussed below (Christensen 1959:257). There is no indication that any particular characteristic at birth identifies the newborn Ashanti or Fanti as a future priest, as is the case among the Nupe (Nadel 1954:72) and the Yoruba (Bascom 1944:24). In both these societies a child born with a prominent tuft of hair on top of his head is required to become a priest.

The Ashanti priest-candidate usually has an experience in which,

during the course of his daily tasks, or more often while at some religious ceremony, he becomes subject to a sudden convulsive-like seizure, or he goes into a trance. A fully qualified priest or priestess is then called in to interpret the phenomenon, and it is usually attributed to the spirit of a particular god who wishes to marry the person. The subject of the seizures is then usually persuaded to enter and train for the priesthood. The candidate who so chooses enters the service of some full-fledged priest of the particular god whose spirit he has been told has manifested itself in him. He undergoes the skeptical scrutiny of the village headmen and priests, being examined for family background, health, intelligence, aptitude, moral character, and his general knowledge of the requirements of this vocation. If he survives this screening he is pronounced ready for training, and is permitted to make vows to the gods and to the community. He then begins the II B
three-year novitiate incumbent on all candidates for the priesthood. During this time he is forbidden to marry, and if he is already married he must refrain from cohabiting with his wife. If this celibacy vow is violated, the novice must not only offer sacrifice to his own god and that of his priest-mentor, but he must also begin his training all over again. He must observe all the taboos of his god as well as those of his master's god. He is early IV A 3 IV B
taught to remain perfectly silent whenever a shrine is placed on his head, and he is expected to know whenever this silence is required of him.

The novitiate period is divided into three sessions of one year each. II B
During the first year the novice is kept under constant observation by the older priest. He is not told anything very secret, and if he does not prove obedient and attentive to the instructions, his family is informed that he is not likely to make a good priest, and the training will cease. On all the ceremonial days of his god he will sit beside his shrine and strive

to listen to the god's voice. Instruction during the second year includes II B
several admonitions, some of which concern speech. The novice is warned
never to gossip, quarrel, adjure his god to kill anyone, or to attend the IV A 1. IV B 3
chief's court. He is also taught to salute his elders by bending his right IV B 1,3
knee and touching the ground with his right hand. Water-gazing and divining I D
are taught during the third year. At this point the novice learns how to II B
impregnate charms with various spirits, how to hear the voices of the trees,
the stream, and the mmoatia or fairies, and what trees should be greeted, and
in what manner.[2] After the third year, the candidates enters the status I A
of full priesthood after a rite in which he dances all night to the accompaniment of drums and singing. The rite is concluded by the new priest offering IV B 1,3
a sheep to his god and saying:

> Obosom asumasi gye 'gwan yi di, nne na wa ware me
> wa wie; me nsa m'gwan ni, na gyina m'akyi akyigyinapa.
>
> God so-and-so, accept this sheep and eat; today
> you have completed marriage with me; this is a sheep
> from my hands, stand at my back with a good standing.
> (Rattray 1927:47).

During this three-year period, the candidate must also achieve proficiency I A, B
in the ceremonial language spoken by the priests. This has been identified
as an archaic dialect of Twi, but most Ashanti profess not to understand it
(Lystad 1958:171). The priest must also learn the rituals, songs, dances,
drumming, diagnosis of illnesses and prescriptions for cures, and the insight IV B 1
and wisdom to solve personal problems and relieve anxiety for those who come
to him. Above all, he must learn to maintain some sort of control in even
the most excited states. If a priest laughs or even smiles at any incident IV A 3
during a fetish dance, for example, it is said that he is not truly possessed.
He is taught not to speak lightly of a patient's illness, or to suggest that IV B 1,3,4
the sick person might get well. Akesson reports that an informant told him,

that an Ashanti priest must always indicate that the patient's condition is very very grave in words such as, "He will die, but I am going to try." (Akesson 1950:241). IV B1,3,4

When anyone comes to the priest in difficulty he interviews the person, IV B1,2,3,4 discovering, usually indirectly, the nature of the problem, and then interpreting the mind of the god on the matter. The interview is conducted through a spokesman. The Fanti priest, who apparently functions in much the same manner as that of the Ashanti, speaks on such occasions in a gutteral voice to transmit the message from his god, and it is said that this speech is intelligible only to his trained spokesman (Christensen 1959:262).

Although the Yoruba priest acts as intermediary between the gods and men, an actual session in which persons solicit help from him differs somewhat from the Ashanti interview. The session begins with a prayer. Then the Yoruba does not listen for the voice of his god as does the Ashanti priest, but rather interprets the god's will be casting down two chains of palm ker- V D nels and cowries and analyzing the various patterns formed. Each of the two hundred and fifty-six possible positions has a specific meaning which communicates the message of the god to the priest. A similar method is used by the Nupe (J. Clarke 1939:235-236; Paulme 1962:574).

All religious cult among the Ashanti is ultimately bound up with a IV B 3 strong desire for the fertility of man and nature. Prayers almost invariably contain petitions such as "give us children, give us good hunting; give us' a good harvest: (E. Clarke 1930:464). The pantheon includes Nyame, the supreme god, various abosom or gods, samanfo, the ancestral spirits, and numerous suman, a word usually translated "fetish" which includes such things as charms, amulets, talismans, etc. (Rattray 1927:11). According to the creation myth reported by Rattray, the four main abosom are Tano, Bea, Apo, and Bosomtwe, all sons of Nyame who became the principla lakes and rivers of Ashanti. The following are some of the titles by which the Ashanti refer to

Nyame: IV B 3

Onyàmé - "to be satiated"

Onyankòpon - "Great One, Alone

Tweaduampon - "I"lean on a tree and do not fall"

Bore-Bore - "make things"

Otumfo - "power"

Onyankópon Kwame - "That great one who was born on a Saturday"

Odōmankōma - "Inventor"

Ananse Kokorko - "The Great Spider"
(Rattray 1916:19).

The Ashanti do not have a formalized liturgy except the praises and prayers of the songs and the language of the drums. The main features of public worship are changes in the songs and in the drum pieces which correspolnd to changes in the movements of the priests. The gods are said to be sensitive to the language of the music and the Ashanti say that the gods would like to come down and see "their children" if only the music were pleasant to them. It is because of this belief that singers and drummers exert themselves to the utmost at religious ceremonies (Nketia 1963:99). IV B3 V D

Corporate worship normally takes place on dabone (unlucky days), when festivals such as Adae are held, and during annual state festivals such as Odwira, or during special festivals of the gods (Nketia 1963:27). Extraordinary ceremonies or meetings can be arranged for other days, but only when there is a matter of great urgency. During these corporate ceremonies, the activities of worship take the form of a drama with the priests and priestesses filling the most important roles. Periods of drumming and singing are interspersed with brief pauses for rest during which the priests go around shaking hands with the people, and verbally greeting those they cannot reach. IV B1 IV B 3

Individual worship among the Ashanti takes the form of an interview with the priest as described above, for communications of individuals are not readily heard or answered by the gods except through a priest. As in the situation already mentioned, drumming, singing, and dancing are all omitted.

Both corporate and individual worship are offered to the spirits of the ancestors, and these religious activities may involve priests or not, according to circumstances. It is common, for example, for elders to give wine to the ancestors without having a priest to act as intermediary. Frequently at such times the elders pray for whatever they most need, and Rattray points out that formerly their prayer was usually that the members of their households might never say anything that would bring trouble upon them (1929:14). In other instances, a priest is present, particularly when it is desired to interpret the will of the ancestors. Thus a priest who is called in to examine the cause and prognosis of some sickness may be able to communicate with the ancestors and interpret their minds to the patient and his family. In one example of such a case, the priest said that the ancestors of an ill paramount chief were annoyed with the patient because he had been heard to say that he had done more for the stool than they had (Rattray 1923:138).

Doctors:

Although the Ashanti often call in a priest in times of sickness, they IV B 3 do distinguish among the okomfo (priest), the Bonsam 'komfo or Bayi 'komfo (witch-doctor), and the sumankwafo, dunseni, or oduyèfo (all names for "medicine man") (Rattray 1927:39). "Bonsam 'Komfo" and "Bayi 'Komfo" are both translated "priest of witchcraft," "Bonsam" being the term for a male witch, and "obayifo" for a female. This witch doctor is the only one in Ashanti society who can deal with the effects of witchcraft. He uses the techniques of black magic in order to defeat and control evil spirits, usually resorting to indirect methods of treatment which are more oriented toward destruction of the cause of whatever sickness the patient has than merely toward symptomatic treatment. One of the most potent factors with which the witch doctor must contend is the witch's power of verbal command, believed by the Ashanti IV A1 to be tremendously efficacious. Witches can cause striking instances of unnatural phenomena simply by ordering nature to obey, and it is with such phenomena that the witch doctor is frequently called upon to cope.

There is no evidence that such verbal power is attributed to Ga witches, and the Ga conception of the role of speech in witchcraft appears to differ sharply from that of the Ashanti. There is among the Ga much less preoccupation with witches than among the Ashanti, and in fact there is no Ga word IV A1 for witch. The expression commonly used is "aye," a Fanti word. "Aye" is also used by the Ga to refer to people whose extreme cleverness or charm is attributed to some beneficent medicine. In this context the word has no harmfull connotation. If the Ga wish to be exact in describing that quality which is essential to a witch, however, they use the Twi word, "obeye." Manoukian's report (1950) strongly suggests that Ga witches must always do IV A1 IV B 3 something to effect their ends rather than merely say something as the witch may according to the Ashanti belief. The Ga do hold that to curse something

or someone by verbally calling down the destructive activity of some god or IV B 3
spirit may be an efficacious act, and the words themselves may effect the destruction mentioned in the curse. Field reports encountering a witch who claimed to have this power (1937:151). Field remarks, however that it is the woman's obsession with her own power in this matter which marks her as a witch, and not the efficaciousness of her curse, for the Ga do not IV A 1
associate special powers to effect goals verbally with witches.

The medicine man or sumankwafo has a different role from that of the witch doctor. His title means "dealer in suman," the fetishes, charms, etc. mentioned above which are so prominent in the Ashanti religious system. Although it is true that medicine men are well versed in the lore surrounding these suman, there are other branches of knowledge which are equally important for a medicine man if he is to be considered successful. These are indicated by the other two titles accorded the members of this profession: "Dunseni," "worker in roots," and "odu'yfeo," "worker in medicine." These men are required to know the forest and its inhabitants thoroughly and accurately. The botanical and zoological information which they are required to master includes knowledge not only of the names of every tree plant, fern, animal, bird, and insect, but also of the spiritual and healing properties of each. With such requirements associated with the profession, it is not surprising that many medicine men combine their healing services with hunting. Notoriously taciturn in IV A 3
the presence of Europeans, Ashanti medicine men claim to hear and understand the voices of nature in all her manifestations.

A young man who wishes to practice medicine must retire alone into II B
the forest for a considerable period (on the order of forty days and forty nights according to one example), during which he studies nature. He does not inform his friends and relatives of his intentions when he does this,

and is usually given up for dead. Eventually he emerges from his retreat, and he is received as one returned from the dead. He then tells his family and friends that he has not been dead, but merely serving an apprenticeship to become a medicine man under the tutelage of either fairies or forest monsters. There is not a great deal of information concerning these latter, although both Rattray (1927:27) and Masters (1950:216) describe the most prominent monster, Sasabonsam. Covered with long hair, and possessed of large blood-shot eyes, long legs and feet pointing in both directions, Sasabonsam sits in high trees, dangling his legs with which he occasionally snatches up unwary hunters. Hostile to men, and especially to priests, this monster is said to be in league with all workers in black magic, i.e., with all witches and fairies. II B

Fairies, called by the Ashanti, "mmoatia," are little forest people, about one foot in height, and they exist in three varieties: black, red, and white. Their feet point backwards. The mmoatia are said to converse by means of whistling. Rattray points out that whistling is hateful to certain suman (1929:314), but it is not clear whether there is a relationship here. He does report the existence of a whistling language among tribes of the Northern Territories (1927:26). The fairies are useful to men not only because of their ability to instruct him in the art of medicine, but also because they have power to effect the death of one's enemies. Thus a man who is in contact with the mmoatia can use the death suman and invoke their aid in his cause, praying: V D IV B3

> This man __________ has been a man who has been in
> my way in all things. In my journey to happiness
> he has been a stumbling block. Knowing, therefore
> the power of the ancient gods, I appeal to you with
> all sincerity of heart, that you will give me every help
> to overcome this enemy.

Praises of the suman are recited and then the supplicant says:

> You gods, I charge you that tomorrow I will see __________ dead.
> (Masters 1950:224).

The Chief and Officials of his Court:

With regard to the chief and other public officials, there are certain prescribed verbal behaviors which all are required to observe. IV B 3,4 Perhaps the most basic rule is that the chief is never spoken to, nor does he speak to others, directly. All speech is channeled through a spokesman, or okyeame, one of the most important officials in the court.

A chief may never appear in public without his okyeame who repeats what IV B 1,3,4 the chief says to his audience and relays the words of others to the chief. The word okyeame is said to be derived as follows:

kyem - to make perfect, whole, to bring to a finish

ame - slurring of "ma me" - for me

O - abbreviation of "Ono" - he

Okyeame - "He who makes (it) perfect for me" (Danquah 1928:41).

Danquah relates this practice of communicating through a spokesman to the IV A 1 IV B 3 fact that stammering is considered a regal accomplishment, and that most higher chiefs are professional stammerers. In Danquah's view, the spokesman is necessary for intelligibility (1928:41). Rattray, however, suggests that the existence of this particular office is linked rather to such taboos as the one requiring the wives of weavers to address their husbands only through the medium of a child when they are menstruating. This taboo is observed in order to prevent any contagion of the woman's unclean state to the weaver. So, too, Rattray argues, the use of the spokesman as intermediary is to avoid IV A 1 IV B 5 any chance of supernatural contagion or pollution of the chief, a sacred figure, from those with whom he is in verbal contact. Whatever be the origin of this practice, the role of spokesman is present among many Kwa speaking groups. Among the Yoruba, for example, the king usually holds a specially IV A 1-3 prepared cow's tail of spotless white in front of his mouth when speaking, for "it is considered in bad form to see him open his mouth in public."

The tail is also an emblem of peace and grace. The king speaks sotto voce and it is the task of the chief eunuch to repeat his words to the assembly in a loud voice (Parrinder 1950:51). IV B1,2,3,

Ordinarily, at all public assemblies an Ashanti spokesman sits to the right of his chief. He must never remain seated when speaking in public except when someone other than the chief is addressing him. It is not always necessary for the spokesman to repeat an entire utterance of the chief word by word, particularly if the speech is long. In such cases, the spokesman, who stands with the gold or silver cane which is the symbol of his office in his hand while the chief speaks, concludes by saying, "Se ohene se ni," "So says the king." Frequently, however, the spokesman speaks much more extensively, and although he is forbidden to add fresh matter to the chief's words, he may enlarge upon certain phrases and reconstruct the sentences, interspersing the speech "with some of the celebrated witty and philosophical reflections for which they are justly celebrated to the credit of both himself and his chief" (Danquah 1928:42). The spokesman who is considered accomplished in his role is not only adept at the art of rhetoric, but he exhibits a mastery over gesture and a thorough knowledge of the whole history and all the proverbs of the particular clan he represents as well. He is an expert on court etiquette, and may even be called upon to instruct a new chief or king.

IV A 3
IV B1,2,3,
IV B5
IV A4
I D
IV B3

When duly authorized, an okyeame may represent his chief and act for him as plenipotentiary or legate. Some are empowered to give expression to the chief's views at any time or place. Because of the high intelligence required of spokesmen, they are regarded as the chief's private advisers and counsellors. So important is this advisory function of the spokesman that the success or failure of any government is generally attributed to him rather than to the chief, as is indicated in the popular proverb: "Kuro ebo a, efiri 'kyeame, Kuru gyina a, efiri 'Kyeame," "If a town becomes broken, IV B5 it is the fault of the okyeame; if a town stands, it is due to the okyeame" (Rattray 1927:277). The Fanti, among whom the spokesman has a similarly significant role, have a proverb very like that of the Ashanti: "There are no bad chiefs, only bad okyeame" (Christensen 1954:32). The Ga also have spokesmen for every official and group, but they consider the office to be only a junior one. Although they are chosen for their fluency, accuracy, and tact, spokesmen never assume the importance among the Ga which is given them by the Ashanti (Manoukian 1950:83). IV A 1

Besides the spokesmen there are a few other official members of the chief's household whose functions are largely defined in relation to verbal matters. The first of these, the esen or herald, is charged with the duty of maintaining order in any assembly or tribunal, or in any gathering in which the chief who appointed him is present. Just as a chief never travels without his spokesmen, so too, a spokesman never goes anywhere without heralds. IV B5

In the days when Ashanti was a war-like nation, heralds were frequently used as spies, or sent as their master's envoys when war seemed imminent. In this latter capacity they would deliver the master's terms to the enemy. In keeping with their duty to maintain order in assemblies, heralds often punctuate the remarks of judges and witnesses in court with cries of "Tie! Tie! Yentie!odedewi," "Listen ! Listen! Let us listen! Too much noise!" (Rattray 1927:279). In addition to these rather serious functions, the role of the herald has its lighter aspects. As the more or less official court jesters among the Ashanti, heralds are privileged to say very much what they like to their masters. They are the only men other than eunuchs permitted near the king's harem because of their special status. The king of Ashanti in fact refers to his heralds as his wives (Rattray 1927:279). IV B1,3,5

The other officials to be mentioned here are the kwadwumfo, two minstrels who on all state occasions drone in nasal tones the names and deeds of dead IV B1,3 kings and queens as far back as tradition has a record directly into the ears of the presiding chief. He listens as they sing, and it is said that his heart fills with sadness for the dead as he hears their deeds recounted. These eulogies and condolences are set pieces, but the minstrels are free to develop various manners of delivery and a high value is placed on a distinct and eloquent presentation. According to Danquah, each minstrel holds his mouth or jaw between the index finger and thumb of his left hand as he recites the traditional accounts (1928:55). IV B1,3

It appears that the counterparts of the Ashanti minstrels among the Yoruba are the Arokins, who repeat daily in songs the genealogies of kings, and the principal events in Yoruba history, covering approximately the same subject matter as the kwadwumfo (Johnson 1921: 58). IV B 3

Anyone who is responsible for recounting Ashanti tribal lore is required to keep in his head an accurate record of names and events in correct chronological order. Recitation at the various rites and ceremonies must be word perfect, and penalties for errors are very severe. If a chief is recounting past events in which his ancestors participated, he speaks in the first person, as if he himself had played the role he is describing. IV B 3

When a new chief is enstooled, the elders join in warning him through a spokesman, against misrule. Many of their admonitions touch on his verbal behavior: IV B1,3

Ka kyere se	Tell him that:
Yempe Asekyere	We do not wish that he should disclose the origins of any person.
Yempe Atendidie	We do not wish that he should curse us.
Yempe Asodine	We do not wish that his ears should be hard of hearing.
Yempe Kwaseabuo	We do not wish that he should call people fools.
Yempe Apo	We do not wish personal abuse.

Yempe Popo	We do not wish personal violence (Rattray 1929:82).

The chief responds from time to time, "Ma te," "I have heard." This response is the basis for a common saying all over Ashanti:

> Ma te, ma te, yamfa nyo ahenie
> Ma te, ma te, yemfa mmu man.
>
> I have heard, I have heard, does not alone make
> a good ruler (Rattray 1929:253).

Further advice concerning the new chief's future mode of life is given by the queen mother.

Religious Function:

The chief, as occupant of the ancestral stool of the Ashanti nation is a sacred person whose function is of a markedly religious nature. He is in fact, the central figure in many of the organized religious observances, such as the Adae ceremony. The term "Adae" means a place of rest, or lying down, and is applied to those rites which propitiate the spirits of departed rulers, recalling their names and deeds, soliciting favors and mercy. During the ceremony, which takes place every forty-three days, there is a taboo on speaking bad news of any sort to the chief. Violation of this taboo was formerly punished by death (Rattray 1923:103). IV B1 IV B3

Whenever the chief speaks or prays aloud during this or any religious ceremony, his speech is punctuated by deep-voiced exclamations of "Yo!" by the spokesman, and shrill cries of "Tie!" by the herald. When he offers meat to the ancestral spirits during the Adae, a bell is rung to announce that the ancestors are eating, or are about to eat. IV B1, 3 IV B3 V D

At one point during the Adae the chief withdraws to change his clothes and the interval, which may last about forty-five minutes, is filled by an experienced drummer telling the history of the particular division on his two ntumpane or talking drums. When the chief reappears he is closely V D followed by his two minstrels, who drone traditional history into his ear. As soon as he seats himself the talking drums beat out, "The king has sat down, the destroyer of towns has sat himself down..." (Rattray 1923: 104). IV B1, 3 V D

Each sub-chief present pays individual homage to the chief, bowing low before him and saying, "Grandfather, good morning." The chief does not respond verbally to these greetings, although he does acknowledge them with a very slight inclination of his head. Rum and whiskey are then served to everyone, and finally all give thanks to the chief, signalling the end of the rite. IV B1, 3

Secular Function:

Besides the religious aspect of his office, however, the chief of course has several functions of a more secular nature. In former times, when warfare was prevalent, not least of these functions was the chief's military role. He was ultimately in charge of all military operations, and it was to him that the generals swore their oaths on the evening before any campaign: IV B 1, 3

> Me ka ________ me ka ntam kesie, osa yi wa yi me se menkoro yi, se me ko na se me de m'akyi kyere dom, se me soma korabo na se wanko na se manfa ho, na se me ko guane, ya me to ntam kesie me to __________.
>
> I speak the forbidden name of ________. I speak the great forbidden name that, if I do not go to this war on which you have sent me forth, or if I go and show my back to the enemy, if I send a bullet and it falls short, and I do not follow it, and if I run away,

> then have I violated the great forbidden word, then
> have I violated the great forbidden name of ________
> (Rattray 1929:123). IV B1, 3

For those fighting in a military campaign there was a general immunity from all usual consequences of swearing oaths. Anyone might use these oaths freely, even frivolously, without incurring any legal penalty. In speaking of this immunity, the Ashanti say:

> Ye ko osa, na ya bra ntam nsem nni.
> When we go to war, we prohibit the investigation
> of any case arising out of the swearing of an oath.
>
> Ya hine Asante Hene ntam adaka.
> We have closed the oath chest of the King of Ashanti.
> (Rattray 1929:123).

Oaths:

It is clear from the number and variety of occasions on which the Ashanti speak of swearing an oath that this verbal form has particular significance for them. As much of the litigation over which the chief presides is connected with this special place of oaths in Ashanti ideology, it is a matter which should perhaps be discussed before the judicial and legislative functions of the chief are described. IV B3

Oaths among the Ashanti have reference to some misfortune or disaster that, according to tradition, occurred at some point in the past of the Ashanti nation. Each elder and chief, and most government and court officials have their own. In the case of a lineage elder, for example, his oath would usually be concerned with the death, disease, or bodily deformity or mutilation of an ancestor. It is strictly taboo to allude to any of these misfortunes because the ancestors become annoyed or grieved by the memory of them, and also because use of the oath might cause the same disaster to recur. Tradition records that one of the first subjects to become a national taboo was the death of Osai Tutu, a great Ashanti king who was killed in battle on IV B3 IV B4 IV A1 IV B5 a Saturday around 1730. Like many of the oaths, this one has become the mere mentioning of the day of the week on which the incident is alleged to have occurred. Thus it is forbidden to mention in the form of an oath the word "memeneda," "Saturday." Another circumlocution for this event is the term "ntam kese," the "great oath." Thus it is forbidden to say, "Meka ntam kese," "I say the great oath," as this is understood to refer to the death of Osai Tutu. IV B 3,4

The etymology of the word "ntam" is not clear, but the expression "ka ntam" is always translated, "to swear an oath." Rattray suggests that the root of ntam may be from "tam," "something heavy or difficulty," or from "tan" "to hate." He notes that there appears to be some historical evidence for the latter derivation (1927:215).

Most of the tabooed words are restricted to events in which disasters have occurred to male rulers or warriors. There is one equivalent in the female line, however, in the queen mother's oath, "Me ka nana yafunu," "I mention ~~the~~ grandmother's belly." (Rattray 1927:213).

In order to bring a private disagreement under the jurisdiction of a central authority, the one who desires his cause to be thus examined swears an oath in the presence of a third person. The party with whom he differs responds by swearing in defence of his claim. The third party then arrests both of them. IV B 1,2,3, 5

In general the oaths may be divided into three main kinds: 10 Fetish oath, "dua-bo," the personal oath of a commoner; 2) The Chief's oath, "brepo," or "nhyira;" and 3) The national oath, "Okyenhene ntam." The fetish oath is sworn by invoking the wrath of a fetish either on one's own life or on that of another. It is revoked by striking stone or wood on the ground, saying, "Anokye koko twea," "Anokye fetish, take away the curse." A person IV B 3 must always be present when another swears an oath against him, as is IV B 3,4 pointed out in the popular saying, "Obi nka ntam ngu obrane atiko," "One does not swear an oath at the back of a man's head." The fetish oath is not usually a sufficient condition for initiating the action of the courts, but it is required of anyone giving evidence in court cases. In these instances IV B1,2,3 the spokesman administers the fetish oath in the following formulary:

> Ka Wukuda ne Kwanyako, na fre Anokye di nse
> se wobe kã nokware (wo asem yi mu).
>
> Be sworn by Wukuda and Kwanyako oath, and
> invoke Anokye against your life that you
> will speak the truth (in the present cause).

The witness raises his right hand and says:

> Me kã Wukuda ne Kwanyako se meka nea menim,
> se mankã nokware a Anokye nkru me.
>
> I swear by Wukuda and Kwanyako oath that I
> shall say what I know, if I do not speak the
> truth may Anokye kill me (Danquah 1928:71).

Certain classes of people, i.e., all those whose positions are such that they are considered sacred persons, are exempt from taking fetish oath. If any of these are found guilty of giving false evidence, they are liable to be destooled.

A chief's oath consists in the invocation of the penal wrath of a IV B1,2,3,5 fetish on the life of the chief. It may be sworn when the complainant in a dispute finds himself incapable of obtaining immediate judicial action from the parties whose duty it is to assist him in that respect. It is also used when one party to a disagreement not yet before the court wishes to press on his adversary the justice of his claim. If the person swearing the oath directly mentions the official name of the chief whose life he is invoking into the power of the fetish as well as the name of the particular fetish he is conjuring, the oath is known as "asita," or "direct brepo." The word, "brepo," signifies "the oath of the solemn palm leaf," referring to the old custom of solemnly hanging palm leaves on the streets and public places whenever any grave event affecting the State or an important chief occurred (Danquah 1928:74-75). The person who has used direct brepo is said to have "sii asita," "sworn in the bold, direct manner," or to have "ode ne ti opemdan," "bumped his head against the wall." The advantage to direct brepo is that it results in immediate action taken against the person who has thus sworn, but its great seriousness and the almost unlimited expense to which it often leads constitute important disadvantages. IV B1,2,3

The most serious oath which an Ashanti can swear is the Great Oath of Osai Tutu mentioned above. When this oath is sworn, the case must be heard by a paramount chief. If it is desired to appeal the decision of one court before a higher tribunal, the dissatisfied party against whom judgement has been found appeals against the spokesman of the lower court who has delivered the verdict against him. He does this by coupling the spokesman's name with another and greater calamity associated with some higher chief. This necessitates a reopening of the case before the higher court, in which the place of the original litigant, in whose favor judgement had been given, was formerly taken by the okyeame who had given that judgement (Rattray 1927:213). IV B1,2,3,5

The place in which an oath is sworn always determines venue of trial. In general, these oaths which initiate court proceedings are used somewhat sparingly, because they always entail some expense. Whether the person who has sworn the oath is found innocent or guilty, he will incur some debt for the use of the oath, which constitutes a transgression of a tribal taboo. The Ashanti attitude toward this is expressed in a native proverb, "The chief's oath is like the hole in which yam is planted; no one falls into it and comes out scot-free" (Busia 1951 ~~1963:~~161). IV A1

The use of these forbidden words in oath form is clearly restricted IV B3,4 to cases of a serious nature. It is strictly forbidden to use them in any quarrel over trivial matters. If it can be proved that a man is under the influence of drink when he breaks these taboos, he may be excused from the penalties which would ordinarily result. There is also a widespread tolerance of breaches of this taboo by children. IV 153,4

Judicial and Legislative Functions:

The major decisions of chiefs and elders are submitted to a full Council. New legislation which grows out of such meetings is proclaimed throughout a division by the stool heralds. Such edicts are always made public late in the evening when everyone would have returned from forest or farm. Attention is first arrested by the musical sound of the odawuru, an elongated bell-shaped gong typical of West Africa. Then the herald announces the new law. Yoruba edicts are promulgated in a similar manner (Ajisafe 1924:22). IV B 1,2,3

Violations of law and other offences categorized as oman akyiwade, i.e., behavior which is said to be the concern of some central authority because of its serious nature, are dealt with at the Asenii, or place of palaver, of the elders, or at the chief's court. There are three main processes by means of which an action may be commenced:

1) the oath, which has already been discussed.
2) Procedure by summons;
3) Amanenya, criminal cases.

In the case of a summons, one person having a grievance against another verbally lodges his claim with a chief or other elder having some for of jurisdiction over both of them. A small fee is paid by the claimant to the chief who then sends for the defendant and informs him of the plaintiff's claim. When this happens, the plaintiff is said to have "wofre no wo mpanin anim," which is translated as, "called IV B 1,2 the other party before the elders." This mode of procedure generally avoids the inevitable hostility which is always connected with an action commenced by an oath (Danquah 1928:83). IV B1,2

The actual process of arrest connected with the summons is always conducted in terms of set forms. The chief dispatching a state messenger to arrest someone provides him with a state emblem and issues his instructions to him through a spokesman in words such as the following:

> Mate se Kwaku Kuma Akoton Amanyakwon asase
> a minnim ho fwe, enti kokyere no bre me/ IV B 3
>
> Information has reached me that Kwaku Kuma has sold stool land attached to the town of Manya without my knowledge and consent. Therefore, I hereby order you to arrest and bring him to me" (Danquah 1928:90).

Within the court situation itself only the queen mother may rebuke the chief, spokesmen, or the councillors, address the court on her own initiative, or question the litigants. All petitions for pardon or mitigation of sentences are addressed to her. A chief speaking in court may never be contradicted, even through the spokesman. Consequently, the chief should never speak hastily, but should first deliberate, then say whatever he wishes to say without repeating it. "Ka preko," "Say once" is a common title for a chief (Rattray 1929:87-88). IV B1,4 IV B 3,4

Witnesses are usually called in to testify, although it is not ordinarily taken for granted that they will be truthful while giving testimony. It is believed, however, that the witness who deliberately lies will be punished by the gods on whom he has sworn to speak the truth. The Ashanti proverb, "Odanseni owu n'afu," "A witness dies because of his belly," signifies that a witness who has lied for some bribe will surely be killed in this way. IV B1,3 IV A 1

if any witness dies soon after testifying, an obosom, god, will be consulted. IV A 1
If this god declares through his priest that the man's death is due to his
having given false evidence on oath his body is thrown into the bush, his
property confiscated by the chief and the priest, and the original judgement
is reversed if possible. In spite of this general suspicion of the witness' IV A 1
veracity, women on the witness stand are given a great deal of credence. IV B1
Danquah reports that formerly in cases of misconduct a woman's evidence was
scarcely rebuttable (1928:92).

In all courts of justice, oratory is carried to a remarkable pitch, IV A 3
and witnesses are frequently as proficient in this as are other members of IV B 1, 3
the court. It is common for them, even if they are young boys of only eight
or ten years of age, to address the jury in an able, self-assured manner.

For an Ashanti to proclaim in public "Menni di bio," "I shall not eat IV A 1
again," is sufficient evidence to cause him to be arraigned before his chief
on a murder charge. Such a person indicates that he is either contemplating IV B 3
murder or is intending to "bless" the chief, a euphemism for cursing the chief.
In former times he would probably be killed, for as the Ashanti say, "NNipa
bone yenkora no," "We do not treasure up a wicked man." A suicide is treated
in the same manner as a murderer, if the act has been committed out of a desire
to escape punishment for wrongdoing. The body of the suicide is made to stand
trial, and if no motive for the suicide is known, it is presumed that the person
had evil intentions. The spokesman addresses the chief, pointing to the body:

> This is your slave. No one knows what he had done, and today he has hanged himself.

Then, turning to the corpse, he says:

> No man knows a single thing that came into your head, but, because you did not bring your case here that we might take good ears to hear it, but took a club and struck the Akyeame -- and when you kill us (thus) you regard us as brute beasts --therefore you are guilty.

A similar formula is followed if the suicide is known to have been guilty of murder. (Rattray 1929:300). IV B 3

When a person is to be executed, a small knife is driven through his cheeks and tongue to prevent him from cursing the king (Rattray 1923:160). The crime of cursing the king is traditionally a capital offence for the Ashanti, and it is generally regarded as one of the most terrible sins of which an Ashanti can be guilty. Although a form of cursing which is apparently not taken too seriously between commoners does exist, it takes on a wholly different character in relation to the king. This offence consists in the invocation of some spiritual power to kill the king, and is never referred to except euphemistically, for the mere mention of cursing coupled with the king's name is dangerous. It is euphemistically called "hyira ohene," "blessing the king." Other expressions which also signify cursing the king are: IV B3

Bo ohene dua - clubbing the chief

Wa sebiribi - he has said something

Wa de na nsa si fam - he has placed his hand against the ground.

Destoolment:

Any subject may lay a complaint before one of the elders regarding the chief's conduct, and if the complaint is well-founded, the elders inform the chief and he is publicly admonished, and if necessary, fined. He is warned that for a second offence he is liable to be destooled, and the queen mother is also told to admonish him. Busia cites actual instances of destoolments which have occurred variously because of the chief's drunkenness, gluttony, illicit dealings with charms and poisons, abusiveness, excessive cruelty, and constant reproach of his subjects with reminders of their slave ancestry (1951:21-22). If a chief is found guilty of a second offence, the elders report the matter to the Asnatehene who may intercede for the chief, and pos- IV B1, 3

sibly obtain pardon for him. At a third offence the elders again resort IV B1,3
to the Asantehene who must then send for the chief, disguising the reason
for the summons. The elders make the public accusation only after the chief
has arrived. Destoolment is always accompanied by insults, verbal abuse IV B1,2,
and even physical violence. Some common expressions for the procedure are:

> Ya bo no pome
> They beat him, bump!
>
> Ya fwen ne to akonnua.
> They drag his buttocks from the stool
>
> Ya tu no adie so, or akonmua so
> They take him off the thing, off the stool.

The ancestral spirits are immediately informed in the following formula:

> Wo nana asumasi a ye ma no tena nwokyiri, wa
> ye sa yi, wa ye sa yi, mi ye tu no so, nwomoa
> yen, na yempe nnipa papa na oma nwo biribi nni.
>
> Your grandchild so-and-so, whom we caused to stand
> behind you, has done such-and-such, and such-and-such
> things; in consequence, we have removed him; you must
> help us to seek for a good man that he may give you
> something to eat. (Rattray 1929:146).

Death and Funeral:

When the king is grievously ill no one dares to say that death is im- IV B1,3
minent. Euphemistic allusions are made to this in such expressions as,
"The house is going to fall," or "The great tree is going to be uprooted."
When the king dies aperede drums are beaten incessantly for eight days and I D
nights. In former times when the king's wives were sacrificed at the time IV B1,2,3
of his funeral, they were summoned for this purpose with the rather enigmatic
command, "I bid you set out for a certain place." Their answer would be,
"I have heard Akoranto (the title for any descendant of Osai Tutu)." Besides
those who had no option, freedmen, and sometimes slaves would frequently

volunteer for death by saying, "I am hungry." They would encourage a reluctant executioner by urging him, "I swear the great oath that you must kill me that I and my master may set out, and I am hungry" Rattray (1927:109). IV B1,2,3

At the funeral itself, a volley of guns are discharged, the reason for this being, according to Busia, the desire to impress all present with the esteem in which the dead person had been held, and with the piety of his kinsfolk (1951:95-96). While mourners are keeping vigil by the body, messengers come and go, bending over the corpse, whispering imaginary intelligence into its ear and receiving orders which they rush off, pretending to obey. After a ceremonial feast, the elders advance one by one and standing before their dead master, naked to the waist, each unsheathes his ceremonial sword and swears an oath: IV B3 IV D IV B1,2,3

> Me ka Yaoada, me ka ntam kesie; se nyo Odomankoma Owuo
> na abe fa wo, na se dom ano na wufiri mu se yie nankra
> se' man yansa ha; ya me ka ntam kesie, me ka Yaoada.
>
> I speak the forbidden name of Thursday, I mention the
> great forbidden word, and say that had it not been
> the Creator's Death who came and took you away, but
> had it been in the mouth of battle that you went forth
> like this, and had I and this tribe not perished there
> with you, then had I violated the great forbidden word,
> then had I violated the forbidden name of Thursday
> (Rattray 1929:83).

The skeletons of the following kings are preserved in a mausoleum at Bantama: Osai Tutu, Opoku "Ware, Osai Kojo, Opoku Fofie, Bonsu Panyin, Osai Yao, Kwaku Dua, and Kwaku Dua II. Each has its own saman yere, i.e. wife of the ghost. These women had never been wives of the kings during the king's lifetime, but they are chosen from certain families[2] to minister perpetually to the supposed wants of respective skeleton spouses. Each is wedded to a ghost for life, and when she dies, her place is immediately filled by another. No one, not even the reigning king of Ashanti is permitted to

speak with these women. Should they ever have occasion to leave the pre- IV B4
cincts of the mausoleum, they are preceeded by boys carrying whips who con- IV B1, 3
tinually shout, "fwe! fwe!," "look out! look out!:. Anyone who sees these
women approaching must kneel down and cover his head with a cloth.

Special Codes:

In addition to the communicative codes used by the Ashanti in daily intercourse which have already been discussed, there are other codes of a more specialized nature which come into play under certain kinds of conditions. One of the most important of these is the musical code which is sometimes heard as an independent non-verbal medium, and sometimes in connection with the verbal code in the form of songs. Lystad has pointed out the popularity of strongly rhythmic chants which are often sung while the Ashanti are working (1958:192). Songs are sung on almost any occasion of communal activity and are especially common at team games (Lystad 1958:152). This is also true of the Nupe, who ordinarily begin all songs with some well-known proverb (Nadel 1942:395). Popular bands, combining singing and drumming are important. They are employed most frequently to play during ordinary recreational situations, independently of public celebrations. IV B 3

The most important musical form which constitutes a communicative code, I D however, is drumming, supplemented by horn calls. Although Rattray insists that drums are not used by the Ashanti for signalling, but rather as a speech surrogate constituted by a verbally-derived code (1916:134), Nketia states that this type of drumming is only one of three modes commonly used (1963:17). Drums, according to Nketia, may be used for: 1) signalling; 2) communicating linguistic messages; and 3) accompaniment for dancing. All three are important, and although the second mode is perhaps the most striking to the western observer, the other two cannot be ignored. Danquah notes that the Ashanti have specific drum music for various occasions and situations, for example, war, peace, praise, condolence, glad tidings, funerals, earthquakes, and eclipses. He also reports that drum music exists for "all natural phenomena" and "every emotion" (1928:54).

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Drums are an integral part of public worship and constitute a portion of the means by which links are established between priests and spiritual beings, and between priests and devotees. They must be used for summoning judiciary meetings or any assemblies convened for the settlement of urgent transactions. Certain drums are set aside as tribunal drums so that whenever they are beaten, everyone knows that court will be in session. In this case each tribunal drum beats out three calls, each of about one minute's duration, with an interval of about one hour between calls (Nketia 1962:123). It is not clear whether these calls are verbally derived, having semantic content, or whether they are merely signals without such derivation or content.

The various drumming patterns are formed by utilization of one or more of a range of intensity differences, duration differences, and/or tone differences. Contrasts such as low pitch versus high or intermediary pitches, light sound versus clear or imitative tones, are all called into play. Differences are dictated by the need for a variety of sounds to which functions of a musical or social importance can be assigned. A tonal classification of the most common Ashanti drums may be found in Table 1.

Drums are not themselves objects of worship, although they are offered libations and they carry prohibitions because they are repositories of the spirit of the wood from which they are made, and carry associations with the ancestor drummers. For these reasons drummers usually begin a performance with invocations to the spirit of the wood and to any spirits capable of interfering with their work, including especially, those of former drummers. In one of these drum preludes, "the Awakening," the drummer addresses the various materials of which the instrument is made:

TABLE 1 TONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DRUMS

Imitative	Low and Heavy	Moderately Low	Intermediate (dull)	Intermediate (bright)	High
ETWIE (snarl of leopard)	bommaa (also called from, add twenekesee)	atumpan (standard size)	petia	operenten apentemma	akukua akukuadwo ose (also called apirede)
aburukuwa (bird)	byamadudu	mpintintoa	nkrawiri kusukurum	mpebi asafotwene	aburukuwa adedemma
akukuadwo (clockObird)			(master drum of apirede)	donno (also called nnonka)	pasoo

(After Nketia 1963:177).

As a rule, women have nothing to do with drums. As mentioned above in the section on puberty, however, they do play the dono drums at the girls' puberty rites. This is contrasted by the Nupe custom of permitting women to play crums on an equal basis with men.

All important Ashanti chiefs have special drum music which is played for them on state occasions. Much of this music is provided by drums which are kept in the chief's palace and regarded as part of the stool regalia (Nketia 1963:19). Similarly, among the Nupe, there are special drum rhythms and songs linked with certain noble families and important officials. As soon as a family or a man comes to power, the drummers supply him with a musical salute (Nadel 1942:130). The Ashanti are much more exclusive than the Nupe in the number of people for whom special drum music is provided. They specifically prohibit village headmen from having drums, reserving this right for paramount chiefs only.

The general term "'twene" is sometimes applied to all drums, although each specific type has its own peculiàr name and taboo. With the exception of the etwie drum, which is played by rubbing the drum head with a stick, all drums are played by making an impact on the drumhead. The technique by which this is done varies according to the drum and mode in use. Four different methods are employed. The hand technique enables the drummer to vary the tone quality and pitches of the drum by using various parts and shapes of the hand, such as the base of the palm, the palm, the fingers, etc. The stick-and-hand technique entails use of a stick in the right hand while the left hand is used either to mute the beat of the stick, or to strike a note. The third technique, restricted to the hourglass drum, is the stick-and-armpit-control technique. The drum is held in one armpit and is hit by a stick held in the free hand.[2] The fourth technique, the stick technique, is for the Ashanti the most important of the four. Usually two sticks are used.

Drum signals are usually produced by the stick technique. Those drum sounds which constitute "talking" may be made by all four techniques. Each technique has its own peculiar set of advantages. The hand technique is good for producing a wider range of pitches on the same drum than is possible with any of the other methods, but the stick technique produces sounds which carry farther. There is a prescribed technique for each drum, and the drummer is expected to use that technique and exploit its possibilities (Nketia 1963: 18-20). A classification of drums by technique appears in Table 2.

The mode of playing the talking drums is characterized by a steady flow of beats, often lacking regularity in phrasing, but distributed within a framework of two tones. The rhythms are played in groups which are separated from each other by pauses of longer duration than they contain within themselves. The atumpan is considered to be the principal talking drum by the Ashanti. (Nketia 1963:28-29). All talking drums belong to the chief, and are housed in a special room in the chief's house. They are used to communicate many different kinds of messages by means of a verbally-derived code based on a direct transfer of the spoken language elements such as tone and some phonetic features into a musical medium. This constitutes what Rattray has called a "tympanophonetic" as opposed to a "tympanosemantic" means of communication (1923:243). Tones, accent, stress, pauses, speed, and variation between loudness and softness which represents the gestural accompaniment to speech are all employed to transform Twi effectively into a drum dialect. Rattray reports that the drummers themselves say they use only two tones: the low, or male tone, and the high, or female tone (1923:248).'

Although many Kwa-speakers and related groups of the Guinea Coast have talking drums, each group does not always translate the drum code into its own language or dialect. For example, the Ewe of Togo, who learned this mode of communication from their Twi neighbors, do not transpose the code into Ewe, but rather, drum Twi (Herzog 1945:217). The ultimate goal in all of

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TABLE 2 CLASSIFICATION OF DRUMS BY TECHNIQUE

	Hand	Stick and Hand		Armpit Control	Stick Only
DRUM	apentemma	brenko	(minor fontomfrom drum)	donno	from (also called bommaa)
	operenten	apentemma	(minor fontomfrom drum)		atumpan
	awaa drum mpintintoa	asafotwene			apedemna pasoo akukuadwo nkrawiri mpebi kantamanto petia, etc.

(After Nketia 1963:177).

this use of talking drums is always communication of a verbal type. V D The requirements of intelligibility call for employment of poetic forms in the transmission of messages by drums. Many of the stems used in Twi are monosyllabic, and the bare occurrence of a single beat could therefore mean any number of things. Because of this the context of the word is expanded with paraphrastic formulae such as proverbs or honorary titles which characterize various persons or animals, etc. Thus it is not a single beat, but a particular rhythmic and melodic motif which identifies the subject.

Rattray has described the various classes of messages which are ordinarily transmitted by the Ashanti drummer. These include the names and deeds of each king or chief who has occupied the tribal stool for as far back as tradition remembers, the messages addressed to the various materials of which the drum is made, the best known proverbs, any alarms, especially if there is a fire, and war messages. These war messages are always insulting communications to the enemy, and never include instructional or other informational matters for the Ashanti themselves. V D IV B3 The talking drums may also be used to announce the death of a chief, but this mode is never used to announce the death of a commoner. In all great calamities the drummer of the talking drums is expected to be at his post throughout the duration of the calamity for the purpose of expressing in song the feelings of the king and the people, and to invoke the sympathy of the ancestors. On such occasions, the talking drums are played alone without any kind of accompaniment.

In spite of the elaboration of the drum code, it is not easy to understand without some study. In practice, both sender and receiver should have some familiarity with the phrases drummed (Rattray 1923:257). IV D

When the drums are used for signalling, they are played in short, repetetive rhythms or in a broken series of beats played at one level of pitch. The Ashanti refer to such drumming as "short drumming" (Nketia 1963:27). One example of such signalling is the adidi 'twene, the dinner drum played at midday when any one might enter the palace and eat. The recipients of this hospitality simply go to the palace when they hear the drum, and they need not even thank their host unless they are given palm wine. IV D IV B 3

Drums used as accompaniment for dancing include talking drums on which texts concerning any of four set subjects may be drummed at dances and festivals. These include: 1) Invocations to spirits, creatures, deities, and ancestors; 2) panegyrics or eulogies; 3) greetings, warnings, congratulations, emergencies, announcements; and 4) proverbs. All of these texts are traditional, but for the listener, the ability to appreciate the music of the drum and to make the appropriate bodily movements or other responses counts far more than ability to translate, though enjoyment and participation are enhanced if this too is possible (Nketia 1963:48-49). IV D

At all state celebrations there are open dances at which the spectators shout out encouragement and congratulations to the dancers with outstretched arms. All the fingess of the cheering spectators are clenched in this gesture of encouragement except the forefinger and middle finger. Whenever a new individual steps into the dancing ring, he is announced on the drums. The greatest moment occurs when the chief steps into the ring. The talking drums' welcome him with praise and a warning to others to make way. For effective use of the drums on such state occasions, court drummers are specially appointed. The drummers themselves are organized into groups, each specializing in the music of one set of drums. State drumming is the peak of all drumming in IV B1,3 IV D the Ashanti community, and some of the best and most complex forms of drumming are heard on state occasions (Nketia 1963:151).

IV B1
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Drummers participate in an annual drum festival always held a fortnight before the Odwira Ceremony. At this time the young drummers who have hitherto been receiving private training are brought to the drumhouse for practical lessons. At the close of the festival, all drums in the drumhouse except the tribunal drum, are put away to rest until Odwira. None of the drums may be used until the opening of that ceremony.

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In former times, the training of a state drummer was a serious undertaking. The candidate would be taken to the drums early in the morning, and formally instructed in the art along with other prospective drummers. Instructors would speak the rhythms either in intelligible utterances or in nonsense syllables. In modern times, when drumming does not pay so well as it once did, less emphasis is placed on a rigorous apprenticeship for young drummers. The drummer is officially a servant of the court, and the office is usually given to households of commoners or of chief's sons. Although it is not strictly a heritable office, it is believed that a father's drumming skill passess from him to his son, and thus it often happens that the office is inherited by a son from his father. It is also possible that an infant may show signs that he has been born to be a drummer by drumming with his fingers on the back of the one carrying him. A father never teaches his son the art of drumming, but always engages some other drummer to do so. This is because it is believed that should a father teach his son, the older man would die as soon as the younger drummer became proficient (Rattray 1923:263). This contrasts with the Nupe practice of keeping the art of drumming quite strictly within the family, with the skill ordinarily being handed down from father to son (Nadel 1942:301).

V B
V D
II B
II B

The training of a drummer includes not only the technical side of learning how to beat out the various rhythms, but also instruction in the Ashanti traditions, genealogies of all kings, and tribal folklore. Similarly among the Yoruba, names, praises, and attributes of every family of note are known to all drummers and musicians, (Johnson 1921:58). The Ashanti themselves insist that drummers should be very intelligent and gifted people (Danquah 1928:54). As the national poets for a people who value tradition, drummers in the act of drumming are considered sacred, and are immune from assault, annoyance, and interruption. Although when not drumming they do not have the privileges and prerogatives of sacred persons, all of these are accorded them when they are actually performing. If a drummer makes a mistake he attributes this to interference by an evil spirit, and all such errors are punishable by a fine of a sheep. II B V D

Drummers are known as Odomankoma 'kyerema, "the Creator's drummers." The Ashanti have a myth which says that the creator made in earliest times a herald, a drummer, and an executioner. Precedence at court is observed in that order. Those who play the talking drums are considered the greatest of all drummers because of the breadth of knowledge and skill demanded by their work. These drummers are said to be closest to the ancestral spirits, and to nature from whom they conjure up the spirit of creation, and from whom the components of the drums are obtained (Nketia 1963:154). IV B 3 V D

Many Ashanti claim to think that the man-in-the-moon is a drummer. Children are told not to gaze at him too long lest they see him lay his drum sticks on his drums, and thus die themselves (Rattray 1927:282). A drummer never carries his own drums, for it is believed that this would cause him to become insane. V D

Horns:

As has been mentioned above, horns are another instrument used communicatively by the Ashanti. Although communication by means of the horn is much less elaborated than that of the drum, there are still several kinds of horns and special horn calls which have a great deal of significance. One of the major distinctions made is that between the speaking horns, Aseseben and Asokoben, which are capable of repeating every saying or proverb, and Mmontia, which are short horns used for single airs and signalling. There are also some special elephant horns known as owuo (death), the name being imitative of the note they sound. These are always played at executions and funerals, but may be used at other times as well. VD

Each paramount chief has his own particular horn call and every Ashanti can identify by the notes sounded just which chief is approaching. Similarly, each army divisional leader has his own horn calls which were formerly used to rally scattered units. When the Ashanti are at war one officer traditionally remains behind to look after the town or village while the chief accompanies his men to battle. This officer has for his horn call: "Esa akyi eye ya," "To remain behind when they have gone to war is hard" (Rattray 1929:137).

Gong:

Another musical instrument which should be mentioned here is the gong,' which is frequently used to signal official pronouncements. In particular, the promulgation of new edicts is always signalledby the sound of the gong before the herald pronounces the words of the new law.

Bells:

Rattray mentions that a bell is rung during the Adae ceremony to signify that the spirits are eating. Details about the use of the bell are not given.

Gesture:

A gesture code of a rather limited nature does exist among the Ashanti. V D Although Rattray reports that gesture is very important, the data which have been gathered on the Ashanti do not include detailed information about the significance of specific gestures. Neither is it clear whether gesture ever completely replaces speech in any given contexts, or whether the speech and gesture codes are always used in combination. It is clear, however, that gesture is sufficiently important for the Ashanti to have found a way to include it in their drum code in which loudness and softness are said to function as gesture in speech.

Gestures should always be made with the right hand. The left hand is used to hold the anus-wiping stick, and it is considered particularly insulting ever to point with, or take anything from another with this hand. There is even an Ashanti proverb,"Only the fool points at his origins with his left hand" (Sutherland 1961). The use of arm and hand gestures to encourage dancers has already been described, as has the use of gesture to signify abuse.

Among the Nupe, the gesture system appears to be more highly elaborated than that of the Ashanti, particularly in greeting situations, when men of equal rank are expected to bow low for about half of a minute while exchanging words of greeting, and if they are well acquainted they stretch out their hands several times in succession and lightly touch one another's fingers. Women of equal rank kneel on one knee when greeting each other (Nadel 1942: 129). No such formalities at greeting have been reported for the Ashanti.

Other Special Codes:

A code of the dead is spoken of by the Ashanti, and although it is not clear whether the dead communicate with each other by means of this, they do transmit messages to the living by this code. They do this soon after death in an attempt to identify for survivors the agent responsible for their death. Thus a young person, usually one with an interest in prophecy, will often be seized in a frenzy immediately after someone dies. These seizures are characterized by an excited jibbering in a half-articulate language which is interpreted as the confession or revelation from the spirit of the dead person. V B1

Sneezing also has a special place in the Ashanti repertoire of sounds, although the precise conceptualization of sneezing is rather obscure. When a subject sneezes in the presence of a chief his nose is immediately rubbed with white clay and during the particular day on which the sneezing occurs heis held accountable for all the good or bad luck the chief has. He may be punished or rewarded accordingly, It is not clear whether the sneeze is actually considered to be communicative, but it is included in this discussion because of its believed instrumentality. V D

The Ashanti recognize another special code which they frequently mention, although they themselves do not participate in it. This is the "language " of birds and animals, which appears actually to be considered by the Ashanti to be a rather limited version of Twi itself. The Ashanti acknowledges that he does not always understand the sounds made by the beasts, but he does frequently interpret them in terms of his own language (Rattray 1916:56-57). Thus, he describes the chatter of a certain species of black colobus monkey as "Wahu wahu?" "Have you seen, have you seen?" The neteko monkey is said to speak these words: "Wo to ko, wo to ko," "You red bottom, you red bottom" (Rattray 1916:56). Similarly, the cry of the fish-eagle is interpreted as "gye 'tuo, gye 'wo," "Only a gun and a snake I fear" (Rattray 1923:99). V D

Notes

[1] Field's inquiries yielded evidence that invariably the wo'yei have spent some part of their early childhood with friends or relatives who speak the foreign language. For ordinary usage, however, the wo'yei appear to have quite genuinely forgotten the language in question (Field 1937:100ff).

[2] Frequently these women are the wives of captive generals (Rattray 1923: 118-119).

[3] Although the Ashanti apparently use the armpit or donno drum only for musical accompaniment, the Yoruba use it as both a "talking" and a "singing" drum (Nketia 1963:19).

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APPENDIX C

ASHANTI II

An Ethnography of Communication
among the Ashanti

Sister Peter Marie Hogan

P12.6100

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Introduction

Although the scope and aims of anthropology have been approached and defined in terms of several different points of view, most of the twentieth century approaches seem to be in at least tacit agreement with Goodenough's statement that "the anthropologist's basic task, on which all the rest of his endeavors depend, is to describe specific cultures adequately (1957: 167). To define the goal of anthropology as adequate description of specific cultures requires, however, some elaboration if the statement is to be clear. Goodenough himself has expanded the notion of "describe" and "cultures" in a manner which gives a great deal more precision and rigor to his definition. In the paper which contains the statement just quoted, he discusses the notion of culture, the object of the anthropologist's descriptive operations. Taking into consideration the rather incomplete state of our understanding of the concept, Goodenough proposes a working definition of culture:

> ...a society's culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order

> to operate in a manner acceptable to its members, and do so in any role that they accept for any one of themselves (1957:167).

By defining culture in terms of what one must "know or believe," Goodenough is clearly referring to a phenomenon the locus of which is mental. Culture is not, according to this notion, observable behavior or artifacts. It is rather the forms of these things which organize the real and phenomenal world according to distinctive models of perceiving, interpreting, and valuing.

The other element of his definition which Goodenough has elaborated is the operation which he terms "describe." Having discussed the notion of culture in terms of mental forms, or standards, he rejects as inadequate descriptions which deal only with behavior, artifacts, events, and other observable material phenomena characteristically associated with a given group. These are in fact representative of, indeed artifacts of, a conceptual system which is the culture. It is an understanding of this conceptual system which is the goal of the anthropologist's endeavors.

It follows from all this that the anthropologist's description must not merely state what the anthropologist observes, but it must also account for what is observed. Adequate anthropological description, then, entails the construction of a theory about the organization of phenomena, as well as accurate reporting of what these phenomena are (Goodenough 1956;1957).

Commenting on this approach to ethnographic description, Hymes has written:

> The ethnographic task has sometimes been designated "mere" description. A new generation of ethnographers rejects the "mere," and sees in the formulation of an adequate description a truly theoretical

> task, the development of a theory adequate to a particular case (1964c:94-95).

Always, the theory with which the anthropologist is concerned is a theory about the cognitive systems and behavior of the people under study which will account for their observed behavior.

One of the most obvious and ubiquitous phenomena which may be perceived directly by the ethnographer and which may provide valuable insights into underlying cognitive models, is the speech act. Interest in the role of speech in the cultural system of a given group, and the relationship between language and other aspects of culture is certainly not new in American Anthropology. Hymes has pointed out that the traditional concern with this problem, dating from the early work of Boas and Brinton, and becoming increasingly important in the work of Sapir and Whorf (1962). The viewpoint from which much of this work has been undertaken, however, assumes cross-cultural uniformity in the role of language and speech in relation to other cultural traits. Although scholars have differed as to the nature of this role, most have apparently regarded it as a constant, which, once described correctly for one culture, would be understood in relation to all. Thus Hymes has discussed the well known argument that differences in language shape or interact with differences in world view, the assumption basic to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, pointing out that such a position entails the assumption that the functional role of language in relation to world view is everywhere the same (1964:19).

Hymes has termed the Whorfian kind of linguistic relativity a secondary kind which is "dependent upon a primary sociolinguistic relativity, that of differential engagement of languages in social life" (Hymes 1964b:20). This "differential engagement" is something which older perspectives have failed to take into account, but it is a crucial point in terms of ethnographic description which attempts to theorize about cognitive behavior. Rather than begin by considering the relationship between communicative systems and various patterned elements of the culture, it would seem that the ethnographer must first identify the patterning imposed by the culture on communication itself. Thus, speech, language, and whatever else enters into the communicative systems of a society must be studied along with the other more traditional categories of cultural manifestations such as social organization, political organization, religion, economics, etc., if an ethnographic description is to be complete.

It is from such a perspective that the notion of ethnographies of communication has arisen. Evidence of a growing professional interest in this area is the American Anthropologist Special Publication of 1964 entitled THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF COMMUNICATION (Gumperz and Hymes, eds.). The concept, its goals and methodology, have been most fully described by Hymes (See Bibliography). According to Hymes, such a description begins by defining its object of study as "the communicative habits of a community in their totality" (1964b:13). The method assumes that all the communicative activity of the group under study is subject to patterning, and it proceeds by identifying the communicative events which are relevant to the society as well as the components and range of functions of these events. An ethnography of communication must also concern itself with the relationships among the various events and when possible, it should state the rules which are implicit in behavior judged to be appropriate by members of the society (1964c:101).

Ideally, an ethnography of communication is compiled from field work in which the orientation of the investigator is directed toward discovery of relevant information in the form of answers to pertinent questions, and his own direct observations. The kinds of questions which would seem best geared for elicitation of necessary material have been compiled into a Field Guide by Hymes et al. (1967, unpublished). It also seems fruitful, however, in order to build up a minimal body of cross-cultural data within a reasonable amount of time, to examine existing ethnographies in terms of the kinds of questions asked in compiling an ethnography of communication. As these materials have usually not been collected with such a perspective in mind, it is not to be expected that they will provide adequate answers for all the questions one would wish to ask. One may contain full information on language and speech socialization, for example, but completely ignore the matters of non-verbal codes, analyses of speech events, etc. Another may emphasize adult attitudes toward various kinds of speech, yet contain no information on language acquisition or learning and teaching. Such gaps, tantalizing as they may be for the researcher, by no means invalidate the data which are included, and it appears that quite a bit of material necessary for ethnographies of communication may in fact be found in existing reports.

This paper represents an attempt to describe the communicative system of the Ashanti of West Africa, and to a limited extent to account for that system in terms of native attitudes and standards. It is, of course, limited by available materials. Research in the published reports dealing with the Ashanti has brought to light, however, some information which should definitely be included in an ethnography of Ashanti communication. Where possible, information on related groups, the Nupe, Ga, Fanti, Bété, Agni, and the Yoruba, has been included in notes at the notes at the end of the paper for comparative and contrastive purposes. These are all West African peoples whose languages belong to the same family, the Niger-Congo. All, including Twi, the language spoken by the Ashanti, are classified in the same sub-family, Kwa, although Greenberg points out that this classification of the Bété is only tentative, as the relationship of their language to the others is somewhat obscure (Greenberg 1963).

The Ashanti

The Ashanti are a politically complex group inhabiting the southern part of what is now Ghana, along the Guinea Coast of West Africa. Once a powerful and warlike nation, they are organized along descent principles, Although both the maternal and paternal lines are recognized, each has a different significance. The father's descent group, his ntoro, provides religious/and educational ties for a child, but most rights and duties, especially those of a political nature are derived from the mother (Busia 1951:1). Membership in a given lineage, or abusua, is based on the mother-child bond. This bond is automatically a determinant in the selection of chiefs because the Ashanti chiefdom or division is precisely an aggregate of lineages which are localized. Politically the Ashanti are organized into villages under village headmen and elders, sub-divisions under chiefs and paramount chiefs, and ultimately all members of the Ashanti nation are under the Asantehene, who is king of the entire people.

Code Inventory

The Communicative codes used and/or recognized by the Ashanti are:

I. Verbal Codes

A. Twi, a dialect of the Akan language group which belongs, according to Greenberg, to the Kwa sub-family of the Niger-Congo family (1959; 1963). It is a tone language characterized by five distinct tones: high, mid, low, rising, and falling. Tone alone may differentiate forms, either as to lexical meaning, or as to tense. It is the tonal aspect of Twi which makes the language most amenable to the drum elaboration discussed below.

B. A ceremonial language used by priests and priestesses. This has been identified as an archaic dialect of Twi. It is an esoteric code taught to each candidate for the priesthood by the particular priest-mentor supervising his three-year novitiate. Most lay Ashanti profess not to understand it (Lystad 1956:171).

C. The language of the ghosts, a code believed to be intelligible to all unborn babies and new-born infants who have not yet cut their teeth. The language consists in the cooing noises made by infants, and presumably is forgotten at about the age when the teeth begin to appear, for older children and adults do not understand it.

D. A code of the dead by which recently deceased persons transmit messages identifying the agent responsible. for their death to survivors. This communication takes place through some young person, usually one with an interest in prophecy, who is seized in a frenzy immediately after the sender of the message has died. These seizures are characterized by an excited jibbering in a half-articulate language which is interpreted as the confession or revelation from the spirit of the dead person. Unfortunately, in reporting the existence of this code, Danquah (1928:231) does not mention who interprets the "jibbering." Neither does he indicate whether it is believed that dead persons communicate with each other by means of such a code. One would also like to investigate the possibility that this code might actually be the same as the language of the ghosts mentioned above, although none of the ethnographers consulted mentions this. The question as to whether both unborn babies and the dead might, as inhabitants of the same spirit world, communicate by means of the same code, is one which warrants investigation.

E. The Animal Code: Strictly speaking, this is apparently a limited version of Twi, It is considered separately here because the rather extreme limitations on the Twi which animals are believed to use modify the code to an extent which seems to justify classifying "animal Twi" apart from Twi spoken by humans. The Ashanti acknowledge the fact that they do not always understand the "language of animals, birds, and insects, but they seem to attribute this difficulty more to differences between the human receiver and the animal sender than to differences between the human's Twi and the code used by the animal. Frequently, the Ashanti claim they do understand animal communication, and in such cases the animals are said to be speaking Twi (Rattray 1916:56-57). Thus, the chatter of a certain species of black colobus monkey is described as the Twi expression "Wahu wahu?", "Have you seen? Have you seen?" The neteko monkey is said to speak the insulting "Wo to ko, wo to ko," "You red-bottom, you redb-bottom," and the cry of the fish-eagle is interpreted as "gye 'tuo, gye 'wo," "Only a gun and a snake I fear" (Rattray 1923:99).

II. Non-Verbal Codes

A. Drum Code. This is a speech surrogate constituted by a verbally derived code based on a direct transfer of spoken language elements such as tone and some phonetic features into a musical medium. These elements are distributed within a framework of two tones, the low, or male tone, and the high, or female tone (Rattray 1923:248; Nketia 1963b:28-29).

B. Horn Code. Similar to the drum code, although much more limited, the horn code consists of a transfer of every saying and proverb of the Ashanti people into te notes which can be played on the Aseseben and Asokoben horns, the so-called "speaking horns."

C. Whistling. Very little has been reported about this code, except the fact that it exists in the code repertoire recognized by the Ashanti, although it is apparently not used by them. The Whistling code is said to be the means by which mmoatia, the fairies who inhabit the forest, communicate. Rattray reports that whistling is believed to be hateful to certain suman (fetishes), and although he does not give details, it would seem that this is relevant as the mmoatia are dealers in all kinds of magic, and have a great deal to do with suman (Rattray 1929:314). Rattray does point out that there is a whistling language among tribes of the Northern territories of Ghana (1927:26). The intelligibility of the whistling code as far as humans are concerned has not been discussed, but Ashanti medicine men frequently claim to have learned their art from the mmoatia. It is not clear whether they are taught by means of the whistling code, or by some other means.

D. Gesture Code. Although Rattray reports that gesture is very important, the data do not include detailed information about the significance of specific gestures in many cases. Neither is it clear whether gesture ever completely replaces speech in any given context, or whether the speech and gesture codes are always used in combination. It is reported, however, that gesture is sufficiently important for the Ashanti to have found a way to include a substitute for it in their drum code, in which loudness and softness are said to function as gesture in speech.

E. A kind of signal code composed of verbal and non-verbal elements. In this code any one of the sounds signifies to the Ashanti something specific and distinctive. Thus each of the sounds is communicative because of the univocal interpretation traditionally assigned to it.

1. Crying. This is always understood as signifying distress. In an infant under three months of age crying is interpreted as the infant's way of communicating the fact that he is hungry. The mother always responds immediately by suckling the child. After the age of three months, it is believed that the baby might be communicating hunger, but fear, rage, or some other form of physical discomfort are also considered possible topics of the communication. Thus a variety of responses are made to crying in a baby over three months old. The signal is interpreted differently, then, according to the age of the addresser.

   Age is also a factor which determines whether the crying signal is an acceptable means by which to communicate. Crying is not tolerated in older children, although unfortunately, none of the ethnographers has reported a specific cut-off age after which crying is no longer tolerated. They do specify, however, that an older child who persists in crying is punished. There is one special circumstance in which weeping is required of women and girls. At all funerals it is important that they show their grief by weeping and wailing loudly. Here setting and sex of the addresser are the determinants which render acceptable a communicative act which is ordinarily unacceptable. Table 1 schematizes the relationships among the various components of the different kinds of crying recognized by the Ashanti.[1]

2. Drum Signals. In addition to their use as a means for conveying linguistic messages, drums are also used for signalling (Nketia 1963b:17). When thus used, they are played in short repetitive rhythms, or in a broken series of beats played at one pitch. The Ashanti refer to signal drumming as "short drumming" (Nketia 1963b:27). Each particular rhythm pattern has a specific meaning assigned to it so that a drummed signal elicits the desired response.

3. Horn Signals. Played on short horns, called mmontia, horn signals communicate because of specific meanings traditionally assigned to distinctive horn calls, as in the case of drum signals.

4. 4. The Gong. The odawuru, a bell-shaped gong, is an

~~[illegible]~~

Table I Components of Communicative Acts: Crying

Setting	Participants		Ends		Act Sequence	Channel
	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes		
Baby crying	Baby under 3 months	usually mother	to have hunger relieved	baby is suckled	baby cries; mother immediately interprets cries to indicate hunger, suckles child	voice
Baby crying	Baby over 3 months	usually mother	to have some form of physical discomfort remedied	multiple response until cryingstops	baby cries; mother performs various acts to comfort him until crying stops	voice
Older child crying	child	usually a parent	various	child is punished	older child cries; parent first reprimands him verbally, then thrashes him if crying persists. If child continues crying after thrashing, he is punished with rectal suppository	voice
funeral	women and girls	unspecified	to show grief		women and girls weep throughout course of funeral	voice

instrument typical of West Africa. In every instance of its use cited in the ethnographies consulted, the gong is used either as a musical accompaniment (as are the drum and horn), or as a signalling device signifying that an announcement is about to be made, or an event is about to take place for which the attention of the populace is desired.

5. Bells. The use of a bell is mentioned only once. It is rung during an Adae ceremony to signify that the ancestral spirits either are or are about to begin eating.

6. Other. The distinctive striking of a stone or knife against an old hoe is apparently the distinctive sound which signifies the beginning of a girl's puberty rite. Rattray who reports this signal (1927:69-70), does not mention any words being spoken by the mother who announces the rite in this way. The mere sound seems sufficient to draw the women out, singing the songs which open the ceremony.

Announcing

The codes just described vary considerably in their uses and significance for the Ashanti. Although it is important to know about the variety of codes and the constituents of each, it is also necessary to examine specific speech acts and genres in order to try to penetrate the basic attitudes and values underlying the communicative system. The first of these genres to be considered here is Announcing.

In discussing the communicative genre, "Announcing" as it is used by the Ashanti, a basic distinction must be made. The Ashanti have a class of communicative events which signify that something of a public nature is about to happen. In addition they have a class of communicative events by which information that something public either is currently happening or has happened is conveyed. For the purposes of this analysis, the former class will be termed "Announcements," and the latter, "Pronouncements." Although this may appear to be an arbitrary distinction, it is one which seems to be dictated by the data, as the following discussion will indicate.

There is among the Ashanti a variety of events which are always preceded by a public announcement that they are about to begin. All of these are events which require the presence of large numbers of people, and announcing actually has the character of a summons as well as merely a means of communicating information. Although some announcements are immediately followed by verbal proclamations or pronouncements, none of the announcements is itself made verbally. Each is rather made by means of a non-verbal code or signal which attracts attention and in all cases conveys at least a limited amount of information.

The Gong

Three occasions are reported on which the channel for the announcement is the gong. The first of these is the promulgation of a new law by the stool herald. The herald always performs this particular duty late in the evening, when everyone has returned to the village from working in the forest or on farms. Attention is first arrested by the sound of the gong, and then the herald promulgates the new law in a set formula:

> Ton, ton, ton - Hene se wa ma nwo adwo; ose oma nwo adwo Apeafo. Ose-Ya, obiara ye be hu se-ye ku, ana nwo be timi ato wo tiri a, mperegwan nsia. Ya nwo to kwesiara, nwo to ntam kesie. Pa fwi!
>
> Ton, ton, ton - Chief says he bid you cool of the evening, he bids you cool of the evening Apeafo. He says (here follows the new law). Therefore any one whom we see (breaking the law) we shall kill, or if it be that you are able, you may buy your heads for six pereguan. For (if you disobey), then you have violated the forbidden name of Sunday, then you have violated the great forbidden name (Rattray 1929:315).

Here the formula constitutes the pronouncement. It conveys the information that something is currently happening, i.e., that as the words are spoken the law is becoming a binding obligation. The ringing of the gong before the pronouncement is the announcement.

The second instance of an announcement effected by use of the gong is that which occurs early in the annual Apo ceremony. This eight-day festival is a special time set aside each year when the

Ashanti

Ashanti ban on personal abuse, normally quite absolute, is lifted. As the festival gets underway, the herald circulates throughout the town, beating a gong and crying out:

> The chief says that I am to tell you that upon this Apo festival which has come round you are to celebrate it by abusing him. And during this time if any one of you have a cause of quarrel with any one else, or if your friend should seduce your wife, or some one should insult you, and you do not keep your temper, but lodge a complaint, then you are bound by the oath of Wednesday and of Thursday which make you liable to a penalty of ntano. That is the end (Rattray 1923:156-157).

Again, the words are the pronouncement that Apo is currently being celebrated, and the sound of the gong is the announcement.

Still a third instance in which the gong is used, this time without any verbal utterance following, serves to point up the use of this instrument in announcing. Rattray reports that traditionally the punishment for anyone convicted by a native court of irresponsible speech (such as gossip or tale-bearing) is to have one's face smeared with charcoal and parade through the village, holding a live fowl between the teeth. At the same time the culprit is required to beat a gong, announcing his presence to the populace. In this case the villagers are expected to congregate in order to abuse and ridicule the guilty party.

In all three instances, it seems at first sight that the sound of the gong itself signifies only that something of general interest is about to take place. It means, "Come," but those who respond to its call do not know precisely for what purpose they are being called until they confront the one who is striking the gong. The gong, then, by its very lack of specificity, is a signal to all the people, and is used only in announcements which are directed to an entire village or town.

It is impossible to know, from the data available, whether the gong is used in other announcements besides the three cited. From its very general signification, it appears possible that it is used whenever the political authority wishes to assemble all of the people. In terms of the three occasions described, however, it seems not unlikely that the gong is used only in announcements that are in some way related to breaches of law. Thus in the first instance, the announcement before the promulgation of a new law, the event announced is concerned with imposing sanctions against such breaches, as well as with making the law known. In the Apo announcement, the intention of the announced formula is to redefine the law for the duration of the ceremony in order that what would ordinarily be illegal be legalized. The third instance, of course, only exists because a law has been broken, and punishment must be administered. Here the announcement precedes punishment by general ridicule of an illegal act. In all three cases, the gong represents the state summoning all the inhabitants of a specific area to inform them of something relevant to the security and peace of the whole society.

This interpretation is reinforced by the burden of the texts spoken by the herald after each of the first two announcements. Each begins with a reference to the chief as the source of the ensuing message. Next comes a description of certain behavior which the chief prescribes for his people. This is followed by a warning that failure to behave as indicated will warrant a penalty, the penalty is named, and the binding force of a particular oath is invokes. Both pronouncements then, involve the imposition of laws by the state on its members, a definition of the conduct which constitutes a breach of the law, and the penalty for such a breach.

The existing date indicate then, that the sound of the gong actually signifies more than the very general summons superficially suggested. More specifically the gong seems to announce: 1) that all people of the area should assemble; 2) that the peace and security of the society are at stake; and 3) that the potential or actual threat to this peace and security comes from within the society itself, and 4) that each must now fulfill his responsibility in either preventing social disruption of the society, or in restoring the equilibrium of it.

Striking the Hoe

Another form of announcement, reported as signalling only one kind of event, is the striking of an old hoe with a stone or a knife, the means by which a mother announces to the women of the village that her daughter is about to celebrate her puberty rite. This is the only announcement directed exclusively to women. It appears to be unique to the puberty rite, for according to Rattray, the women respond immediately with puberty songs, without benefit of any verbal explanation (Rattray 1927:69-70). Like the events announced by the gong, the puberty rite is a very important occasion for the life of the whole society. The theme of the celebration is the girl's attainment of maturity and her consequent ability to bear children, thus perpetuating the Ashanti nation. Significantly,

~~after celebrating the joyful event, [illegible]~~

after celebrating this joyful event, a girl is called "eno," "Mother," by the children of her village. The celebration of the attainment of puberty is in a sense an occasion of rejoicing in the fertility of the Ashanti people, and as such it is an event in which all women and girls are expected to participate.

The Horn

A third channel sometimes used for announcing is the horn. Every paramount chief has his own horn call on the so-called speaking horns, the Aseseben and Asokoben. When a paramount chief is approaching every Ashanti can identify who he is by the horn call which announces him. Here the announcement not only signifies who is arriving but summons those whom protocol demands should greet the chief. Because of the chief's role as the primary focus of tribal unity the association of this announcement with an event of importance for the whole people again seems clear.

Drumming

One of the most common modes by which announcements are made is by drumming. Both signal and talking drums are used for announcing, although it would seem that the former are much more common. Judiciary meetings and assemblies convened for the settlement of urgent problems are all announced by means of the drum. Similarly whenever court is to be in session this too is announced in three drum calls of about one minute's duration each, with an interval of about an hour in between (Nketia 1963b:123). It is not clear whether these announcements are made on talking or signal drums; but the latter seems more likely. In all three cases, the announcement is directed to a relatively limited audience, but again, the events announced are intimately connected with the well-being of the nation, for all involve maintenance of law and order and settlement of disturbances and potentially disruptive problems.

When a meal to which anyone may come is being served at the chief's palace at midday, the event is announced on a signal drum. Rattray, who reports this (1929:114), does not describe the particular drum used, but refers to it as "adidi 'twene." In Nketia's inventory of Ashanti drums (1963b), no such type appears and it is probable that Rattray is merely defining the type by its function without giving the Ashanti name for it. Although anyone may respond to the call of this drum, it is not a general summons for everyone to assemble as are the gong announcements. It is rather an announcement that a meal is about to be served, and a summons for those who wish to come and partake. Here the relationship between announcing and events which are important for the life of the nation is less striking than in the cases already discussed. When one consideres this instance in relation to the Ashanti emphasis on food as associated with life, however, the announcement that food (continued access to life) is available at the home of the chief (symbol of the nation) is indeed relevant to the preservation and perpetuation of the society.

Funeral Announcements

There are only two occasions preceded by announcements remaining. It has been reported that the deaths of chiefs, and of members of great families are announced by drumming on the talking drums in the first case, and by firing two gun shots in the second.

(Danquah 1928; Nketia 1963b:43). Details about informing villagers of other deaths are not given, although it is mentioned that "word" is carried to other communities (Lystad 1958:100). The assumption is that the information is conveyed verbally. In any case, informing anyone of a death constitutes, in terms of this analysis, not an announcement, but a pronouncement. It appears that when an Ashanti commoner dies, this fact is communicated to the people in some verbal pronouncement, and those who wish may attend the funeral or not. In the case of a chief or a great person[2], however, pronouncement of what has occurred, i.e., death, is not sufficient. It would seem that for such a person it is also necessary to announce that the funeral is going to occur, for the funeral of a chief or someone important to the nation takes on the character of a state occasion. In both cases, verbal messages reporting the death are sent, as well as the drum and gun funeral announcements (Rattray 1927:110). The drumming and the gunshots, signify announcements, then, not of the death which has occurred, but of the funeral which is about to take place, and they summon mourners to the funeral rites.

Conclusions

Eleven occasions regularly preceded by announcements have been cited. Each of the announcing events is schematized in terms of relevant components in Table 2. The analysis reveals certain characteristics which consistently appear in announcements and which may be cited as criteria by which the Ashanti decide when to announce and the appropriate channels to employ. These may be summed up as follows:

1). Announcements are made only in relation to events of great national import. The life, peace, and security of the Ashanti people must in some way be at stake in any event which is formally announced. There are not sufficient data to say conclusively that such events are always announced but the trend, revealed in existing reports indicates that this might be the case.

2). An announcement always signals an event which is ultimately good for the life of the society. In the case of legal pronouncements and announcements of court sessions, judiciary meetings, and special assemblies it insures preservation of law and order. The puberty midday meal announcements are relevant to the vigor and fertility of the nation. The announcement of an approaching chief signals the arrival of the very symbol and in one sense the embodiment of the Ashanti people. The funerals of persons similarly identified with the society are observances which promote the good of the society by insuring a happy passing over into the spirit world and a uniting with the ancestors which will augur well for the Ashanti people.

3) The channel for announcements is always non-verbal. In two instances, the approach of a paramount chief, and the funeral of a chief, a verbally-derived code is used, but in each case the channel is a musical instrument rather than the human voice. It is significant that in both cases the announcement deals with an event concerning a chief, and it may be a rule that such announcements require the verbally-derived codes.

4) An announcement constitutes a summons.

a) The gong summons everyone.

b) It is not clear just who is summoned by the verbally-derived codes, as reports do not indicate exactly who must be involved in greeting or mourning a chief. In neither case where such a code is used is the message form given, so it is impossible to know whether addressees are in some way named in the announcement. It seems reasonable to say that announcements couched in verbally derived codes summon those who are required by protocol to greet or mourn a chief.~~an important person~~

c) Gun shots, much like the talking drum announcing the chief's death, summon all who are required by protocol to mourn an important person.

d) d) The signal drum summons those involved in the event signalled. In some cases, as the noonday meal, and court sessions, response to the summons is optional for at least some people (those who do not wish to eat, spectators in the case of court sessions).

e) The striking of a hoe summons all the women of the village.

TABLE 2 Components of Communicative Acts: Announcing

Setting	Participants	Goals	Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Promulgation of new law	Herald (addresser) all the people (addressees)	To assemble all the people	All the people assemble	Herald rings gong, People assemble, law is enunciated	Gong
Beginning of Apo ceremony	Herald (addresser) all the people (addressees)	To assemble all the people	All the people assemble	Herald rings gong,	Gong
Punishment of gossiper or tale-bearer	Gossipper (addresser); all the people (addressees)	Same	Same	Gossipper rings gong	Gong
Beginning of puberty rite	Mother of girl celebrating (addressor); women (addressees)	To assemble the women	Women assemble	Mother beats hoe with stone or knife	Hoe
Approach of important chief	hornblower (addresser) all (addressees)	To inform people of chief's approach	Those who should greet chief assemble	hornblower blows appropriate notes	speaking horn
Announcing a judiciary meeting	drummer (addresser) elders (addressees)	Assemble elders	Elders assemble	drummer signals judiciary meeting to take place	drum (Probably signal drum)
Special Assembly	same	same	same	drummer signals special assembly to take place	same
Convening of court	drummer (addresser) all involved in court case (addressees)	all involved should assemble	all involved assemble	drummer signals court to convene	drum (Probably signal) tribunal drum is used.

27.

TABLE 2 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: ANNOUNCING (cont'd)

Setting	Participants	Goals	Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Midday meal at palace	drummer (addresser) all (addressees)	To invite people to palace for meal	Those who wish go to palace for meal	drummer signals meal is ready	signal drum
Funeral of chief	drummer (addresser) all (addressees)	To inform people of chief's funeral	People go to chief's funeral	drummer drums message about chief's funeral	talking drum
Funeral of important person	Person shooting gun (addresser) all (addressees)	To inform people of important person's funeral	People go to funeral	Two gun shots are fired	Guns

Pronouncing

Pronouncements, for the Ashanti, are public speech acts which convey information about something taking place at the time of the pronouncement, or about something which has taken place in the recent past. In the latter case, pronouncements apparently confirm or ratify the events which constitute their subject matter. They may be considered completive in the sense that the pronouncement seems to be necessary for the event to be considered fully actualized. They are connected with various phases of the life cycle, as well as with certain legal formulas concerned with the establishment of guilt in court.

Completive Pronouncements: Life Cycle

The first completive pronouncement made in connection with the life cycle is that which occurs as soon as a child emerges from its mother's womb. The midwives assisting at the delivery cry out, "Hail so-and-so," calling the baby by his natal name. This name, sometimes referred to as "Nyame's (God's) name," is determined by the day of the week on which the birth takes place. Each week day has a special name and spirit associated with it, and every newborn Ashanti is placed in the special care of the appropriate spirit and given the name specific to his natal day according to the chart in Table 3.

Although at first sight it may appear that the midwives are effectively naming the child when they make this pronouncement, analysis of the Ashanti pronouncement system indicates otherwise. The name is not chosen or bestowed by human agents. It is an automatically assigned to the child by the same forces which govern his conception, the time of birth, etc. Thus the midwives are not bestowing the name when they pronounce it. Rather they are affirming and ratifying both the fact that the child has emerged from the womb, and the fact that he emerges already named when they make the completive pronouncement.

The next pronouncement of this type takes place when the birth of a child is considered to be complete, after the umbilical cord has been cut. The midwives pronounce the words, "Asumasi aba a, tenase," "As so-and-so (using the natal name

Table 3 Assignment of Natal Names

Day of the Week	Natal Name Male	 Female	Special Spirit of the Day
Sunday - Kwasida	Kwasi	Akosua (Asi)	Ayisi (Awusi)
Monday - Dwowda	Kwadjo	Adjoa	A(d)wo
Tuesday - Benada	Kwabena	Abena	Bena
Wednesday - Wukudu	Kwaku	Akua	Wuku (Aku)
Thursday - Yaoda	Yao	Yaa (Aba)	Awo (Aberaw)
Friday - Fida	Kofi	Afua	Afi
Saturday - Memenda	Kweme	Ama	Aman

already given), let him (or her) sit down with us." The pronouncement marks completion of the act of parturition and ratifies the fact that the foetal existence of the child is over. The midwives here seem to represent the whole Ashanti society in their role of welcoming the newborn to the world of humans. The pronouncement takes on the character of public speech because of this representative aspect of the midwives' function, and the great importance which any birth has for the society at large.

At the birth of twins, a particularly good omen for the Ashanti, the initial pronouncements are soon followed by a third. One of the midwives places the twins in a basin which she carries on her head through town. The other midwives follow her making the pronouncement, this time in the form of a song, "Wa wo nta, wa wo nta abien," "She has borne twins, she has borne two twins." That the words of the song have a function other than merely conveying to the villagers the information that twins have been born is indicated by the fact that the women of the village apparently join the midwives in singing. Although Rattray is not explicit about this, he speaks of "other women" following the one carrying the twins, and the impression given is that many women besides the midwives are involved in the procession. If this is accurate, it would appear that the sung pronouncement constitutes not only a means of making the good news known, but also a kind of completive affirmation of the event.

A similar kind of pronouncement characterizes the celebration of a girl's puberty rite. The women of the village again join in song confirming the girl's attainment of puberty. Responding to the non-verbal announcement that a puberty celebration is about to begin, the women immediately begin singing their bara (the word for menarche) songs, such as the following:

Wa yo, wa yo, ye 'nua ayo
Ye ma no mo, ne yo
Chorus: A ye, ye'nua ayo el e!

She has done it, she has done it, our sister has done it.
We congratulate her on the doing of it.
Chorus She has done it, our sister has done it. (Rattray 1927:69-70).

Here the primary intention is clearly not to convey information, for this is accomplished by the distinctive announcement made by the girl's mother. Again the songs seem necessary to validate the girl's attainment of marriageable age, and as an integral part of the bara ceremony they are indeed a prerequisite for recognition of the girl's new status.

These four pronouncements, all intimately connected with birth and the ability to bear children are all made by women. None of the four has a specific addressee, and they appear to be directed to society at large. All mark the assumption of a new status on the part of the persons about whom they are concerned. In the first instance the newborn is recognized as having tentative human status and a natal name after his sojourn in the spirit world. In the second, the child's complete physical (though not necessarily psychological) separation from the spirit world is acknowledged. In the third twins and their mother are recognized as having the special honored status which the Ashanti accord twins and the woman who has borne them. Finally in the bara songs, the girl is recognized as having the status of a young, marriageable adult.

Completive Pronouncements: Legal Formulas

The other completive pronouncements which have been reported are concerned not with the life-cycle, but rather with certain legal consequences which follow upon proscribed behavior. These pronouncements are of two types: 1) those which deal with the unintentional commission of some prohibited act, and 2) those which deal with the alleged deliberate commission of such an act. An example of the first type may be seen in the Ashanti handling of a case of accidental killing. The taking of another's life for no just reason is always a serious offence for the Ashanti, and although accidental manslaughter is distinguished from murder, still the person involved in such an accident does bear some responsibility. He is usually required to pay a fine to the family of the victim and to offer a sheep to be sacrificed over the ancestral stools to the chief. Upon receiving the sheep, the chief's spokesman makes the following pronouncement:

> Obi na ato 'tuo bone, na ye fwe fwe ~~asim~~ aseimm no mu.
> Ommoapa, na ye se onko si nnipi no. Ye sere
> nwo, nwo mma asem 'one bi sa yi mma bio.
>
> Someone has fired a bad gun, and we have investigated the matter carefully. He did not do it with intention, and we have said that he must bury the man. We pray you not to permit such a thing to happen again (Rattray 1929:296).

It is this pronouncement, addressed to the ancestors who have been disturbed by the killing, which formally marks the incident as closed, affirms its accidental character, and permits the person involved to continue about his daily business.

The second type of legal completive pronouncement follows the trial of one convicted of a crime. In this case the spokesman addresses the culprit, pronouncing both verdict and sentence. It is the pronouncement of the verdict which affirms guilt and justifies the subsequent pronouncement of sentence. Presumably a similar pronouncement of a verdict of innocence is made when the court so judges, and also constitutes a necessary condition for the release of the defendant.

In both types of legal completive pronouncements the words of the pronouncement are necessary to complete the handling of the offence in question. The subsequent fortunes of the defendant depend on this pronouncement, and he cannot proceed to either penalty or freedom until it is made. In this sense, the legal pronouncements are similar to the life cycle type insofar as they too effect a recognition of a new status for the defendant, either innocent or guilty, penalized or freed.

Effective Pronouncements: Life Cycle

The pronouncements which are concerned with something occurring while they are being made differ from the completive type insofar as they do not confirm, but rather, they effect the event of which they speak. Four of these pronouncements are directly related to the life cycle.

The first of these, the naming pronouncement, exists in several different forms. On the eighth day after birth, when an important rite known as Ntetea occurs, the baby is usually given his patronymic. This name is ordinarily chosen by the father from the names of his forbears on both sides. It is always bestowed by a member of the father's ntoro, and frequently by the paternal grandfather if he is alive. At the reception of the name, the child is placed on the lap of the person who is to name him, who spits into the infant's mouth and pronounces the naming formula:

> Agya 'bosom Asumasi me 'ba Asumasi na wa wo 'ba, na ode no abere me, na me de no to me no asumasi; nyini, be to me be ma me biribi minni.
>
> Father and god, so-and-so, my child (or brother, etc.) so-and-so has begotten a child and he has brought him to me, and I now call him after myself, naming him so-and-so; grant that he grow up and continue to meet me here, and let him give me food.

The namer then makes a gift to the child such as he can afford (Rattray 1927:64).[3] As has been mentioned, the pronouncement actually bestows the name on the child. Interestingly enough, the formula does not require that the name itself be pronounced, but only that it be indicated by reference to the fact that the child is to bear the speaker's name.

If the father wishes to name his child after a deceased member of his ntoro, he will carry the baby to the ruins of the person's hut, offer some wine to the spirit of the deceased, and pronounce the following words:

> Receive this wine and partake; I place your grandchild before your face and give him your name; see that he does not lack food.

Again it is the pronouncement which confers the name, although the name itself is not actually uttered.

The importance of a pronouncement in conferring a name is further indicated by the former practice of men going to war during the course of their wives' pregnancy. Such a man would christen his unborn child by spitting three times on his wife's abdomen, saying, "If you come forth a male, your name is so-and-so. If you come forth a female, your name is so-and-so." In this case, the name is uttered, and it is only conditionally bestowed, depending on the sex of the baby. Nevertheless, the baby is named either x or y, and the conditions for determining which explicitly stated, so that the father does effectively name the baby when he recites this formula.

Many Ashanti have other names added to those already discussed. Frequently a name indicating some special circumstance accompanying the birth is affixed to the natal name. For example, third, sixth, and ninth children, those born after a couple has lost several young children, and those born on days considered lucky by the Ashanti are usually so distinguished. In addition, many are given a mmerane, or strong name in honor of some great man or a heroic deed. Finally, some boys receive so-called "answer names" from their fathers, involving a special name by which the father addresses his son, and a particular proverb or saying which constitutes the son's response. The only details about bestowal of these names which have been reported are that the strong name is usually given about two weeks after birth and that the answer name is conferred and used exclusively by the father.[4] It seems probable that each of the names is conferred by means of a pronouncement as are the names about which more information is available.

The second effective pronouncement related to the life cycle is that which initiates marriage proceedings. The common formula by which marriage is proposed is "me pe wo," "I want you," or "I need you" (Rattray 1927:77). When a man pronounces these words to a girl he declares himself ready to begin negotiations with her abusua, to whom the girl then refers him. After presenting a series of gifts to the girl's mother, the boy pronounces another phrase which begins the second phase of the proceedings, a series of exchanges between the suitor and the girl's family: "I have seen your daughter and wish to marry her." If a boy is shy he may engage an intermediary to make the second pronouncement, but in any case it effectively initiates phase two of the marriage negotiations. The consummation of the marriage is not marked by any special ceremonies or formulas. It appears that the two pronouncements of the suitor together with the gifts he presents to the girl and her abusua, are sufficient to effect in time his change in status from casual suitor to betrothed, to husband.

Divorce is yet another event in the life cycle which is effected at least in part by a verbal pronouncement. The term for divorce in Ashanti is "awa 'diegyae," literally, "abandonment of the marriage state," but the idiomatic expressions, "gyae aware," "to leave off marriage," or "gu no hyiri," "to sprinkle her with white clay," are commonly used.

The husband is ordinarily the initiator of a divorce action. He need only assemble witnesses, including relatives of both parties and utter the formula, "I have ceased to cohabit with you," while sprinkling white clay on his wife's shoulders to become effectively divorced. The woman may initiate a divorce by presenting her husband with clay and saying, "Here is clay; sprinkle it on me." Note that she cannot effect the divorce however. She must persuade or force her husband to make the formal pronouncement if the marriage is to be legally ended.

When an Ashanti dies, the end of his life on earth is also marked by effective pronouncements. On the third day after death, the head of the deceased's family steps forward just before the grave is dug and the burial accomplished. Holding in either hand a branch of summe with which he touches the coffin, he says, "Asumasi me pae wo 'kra ne yen ntem," "So-and-so, I separate your soul from us." This pronouncement apparently signifies the shift in which the Ashanti cease to think of the deceased as a member of their own human world, and consider him rather a member of the spirit world. It seems to be the mechanism by which, psychologically at least, the transition from earth to the domain of the ancestors is effected.

Similarly, on the sixth day after death, the part of the funeral which focuses on the grave and the actual burial and subsequent welfare of the deceased is also marked by a solemn pronouncement. After a final offering of food and wine to the deceased, the mourners close off the path to the grave with vines, and the following words are spoken:

> We have finished your funeral rites, we have finished the sora rites (the offering referred to above), we have closed the path. It is finished.

No weeping is permitted at the time of this pronouncement, and it appears that the words again effectively end the long period of mourning which characterizes Ashanti funerals.

One characteristic of the effective pronouncements related to the life cycle is particularly striking. In every instance the verbal pronouncement is supplemented by the xxx use of some material element. The conferring of the patronymic is ordinarily accomplished by reciting the pronouncement and placing spittle in the child's mouth. In the case of naming during the Ntetea ceremony the child is also presented with a gift. When it is a foetus which is being named, the father places spittle on the mother's abdomen. Even in the case of naming the baby for a deceased person, recitation of the formula is accompanied by an offering of wine. The marriage pronouncements must be supplemented with gifts, and a divorce is effective only if white clay is sprinkled on the woman's shoulders. At a funeral the pronouncement of separation is uttered while the speaker touches the coffin with summe branches, and the pronouncement marking the end of the grave ceremonies is accompanied by the arrangement of vines across the path. The possible significance of these material components will be discussed in a separate section. Like the completive pronouncements, all of the effective pronouncements so far considered are associated with changes in status from unnamed to named, single to married, married to divorced, alive to dead, and from the mourned recently xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx deceased to the venerated ancestral spirit.

Effective Pronouncements connected with Official or Legal Status

The remaining occasions characterized by effective pronouncements are concerned either with special offices within the state, or with certain legal prohibitions. In the former case candidates for the priesthood and for the office of chief are both informed of their candidacy in formal, official pronouncements. With regard to candidates for the priesthood, they are subjected to a thorough investigation conducted by the village headman and priests. After a candidate successfully passes this examination of his family background, health, intelligence, aptitude, moral character, and his general knowledge of the requirements of the priestly life, his examiners pronounce him ready for training. The pronouncement effectively begins the three year novitiate which he must undergo before being recognized as a priest, and effects his status change from that of informal aspirant to that of committed novice.

Wen a chief dies, the elders and the queen mother immediately begin consulting about the election of a new chief. As the acknowledged authority on kin relationships, the queen mother has the right to declare the person she judges most suited for the office, although the many democratic mechanisms built into the Ashanti political structure militate against her neglecting to consider the people's choice. Of the various names discussed by the elders and the queen mother, and by the common people and their elected leader, the Nkwankwaahene, one person becomes the candidate upon whom the people then vote. The means by which a person becomes that candidate is the official pronouncement of the queen mother. She makes the pronouncement to the assembled populace through a spokesman, saying:

> Adere bu a, ye bo bi poma mu, nti nwonfa me ba (me nua) asumasi na nfa onananom 'tuo.
>
> When a sickle breaks we put a new shaft to it, so you must take my child (or brother) so-and-so, and give him the gun of his grandsires. (Rattray 1929:142).

It is the pronouncement which transforms the person named into a candidate for the office of the chief.

The legal prohibitions which are effected by means of pronouncements are of several kinds. In general, the pronouncement of any oath more grave than a simple fetish oath automatically transforms the matter under discussion into a public affair. Oaths are extremely important in Ashanti, and will be treated in more detail in a separate section. For the present, it is sufficient to say that the pronouncement of an oath violates a tribal taboo, constitutes a disruption of tribal unity, and thus gives a public character to any speech act no matter how trivial the content may appear to be.

Just as pronouncement of an oath effects a change in the character of a speech act, transferring it from the private to the public domain, so too, the linking of a legitimate prohibition to the violation of an oath automatically gives that prohibition the sanction of law and renders infractions of it illegal. One such prohibition which may be thus linked is that by which a husband forbids his wife to have any dealings with a particular lover. The husband who wishes to give the force of law to his directive will make a pronouncement such as the following to his wife:

> If from today you mention the name of, or speak with
> or receive presents from, or have any intercourse with
> so-and-so, may the national fetish kill you and may
> you be arraigned for violating the national oath (Danquah 1928:172).

This pronouncement effects a change in her status if she so much as speaks the name of her alleged lover, rendering her a criminal. The pronouncement may also include a prohibition against her ever marrying the lover. Should she then do so, even after the death of her husband, not only she, but ~~he also is guilty of a~~ the lover also, is guilty of a serious offence.

Two more examples of pronouncements which change~~s~~ the status of a person with regard to the law are connected with borrowing and lending money, persons, and/or goods. When an Ashanti borrows anything of any value he frequently has someone act as surety for him. The person filling this role becomes the abasom, or surety by pronouncing an oath that he will repay the principal with interest on an agreed date. His official relationship to both borrower and lender is effected by his pronouncement of the oath. Similarly, if the lender commits any illegal action such as approaching the borrower directly for payment, the surety may extricate himself from the business relationship by pronouncing another oath, this time against the principal: "Me ka ntam se ko yi me abasom," "I speak the forbidden name that you must relieve me of my suretyship." The lender's reaction to this oath is inconsequential. The pronouncement of the oath on the condition that the lender has been operating unfairly effects the speaker's change in status from legally responsible surety to uninvolved citizen not responsible before the law.

A common way of obtaining needed funds among the Ashanti is the pawning of goods or persons. This must be accomplished by the pronouncement of the terms of the transaction in the presence of at least two witnesses. The pronouncement effects the transaction; failure to pronounce the terms invalidates it.

The two remaining instances of pronouncements have already been discussed in the section on Announcements, for they are announced pronouncements. These are the declaration at the beginning of Apo which initiates the lifting of the ban on abuse each year, and the promulgation of new laws by which pronouncement the laws actually take effect.

Conclusions

The components of the various kinds of pronouncements are schematically presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6. Analysis of pronouncements as employed by the Ashanti shows certain characteristics to be common to all such speech acts:

1) All pronouncements use the voice as channel. In one instance, a man's pronouncement of his intention to marry, an intermediary is optional. In another case, the pronouncement of someone as candidate for the office of chief, a spokesman always pronounces the actual message form. In no case, however, is any channel

other than voice used to make the pronouncement.

2) Like announcements, pronouncements seem to be connected with events which ultimately promote the good of the state. In all those related to legal forms, the preservation of a peaceful and secure society seems to be the goal of the pronouncement. Those related to events in the life cycle celebrate life and fertility. The only case where this relationship between the pronouncement and the ultimate well-being of the Ashanti people is not clear is that of divorce. It may be that the Ashanti conceptualize this means of effecting a divorce by simple pronouncement as an improvement over the disharmony and strain of an unhappy marriage. If this is true, then divorce may be considered a means of restoring peace in a situation where it has been lost, and in this sense, productive of national well-being.

3) Pronouncements either themselves effect, or they complete and mark society's recognition of a change in the status of some individual. There is no instance where a pronouncement is made in relation to maintenance of the status quo.

4) Pronouncements apparently constitute an integral part of certain kinds of status change, and possibly of all status changes, although the data do not permit a definite generalization to that effect. In all of the instances cited though, it appears that the particular status change in question is not considered to have occurred unless the pronouncement is made.

5) Pronouncements are of two main types, each of which is further subdivided into two categories. First there are pronouncements of the completive type, and these include both events related to the life cycle and those of a legal character. Secondly there are effective pronouncements which are also divided into life-cycle - legal kinds of categories.

Of the completive pronouncements, those which are connected with life-cycle events have the following characteristics:

1) The event in question has to do with birth or the ability to give birth.

2) The speaker is always a woman, or a group of women

3) There is no specific addressee in any case

4); The tone in which the pronouncement is made is joyful, congratulatory.

5) In two cases, the pronouncement is sung rather than spoken.

The legal completive pronouncements are characterized by the following:

1) The setting is a formal court situation

2) The speaker is always a stool ~~xpakkx~~ spokesman.

3) There is always a specific addressee, either the ancestors being propitiated, or the defendant.

4) The manner of delivery is extremely formal, with no possibility of spontaneity.

The effective pronouncements made at life-cycle events also have certain identifiable characteristics:

1) All are accompanied by the use of some material component as well as the verbal formula/

2) The speaker is always a male, or someone whose right to make the pronouncement is derived through males. This last occurs when a woman (usually the father's sister) is the bestower of the patronymic. Although a woman may do this, she must always be a member of the father's ntoro.

3) There is always a specific addressee, always either a god or an ancestral spirit, or a person whose status will be changed by the pronouncement. Even in the case of a suitor speaking to the mother of his prospective bride, the addressee changes status in relation to the speaker, from mother of girl friend to prospective mother-in-law.

4) The joyful tone associated with completive pronouncements made at various points in the life cycle is replaced by a more formal, solemn manner.

~~x5xx~~ The following characteristics are associated with the remaining effective prohouncements:

1) All have to do with the changing of someone's legal status before the law. Thus one is transformed legally into a semi-sacred person when one is recognized

as a priest-novice. The unconfirmed chief-candidate also enjoys a certain legal status quite different from that of the non-candidate. The effective action of all the other pronouncements in this category in changing legal status, especially with regard to the responsibility of a person before the law, is equally clear.

2) In each case, except in the pronouncement of an oath, the speaker is specifically designated. Even in the use of oaths, one may identify the speaker as a disputant, at least designating him in terms of the addressee. In all cases the speaker has some ascendancy over or claim on the addressee, either political, legal, or at least alleged moral ascendancy or claim. Thus, the examiners of the priest candidate are fully qualified priests or village headmen. The queen mother who pronounces the name of the candidate for the chief's office has political authority over the common people and elders who constitute her audiecce. The herald, as representative of the chief has political ascendancy over the people he qddresses, and a husband has a certain ascendancy over his wive, at least in some matters. The one who pronounces an oath asserts a claim to moral ascendancy over his adversary, and in the case of pronouncements made by the one pawning anything, or a surety, certain claims that the speaker can make on the addressee are legally recognized.

3) There is always a specific addressee or group of addressees. In the case of a pronouncement that someone is eligible to begin his training for the priesthood, no message form is given, and it is impossible to know who the addressee is. It seems likely however, that the norms for this pronouncement fit the general pattern for this kind of speech act, ~~and~~ and that there is a specific addressee.

4) The manner of delivery is formal. Again, one can only hypothesize that this holds true for the pronouncement concerning priest-candidacy as the data do not include details concerning the manner in which that pronouncement is made.

TABLE 4 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: PRONOUNCEMENTS (Completive

Setting	Addresser Participants	Addressee(s)	Ends Goals	Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Pronouncing natal name	Midwives	Newborn	to recognize baby as named		As soon as child emerges, midwives shout, "Hail so-and-so"	Voice
Cutting of umbilical cord	Midwives	---	to confirm birth		When cord has been cut, midwives say, "Asumasi aba a, tenase." (see text)	Boice
Carrying newborn twins through town	midwives	women	Same	womeb join in honoring twins	Twins carried through town in basin atop midwife's head. Other women follow, singing (see text)	Voice (singing)
Beginning of bara rite	women	---	to confirm girl's arrival at puberty	girl's new status recognized	women sing bara songs (see text)	Voice (singing)
Unintentional breach of law	spokesman	ancestors	to confirm accidental character of act	defendant freed	Spokesman explains that breach was accidental	Voice
Alleged intentional breach of law	spokesman	defendant	to confirm defendant's guilt or innocence	defendant sentenced or freed	Spokesman addresses defendant, informing him ofverdice	Voice
~~Ntetea Ceremony~~	~~namer~~	~~god~~	~~bestowal of~~			

Life Cycle

Legal forms

TABLE 5 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: EFFECTIVE PRONOUNCEMENTS
(Life Cycle)

Setting	Participants		Ends		Act Sequence	Channel
	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes		
Ntetea Ceremony	namer	god	to bestow patronymic	baby named	Mother places child in lap of namer, who spits into child's mouth, recites formula (see text)	voice
Naming if person for whom child is named is dead	namer	ancestor	same	same	child taken to ruins of ancestor's hut. Namer pours out wine, recites formula (see text)	voice
Naming foetus	father	foetus	same	same	father spits 3x on wife'a abdomen, recites formula (see text)	voice
Declaration of intention to marry	suitor (intermediary)	girl girl's mother	to negotiate marriage	marriage	suitor speaks to girl; girl refers him to her family. Suitor gives presents to her mother, speaks to her mother (see text)	Voice
Divorce	husband witnesses must be present	wife	to effect divorce	divorce effected	husband sprinkles clay on wife, recites formula (see text)	Voice
3rd day of funeral	head of family of deceased	deceased	to effect separation of newly deceased from living community		Touches coffin with summe branches, recites formula (see text)	voice
End of funeral	?	deceased	to end funeral	That part of funeral concerned with burial ended	Path to grave closed off with vines, formula recited (see text)	voice

TABLE 6 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: PRONOUNCEMENTS (Connected with official or legal status)

	Participants		Ends			
Setting	Addressers	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
End of priest-novice's examination	examiners (village headmen and priests	---	to begin novitiate	novitiate begins	Candidate is pronounced ready to begin novitiate	?
Declaration of candidate for office of chief	queen mother	assembled people	to obtain new chief	candidate is voted upon	announces her choice for chief to assembled people, through spokesman (see text)	voice
Swearing of an oath	anyone	anyone	to give speech public character		a catastrophe which occureed to the Ashanti in past is alluded to	voice
Pronouncement of a formal prohibition under oath	husband	wife	to make her private offences public and illegal	her private offences become public and illegal	see text for message form	voice
becoming surety in borrowing transaction	surety	lender	to obtain money from lender for borrower	surety is responsible for repayment	surety swears oath that he will be responsible	voice
Ceasing to be surety in borrowing transaction	surety	lender	to be freed of responsibility	suretyis no longer responsible	surety swears oath that he is no longer responsible	voice
Pawning transaction	persons pawning		to obtain money	use of goods or persons temporarily transferred to another	Public pronouncement of terms of transaction	voice
Beginning of Apo	herald	all	to initiate Apo	Apo begins	Herald proclaims regulations for Apo festival (see text)	voice
Promulgation of new law	same	same	to make new law effective	new law becomes effective	Herald proclaims stipulations of new law	voice

Prayers

It has already been mentioned that certain kinds of formal pronouncements are never made without some material element being called into play. This is also true of another class of speech act among the Ashanti, the prayer. The recitation of the verbal formulas which meet the criteria for an Ashanti prayer (these criteria will be discussed below) is always characterized by manipulation of something material. In most instances this constitutes an offering to the addressee, and in the few cases where this is not so, the element does have a function similar to that of an offering.

A prayer among the Ashanti is a verbal formula addressed to a member of the spirit world for the purpose of petitioning some favor. The element of petition is essential, and no prayer has been reported which, does not include this component. All prayers have an element of offering. In most this is an overt handing over of something, usually food or drink, to the spirit addressed. In a few cases the offering is less direct, but the element is never completely ignored. All prayers which are directed toward the resolution of a specific problem contain a statement of the problem and the circumstances which have made the prayer necessary. There are five examples of prayers in which this statement is only implied, but again, the component is not completely neglected. In prayers for the sick, it is only possible to assume that the statement of fact is included, as no message form has been reported. In three instances, the statement is left out, but these are all general prayers, not dictated by particular circumstances, but rather by the general ideology and ceremonial calendar of the people.

Prayers to Members of the Ghost World

Prayers fall into four major categories according to addressee. The first of these is made up of only two prayers, both of which are addressed to members of the ghost world. When a baby is born it is not fully incorporated into the community until a period of eight days is over, for the Ashanti say that "when a child is born in this world, a ghost-mother mourns the loss of her child in the samandow (spirit world)" (Rattray 1927:59). During the eight days no one can be certain whether the infant will prove to be a human child or, by dying during this period, show itself to be merely a wandering ghost. It is never addressed in any endearing terms during this time. Should the baby die before the eighth day, the reaction of its parents is one of anger. The body of the dead infant is whipped, sometimes mutilated, and buried in the village midden heap. Such a child is thereafter referred to as "kuku 'ba," "pot child," after the pot in which the body is frequently buried. After a series of insulting observances engaged in by the parents, the maternal grandmother sometimes performs a ceremony which points up the underlying meaning of these reactions. Taking some mashed yams or plantain and eggs, the grandmother and the mother go to the cross-roads of the village and, standing at their junction, the older woman says:

> 'Na owo asamandow gye eto ne nkesua yi di, ye da wo ase
> pi se wa ma woye aba, ye sere wo foforo. Akoda wokoro
> gye wo nkesua ko ma aberewa se de obeba bio die a, otenase.
>
> O Mother who dwells in the land of spirits, receive this
> eto and eggs and eat. We thank you very much that you
> permitted this one to come, but we beg you for a new one.
> And you infant, who are going, receive your eggs and give
> to your old mother saying: "Let one come again, but permit
> it to remain."

Next, the grandmother feeds the earthly mother, giving her a spoonful of food three times, and the following words are spoken each time:

> Sudie didi 'Kwanso na nnidi me yafuno mu.
>
> Spirit (of a child that has died before eight days),
> eat on the path, do not eat in my belly.

In these prayers the offering is ~~[illegible]~~ of the typical form, the giving over of food to a member of the spirit world, the food constituting the material component of the prayer. The petition element is also explicit: "We beg you for a new one;" "Let one come again, but permit it to remain;" "Eat on the path, do not eat in my belly." The statement of the problem is not so explicit, but it is clearly implied in the thanksgiving section of theprayer, "We thank you very much that you permitted this one to come," immediately followed by the petition, "but we beg you for a new one." This is the only prayer reported which includes an explicit statement of gratitude and this seems clearly to function as the statement of the problem characteristic of other prayers.

Prayers to those who have Died Recently

The second group of prayers is that in which petitions are directed to the newly deceased. Although the first group discussed does contain a prayer to a newly deceased child, that prayer differs from those in the second group because the child addressed is not recognized as ever having been a member of human society. He is rather regarded as a ghost figure who never completely left the ghost world. Those addressed in the second group of prayers are deceased adults who have participated in and contributed to the Ashanti community during their lives. Most of these prayers are funeral petitions directed to the corpse during the seven days of ritual surrounding the death of any adult.

At the moment of death, the deceased is immediately propitiated by some member of the family who has been watching at his side. Pouring a little water down the throat of the dead person, the speaker recites the following:

> Asumasi se begye nsu yi nom wo kore yi amma asem
> biara mima ha, na mma ewo efie ha myina nwo mma.
>
> Your clansmen so-and-so and so-and-so say, 'Receive this
> water and drink, and do not permit any evil thing to come
> whence you are setting out, and permit all the women of
> this household to bear children.

Reference to the offering, the water, is explicit, and the petition is clearly stated in the prayer. The definition of the situation which warrants recitation of the prayer is implied in the phrase, "whence you are setting out," referring to the deceased's journey to the spirit world.

During the first two days after someone has died, mourners present themselves to the place where the body is lying. Approaching the corpse with gifts of money, food, and cloth, they recite petitions to the deceased. The theme of these is: "Let your family have long life and health. May we get money to pay for your funeral. Do not let any of us fall sick. May the women bear children." These prayers are apparently spontaneous, and the complete form of one has not been reported in any instance. The petition seems to be the core of the prayer, and as they are recited precisely while offerings are being made, that element too, is clearly present whether it is actually referred to verbally or not. The data do not permit a definite conclusion that the situation, i.e., death of an adult member of the community, is explicitly stated in the prayer, but the reference to money to pay for the addressee's funeral certainly defines the context sufficiently to satisfy this criterion of an Ashanti prayer.

On the third day after death, the day of burial, a member of the dead person's family steps forward and addresses the following prayer to the deceased:

> Today you go. We have fired guns. We have brought sheep. We have brought cloths. We have made a fine funeral. Do not let anyone fall ill. Let us get money to pay for the expenses we have made. Let all the mourners have strength. Life to the chief. Let him beget children. Let all be fertile.

Again the petition is explicitly made in the last section of the prayer. The offering element is contained in the references to the sheep and cloths brought to the deceased. The situation warranting the prayer is defined in the phrases, "Today you go....We have made a fine funeral."

The sixth day after death is called sora da, the day of rising, and is characterized by a rite which begins in front of the special sora hut constructed on the outskirts of town on the preceeding day. The chief presides at this rite, reciting the following formula at the hut:

> Today with the sora rite we finish your funeral.
> Come and receive this wine and drink and be gone

> and rest peacefully. Let no one fall ill. Do not let the chief's eyes become covered over. Let the women bear children. Let nothing evil befall. Let us get money to pay the expenses of your funeral.

After this prayer has been recited, the mourners all process to the cemetery where food and wine are offered to the spirit of the dead person. Petition (the second part of the prayer, from "Let no one fall ill" to the end), offering ("Come and receive this wine and drink...."), and statement of the situation ("Today with the sora rite we finish your funeral"), are all made explicit in this prayer.

The one prayer in this category which does not occur during the funeral is that addressed by a dead man's brother to the deceased one year after the funeral. The Ashanti practice the levirate and in the normal course of events a widow becomes the wife of her deceased husband's brother. The brother is forbidden to marry the woman until a year has elapsed since his brother's funeral however, and he prays to the spirit of the dead man before cohabiting with her:

> Asumasi, ye se adere bu a, ye bo bi poma m' nne na wo ye' ye de no ama me, me sere wo fwe me ne no so fwe pa. Ma nkoda yi nye yiye ne ma yen some me; ma menwo 'ba, bi nka wodie yi ho.
>
> So-and-so, they say that when a cutlass breaks, they put a new shaft to it; today they have taken your wife and given her to me. Ibbeg you to look well after me and her. Let these children prosper and serve me, and let me beget others to add to your own (Rattray 1929:28).

While reciting this prayer, the man pours wine upon the ground, and this constitutes the offering. The petition is again contained in the second part of the prayer and the statement of the situation in the first part. In all of the prayers in this category the offerings accompanying and/or referred to in the verbal formula represent the material element always present in Ashanti prayers.

Prayers to the Ancestors

A third category of Ashanti prayers is constituted by formulas addressed to the ancestral spirits. Because of the great importance attached to the ancestors these occur in a variety of contexts.

One of the most important occasions on which the ancestors are addressed is the Adae ceremony, which takes place every forty-three days. The term "Adae" means "a place of rest" or "lying down," and is applied to those rites which propitiate the spirits of departed rulers, recalling their names and deeds, eliciting favors and mercy. At the beginning of the ceremony, the chief greets the ancestral spirits, "nananom samanfo makye," "Spirit grandfathers, good morning." He then makes offerings to them by placing mashed plantain and yams on their stools, praying to them all the while, asking for prosperity and fertility in the village. Next, a sheep is brought in amid loud cries of "Tie!" and the chief sacrifices the animal, again addressing himself in prayer to the spirits. When the meat is cooked a bell is rung to announce that the spirits are eating or are about to eat (Rattray 1923:97). The meat is distributed by the chief to each of the ancestor's stools and at each the chief says, "Here is meat; receive and eat." Then the various stool carriers of the chief's household smear the sheep's blood upon each stool, maintaining complete silence as they do so. The head stool-carrier also pours a few drops of whiskey on each stool, again asking blessings from the ancestors.

Throughout the ceremony the petition and offering elements are explicitly contained in the prayers uttered by the chief and the head stool-carrier. The material element is clearly provided by theplantain and yams, sheep, and whiskey. There is no direct definition of the situation giving rise to the prayers, but as has been mentioned above, such a statement does not constitute an essential criterion of prayers recited in rites which are automatically celebrated because of some ideological or calendrical consideration.

Elders frequently address the ancestors in private prayers, offering them wine and begging them to grant various requests. As these prayers are apparently occasioned by felt needs, presumably there is a statement of the problem or situation, although the actual message form has not been reported. Conceivably such a statement might be incorporated into the petition, with for example, a petition for the recovery of so-and-so clearly indicating that so-and-so is ill and this is the situation which occasions the recitation of the prayer. The petition constitutes the core of the prayer, and the offering is made in the pouring of the wine. Occasionally an elder will call in a priest to act as intermediary in the recitation of these prayers, but this does not appear to alter the form of the prayers themselves.

Because of the Ashanti attitude toward land as being essentially the property of the ancestors, any alienation of land requires propitiation of the true owners. Thus one who finds himself ~~mx~~ so in debt that it becomes necessary for him to mortgage his land, pours wine on the ground and recites the following formula:

> Me nananom nsamanfo, mo ngye nsa yi nom, na nye me na
> me ye biribie, na eka na ato me na m'aton asase a ewo
> na yi 'ama Asumasi me de m'atua me ka.
>
> My spirit grandfathers, receive this wine and drink, for
> it is not I who am at fault but a debt which has fallen
> upon me so that I have to sell this land here to so-and-
> so and pay my debt (Rattray 1923:232).

In this prayer it is the petition element which is least explicit. The offering and statement of the problem are clearly present, but the petition ~~mx~~ is only implicitly present in the phrase, "It is not I who am at fault...." Here the speaker seems to be asking the ancestors to be lenient in their judgement of his action, and to continue to deal favorably with him in spite of his alienation of their land.

Another prayer to the ancestors is contained in one of the pronouncements already discussed. The formula which constitutes a completive pronouncement with regard to any accidental homicide is also a prayer addressed to the ancestors when a sheep for sacrifice to them has been received from the responsible person. The sheep is the offering, the petition is constituted by the last sentence in the formula, and the statement of the situation is contained in the first part of the utterance.

The destoolment of a chief is another occasion on which the ancestors must be informed and propitiated. Immediately after effecting the destoolment, the elders address the ancestors:

> Wo nana asumasi a ye ma no tena nwokyiri, wa ye
> sa yi, wa ye sa yi, mi ye tu no so, nwomoa yen,
> na yempe nnipa papa na oma nwo biribi nni.
>
> Your grandchild so-and-so, whom we caused to stand
> behind you, has done such-and-such, and such-and-
> such things; in consequence, we have removed him; you
> must help us to seek for a good man that he may give
> you something to eat (Rattray 1929:46).

Here the petition and definition of the situation are explicit; the offering is not. At first sight it appears that this formula does not in fact satisfy the criteria of a prayer form because the offering element is not apparent. It seems probable however, that the empty stool actually constitutes the offering in this case. It is of great concern to the ancestors that the stool be occupied by a worthy representative. When a chief proves to be unworthy of his office, the elders can best please the ancestors by courageously effecting his removal. The empty stool, then, is an object of high value achieved at the expense of the elders' personal efforts, representative of their very life, and eminently pleasing to the ancestors. Because of these characteristics it seems probable that the stool does constitute an offering in the destoolment prayer.

The last instance of a prayer addressed to the ancestors is that spoken by a man to his deceased ancestor when he names his child for the dead person. The formula has already been quoted in the section on pronouncements, for it appears to be an effective pronouncement as well as a prayer. It contains the petition, offering, and statement of situation elements, all in explicit form.

In all of the prayers in this category the material element is in the form of the offering. According to the interpretation suggested for the destoolment prayer, the stool itself constitutes the material element in that case.

Prayers to Various Gods and Spirits

The fourth category of prayers is made up of those addressed to gods and various spirits other than those of the dead. These include various fetish spirits, spirits of natural phenomena, objects such as trees, rivers, streams, etc., and the fairies whose mysterious natures and supernatural powers over people, things, and events seem~~s~~ to justify associating them in this study with inhabitants of the spirit world. In one instance, ancestors are included in the spirits addressed, but as many other spirits are also invoked in this prayer it will be treated as belonging to the fourth category.

The supreme god in the Ashanti pantheon is Nyame. Priests dedicated to this god officiate at a special rite in his honor each year. The rite is always held on a Saturday, the day dedicated to Nyame. In it the priest offers the god a spoonful of mashed yams, saying, "Me Nyankopon me sere wo nkwa, na me sere wo ahooden," "My God, I pray you for life and I pray you for strength." A sheep is also killed while the priest prays, "Here is a sheep I kill for you, take and eat, and give me health and strength" (Rattray 1923:144). The petition and offering elements in the prayer are obvious. The ceremony is much like the Adae ceremony insofar as it is occasioned by calendrical dictates rather than by the occurrence of a specific situation requiring a remedy or solution. The statement of a problem or definition of a problem situation therefore does not appear.

Every priest officiates at a rite in honor of his own particular god on the night marking the end of his three year novitiate and the beginning of his priesthood. The rite is concluded by the new priest offering a sheep to his god and saying:

> Obosom asumasi gye 'gwan y i di, nne na wa ware me
> wa wie; me nsa m'gwan ni, na gyina m'akyi akyigyinapa.

> God so-and-so, accept this sheep and eat; today you
> have completed marriage with me; this is a sheep
> from my hands, stand at my back with a good standing
> (Rattray 1927:47).

The petition, offering, and statement of the situation are all made explicit in the prayer.

The special totemic spirit or ntoro of a man's patrilineal group is addressed in prayers recited during the Adofie ceremony held at about the sixth or seventh month of his wife's pregnancy. In this rite, the woman presents her husband with a fowl and some eggs telling him to give them to his ntoro in order that she might give birth to a healthy baby. He takes the fowl to a corner of his sleeping room and addresses his ntoro:

> So-and-so, come and receive this fowl that your
> child in the woman's womb may come forth
> without harm.

The petition and offering are explicit elements in the prayer. The statement of the situation is included in the petition in the phrase "...your child (is) in the woman's womb...."

In the naming of a child during the Ntetea ceremony, the naming pronouncement already cited also constitutes a prayer directed to one of the gods. In the formula the definition of situation and the petition are both explicit. The offering here is made not directly to the god, however, but rather to the child, for the namer is expected to present the newborn with a gift. This gift is indirectly given to the god, for it is presented only after the name has been bestowed and the child placed under the particular care of the god. The child's relationship to the god is then such that the god is pleased by the promotion of the child's welfare.

Several gods and spirits, including ancestral spirits are addressed in a prayer recited during the bara rite by the mother of the girl whose puberty is being celebrated. At the beginning of the ceremony the mother spills a little wine on the ground saying:

> Nyankonpon Tweaduapon 'Nyame, gye nsa nom!
> Asase Ya, gye nsa nom!
> Nsamanfo, munye nsa nom.
> Oba yi a Nyankonpon de ama me yi, nne na wa bo no bara.
> Oni a owo Samandow, ommefa no onnye bara nwu.
>
> Supreme Sky God, who is alone great, upon whom men lean and
> do not fall, receive this wine and drink.
> Earth Goddess, whose day of worship is a Thursday, receive
> this wine and drink.
> Spirit of our ancestors, receive this wine and drink.
> This girl child whom God has given to me, today the Bara
> state has come upon her.
> O mother who dwells in the land of ghosts, do not come
> and take her away and do not have per-
> mitted her to menstruate only to die
> (Rattray 1927:70).

Offering, petition, and definition of the situation, are all explicit.

Another bara prayer displays the same kind of explicit reference to these three elements. On the second day of the ceremony the girl is taken to the river and bathed. Her loin cloth is removed and placed, together with an egg and the sponge with which she has been bathed, in the river. Prayers are then addressed by the women attendants, to the river in words such as:

> Gye 'tam, ne sapow, ne 'kesua yi ma akoda yi nye
> bara nwu.
>
> Receive this loin cloth, and sponge, and eggs,
> and do not let this infant have come to puberty
> only to die.

An alternate prayer is:

> When the ghost-mother of this infant comes to draw
> water, do you, o stream, give her these things,
> and tell her that her child has reached puberty, and
> that she must not look upon her again as she now has
> a mother here (Rattray 1927:72).

Offering and petition are clear. The definition of the situation is given in the words "...this infant...(has) come to puberty...." in the first instance, and "...her child has reached puberty...." in the second.

Various gods are addressed in prayers for the sick. The actual form of these has not been reported, but the element of petition is clearly present, and it seems likely that a statement of the problem is also present. An offering is always made to the priest when his services are thus engaged, and whether one is made to the god invoked or not, this satisfies the criterion of the offering element.

At burials a prayer is always addressed to the spirit of the earth before the grave is dug. A libation is poured on the spot and the following words are recited:

> Asase Ya gye nsa nom. Wo nana asumasi na wawu.
> Ya be sere wo aha abo amena.
>
> Goddess of earth, receive this wine and drink.
> Your grandchild so-and-so has died. We beg of
> you that we may here dig a hole.

Offering, petition, and statement of the problem are all explicitly contained in the prayer.

The mmoatia are forest people or fairies recognized by the Ashanti as experts in medical lore who are responsible for the training of many medicine men. They have many powers including those related to black magic and the Ashanti frequently invoke their aid in order to effect the death of a particular enemy. The death fetish must be held as the following prayer is said:

> This man so-and-so has been a man who has been in
> my way in all things. In my journey to happiness
> he has been a stumbling block, Knowing, therefore
> the power of the ancient gods, I appeal to you with
> all sincerity of heart, that you will give me every

help to overcome this enemy.

Praises of the suman are recited and then the supplicant says:

> You gods, I charge you that tomorrow I will see so-and-so deadd (Masters 1950:224).

Petition and definition of the situation are obvious. The offering seems to be present in the form of the speaker's grasp of the death fetish, a kind of offering of the powers of the fetish to the fairies in order to enable them to effect the stipulated goal.

Another kind of spirit invoked in prayers of this category is the spirit of the wood from which drums are made, addressed by drummers at the beginning of performances. Invocations are also made to any spirits capable of interfering with the drummer's work, including especially those of former drummers. In one of these drum preludes, "The Awakening," the drummer addresses the spirits of the various materials of which the instrument is made:

Drum pegs, knocked in by drummers,
Drum pegs, if you have been away,
I am calling you; they say come.
I am learning, let me succeed.

Elephant, Kotomirefi, that frees Kotoko.
Elephant of Kotoko that swallows other Elephants,
Elephant, if you have been away,
I am calling you, they say come.
He that saw your birth
Never apprehended your beginning.
He that knew of your formation
Never saw how you were born.
Shall we go forward? We shall find men fighting.
Shall we press on? We shall find men fleeing.
Let us go forward in great haste,
Treading the path beaten by the Elephant,
The Elephant that shatters the axe,
The monstrous one, unmindful of bullets.
Elephant, if you have been away,
I am calling you; they say come.
I am learning, let me succeed.

Ampasakyi, drum string of the bark of obofunu,

> Obofunu, the last born,
> Drum string, if you have been away,
> I am calling you; they say come.
> I am learning, let me succeed (Nketia 1963b:10-11).

Again, petition, and definition of situation are explicitly made. The offering in this instance appears to be the actual performance of the drummer, i.e., the beating of the drums with hand and/or sticks.

Conclusions

In every instance then, Ashanti prayers do meet the criteria of petibn and offering of some sort. In all but calendrically determined instances a statement of the situation which occasions the prayer is also present. All prayers are accompanied by a material component which in all cases constitutes the offering. In the case of naming at the Ntetea, the material offering of a gift is further supplemented by another material element, the placing of spittle in the mouth of the new-born child.

Prayers are said by the Ashanti at various stages during the life cycle, whenever anything which might anger the ancestors has occurred, or whenever their special help is desired. They are also offered to various spirits and gods when their protection or aid is being solicited. In addition prayers are recited at certain predetermined times during the calendar year. Tables seven through ten present a schematic analysis of the components of Ashanti prayers.

TABLE 7 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: PRAYERS TO MEMBERS OF THE GHOST WORLD

Setting	Participants Addresser	 Addressee	Ends Goals	 Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Rites after death of newborn under eight days old	child's maternal grandmother; probably child's mother	ghost mother ghost child	to propitiate ghost mother and ghost child; to obtain another, healthy child		Food offered, prayer recited to ghost mother; (see text); grandmother feeds earthly mother. Prayer is offered to ghost child.	Voice

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TABLE 8 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: PRAYERS TO THOSE WHO HAVE DIED RECENTLY

Setting	Participants Addresser	 Addressee	Ends Goals	 Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Rites at moment of death	Member of deceased's family	deceased	to give dead person water for journey; to propitiate him and insure his well-being and that of the household		At moment when soul leaves body member of family pours water down deceased's throat, recites formula (see text)	Voice
First two days of funeral	mourners	deceased	to express sorrow, propitiate the deceased		Women weep and wail; guns, drumming, singing provice noise. Gifts presented to corpse with speeches (see text)	Voice
Burial	family member	deceased	to propitiate deceased		addresses the deceased (see text). Coffin closed	Voice
	?	earth spirit	To propitiate spirit of earth		Libation poured, prayer recited (see text). Grave dug	Voice
Sora rite	?	deceased	to finish funeral, propitiate corpse	part of funeral connected with burial is concluded.	Prayer recited before sora hut (see text). Mourners process to cemetery, offer food to deceased.	Voice
Marriage between widow and brother of deceased	heir	deceased	to appease deceased, and obtain his good will and blessing on the marriage. Cohabitation then begins.		Wine is poured on ground. Heir recites prayer (see text). Couple may then cohabit.	Voice

TABLE 9 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: PRAYERS TO THE ANCESTORS

Setting	Participants		Ends		Act Sequence	Channel
	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes		
First half of Adae ceremony	chief spokesman herald attendants	ancestors	propitiate ancestors		chief greets ancestors, distributes food, prays; Sacrifices sheep to them. Bell is rung, meat and blood and whiskey distributed. Spokesman and herald interject throughout (see text)	Voice
Ancestor worship	elder OR priest	ancestors	propitiate ancestors, obtain favors, interpret will of ancestors		elder offers wine, prayers. Priest prays to wncestors, listens to their voices, interprets their will to worshippers	Voice
Mortgaging land	person obtaining mortgage	ancestors	propitiate ancestors		offers wine, prayer (see text)	Voice
Prayer after an accidental killing	spokesman	ancestors	appease ancestors; killer is freed after prayer		person responsible for the killing offers sheep to be sacrifieed to ancestors. Spokesman prays (see text)	Voice
Destoolment	elders	ancestors	propitiate ancestors, obtain their help in securing new chief		chief is destooled, elders pray to ancestors (see text)	Voice
Naming of child when person for whom he is named is dead	father of child	ancestor for whom named	father pours wine, prays to inform ancestor that child is named for him, secure his special protection for child.		father pours wine, prays (see text)	Voice

TABLE 10 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: PRAYERS TO VARIOUS GODS AND SPIRITS

	Participants		Ends			
Setting	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Rite honoring Nyame	priest	Nyame	worship, propitiate Nyame		Offers food, prays (see text)	Voice
End of priest's novitiate	priest	his special god	to obtain special protection of the god		priest dances all night, ends by offering sheep, reciting prayer (see text) to god	Voice
Adofie ceremony	man whose wife is pregnant	ntoro spirit	obtain protection of expected child from ntoro spirit		man gives cloth, gold to wife; she gives him fowl and eggs for ntoro. He offers fowl, prayer to ntoro in corner of sleeping room (see text)	Voice
Ntetea ceremony	namer	god	bestow patronymic		Namer spits into child's mouth, recites prayer (see text). Gives gift to child.'	Voice
Bara rite: first part	Mother	various spirits: sky god earth spirit ancestors ghost mother	insure protection of girl		mother pours wine, offers prayer (see text)	Voice
Bara rite: 2nd part	Women	Spirit of river	insure protection of girl		Girl taken to river, bathed Loincloth, sponge, eggs given to river, prayer recited (see text)	Voice
Sickness	priest	god	obtain health of sick person		priest called in to determine reason for sickness, obtain cure	Voice
Burial	?	earth spirit	propitiate earth in which grave is about to be dug		libation poured, prayer recited (see text)	Voice

TABLE /0 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: PRAYERS TO VARIOUS GODS AND SPIRITS (cont'd)

Setting	Participants Addresser	 Addressee	Ends Goals	 Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Invocation of mmoatia	anyone	fairies	to obtain aid of mmoatia in effecting death of enemy		use death suman, recite prayer, praises of suman, final invocation (see text)	Voice
Beginning of drum performance	drummer	spirits of drum materials and former drummers	to obtain help of spirits in drumming well		Drummer begins performance by addressing various spirits	talking drums

Communicative Acts with Material Components

It has been pointed out that all prayers and all pronouncements connected with the life cycle which effect what they say are characterized by the manipulation of some material element. These are not, however, the only utterances so characterized. The remaining ones may be divided into two general types, those which affirm the event of which they speak, and those which have as their goal either the undoing of some act or situation, or at least the prevention of a recurrence of that act or situation.

Affirmations

The first category of these speech acts include those which take place when the Ashanti wish to affirm some particularly desirable occurrence, and perhaps reinforce the behavior patterns leading up to it. One such occasion is the bara ceremony during which the whole female community expresses joy at the puberty of one of its members. The young girls who parade through the village during the celebration all carry white flags as they sing the traditional bara songs. Examples of the songs are as follows:

-1-

Shout for joy!
Joy! Joy!
God of old,

We thank thee,
We thank thee, O God,
We are blessed.

This is the opening song of thanksgiving, followed by others:

-2-

Give me a donno drum to play.
Obeyaa of Dankyira,
For I have none.

Something approaches:
It is the Queen
What is (the value of) a drum?
Give me a donno drum to play, Obeyaa,
For I have none.

-3-

There is joy, there is joy.
There is joy, there is joy.
Queen Mother Akua,
Joy!
There is joy, there is joy.
There is joy, there is joy.
Queen Mother Akua,
Joy!
Queen Mother Akua,
We come from Kontonkyi: we are up in the morning;
It is the grandchild of Fredua Agyeman:
Celebrate her puberty for me.

(Nketia 1963b:53-55).

The tone is one of joy and congratulation, and the whole mood signifies a delighted affirmation of the girl's attainment of maturity. The significance of the white flags is not obvious in itself, but they surely serve more than a purely functional purpose such as signalling, for it has already been shown that the very announcement of the bara is sufficiently distinctive to convey the information that a puberty rite is about to be celebrated, without any words at all. In addition, the words the girls sing are themselves communicative as well as merely expressive. In the light of other uses of material compoeents along with verbal utterances it would appear that the flags function here to add affirmation and reinforcement to the general spirit of rejoicing expressed in the words of the songs.

Another example of the material element used in a situation which is considered by the Ashanti to be desirable is the presentation of a small gift along with verbal praise to children whose behavior has been especially pleasing. The Ashanti are sensitive to the value of rewards as a means of reinforcing good behavior. Praise is always given a child who has shown good conduct or worked diligently at some task. Although it is not always accompanied by a gift, frequently praise is supplemented by a penny or a piece of fruit. The verbal element is the ~~mere~~ basic aspect of the reward, for it is always present. Nevertheless, the reward is certainly enhanced by the addition of a small present. Nothing has been reported as to criteria for defining what kinds of conduct are rewarded by praise alone as opposed to those which also warrant presentation of a gift. Again in the total context of other instances of communicative acts in which the Ashanti consistently employ a material thing as well as words, it seems probable that the gift is given when the Ashanti particularly wish to reinforce a given kind of behavior. This will be discussed in more detail below.

Undoing

Other instances of this use of some material in connection with communication occur when the Ashanti wish to undo or prevent the recurrence of some particular act or situation. In three instances the undoing function is particularly apparent. The first of these is the revocation of a fetish oath. The oath is originally sworn by invoking the wrath of a fetish either on one's own life or on that of another. This is done usually in an effort to prove one's innocence or truthfulness. The oath is revoked by striking stone or wood on the ground while saying, "Anokye koko twea," "Anokye fetish, take away the curse." The stone or wood of course constitutes the material element in this case.

Another occasion on which the undoing element seems clear is the settlement of a dispute between an older child and his father. Such settlement is effected by consultation with a clan elder who passes judgement as to which party is in the wrong. If it is the child who is declared guilty he is required to apologize through an intermediary and usually to offer a sacrifice in order to appease his father's ntoro. The single communicative act constituted by the apology and the sacrifice is a way of undoing the harm wrought by the original offence, and again the function served by the material element, the object sacrificed, appears to be significant.

The third instance of this undoing occurs at the destoolment of a chief. This takes place usually after several complaints have been lodged against the chief and he has beenppublicly admonished and warned by the Asantehene at least twice. It is effected by public accusation by the elders together with a great deal of verbal ridicule directed against the chief and usually physical removal of him from the stool. The material component in this case appears to be the stool. By accusing and ridiculing the chief and regaining physical possession of the stool the elders undo what had been done in the chief's enstoolment, deprive him of his authority to rule, and make vacant once again the office of the chief.

Punishment and Prevention

A material element is also used in connection with certain utterances directedd at the prevention of certain kinds of events or situations from recurring. The first such occasion is the ridiculing rite performed whenever a woman dies in childbirth. xkkkxkk It is considered shameful for a woman even to cry out during labor, and to die in childbirth is a very great disgrace. All the pregnant women of the area go and cut budding plantain leaves, and entering the compound where the corpse is lying, they point the shoots at it, saying,

> Poom! fa wo musuo ko, wantumi anwo, wantumi anko, wa ko ato.
>
> Bang! Begone with your evil, you have been unable to bring forth, you have been unable to fight, you have fought only to die (Rattray 1927:58-59).

The goal of the ceremony seems to be to properly chastise the woman who has failed in her primary duty, but also to prevent such a failure from recurring. The fact that it is only pregnant women, i.e., women who are vulnerable to an identical kind of failure, who participate in this rite points up this preventive function.

The child who persists in bed-wetting is similarly ridiculed, again with a material element being operative in the ceremony. The father of such a child calls in a group of small children of his own child's age, telling them to come and catch the guilty child, and make him dance a dance called "bonsua bono." The child is tied in his mat, taken to the bush, and dressed in nettles. Water is thrown over him while his peers sing:

> Tworodobia e! wo si wo kete anadwo.
> Tworodobia e! wo si wo ntama anadwo.
>
> You wash your sleeping mat in the night, Tworodobia e!
> You wash your cloth in the night.

He is then taken to a family elder and taught to swear that he will not again have an accident at night. The water thrown over the child and the nettles in which he is wrapped constitute the material element of this ridiculing ceremony which is apparently designed both to chastise the offender and to prevent him from offending in the future.'

A third instance of this kind of speech act occurs when a man has been found guilty of committing adultery with his slave's wife. In this case a public ceremony usually takes place in which the man is required to kneel in front of his seated slave with a sheep across his shoulders. He brings the sheep over his head, and as it touches the ground in front of him, says: "Di bim apeafo," "Yours is a just cause." The slave replies, "Ma gyae, me ka ntam se me som wo se me som wo da da," "I leave it, and I swear the oath that I will serve you as I served before this happened." Everyone then jeers and laughs at the master. If the slave fears the revenge of the master he says publicly: "Me ka ntam se fa me ko ma Ohene na gya wo sika, na wa di me ye' mensom wo dio," "I swear the oath that you must take me to the chief, and he will hand you the money you paid for me, for you have eaten my wife and I will not serve you any more (Rattray 1929:38-39). The ceremony serves as both punishment of a guilty man and prophylactic against the commission of a similar offence either by the culprit or any other member of the community.

Another occasion when verbal ridicule and some material object are united in a communicative act which is both punishing and preventive is that in which a tale-bearer or gossipper is chastised. This punishment, already mentioned under Announcing, requires that the offender, his face smeared with charcoal and a live fowl between his teeth, parade through the village beating a gong while all the villagers ridicule and jeer at him. The action is apparently designed to punish the culprit and also to act as a deterrent on others who might be tempted to commit a similar offence.

All of the speech events directed toward punishing and preventing the recurrence of some offence involve the use of ridicule. Those designed to undo some former act or event are of a more formal and solemn nature than the other events discussed here, while those which affirm and reinforce some act or event takeplace in a less solemn and less rigidly defined context.

Conclusions

If all of the speech acts involving some form of material component are analyzed (See tables 11 through 13), it appears that they all have certain characteristics and goals in common. Those described as prayers and effective pronouncements, as well as the acts discussed in this section all have a certain forcefulness about them and a tendency toward affecting future behavior not manifested in other speech acts. Thus, those which are designed to affirm approved behavior are also oriented toward reinforcing the behavior pattern in the case of praising children, and toward insuring the future fertility and well being of young girls in the case of bara rites. Those which seek to undo prior acts or situations require the force necessary to effect a change in what has already been done to the extent that people may act as if in fact the prior act or situation had never existed. The speech events which have for their objective punishment and prevention are also geared to effect changes in the psychological or physical mechanisms which have permitted certain offences to occur such that these offences might not be permitted to occur in the future. Prayers, with their emphasis on petition are also designed to effect certain activities on the part of the addressees so that the petitions might be granted. In the case of effective pronouncements, this aspect of actually causing the words to do as well as say is especially obvious. This leaves a question as to the absence of a material element in connection with the effective pronouncements which are not related to the life cycle, i.e., those which are connected with the assumption of a new office, or with certain legal formulas.

It is likely that all effective pronouncements of this type are connected with the swearing of an oath. In only two cases is this relationship not explicit. It has not been reported that it is necessary for the contracting parties to swear an oath when they are negotiating about the pawning of some object or person. In view of the fact that oaths are sworn in all similar transactions such as borrowing and lending, it appears likely that this is the case, however. Similarly, no ethnographer has mentioned an oath as such in connection with the pronouncement of a boy's candidacy for the priesthood. It is mentioned however, that the new novice takes vows to god and to the community at this time. It seems probable that the vows are couched in oath form. In all other cases of this type of pronouncement the oath is clearly a part of the pronouncement.

Because of the great significance and efficacy of oaths for the Ashanti it appears that when this solemn form is used the words alone suffice to *be* and *do* what they say. No other supplement is needed to insure their efficacy. In all speech acts which have as their objective the effective accomplishment of what the words themselves purport, it appears that the Ashanti require either the oath form or some material component to be included. The main function of the material element then would seem to be the instilling of efficacious power in the verbal formula.

TABLE 11 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS CONNECTED WITH MATERIAL ELEMENTS: AFFIRMATIONS AND REINFORCING ACTS

Setting	Participants		Ends		Act Sequence8	channel
	Addresser	Addressor	Goals	Outcomes		
Bara rite	young girls	---	to affirm girl's attainment of puberty and congratulate her		girls parade with white flags, singing bara songs	voice (singing)
Rewarding good behavior of child	adult	child	to reinforce good behavior patterns		child who behaves well is rewarded with praise and gift	voice

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Connected with Material Elements: Undoing

TABLE 12 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: "UNDOING-PRONOUNCEMENTS"

	Participants		Ends			
Setting	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Revocation of fetish oath	person who had sworn fetish oath	---	to undo effects of fetish oath	effects of oath are no longer operative	strikes stone or wood on ground, says, "Anokye fetish, take away the curse."	voice
Settlement of dispute between parent and child	child intermediary	parent	to appease parent		child apologizes through intermediary to parent he has offended. Offers sacrifice	voice
Destoolment	elders	chief	deprive chief of his stool and authority	chief loses all authority and official prerogatives	elders accuse chief, ridicule and abuse him, and physically take stool away from him	voice

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TABLE 13 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS CONNECTED WITH MATERIAL ELEMENTS: PUNISHING AND PREVENTING. (Genre for all is ridicule)

Setting	Participants		Ends		Act Sequence	Channel
	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes		
Rites for a woman who has died in childbirth	all pregnant women of village	deceased	to punish woman who has failed in her social duty; prevent recurrence		point plantain shoots at corpse, ridicule dead woman (see text)	voice
child accused of enuresis	child's peers	child	to punish ~~boy~~ child who has failed in meeting social expectations; prevent recurrence		child's father assembles child's peers who tie him in his sleeping mat, dress him in nettles, throw water on him, ridicule him (see text)	voice (singing)
Public ridicule of man who has committed adultery with slave's wife	accused, slave, spectators		to punish man who has failed in his social duty; prevent recurrence		man kneels in front of slave, offers sheep, declares guilt. Slave swears to serve as before Everyone watching jeers, OR Slave may swear to serve no longer	voice
Punishment of gossipper or talebearer	all villagers	culprit	to punish man who has failed in his social duty; prevent recurrence		culprit parades through village face smeared with charcoal, live fowl between teeth, ringing gong. Everyone ridicules, jeers	voice

Oaths

It is clear from the number and variety of occasions on which the Ashanti speak of swearing an oath that this verbal form has particular significance for them. It has already been suggested that the power of the oath is such that it does not require the use of any material object to insure efficacy, but accomplishes the same objective without any such supplement.

Oaths among the Ashanti have reference to some misfortune or disaster that,' according to tradition, occurred at some point in the past of the Ashanti nation. They are invoked in a variety of circumstances, but in all cases they add a forcefulness and efficacious power to the words being uttered. As was noted in the section on pronouncements, any oath automatically gives to the speech event in which it is sworn a public character. This public character entails a certain solemnity and binding force, and also gives to the consequences of the speech act a seriousness and gravity which would not otherwise be warranted.

Each elder and chief, and most government and court officials have their own oaths. In the case of a lineage elder, for example, his oath would usually be concerned with the death, disease, or bodily deformity or mutilation of an ancestor. It is strictly taboo to allude to any of these misfortunes because the ancestors become annoyed or grieved by the memory of them, and also because use of the oath might cause the same disaster to recur. Tradition records that one of the first subjects to become a national taboo was the death of Osai Tutu, a great Ashanti king who was killed in battle on a Saturday around 1730. Like many of the oaths, this one has become the mere mentioning of the day of the week on which the incident is alleged to have occurred. Thus it is forbidden to mention in the form of an oath the word "memeneda," " Saturday." Another circumlocution for this event is the term "ntam kese," the "great oath." Thus it is forbidden to say "Meka ntam kese," "I say the great oath," as this is understood to refer to the death of Osai Tutu. The etymology of the word "ntam" is ~~mptx~~ not clear, but the expression "ka ntam" is always translated, "to swear an oath." Rattray suggests that the root of ntam may be from "tam," "something heavy or difficult," or from "tan" "to hate." He notes that there appears to be some historical evidence for the latter derivation (1927:215).

Most of the tabooed words are restricted to events in which disasters have occurred to male rulers or warriors. There is one equivalent in the female line, however, in the queen mother's oath, "Me ka nana yafunu," "I mention grandmother's belly" (Rattray 1927:213).

Litigation in the Courts

In order to bring a private disagreement under the jurisdiction of a central authority, the one who desires his cause to be thus examined swears an oath in the presence of a third person. The party with whom he differs responds by swearing in defence of his claim. The third party then arrests both of them. Oaths are also sworn by witnesses to attest to the truth of what they say, by anyone who wishes to declare in a formal and binding way his allegiance to a person, a group, or to the state itself. In general they may be divided into three main kinds: 1) Fetish oath, "dua-bo," the personal oath of a commoner; 2) The Chief's oath, "brepo," or ~~"nhyira~~ "nhyira," and 3) the national oath, "Okyenhene ntam." The fetish oath, as has been pointed out in another section, is sworn by invoking the wrath of a fetish either on one's own life or on that of another. A person must always be present when another swears an oath against him, as is stressed in the popular saying, "Obi nka ntam ngu obrane atiko," "One does not swear an oath at the back of a man's head." The fetish oath is not usually a sufficient condition for initiating the action of the courts but it is required of anyone giving evidence in court cases. In these instances the spokesman administers the fetish oath in the following formulary:

> Ka Wukuda ne Kwanyako, na fre Ankye di nse
> se wobe ka nokware (wo asem yi mu).'
>
> Be sworn by Wukuda and Kwanyako oath, and
> invoke Anokye against your life that you
> will speak the ~~truth~~ ~~thrth~~ truth (in the present cause).

The witness raises his right hand and says:

> Me ka wukuda ne Kwanyako se meka nea menim,
> se manka nokware a Anokye nkru me.
>
> I swear by Wukuda and Kwanyako oath that I
> shall say what I know, if I do not speak the
> truth may Anokye kill me (Danquah 1928:71).

Certain classes of people, i.e., all those whose positions are such that they are considered sacred persons, are exempt from taking fetish oath. If any of these are found guilty of giving false evidence, they are liable to be destooled.

A chief's oath consists in the invocation of the penal wrath of a fetish on the life of the chief. It may be sworn when the complainant in a dispute finds himself incapable of obtaining immediate judicial action from the parties whose duty it is to assist him in that respect. It is also used when one party to a disagreement not yet before the court wishes to press on his adversary the justice of his claim. If the person swearing the oath directly mentions the official name of the chief whose life he is invoking into the power of the fetish as well as the name of the particular fetish he is conjuring, the oath is known as "asita," pr "direct brepo." The word, "brepo," signifies "the oath of the solemn palm leaf," referring to the old custom of solemnly hanging palm leaves on the streets and public places whenever any grave event affecting the State or an important chief occurred. (Danquah 1928:74-75). The person who has used direct brepo is said to have "sii asita," "sworn in the bold, direct manner," or to have "ode ne ti opemdan," "bumped his head against the wall." The advantage of direct brepo ~~xxx~~ is that it results in immediate action taken against the person who has thus sworn, but its great seriousness and the almost unlimited expense to which it often leads constitute important disadvantages. It is interesting to note that the gravity of an oath is measured on two dimensions: 1) the importance and sacredness of the person upon whom the power of the oath is invoked, and 2) the directness with which the catastrophe alluded to in the oath is verbalized.

The most serious oath which an Ashanti can swear is the Great Oath of Osai Tutu mentioned above. When this oath is sworn, the case must be heard by a paramount chief. If it is desired to appeal the decision of the court before a higher tribunal, the dissatisfied party against whom judgement has been found appeals against the spokesman of the lower court who has delivered the verdict against him. He does this by coupling the spokesman's name with another and greater calamity associated with some higher chief. This necessitates a reopening of the case before the higher court, in which the place of the original litigant, in whose favor judgement had been given, was formerly taken by the okyeame who had given that judgement (Rattray 1927:213).

The place in which an oath is sworn always determines venue of trial. In general these oaths which initiate court proceedings are used somewhat sparingly, because they always entail some expense. Whether the person who has sworn the oath is found innocent or guilty, he will incur some debt for the use of the oath, which constitutes a transgression of a tribal taboo. The Ashanti attitude toward this is expressed in a native proverb, "The chief's oath is like the hole in which yam is planted; no one falls into it and comes out scot-free" (Busia 1951:161).

Oaths Concerned with Future Behavior

In addition to the oaths which always accompany litigation in the courts there are of course many others. Similar to the oath sworn by a witness are all those in which the speaker swears that his future behavior will conform to a certain stipulated standard, calling down on himself some great calamity if it does not. This is essentially what the witness does when he says, "...if I do not speak the truth may Anokye kill me." Such an oath is sworn by the child who has been ridiculed for bed wetting at the end of the public ridiculing ceremony, by the slave whose master has been ridiculed for committing adultery with the slave's wife, and by one who is acting as surety in the arrangement of a loan. All of these oaths have been described in other sections. Similar oaths are also sworn by officials in relation to the manner in which they will carry out the duties of their offices. When the chief is enstooled, for example, he takes the following oath in the presence of all the assembled headmen and elders:

> Me ka ________, me ka ntam kesie se nye aman mu pa me nananom ne nwo buye, na me ne nwo be buo, se afutuo nwo de ama me se me ntie a, ya me to ntam kesie, me to ____________.
>
> I speak the forbidden word __________, I speak the great forbidden name. If I with you do not rule the people well as my forefathers and you ruled them, and if I do not listen to your advice, then I have incurred the penalty of speaking the great forbidden word, I have indurred thepenalty of mentioning the forbidden name of __________________ (Rattray 1929:87).

Elders themselves take an oath of allegiance to the chief both at the time of his election and at his enstoolment. Again, the burden of the oath is a promise to behave according to a certain standard of loyalty and obedience.

It is also customary for military officers to swear allegiance to the chief before going to battle in a formula such as the following:

> Me ka __________ me ka ntam kesie, osa yi wa yi me se menkoro yi, se me ko na se me de m'akyi kyere dom, se me soma korabo na se wanko na se manfa ho, na se me ko guane, ya me to ntam kesie me to ____________.
>
> I speak the forbidden name of ___________. I speak the great forbidden name that, if I do not go to this war on which you have sent me forth, or if I go and show my back to the enemy, if I send a bullet and it falls short, and I do not follow it, and if I run away, then have I violated the great forbidden word, then have I violated the great forbidden name of ____________. (Rattray 1929:123).

The purpose here is no different from that of the oaths already treated. In all of these cases the oath effects a change in the status of the speaker by imposing on him in a very formal and legally binding way a new or more stringent set of obligations

Oaths which Impose Obligations on Another

There are also oaths which are invoked in such manner as to impose obligations and effect changes not in the speaker, but rather in the addressee(s). This is precisely what is done in the pronouncement by which a husband binds his wife under pain of violating an oath not to have any dealings with her lover. It is also the burden of the oath invoked by the herald when he makes his official pronouncement at the beginning of the Apo ceremony. In this pronouncement the herald, speaking for the chief, binds everyone in the community to refrain from filing legal complaints during an eight-day period. Failure to comply constitutes a violation of the oath of Wednesday and of Thursday, and the mere saying of these words by the herald effectively binds his hearers to obey the stipulations connected with Apo.

Oaths Affirming the Truth of Statements about the Past

Oaths are also invoked as attestations to the truth of statements about past conduct. A woman accused by her husband of adultery is generally required to swear such an oath to establish her innocence. A similar oath is required from a woman who wishes to free herself from her deceased husband's family ~~whexwxx~~ when there is no male heir. Such a woman ~~mxxtxmxx~~ must meet with members of her own abusua and with whoever is her husband's heir. She must give to the heir all the gifts she had received from her husband, saying, "fa sie me," "Take, and look after them for me." The widow is then expected to take an oath that she has been faithful to her late husband. After swearing the oath she is free to return to her own family and to remarry after a one year interval. The performance of this speech act with its statement under oath about the woman's past conduct effects a change in her status by thus freeing her from the original act at marriage which bound her to her husband's family.

At the funeral of a chief the elders individually swear an oath asserting that it is a natural death which has claimed the chief. Standing naked to the waist before the body of the dead chief, each elder unsheathes his ceremonial sword and swears as folbws:

> Me ka Yaoada, me ka ntam kesie; se nyo Odomankoma Owuo
> na abe fa wo, na se dom ano na wufirimmu se yie nankra
> se' man yansa ha; ya me ka ntam kesie, me ka Yaoada.
>
> I speak the forbidden name of Thursday, I mention the
> great forbidden word, and say that had it not been
> the Creator's death who came and took you away, but
> had it been in the mouth of battle that you went forth
> like this, and had I and this tribe not perished there
> with you, then had I violated the great forbidden word,
> then had I violated the forbidden name of Thursday (Rattray 1929:
> 83).

A final example of an oath used in this manner is reported by Rattray in relation to a case of verbal abuse.

> Two young boys were playing together when one "abused"
> the other by saying, "Owontal," "begetter of twins!" The
> boy who was called this retaliated by "swearing the great oath that
> he had never yet even had sexual intercourse with any woman.
> The case was taken before the King of Ashanti, who commanded that
> the youth who had used the abusive word should be castrated
> (1929:3).

Conclusions

The use of the oath form is restricted to cases of a serious nature. It is strictly forbidden to use the form, the most powerful and efficacious speech form which exists among the Ashanti, in any trivial matter. A menstruating woman is not permitted to swear oaths, nor may anyone swear an oath against her. This prohibition has its basis in the Ashanti conviction that menstruation renders a woman unclean. The ability of this uncleanness to contaminate and dilute the power of good forces will be discussed in more detail in another section. It is mentioned here because it seems to account for the menstrual taboo against swearing oaths.

In three cases the gravity surrounding the use of oaths is mitigated. If it is shown that a man guilty of swearing an oath inappropriately had been drinking at the time of his offence, he may be excused from the penalties which would ordinarily be applied. There is also a widespread tolerance of offences of this type in children's speech. The third instance in which the restrictions on the use of oaths are modified is any time of war. For anyone fighting in a military campaign there is a general immunity from all usual consequences of swearing oaths. A warrior might use these oaths freely, even frivolously, without incurring any legal penalty. In speaking of this immunity, the Ashanti say:

> Ye ko osa, na ya bea ntam nsem nni.
>
> When we go to war, we prohibit the investigation
> of any case arising out of the swearing of an oath.
>
> Xx Ya hine Asante Hene mtam adaka.
>
> We have closed the oath chest of the King of Ashanti.
> (Rattray 1929:123).

Oaths, then, constitute the most important kind of speech act used by the Ashanti in terms of the gravity xxdx surrounding their invocation, and the tremendous power attributed to them. Every oath is an effective pronouncement and belongs to that class of speech which is public rather than private because of its allusion to the ancestral spirits and traditional history of the entire Ashanti people. So effective are they said to be that the Ashanti believe they not only change the legal status of the person against whom they are invoked, but they may also cause the national catastrophes to which they allude to recur. No material element is necessary to reinforce this efficacious power of the oath. The verbal formula alone has tremendous power attributed to no other speech genre, The elaboration of oaths and beliefs concerning them is greater than that surrounding any other communicative act, and seems to be in direct proportion to the power attributed by the Ashanti to them.

TABLE 14 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: OATHS - Litigation in the courts

Setting	Participants		Ends		Act Sequence	Channel
	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes		
Witness giving testimony in court	Spokesman Witness	Witness Court	To establish truth of witness' statements		spokesman recites formulary to witness who raises right hand and recites oath (see text)	Voice
Swearing chief's oath	anyone	anyone	to obtain court action in a dispute	Dispute becomes matter for the courts	one who desires his claim to be considered in courts swears oath in presence of his adversary and a third party. Adversary swears in hiw own defence; 3rd party arrests both.	Voice
Swearing great oath	anyone	anyone	to have case heard by paramount chief	case is heard in high court	Same as above, but oath consists in allusion to Osai Tutu (see text)	Voice
Taking case to higher court	person found guilty in low court	court	to have decision of low court appealed in high court	Caseis reopened in high court with low court spokesman taking place of original litigant	Person against whom judgement has been found appeals against low court spokesman by coupling spokesman's name with another greater calamity associated with a higher chief	Voice

TABLE 15 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: OATHS CONCERNED WITH FUTURE BEHAVIOR

Setting	Participants		Ends		Act Sequence	Channel
	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	8Outcomes		
Ridiculing of child who wets bed	child also present: child's father and elder		to punish and prevent child from bed-wetting again		After peers ridicule child for bed-wetting, he is taken to family elder and taught to swear that he will not again wet bed.	Voice
ridiculing of man convicted of adultery with wife of slave	slave	master	EITHER to express forgiveness of master OR to terminate service	EITHER matter is concluded and slave serves as before OR slave is freed	After master acknowledges that slave's cause is just slave swears oath EITHER to serve as before or to quit service of master (see text)	Voice
Negotiating loan	surety	lender	to assume responsibility for repayment	surety is legally responsible for loan	lender negotiates loan with surety who swears oath that he will repay principal and interest on agreed date	Voice
Enstoolment of chief	chief	assembled elders and people	to assure all that he will rule well	enstoolment ceremonies continue	new chief stands before elders unsheathes sword, points it to sky, then to ground. Holding it before him, he recites oath (see text)	Voice
meeting between elders and chief-elect	all male members of royal lineage	chief-elect	to swear allegiance to chief-elect		When chief-elect has beenapproved by all, he meets with all adult members of royal lineage. Differences are settled, all male members swear oath of allegiance	Voice
Enstoolment of chief	elders	chief	to swear allegiance to new chief	elders have right to admonish chief	After chief takes oath of office elders take oath of allegiance to him, promising to be loyal	Voice

TABLE 15 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: OATHS CONCERNED WITH FUTURE BEHAVIOR (cont'd)

Setting	Participants Addresser	 Addressee	Ends Goals	 Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
evening before battle	generals	chief	to assure chief of loyalty and bravery in coming battle		generals swear oath (see text) on evening before any battle	Voice

TABLE 16 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: OATHS WHICH IMPOSE OBLIGATIONS ON ANOTHER

Setting	Participants Addresser	 Addressee	Ends Goals	 Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Swearing of oath prohibiting wife from further dealings with lover	husband	wife	To prevent wife from dealing with lover	Wife is legally bound to obey prohibition. Failure to do so constitutes crime	Husband addressed formula containing prohibition, binding under oath to wife (see text)	Voice
Pronouncement at beginning of Apo	herald	all	to mark beginning of Apo and define behavior considered illegal	anyone who commits any of theacts thus defined is liable to prosecution	Herald recites pronouncement defines illegal behavior, binds people under oath to refrain from this behavior (see text)	Voice

TABLE 17 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: OATHS WHICH AFFIRM THE TRUTH OF STATEMENTS ABOUT THE PAST

	Participants		Ends			
Setting	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Woman accused of adultery	woman accused	her family	to establish guilt or innocence	Her oath is reported to her husband. If she is guilty, family sends to that of correspondent for compensation	A man wishing to ascertain whether his wife is guilty of adultery hands her over to her family who require her to swear oath about her conduct	Voice
Woman being freed to return to her own family after her husband has died and left no brother to marry her	widow	deceased husband's heir	to establish fact of widow's past faithfulness to husband	She is freed to return to her family and to remarry after one year	Widow turns over all gifts from deceased husband to his heir who requires her to take an oath swearing that she had been faithful to husband She swears oath, throwing an egg on ground as she recites formula.	Voice
Abused person swears oath that he is undeserving of abuse	abused	abuser	to show that speaker is undeserving of abuse; to bring abuser's offence to attention of courts	case is taken to court.	abuser insults the abused person, who swears oath as to his own conduct being undeserving of such abuse (see text)	Voice

Ridicule

All of the speech acts with a necessary material component besides the verbal form which are concerned with punishment and prevention may be characterized as ridicule. This genre constitutes the most prevalent form of social control which the Ashanti have. Ridicule is used against children and adults alike when it is believed that their conduct has fallen short of acceptable standards. It has been known to lead to suicide, for the Ashanti are extremely conscious of a "good name" as a valuable and necessary thing. Ridicule may be either overt or covert, depending upon the circumstances.

Covert Ridicule

Covert ridicule seems always to be directed against adults rather than children. It is embodied in the various stories which the Ashanti delight in narrating in the evenings when most villagers assemble for story-telling sessions. In these stories no names of living persons are mentioned, but animals are cleverly and selectively introduced, each one chosen because of certain characteristics suggestive of the particular person the story-teller wishes to ridicule. Although it is apparently taboo to name the person, it is nevertheless the aim of the speaker to identify him so that the object of his ridicule is known to all present. Presumably this usually means that the person ridiculed is himself aware of what is happening, if he is a member of the village.

Overt Ridicule

Most ridicule, however, is of the overt type. That directed against the corpse of a woman who has died in childbirth, the bed-wetter, the man who has committed adultery with his slave's wife, the convicted tale-bearer or gossip, and the destooled chief, has already been described. In all cases the person ridiculed is someone who is at least temporarily deprived of full legal status and there are serious constraints on his ability to retaliate or answer back.

In the case of the corpse this is obvious. The bed-wetter is a child who does not have the status of an adult and is not permitted to speak in the presence of adults unless they ask him a direct question. The man convicted of adultery with his slave's wife, and also the one (male or female) convicted of gossipping or tale-bearing is of course deprived of legal status to the extent that each has broken the law and does not enjoy full rights until he has made amends. In the case of the tale-bearer, there is a physical constraint which prohibits retaliation in the form of the live fowl held between the culprit's teeth. The status of a destooled chief is also that of a law-breaker.

Ridicule similar to that addressed to a woman who has died in childbirth is also characteristic of the Ashanti treatment of barren persons. Formerly when such people died large thorns were driven through the soles of their feet. Ridicule of barrenness and sterility is not limited to deceased persons, however, for this is also overtly practiced against childless couples during their lifetimes. A barren co-wife is taunted by her husband's other wives, "Turn to your weeding, you useless, childless woman," and a sterile man is vulgarly referred to as "Kote Krawa," "wax penis" (Rattray 1927:67).

The rivalry among co-wives reflected in the ridiculing of those who are barren is not confined only to dealings with wives who have not borne children. Sometimes ridicule is directed against the wives who are fruitful, and it is not unusual to hear one wife singing derisively to another as they work together, "That child you think you carry in your belly is not a child; it's just a tumor" (Lystad 1958:67).[6] This kind of singing is especially striking in view of the fact that it is forbidden for any Ashanti to make remarks to a pregnant woman about her condition.

The use of ridicule in the process of socializing children is very common, the bed-wetting instance being but one example among many. In fact, whenever a child's behavior falls short of the expectations of the society, whether of peers, parents, or other adults, the reaction may well include ridicule. In particular, a boy who exhibits effeminate characteristics is ridiculed and laughed at, and this general attitude of others toward him may be maintained throughout his entire life. The Ashanti believe that "Obarima hye obarima 'ba, na oba hye oba," "The training of a boy should be done by a man, and that of a girl by a woman"(Rattray 1929:11). A boy who does happen to be reared by a woman is called "oba 'ba," "woman-child," and is laughed at. A boy who exclaims "Eno e!," "Oh, Mother!," in surprise, rather than "Agya e!," "Oh, Father!," is called "oba 'ba," and is scorned all his life. For a girl to exclaim "Agya e!" in surprise, however, is no disgrace. Rather it is admiringly said of her that "n'ani ye den," "her eyes are strong," or she is called "'ba 'barima," a mannish, i.e., brave woman. This is a general speech area, then, in which males are very vulnerable to ridicule, but females are not. Although the dictum quoted contains stipulations concerning a girl's rearing as well as that of boys, she is not punished for failing to meet the stipulations but the boy is. This will be discussed in more detail in the section on Male and Female Speech.

As in the instances of ridicule already cited most of those described here are used in relation to someone who does not enjoy, at least temporarily, all the legal rights of an adult Ashanti citizen, and who has only limited or no ability to retaliate. In the case of one co-wife ridiculing another, it is not clear whether these characteristics are present. It is not unlikely that the ridiculing of this type is always done by a senior wife to a junior wife in which case the person ridiculed has inferior status and perhaps no right of reply. Certainly in the case of the barren woman there is nothing she can say even if she is permitted, given the high value the culture places on fertility. It is also conceivable that the pregnant co-wife is limited in her freedom to reply by the fact of her condition as well as because of her presumed inferior status. It is known that an Ashanti woman is warned against quarreling with her husband when she is pregnant. Very possibly this taboo extends to all quarreling during that time. It may also be the case that the prohibition against mentioning a pregnant woman's condition is applicable to her own speech as well as that of others. Any of these circumstances, all of which seem not inconsistent with the data, would certainly restrict the ability of a pregnant woman to reply when ridiculed by a co-wife.

Overt Ridicule Outside of the Community

All of the examples of ridicule thus far treated deal with its application within the Ashanti community. One instance of its use in relation to outsiders has been reported. One important class of messages which are incorporated into the repertoire of the so-called talking drums is constituted by war messages drummed during time of battle. These messages do not contain instructions or other information. Rather they are insulting communications addressed directly to the enemy. The following is an example of such a communication:

> He has killed men in order to make our men become what? He has killed men in order to make them become ghosts. The animal, the marsh mongoose, declares he is very grateful for your liver. The Vulture, Kwaku Agai, says he thanks you very much; when the evening falls cool, he thanks you; when the day dawns, he thanks you, hailing you, Akuranto. Tomorrow we shall kill you very, very early in the morning (Rattray 1929:124).

It is not clear whether these messages are believed to be understood by the enemy or whether the objective is to promote and maintain good morale among the Ashanti themselves. It would seem that this latter effect would almost certainly be present whether it is the primary goal or not.

Conclusions

Ridicule, then, in its various manifestations and contexts, schematized in Tables 18 through 20, is an almost ubiquitous speech genre among the Ashanti. In every instance the elements of punishment and prevention seem to be present, even in those cases where the speaker can reasonbbly expect that his words will not in fact have a preventive effect. This is most clear in the instance of one co-wife ridiculing a fellow co-wife who is pregnant by telling her that she cannot really be carrying a child. The element of punishment is present, for it seems clear that the speaker wishes to penalize (if only by making working conditions unpleasant), the wife-rival who has secured the attentions of their common husband. There is no evidence, however, that she believes her words really will prevent the woman from bearing a child. The preventive aspect of this particular act of ridicule seems to lie in the wish realm. The ridiculing co-wife hopes that her words will have a harmful effect on her rival, but experience tells her that this is not always the case. If her wish does not become actualized, however, it is only because she lacks the means by which to make it become so.

Ridicule is not efficacious speech ~~in the sense that~~ insofar as the speakers do not believe their words alone will effect what they say. When combined with certain material components in a much more formalized and public speech act, ridicule may become effective in this powerful sense, (as the ridicule plus water and nettles are combined to form one public speech act by which bed-wetters are supposedly punished and cured), but in itself, ridicule expresses only the wish of the speaker that the act or situation be prevented from recurring.

The tendency to favor ridicule as a means of social control is probably an outgrowth and complement of the general sensitivity of the Ashanti toward personal invective and abuse. This sensitivity will be discussed in the next section.

TABLE 19 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: OVERT RIDICULE (within the community)

	Participants		Ends			
Setting	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Rites for woman who has died in childbirth						
Child accused of enuresis						
Public ridicule of man who has committed adultery with slave's wife			See TABLE 13 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS CONNECTED WITH MATERIAL ELEMENTS: PUNISHING AND PREVENTING .			
Punishment of gossipper or tale-bearer						
DEstoolment of chief	elders	chief	ridicule, abuse man who has failed in his social and political duty	destoolment	Elders accuse chief, then ridicule and abuse him, take away stool	Voice
Ridicule of barren persons	anyone	barren person	ridicule person who has failed in his social duty		anyone may use ridiculing and abusive language to barren men and women	Voice
Co-wives working together	co-wives		one ridicules the other for having failed in social duty		one fertile co-wife says to barren one, "Turn to your weeding you useless, childless woman."	Voice
Co-wives working together	co-wives		to ridicule one who competes for same goals with speaker		one co-wife sings insults to the other as they work	Voice (singing)
Boy exclaiming "o Mother" in surprise	anyone	boy	ridicule one who fails to meet social expectations		Boy exclaims "o Mother" in surprise. He is ridiculed for adopting expression reserved for females.	Voice

TABLE 20 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: OVERT RIDICULE (outside of community)

	Participants		Ends			
Setting	Addressers	Addressees	Goals	Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Sending war messages	drummer of talking drums	? probably enemy	to insult enemy or to raise morale of Ashanti warriors		see text for message form	talking drums

TABLE 18 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: COVERT RIDICULE

	Participants		Ends			
Setting	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Evening story-telling sessions	story-geller	all attending session	to ridicule someone within context of story	audience perceives, enjoys ridicule	story-teller chooses animals, insects, etc. with characteristics illustrative of character traits in person he wishes to ridicule. Sometimes acts out parts toconcretize his point.	Voice

Abuse

Verbal abuse is particularly repugnant to the Ashanti. It differs from ridicule in that the punitive character of ridicule is not present in abusive speech. Indeed, abuse may be described as provocative of further argument rather than punitive and preventive as is ridicule. Whereas ridicule is employed in situations where retaliation is either impossible or at least inhibited, abuse invites retaliation. It is almost invariably followed by legal proceedings, and a great percentage of quarrels and lawsuits have their bases in this kind of behavior.

The Ashanti have several terms which signify abuse. "Ahoya" and "nkyisem" are often used synonymously, the former being translated as "something that makes the body feel sore," the latter as "words said behind the back." These terms do not include notions of truth or falsity. In fact, as Rattray puts it, "the greater the truth, the greater the libel," of which the abuser might be found guilty (1929:326-327). Both terms apparently signify the saying of nasty or unpleasant things about someone in his absence.

A third term, "atendidie," refers to certain abusive expressions addressed directly to a particular person, such as:

Kwasea	fool
Kronfo	thief
*wo'ni	your mother
*wo'se	your father
*wo nana	your grandfather
*wo'ni twe ase	the origin of your mother's privates
*wo se twe ase	the origin of your father's privates
*wo 'samanfo mfo ye ti nwe	May your ancestral spirits chew their own heads
* *wo 'samanfo mfo ye nankasa	May your ancestral spirits take their bones (and eat them)
*'Kwasea 'ba	child of a fool (Rattray 1929:326-32

Many expressions of abuse take the form of maledictions directed against the ancestors. These are classified as sins which must be punished by the living, while personal abuse of the living is treated as a tort. Formerly it was a capital offence for a woman to call a man a fool. To abuse or slander a head-chief is regarded as a national taboo. One of Rattray's informants recited for him a list of expressions which would constitute such an offence in relation to the chief. These included those marked with an asterisk (*) above. Before speaking these expressions the informant said, "sebe," "pardon." He spoke them in an undertone, and snapped his fingers around his ears during the recitation (Rattray 1919:310).

Admonitions Directed to the Chief

Verbal abuse is one of the things against which every Ashanti chief is warned when he takes office. At the enstoolment ceremony, after the elders have sworn their oaths of allegiance to the new ruler they join in admonishing him against misrule, saying to the spokesman:

Ka kyere se	Tell him that:
Yempe Asekyere	We do not wish that he should disclose the origin of any person.
Yempe Atendidie	We do not wish that he should curse us.
Yempe Kwaseabuo	We do not wish that he should call people fools.
Yempe Ebe ba se "kwan nni ho"	We do not wish that it should ever be that he should say "I have no time, I have no time."
Yempe Apo	We do not wish personal abuse.
Yempe Popo	We do not wish personal violence (Rattray 1929:82).

Abuse and Children

The ban against abuse extends to children as well as to adults, and the punishment for it is almost always severe. An example of verbal abuse among children and the penalty once entailed by it has been described in the section on oaths. According to Rattray's informant, one young boy who abusively called another "Owonta," "Begetter of twins," was castrated for the offence. It is particularly striking that such a penalty would be imposed even on a young offender and reinforces the emphasis placed by Rattray, Lysted, Busia, Danquah, Kaye and others on the forcefulness of the taboo against abusive speech.

Exceptions to the Ban on Abuse

It has been noted that such speech is apparently never ignored. It always has consequences, for by its very nature it makes an impact which must be dealt with. There are three occasions, however, which are exceptions to this general rule. The first of these is the annual Apo ceremony, a period of eight days when all Ashantis have complete freedom to speak abusively to and of anyone or anything. The word "apo" is derived from the root "po," meaning "to speak harshly." The ceremony is also referred to as "Attenie," "to abuse or insult," and "ahorohorua," "to wash."

It is permitted to abuse the king as well as anyone else during this period and bands of women sing songs such as those below at various intervals:

> The god, Ta Kese, says if we have anything to speak,
> let us speak it,
> For by so doing we are removing misfortune from the nation.
>
> Your head is very large,
> And we are taking the victory from out your hands.
> O King, you are a fool.
> We are taking the victory from out your hands
> O king, you are impotent.
> We are taking the victory from out your hands.
>
> They know nothing about guns,
> The Ashanti know nothing about guns.
> Had they known about guns
> Would they have let the white man seize
> King Prempeh and Ya Akyaa without firing a gun?
>
> A e! a e! a e!
> Buabasa is a proper fool
> Since the Creator created all things

They (i.e. the kings of Ashanti) come from Adum,
        they who were to succeed (to the throne of Coomasie).
They did not come from Pinanko who were to succeed,
But these days it seems that they come from Pinanko
        who are to succeed.
Oh, Buabasa is a proper fool.
He causes the nation to be destroyed.

Aframa who bore ten children
Her son was Yaa Dwete,
Father eats his yams, but the people of
Nkoranza eat their cassava.
As for us, we eat our yams while the people of Nkoranza eat
        their cassava.

Grandfather Ta Kora is like a cat,
He is not the pet of one person alone.

The Ashanti people may be the children of slaves.
The King of Ashanti may have bought them, but he did not
        buy us.
All is well to-day.
We know that a Brong maneats rats,
But we never knew that one of royal blood eats rats.
But today we have seen our master, so-and-so, eating rats.
Today all is well and we may say so, say,xxxxxxx so, say so.
At other times we may not say so, say so, say so (Rattray 1923:156-157).

It is explicitly stated that all Ashanti participate in Apo, but the Apo songs seem to be sung only by the women.

The second occasion on which verbal abuse is indulged in with no apparent consequences is the destoolment of the chief. A great deal of insulting and abusive speech along with ridicule and the formal accusation are directed to the chief at this time. Far from being punished, such speech is expected and approved at a destoolment. It appears that the chief who has so misruled as to warrant deposition is considered to be outside the realm wherein social norms apply. Thus behavior which is ordinarily deemed inappropriate for human intercourse is accepted in relation to the chief at destoolment.

Abusive speech is also directed to the corpse of a child who dies in its first eight days of life. Such a child, it must be remembered is not considered to ever have been a member of human society. It is regarded rather as a visitor from the ghost world who simply returns to its own sphere after a short period. As such it may be abused for much the same reason that a destooled chief may.

The dictum agains verbal abuse applies only b human society. Neither the destooled chief nor the ghost child ἀxx has a role in that society and consequently neither is protected by the norms and principles upon which social life is based.

Conclusions

These are apparently the only exceptions to the ban on abuse. They are all characterized by the general cathartic effect they are supposed to have on the community. Abuse is called into play apparently when the cumulative ill effects of bad behavior in the society are such as to warrant not mere punishment of the wrong-doers, but a general exorcising as well. No one is ever justified in speaking abusively in any other case. There is no provocation sufficient to warrant verbal abuse, for it has no punitive or corrective function. Indeed this is the very characteristic which most clearly distinguishes abuse from ridicule. Another distinction lies in the content of the speech act. Ridicule includes a disparaging reference to some shortcoming or failure on the part of the addressee, while abuse is constituted by an insulting reference to someone behind his back or the use of a specific kind of insult defined more by its disrespectful allusion to sexual and other private or intimate habits, directly addressed to the person thus offended.

Ridicule in a sense represents the conclusion or resolution of some act or situation, and includes an orientation toward something good or pleasant in the future. It is always related to the affirmation and reinforcement of desirable behavior and the undoing, punishing, and prevention of a recurrence of undesirable behavior. Abuse, on the other hand, does not ratify the past, but serves to initiate future unpleasantness. Ridicule attempts to maintain or establish a basis for socially approved behaviors and events. Abuse invites social disruption and severe penalties.

That the prohibition of all verbal abuse is burdensome is indicated by the culturally approved provision for the annual Apo ceremony. It is interesting that one of the songs sung by the women states as the purpose of Apo the removal of misfortune from the nation. It is also significant that even at this time when free and spontaneous speech is supposed to be permitted there are also certain set formulas in which insults are expressed. The king or chief, who annually hears himself, and his predecessors, abused in these formalized utterances clearly need not feel himself attacked in any personal way. Of course there are spontaneous expressions of abuse as well. Still it is perhaps a good defence against the implications of abuse to embody at least some of the insults in traditional songs sung to all chiefs, rather than improvisations directed to only one.

TABLE 21 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE BAN ON ABUSE

Setting	Participants Addresser	 Addressee	Ends Goals	 Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Apo ceremony	anyone may speak women may sing		to remove misfortune from the nation. Everyone's spirits are calmed by cathartic rites		women sing abusive songs everyone uses abusive speech	Voice (singing & speaking)
Destoolment	elders	chief	to rid the community of any harm the abused person might have wrought		chief is accused by elders abused and ridiculed by them. Stool is taken from him	voice
rites after death of child under 8 days old	anyone, especially parents	corpse	to rid the community of any harm the abused ghost child might have wrought		corpse is abused, mutilated thrown on village midden heap	voice

Silence

Predictably enough, abuse does not constitute the only speech genre about which there are strict prohibitions. The Ashanti have many rules restricting the use of various kinds of speech, and there are also occasions on which it is not permitted to have any speech at all. Still more occasions are characterized by rules regulating who may speak to whom and in what manner, and there are some situations in which the Ashanti are able to ascertain underlying attitudes and moods by the mere fact of speech being either present or absent.

Complete Silence

One occasion requiring absolute silence occurs during the first part of an Adae ceremony, when the chief prays and distributes offerings to the ancestors. When the meat of the sacrificed sheep is cooked a bell is rung and Rattray reports that this signifies that the spirits are about to begin eating (1923: 97). While distributing meat to the ancestors's stools the chief says at each stool, "Here is meat; receive and eat." Immediately after the chief gives out the meat his stool carriers go to each stool and smear the sheep's blood on it. Absolute silence is maintained while this rite is being performed.

The significance of this silence xxx can perhaps best be understood when it is related to the fact that all children are taught at an early age to observe silence at meals. The data concerning speech decorum at meals mention only that children are taught not to sing or talk at these times because to do so would cause their father to die. From this it is impossible to state definitively whether all meals are eaten in complete silence, or whether this prohibition applies only to children. When it is considered in association with the Adae silence it appears probable that all Ashanti maintain silence during meals.

Another occasion which entails a prohibition against speech is any appearance in public of the so-called "saman yere," "wives of the ghosts." These are women who have been chosen from certain families to minister perpetually to the supposed needs of the skeletons of the following Ashanti kings: Osai Tutu, Opoku 'Ware, Osai Kojo, Opoku Fofie, Bonsu Panyin, Osai Yao, Kwaku Dua, and Kwaku Dua II. These skeletons are preserved in a mausoleum at Bantama and each has its own wife. The women occupying this role are frequently the wives of captive generals. Each is wedded to a ghost for life, and when she dies, her place is immediately filled by another. No one, not even the reigning king of Ashanti is permitted to speak with these women. Should they ever have occasion to leave the precincts of the mausoleum, they are preceeded by boys carrying whips who continually shout, "fwe! fwe!," "look out! look out!" Anyone who sees these women approaching must kneel down and cover his head with a cloth.

It seems possible that the silence imposed in relation to these women is simply an acknowledgement of the exclusive rights of their skeleton husbands over them. The harem of any living Ashanti king is inaccessible for all except eunuchs and heralds. In view of this exception it is significant that the king refers to his heralds as his wives (Rattray 1927:279). The silence required in the presence of saman yere, however, extends to both men and women, which points up the fact that the suggested relationship between this silence and the exclusiveness with which the king's harem is governed is but imperfectly analagous.

In all of the instances discussed, any speech at all constitutes an infraction of culturally prescribed norms. There can be times, however, when the very silence here prescribed is itself inappropriate in terms of expected behavior. In particular, the head of a family who is silent in his household is going against approved patterns of interaction and his silence is generally interpreted as an indication of more or less serious trouble.

Silence Imposed on only Some Participants in a Speech Event

On several occasions silence is imposed on one participant in an event in order that others might speak uninterrupted. The speaker in these cases may be human or he may be a representative of the spirit world. The latter is apparently the case whenever silence is required of a priest or priest-novice.

On all the ceremonial days of his particular god, the priest sits by his shrine in perfect silence, striving to listen to the god's voice. Whenever a shrine is placed on his head he also maintains silence. In this case the reason for the silence is not given, but it seems reasonable to assume that it is again imposed in order that the priest may hear his god speaking. The code used in this communication is not described, although the ceremonial language based on archaic Twi appears to be the most probable.

There are two instances described in which children are required to keep silence while their elders discuss in front of them. The first of these occurs when a boy, being commanded by his father to carry the father's stool and follow him, accompanies the older man to sessions with the other men of the village. The boy sits behind his father and listens to all that is said. "Wa te ne kasa," "listens to his voice," is the Ashanti idiom (Rattray 1929:12). At these times, the boy is expected to remain silent, listenіng to the wisdom of his elders. Clearly the silence here is not only a matter of showing respect to elders, but also a means of broadening and deepening the boy's education.

A similar silence is expected of all children in the presence of adults who are visiting with one another. Ordinarily children are permitted to be present at such visits, but they are required to be silent unless they are spoken to. When replying to an adult they must lower their voices respectfully. Children who do not observe these rules of etiquette are required to leave the room where the adults are assembled. In this case the silence is a means by which the children show respect for the adults. It is the only situation in which the penalty imposed for breaking the silence is described.

During the second half of the Adae ceremony the chief maintains a silence which is slightly different from the kinds already discussed. During this part of the rite every sub-chief present pays individual homage to the chief, bowing low before him and saying, "Grandfather, good morning." The chief acknowledges these greetings with a very slight inclination of his head, but he does not respond verbally. The purpose of this silence is somewhat obscure although possibly it is simply a means of preventing the ceremony from becoming too prolonged.

TABLE 22 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: SILENCE

Setting	Participants		Ends		Act Sequence	Channel
	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes		
Distribution of blood at Adae			to give food to the ancestors and allow them to eat in silence		Chief sacrifices sheep to the Ancestors, distributes meat. Stool-carriers distribute blood in silence	
Meals	children		to prevent father from dying		children eat meals in silence	
ghost wives leaving their dwelling					when ghost wives go out, everyone must maintain silence in their presence	

TABLE 23 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: SILENCE IMPOSED ON SOME PARTICIPANTS IN SPEECH EVENT

Setting	Participants Addresser	 Addressee	Ends Goals	 Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Priest has shrine placed on head	god	priest	to hear god's voice		priest has shrine placed on top of his head. Maintains silence in order that he might hear voice of his god	
Priest celebrates feast day of his god	god	priest	to hear god's voice		priest sits silently by his god's shrine in order that he might hear the voice of his god.	
Boy sitting with his father and older men	men converse with each other. boy is silent		to hear the widdom of his elders. The boy learns from listening to the men		Boy accompanies his father to meeting place where he and other men converse. Boy sits in silence, listening to the wisdom of his elders	
children in presence of adults	adults converse; children are silent		to show respect and permit adults' conversation to continue. Child who does not keep silence is made to leave		Adults gather, children permitted to remain on condition that they maintain silence.	
Second part, Adae	each subchief	chief	to acknowledge greetings without prolonging ceremony		subchiefs individually greet chief who acknowledges greetings by slightly inclining head. Chief maintsins silence	Gesture

Proscribed Speech

Besides the various occasions on which silence is imposed on one or more of the participants in any given event, there are also situations when all are permitted to engage in speech, but only within the limits set by certain restrictions affecting the components of the speech act.

Oaths

Such restrictions have already been noted with regard to the swearing of oaths. The context must be serious, the person against whom the oath is sworn must be present, the actual message form must contain an allusion to some event recognized in tradition, and the speaker must be prepared to accept responsibility for a speech act which is essentially public in character. Because of the power attributed to oaths and the general importance of any use of the oath form, the restrictions surrounding the swearing of oaths are ~~basic~~ basic to the communicative system of the Ashanti.

Sacred - Secular Contact

Another very basic restriction which is imposed on speech is that which prohibits any direct verbal intercourse between sacred and secular persons. The most striking manifestation of this rule is the use of a spokesman who, whenever the chief addresses anyone, repeats the chief's words to the addressee and relays replies to the chief. The spokesman is one of the most important officials of the court, and the chief xx may never appear in public without him. The title for the spokesman, "okyeame," is said to be derived as follows:

kyem.............	to make perfect, whole, to bring to a finish
ame..............	slurring of "ma me" - for me
O................	abbreviation of "Ono" - he
Okyeame..........	"He who makes (it) perfect for me" (Danquah 1928:41).

Danquah relates this practice of communicating through a spokesman to the fact that stammering is considered a regal accomplishment, and that most higher chiefs are professional stammerers. In Danquah's view, the spokesman is necessary for intelligibility (1928:41). As Danquah merely refers to this "regal accomplishment" in passing it is impossible to know exactly what is meant by stammering in this context, and what is entailed by being a professional stammerer. One does not know, for example whether it is an acquired skill which the chiefs* learn and practice, whether there is someone who instructs the chief in stammering, etc. At any rate Danquah's argument that the spokesman is necessary for intelligibility is unsatisfactory because it fails to explain why the chief would, when he expressly wishes to communicate, speak in an unintelligible manner, allowing his utterances to be translated and relayed by another. The fact that a chief can and does speak an esoteric stammering code does not explain why he always does so, even at the expense of not communicating.

The more common explanation for the use of a spokesman, suggested by Rattray and others, is that the spokesman protects the chief, a sacred figure, from any danger of supernatural contagion or pollution from those with whom he is in verbal contact. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that spokesmen are also used by priests. Children are used as spokesmen in speech betweenthe wife of a weaver and her husband when the woman is menstruating. Again, the religious significance of weaving seems to be the salient factor in this custom.[7]

It seems clear from these practices that the Ashanti believe that verbal interaction can contaminate the holy. Thus it is avoided by those whose office renders them sacred. It is not clear whether the Ashanti consider the power of evil to be stronger than that of holiness, or whether it is simply a matter in which they are unwilling to take chances. At any rate, there is no instance reported of speech being used by a sacred person in order to sacralize the profane. The influence of speech in this kind of sacred-profane relationship seems to work in only one direction. The latter can pollute the former, but there is no claim that the former can in any way modify the latter.

It is probably this attitude which is responsible for the general belief that an individual's private prayer to the gods is not readily heard except through a priest. Again, there must be an intermediary between sacred and secular elements if communication is to be effected.

Menstruating Women

Besides the prohibition against the wife of a weaver communicating directly with her husband while menstruating there are several other speech taboos imposed on women during their menstrual period. It has been mentioned under "oaths" that no menstruating woman may either swear an oath or have an oath sworn against her. Neither may she sit in court as arbitrator or touch the talking drums. Again, all of these taboos appear to be related to the fact that the forbidden act is in some way connected with the spirit world and the woman is in an unclean, hence potentially contaminating, state. Both the swearing of oaths and arbitrating in court are speech acts which put the speaker into some degree of contact with the ancestral spirits. The oath of course, alludes to some traditional event in which the ancestors were involved, and arbitration is generally a matter of appeasing the ancestors for whatever breach of social norms is responsible for the court action, and discovering the solution which will be most pleasing to them. The talking drums are always a point of contact between the drummer and the spirits of deceased drummers as well as those of the drum materials. Menstruating women are forbidden communicative contact with these spirits apparently because their uncleanness is believed capable of polluting and diminishing the supernatural powers of the spirits, thus destroying some of man's best defences against the unknown and evil forces which constantly threaten him.

Sppech Proscribed because of Abusive Content

Some of the speech acts which are specifically proscribed appear to be so more because of their abusive content than for any other reason. It is interesting to note, however, the various acts of this type which are explicitly mentioned as prohibited in spite of the fact ~~they~~ that they are all covered by the general taboo on abuse.

There are, for example, a number of speech taboos imposed on the chief when he takes office. These have already been enumerated in the section on abuse. Strictly speaking, these speech acts are forbidden to everyone. It is apparently particularly important that one who has power over others, as the chief over his subjects, not engage in abusive speech behavior, and thus the chief is singled out and reminded at his enstoolment that such behavior will not go unpenalized. Similarly, a priest is specifically taught during his novitiate that he is not to quarrel, a kind of speech act which also comes under the general prohibition against abuse. Again the authority and importance of the speaker in this case seems to warrant the added pressure against offending in this regard.

Other instances in which a particular form of abusive speech is explicitly forbidden occur during the child rearing process when children are taught that disrespectful speech in the presence of their parents will be punished and girls are taught that it is a serious offence for any female to call a man a fool. All quarreling between a husband and wife, though sometimes rather frequent, is culturally disapproved, and there are specific prohibitions against abusive speech between a pregnant woman and her husband. Frequent breaches of these norms constitute grounds for divorce, as does persistent abuse of a husband by his mother-in-law. In connection with a pawning transaction, it sometimes happens that a man receives his wife as a pawn. When this is the case he is strictly forbidden to refer to her as his pawn or slave in public, and to do so would be to commit an act of verbal abuse which is specifically prohibited.

A priest has other restrictions placed on his speech besides the one already mentioned. One, against gossiping, seems to be based on the same kind of reasoning which underlies the taboo on a priest quarreling. Gossiping is prohibited for all Ashanti, as will be discussed below. In this case it appears that it is the importance of the priest's role in society which dictates this specific prohibition addressed to the priest. The priest is also instructed not to adjure his god to kill anyone. Because of the priest's special and influential relationship with his god, this admonition seems to be necessary to prevent him from wielding that influence indiscriminately.

All of these specific prohibitions against an act already tabooed under a broad cultural norm affecting the whole society are directed toward one person who would be the speaker in the prohibited speech act. Some prohibitions are determined rather by topic or message form with the identity of participants somewhat irrelevant to the taboo. An example of this is cursing the chief, an act so opprobrious as to have been a capital offence in former times. The offence consists in the invocation of some spiritual power to kill the chief. It is never referred to except euphemistically, for the mere mention of cursing coupled with the chief's name is believed to be dangerous. The expressions by which the Ashanti allude to such a curse will be treated in the section on euphemisms.

Speech Proscribed Because of Relationship Between Participants and Topic

There are other proscriptions which are concerned not with a general taboo in relation to a given speaker, but rather with the relationship between speaker and message form. An example of this kind of prohibition is the general attitude already described toward a boy who exclaims "Oh Mother!: rather than "Oh Father!" in a moment of surprise. Such an exclamation falls short of cultural expectations because the message form is inappropriate to the speaker. Here it is a sexual discrepancy which renders the speech act unacceptable, for the speaker is xxx male and the message ixxx form is considered female.

Several xxxxxxxxxx regulations concerning speech are based on the relationship between message form or topic and addressee. Setting, also, is sometimes a factor, as in the case of the prohibition against reporting any bad news to the chief during an Apo ceremony. Here all three components, setting, topic, and addressee play a part in establishing a basis for the prohibition. This is also true of the taboo against contradicting or rebuking the chief at a public assembly, or addressing the court at the speaker's will when court is in session. Each of these last three speech acts admits of one exception. The queen mother is free to engage in any of them, but this exception will be dealt with in more detail in the section on privileged speakers.

There are three more distinct instances when a particular speech act is forbidden because the combination of topic and addressee make it a culturally disapproved utterance. First, it is forbidden for anyone to approach a married woman with speech inviting her to leave her husband or to have sexual intercourse with someone other than her husband. Such verbal attempts are referred to as "asombo" "burning a hole in her ear," and constitute serious, legally punishable offences. The invitation to sexual intercourse is not an offence in itself. When addressed to a married woman, however it automatically becomes one, regardless of how willing she may be.

Secondly, a money-lender is not permitted to by-pass the surety and ask his debtor directly to return the borrowed sum. Again, it is certainly not prohibited for a lender to attempt to obtain his money. When he bypasses the surety, however, he is directing his speech act to the wrong addressee and may even forfeit his legal claim to the sum for this offence.

The third example of a speech act which is forbidden on the basis of topic and message form is the mentioning of a woman's pregnancy to that woman. There is no evidence that reference to the pregnancy of a third person is prohibited, but all such allusions when the addressee is herself the pregnant woman, are strictly taboo.

Clearly, in the first two cases cited, the social consequences of the forbidden speech acts are great. The seduction of a married woman is disruptive of the family organization on which Ashanti society is built, and thus even attempts at it are prohibited because of their dangerous effect. The money-lender who attempts to deal directly with his debtor when there is a surety in the transaction also commits an act harmful to society, for her thereby tries to exact money from the borrower while another person, the surety, remains legally responsible to pay the amount in question. Attempts to accumulate illegal profit in this way are reprehendible because of their effect on the justice and equity of social dealings.

The prohibition against mentioning her condition to a pregnant woman is also based on the Ashanti conviction that such an act can have grave social consequences. Indeed should a miscarriage occur after anyone has violated this taboo, that person is fined as the responsible agent. The gravity of a miscarriage for the Ashanti is consistent with their emphasis on and concern for fertility and the life and perpetuation of the Ashanti nation.

Socially Irresponsible Speech

The concern for the social consequences of a given speech act reflected in the prohibitions discussed above, is also manifested in some more general rules concerning speech. These embrace three classes of speech acts, all of which are forbidden for all Ashanti, and all of which may be categorized as socially irresponsible speech. The classes overlap to some extent, and it may be that all of the speech acts considered here may constitute only one speech genre in the Ashanti cognitive model. For analytical purposes the three-fold distinction, based on definitions given by Christaller and examples reported by Rattray and Kaye, will be maintained in this paper.

Lying:

The first of these classes may be termed lying, which is in theory at least taboo for anyone over ten years of age. Lying is more or less taken for granted in children under ten, but from that age on it is supposedly considered punishable behavior. In practice, however, it is reported that adults do in fact frequently lie when this is expedient, often, for example, having their children tell the tax collector that no one is home when in fact the parents are merely trying to avoid paying him.

If lying is defined as a speech act in which the speaker says something he knows to be untrue, intending to deceive his listener, there are several Twi words which are apparently applicable. The only word which is univocally rendered "liar" in Christaller's dictionary is "otorofo" (1933:529). The adjective "toro" is defined as signifying "smooth, glib, slippery, lubricous..., false, spurious, not genuine" (529) and "atoro" signifies "a lie, untruth, falsehood." These words appear in some of the proverbs used by the Ashanti to express their attitude toward lying:

> Otorofo de mfe apem tu kwan a onokwafo de dakoro
> tiw no to no.
>
> Whereas the liar takes a thousand years to go a
> journey, the one who speaks the truth follows
> and overtakes him in a day.
>
> Otorofo na ose "me densefo wo Aburokyiri."
>
> The smooth-tongued one says, "My witness is in Europe."
>
> Atokoro see nokwapem.
>
> One falsehood spoils a thousand truths. (Rattray 1916:156).

"Atokoro" here is an elision of "atoro" and "koro" which means "a single one" (Christaller 1933:526). "Onokwafo" is defined as "a truthful, trustworthy, faithful, honest, upright person" (Christaller 1933:350) and "nokwapem" is an elision of "nokware," "truth, truthfulness, faithfulness, honesty, probity" (350), and "apem" which means "a thousand" (384).

In spite of the prohibition against lying, the general attitude of the Ashanti seems to indicate that in fact lying is not uncommon, and they seem to be generally prepared to doubt each other's word, particularly when it is suspected that the speaker might profit were he able to deceive his listeners. Although all witnesses in legal cases are required to swear an oath to the truth of their testimony, there is even a fairly general doubt as to their veracity in many cases. It is believed, however, that the witness who deliberately lies will be punished by the gods on whom he has sworn to speak the truth. The Ashanti proverb, "Odanseni owu n'afu," "A witness dies because of his belly," signifies that a witness who has lied for some bribe will surely be killed in this way. If any witness dies soon after testifying, an obosom, god, will be consulted. If this god declares through his priest that the man's death is due to his having given false evidence on oath his body is thrown into the bush, his property confiscated by the chief and the priest, and the original judgement is reversed if possible. In spite of this general suspicion of the witness' veracity, women on the witness stand are given a great deal of credence, and Danquah reports that formerly in cases of misconduct a woman's evidence was scarcely rebuttable (1928:92).

Gossiping and Tale-bearing

Another word which, according to Rattray, is rendered into English by native interpreters as "falsehood" or "lie" is "nkontompo" (Rattray 1929:327). Actually, this word seems to have a much broader range of meanings attached to it than Rattray's statement would indicate. Christaller defines "nkontompo" as "falsehood, falseness, mendacity, perversion of truth, unfairness, insincerity, duplicity, double-dealing, dishonesty, hypocrisy, slanderous lie, calumny, perfidy, treachery"(1933:253). These definitions, together with the data reported by Rattray suggest that the point of intersection between the significata of nkontompo and English "lie" is the fact that social injury results from both types of speech act. This interpretation brings us to the other two classes of socially irresponsible speech: 1) gossip and 2) tale-bearing.

Gossip refers here to the discussion of family affairs with persons who are not members of the family. Tale-bearing is the name applied to the reporting of what someone has done or said against another to that other person. Both are abhorred by the Ashanti and children are taught from an early age not to indulge in either.[8] It is apparently believed that they have a natural inclination to do both, for a great deal of emphasis is placed on these prohibitions. Children are frequently admonished, "If you talk about what you see a chicken will be hung on your lips" (Kays 1962:170), and a child who sees someone with ears or lips cut off, upon asking the reason, is told it is because of something the person has said.

On the other hand, this prohibition against tale-bearing does not apply within the abusua, and in fact, it is the duty of a nephew to report to his mother's brother if anyone has spoken or acted against the older man. Children are taught the formula with which the legitimate tale-bearer is expected to introduce his report:

> Ma san me hwem so na me ka.
>
> I draw a line down my nose that I may speak.

Or,

> Nson na esi me hwen so yi, se anyenhima na me ka.
>
> Ashes lie upon this, my nose, like the white-nosed anyenhima monkey.

Some examples of speech acts which are referred to as nkontompo were given to Rattray by his informants:

> A man is sitting talking to his friend and in the course of conversation the former remarks that he has paid four pounds for the cloth which he is wearing, whereas he well knows that the price he gave was two pounds. The friend goes off and later the little son of the owner of the cloth goes to the friend and says, "You know Father only paid two

> pounds for that cloth." That boy is a "liar" (nkontompomi), and his father would beat him and say, "You have told a lie" (Rattray 1929:327).

Asked if it was not the father who was the liar, the informant replied, "No, he had not taken any oath." Similarly, a child who reports to his mother the abusive language in which his father speaks of the mother in her absence is a nkontompomi. A slave who notices that his master keeps gold dust in a certain place, and tells others of this is also a nkontompomi. From this it would appear that the term nkontompon may be used to refer both to gossip (the case of the son reporting the price his father paid for his cloth) and that involving the slave), and tale-bearing (the child reporting to his mother). The significance of the latter instance is not altogether clear because of Rattray's stipulation that the prohibition against tale-bearing does not apply within the abusua. As the child belongs to his mother's abusua, it is not apparent why he is considered a nkontompomi in this case. The Ashanti have a particular repugnance for offences committed against persons with whom the offender has close social proximity, as evidenced by their especially opprobrious term for anyone who commits adultery with the wife of a man with whom the adulterer has frequent or intimate dealings. It may be a reflection of this attitude which explains the disapproval of a child reporting his father to his mother. This is reporting one with whom social intercourse is both frequent and close, and perhaps this condition would constitute an exception to the general approval of reporting within the abusua.

Ordinarily this loyal reporting, even obligatory reporting differs from the prohibited tale-bearing and gossip insofar as the forbidden act usually involves an addressee who is a non-family member and the approved one involves an addressee who is a family member. The data do not permit one to state definitively that the topic in the former case always concerns a family member and in the latter never does, but the evidence suggests that this may be the case. If this interpretation is correct, it further explains condemnation of the child who reports father to mother for although the father does not belong to the child's abusua, he is surely a member of the family, and as such his remarks are not within the range of topics which may legitimately be reported.

Proverbs containing the word "nkontompo" were given to Rattray as follows:

> Wode nkontompo ka asem a wofere.
>
> When you speak falsehoods in stating a case, you become weary.
>
> Wode nkontompo pe ode mfe apem a onokwafo de
> de nokware gye wo nsam 'dakoro.
>
> When you seek for a thing for one thousand years by
> the aid of falsehood, the truthful man, using truth,
> takes it from your grasp in a day. (Rattray 1916:156).

Other words which, according to Rattray are also used to refer to gossip and tale-bearing are "mpim," "nkonkonsa," and "nsekúru." He reports that the derivation of the first term is obscure, but that "nsekuru" probably signifies "words that are like a sore" (1929:327). Christaller does not list "mpim" in his dictionary, but the other two terms do appear. "Nkonkonsa" is referred to as a synonym of "nkontompo," and is defined as follows: "falsehood, duplicity, double-dealing, dissimulation, hypocrisy" (251). "Nseku," the base from which "nsekuru" is derived, is said to mean "calumny, slander, to slander, backbite, calumniate, disparage, defame" (437).

Euphemisms

Several Ashanti speech taboos entail prohibitions against referring directly to certain events or topics. It is required that euphemisms be used whenever these are spoken of. Most of the euphemisms reported are in some way connected with death. The only one which is not is used in referring to a girl's first menses when she is considered to be in an unclean state. The relationship here does not seem to be based on this notion of uncleanness, however, but rather on the radical change in a person's whole manner of being which occurs at puberty and at death. At puberty a girl becomes for the first time a productive member of society able to give life and nurture to her people. This idea of becoming a life-giving and sustaining being is paradoxically also very prominent in connection with death. At death an Ashanti joins his ancestors who represent the soul of the people and who are ultimately responsible for their peace and welfare. It must be remembered that funeral prayers are characterized by petitions for the well-being of the nation and above all by the plea for life, "make all the people fertile."

The beginning of a girl's fertile period, then, the onset of menarche, is never directly mentioned, but rather is euphemistically referred to in the following ways:

> "Wa bo no bara" - The bara has stricken her.
> "Nsa ko n'akyi" - The hand has gone behind.
> "Wa bu nsa" - She has turned her hand.
> "Wa kum ese no" - She has killed an elephant (Rattray 1927:69).

Literal referentes to death itself are almost never used by the Ashanti. Instead, the euphemistic "gone elsewhere" indicates that someone has died. One who wishes to refer to the death of someone in his abusua says, "Me se bofuo atu," "My hunter's (canine) tooth has come out," i.e., "I have lost my clansman. This avoidance of referring to death directly is particularly marked in relation to important personages, for death and a great man's name may never be coupled. Thus, when the king of Ashanti is seriously ill, euphemistic allusions are made to his apparently imminent death in expressions such as, "The house is going to fall," or "The great tree is going to be uprooted."

This dread of ever speaking directly about death in relation to a chief is also reflected in the fact that the Ashanti even have euphemisms with which they refer to the crime known as cursing the chief. The expressions which signify this serious offence are:

Bo ohene dua.........clubbing the chief

Wa sebiribi..........he has said something

Wa de ne nsa si fam..he has placed his hand against the ground

In former times when the king's wives were sacrificed at the time of his funeral, they were summoned for this purpose with the euphemistic command, I bid you set out for a certain place." Their answer would be, "I have heard Akoranto (the title for any descendant of Osai Tutu)." Besides those who had no option, freedmen, and sometimes slaves, would frequently volunteer for death by saying euphemistically, "I am hungry." They would encourage a reluctant executioner by urging him, "I swear the great oath that you must kill me that I and my master may set out, and I am hungry" (Rattray 1927:109).

The allusion to hunger in these expressions may be related to the notions underlying the euphemistic language in which two very serious threats are couched. When a son has grievously offended his father and failed to make reparation the older man usually confronts his son with the words,"When I die do not fast." This is a euphemistic way by which the father declares his intention to send his ghost to wreak vengeance on the son.

A second threat involving a euphemistic allusion to food is contained in the words, "Mennidi bio," "I shall not eat again." This expression is always interpreted as indicating the speaker's intention to involve himself in the death of another, either by committing murder himself, or by cursing the chief, and thus invoking the gods to kill him.

From these examples considered together with some of the other regulations of speech acts already mentioned it appears that the fertility of the nation, the transmission and sustenance of life, are areas of major concern, not to be spoken of lightly.for the Ashanti. In particular, the most radical transitions which a person undergoes during the course of his existence, always representing an increased responsibility for the life of the people, are to be referred to only with the greatest care. In some instances, no reference to the transition at all is appropriate, as in the case of the prohibition against mentioning her condition to a pregnant woman. In others, such as puberty and death, the transition may be mentioned, but only euphemistically. The difference between these and the first case, which is not to be mentioned at all, is of course, that these are facts of which the Ashanti can feel reasonably certain when they allude to them. A pregnancy is a different matter, for its outcome is never predictable.

The allusion to food and hunger in several of the euphemisms connected with death are striking and will be treated further in a section on speech and food imagery.

TABLE 24 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: GENERALLY PROSCRIBED SPEECH

Setting	Participants		Ends		Act Sequence	Channel
	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes		
Swearing an oath	SEE TABLE 6 EFFECTIVE PRONOUNCEMENTS CONNECTED WITH OFFICIAL OR LEGAL STATUS					
	PROSCRIPTIONS AGAINST VERBAL CONTACT BETWEEN THE SACRED AND PROFANE					
Direct speech with chief	commoner or other non-ruling person	chief	to communicate directly with chief	spokesman always intervenes	any communication between chief and others takes place through a spokesman	voice (of) spokesman)
weaver's wife communicating with him during menstrual period	any verbal exchange between weaver and his menstruating wife		communication	child always intervenes	any communication between weaver and his menstruating wife takes place through child	voice (of child)
menstruating women in court	menstruating woman	court	to arbitrate during court case	Someone else takes place of women as arbitrator	No menstruating woman may sit as arbitrator in court	Voice (of ;another arbitrator)

TABLE 25 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: SPEECH PROSCRIBED BECAUSE OF ABUSIVE CONTENT

	Participants		Ends			
Setting	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes	Norms of Interaction	Channel
Chief abusing subject	chief	subject	to insult one over whom the chief has authority and power. Can result in destoolment		Forbidden	Voice
Priest quarreling	priest	adversary	to settle dispute by argument.		Forbidden	Voice
Child being disrespectful to parent	child	parent	to claim equality or superiority over one to whom one is junior and to whom one owes respect		Forbidden	Voice
Woman calling man a fool	woman	man	to insult man	Formerly a capital offence	Forbidden	Voice
Quarreling between husband and wife	husband and wife		To settle dispute by argument		Forbidden	Voice
Mother-in-law abusing son-in-law	mother-in-law	son-in-law	to insult daughter's husband		Forbidden	Voice
Man calling wife slave or pawn in public	husband	wife	to insult wife in public		Forbidden7	Voice
Priest gossipping	priest	?	to discuss family affairs with those not involved		Forbidden	Voice
cursing chief	?	?	To bring evil or death upon chief		Forbidden	Voice

TABLE 26 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: SPEECH PROSCRIBED BECAUSE OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ~~SPEAKER~~ Participants AND TOPIC

Setting	Participants		Ends		Act Sequence	Channel
	Addressee	Addresser	Goals	Outcomes		
Boy exclaiming in surprise	boy	?	to express surprise	Ridicule	Boy exclaims "O Mother: in surprise	
Giving chief bad news during Apo	anyone	chief	to communicate bad news to chief	punishment under law	Chief is approached, bad news communicated to him.	Voice
Contradicting or rebuking chief	anyone except queen mother	chief	to deny truth of what chief is saying	punishment under law	Someone denies truth of what chief is saying, or tells him he is in error	Voice
Attempt to seduce married woman	man	married woman	to persuade woman to be unfaithful to her husband	punishment under law	Adulterer tries verbally to persuade woman to be unfaithful to her husband	Voice
Lender approaching borrower for money when surety exists	lender	borrower	to obtain money from borrower as well as from surety	surety may be released from responsibility	lender asks borrower to return amount borrowed	Voice
conversation with pregnant woman	anyone	pregnant woman	to mention her condition	possible miscarriage. Person who mentioned pregnancy is responsible	someone mentions her condition to pregnant woman	Voice

TABLE 27 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: SOCIALLY IRRESPONSIBLE SPEECH

	Participants		Ends			
Setting	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
lying	anyone	anyone	to deceive	punishment if lie is detected	Speaker deliberately attempts to deceive addressee	voice
gossipping	anyone	anyone	to disparage someone or some family group	punishment sometimes under law	speaker discusses family affairs with those outside the family	voice
tale-bearing	anyone	anyone	to cause trouble between two persons	same as above	speaker tells someone outside the family what another has said or done against that person	voice

TABLE 24 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: EUPHEMISMS

Setting	Participants		Goals Ends Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
	Addresser	Addressee			
Reference to a girl's puberty	anyone	anyone	to mention the fact that a girl has attained puberty	Variety of euphemisms used (see text) whenever anyone wishes to refer to beginning of girl's fertility	voice
reference to death	anyone	anyone	to mention the death of anyone	variety of euphemisms (see text)	voice
reference to king's sickness	anyone	anyone	to mention that the king's death seems imminent	same as above	voice
reference to someone's cursing of the chief	anyone	anyone	to refer to the act whereby evil is invoked upon the chief	same as above	voice
volunteering to be sacrificed at chief's funeral	anyone	executioner	to persuade executioner to execute speaker in order that he might be with dead ruler	"I am hungry"	voice
Father threatening unrepentant son	Father	son	to warn son that father's ghost will punish unrepentance in he son	"When I die do not fast"	voice
Threat of person about to curse chief or tocommit suicide	anyone	anyone	to indicate intention to commit capital offence	"I shall not eat again"	voice

Prescribed Speech

Some of the speech genres and acts forbidden by Ashanti social norms have complementary acts which constitute prescribed behavior. Others admit of exceptions already noted. One of the most striking examples of this kind of culturally prescribed speech is the use of praise to reward good children, a complement to the elaboration of ridicule as a means of exercising social control.

The addition of a material gift to verbal praise when reinforcement of a given behavior pattern is particularly desired has been described. Praise itself, however, is the element of the reward which is culturally prescribed and which must be present if the essential criterion of a reward ~~are~~ is to be met. The role of praise in the Ashanti communications system will be treated in more detail in a separate section.

A complement to the strict ban on gossip and tale-bearing is the prescribed loyal report which is required within an abusua. This has already been described under "Socially Irresponsible Speech." If the interpretation suggested there is correct, i.e., that loyal reporting always involves a topic concerning speech or actions of someone outside the family and an addressee who is within the family, then loyal reporting constitutes a complement to the ~~xagx~~ gossip and tale-bearing prohibition rather than an exception to it. The ban itself, apparently concerns a topic connected with affairs within the family and an addressee who is an outsider. Again it should be stressed that more data are needed to substantiate this interpretation, but as nothing in existing reports contradicts this analysis, it is raised as a hypothesis which should be checked by further field work.

Another prescribed speech act which seems to complement a kind of speech ordinarily forbidden is the fetish oath which must be sworn by a witness testifying in court. This oath is similar to any other in its binding and efficacious power, its public character, and its message form which includes an allusion to some catastrophe, in the history of the Ashanti. It differs from most other oaths in that it is imposed rather than voluntarily invoked and the consequences of misusing the oath are administered not by legal process, but by a stroke of the gods. This is a kind of sanction specifically attached to misuse of the oath rather than to lying on the witness stand as evidenced by the fact that sacred persons (who are exempt from swearing the oath) who lie while testifying are punished by the Ashanti society rather than by supernaturals.

The prescribed indulgence in abusive language during Apo does seem to constitute an exception to the cultural ban on abuse. Even in this case, however, the components of the abusive speech acts at Apo are not identical with those of abusive speech in general. In particular, the ends, in the sense of both goals and outcomes, are different, as are the manner of delivery and the norms applying to the act. The goal of abuse in general is to insult or wound another, and the outcome is xxxx usually social disruption and frequently involves legal consequences. At Apo the stated goal is "removing misfortune from the nation," and the outcome is an atmosphere of conviviality and good will. The manner in which abuse is ordinarily uttered is usually angry and rather spontaneous, although there are many stock insults which constitute the average person's repertoire of abusive speech. Abuse at Apo, however, seems on the whole to be couched in formal, traditional formulas which are uttered jovially and amiably, with very little attention to the addressee. Women frequently sing abusive songs at Apo, but there is no evidence that abuse is ordinarily sung in other circumstances. The topic of abuse, however, seems to be identical in all cases, always referring to the unpleasant characteristics of the addressee, his ancestors, his family, and his associates. The notion of abuse at Apo being capable of "removing misfortune from the nation" makes it mandatory for all Ashanti to join in the abusive xxx singing and talking which characterize the festival.

Confession

On at least two occasions confession constitutes a speech act which is culturally prescribed, The pressures put on a woman to confess during a difficult labor as well as on the occasion of her husband's initiating divorce proceedings have been described elsewhere in this paper. At these times it is clear that confession is expected, even required, of the woman in question. Whether there are other occasions which are characterized by the same requirement is a question which only more field work can answer.

Greeting

The other instances of prescribed speech are concerned with the social amenities xxx and courtesies of daily intercourse. In particular, it appears that it is always required for two Ashanti to greet each other whenever they happen to meet. It is correct to include in greetings a reference to the special spirit of the other's natal day, so that a man born on Friday is met with some allusion to Afi, a mark of honor and a recognition of his good birth under Afi's protection. Any person of rank, all old people, priests, and priestesses, gods, fetishes, and spirits of the dead are addressed as "naná," the term specifically used for grandparents by the Ashanti. Anotber title of respect frequently given to chiefs, or by wives to husbands and by children to elders is "adwo" (Rattray 1923:280). Persons addressed as "naná" in return address subjects and followers and supplicants to whom they wish to show special consideration as "nána," the reciprocal of the former term.

Priests are taught a special greeting which they are required to extend to elders. It is reported that the priest must bend his right knee and touch the ground with his right hand xxx whenever he encounters an elder. No verbal utterance has been mentioned as accompanying the gestures, but this does not necessarily indicate that none exists. Indeed, in view of the various respect terms already described, it seems probable that these are used with such a greeting.

Priests are also taught how to distinguish certain trees which are supposed to be greeted, and the manner of greeting them. Rattray, who mentions this fact, gives no details about it; hence it is impossible to know from existing data either the criteria for deciding which trees are to be greeted or the components of the actual act of greeting.

TABLE 29 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: Prescribed Speech

Setting	Participants		Ends		Act Sequence	Channel
	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes		
Child being rewarded for good behavior	older person usually parent	child	reinforce good behavior		child does something pleasing to addresser; receives praise	voice
Reporting something done or said against fellow abusua member	one member of abusua	another member of same abusua	apparently reinforces abusua solidarity and offsets possible harm resulting from act reported		reporter begins with formula which always is used with loyal reporting, then reports	voice
Giving testimony in court	witness	court	to swear to the truth of what is about to be said		spokesman administers oath to witness	voice
Apo ceremony	all		to remove misfortune from nation; has cathartic effect		herald announces beginning of Apo. All engage in abusive talking and singing	voice
			Prescribed Speech - Confession			
WOMAN in difficult labor	woman	midwives	remove obstacles to birth caused by unconfessed guilt		Midwives exhort woman to confess. She, if she complies, calls out name of lover	voice
Initiation of divorce proceedings	woman	her family	to establish guilt of woman accused of adultery		husband turns wife over to her family; they require her to take oath as to her innocence or confess.	voice

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TABLE 29 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: PRESCRIBED SPEECH (cont'd) - GREETINGS

	Participants		Ends			
Setting	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes	Act Sequence	Channel
Two Ashanti meeting one another	one party	the other	to extend courtesy to one another		Each greets the other using culturally prescribed polite forms	voice
Priest meets elders	priest	elder	to extend courtesy to the elder		priesk greets elder using culturally prescribed polite forms	gesture ? voice?
Priest greets certain trees	priest	trees	to extend courtesy to tree		Priest discerns nature of tree, greets according to culturally prescribed polite forms	?

Praise

Just as ridicule constitutes the means of social control to which the Ashanti most frequently resort, so too, praise is an important speech genre by which cultural values are instilled and approved behavior patterns are reinforced. The inclusion of praise in various prayer formulas is apparently optional, but it does appear to be one way of placating and propitiating the spirits. Its use in connection with rewards given to children, including praise of a girl whose surprise exclamation "Oh father!" ~~hxxx~~ shows her to be particularly strong and brave, has already been discussed.

Acquisition of Code and Speech Competence

One very important useage of praise is connected with the acquisition of code and speech competence by young children. Early attempts at speech are enthusiastically encouraged, and parents make efforts to entice infants to repeat words. Kaye reports that anyone near a baby will talk to it. The impression given is that this is more with the intention of having the child repeat one's words, than an expression of a belief that the child can understand their meaning (1962:169). When the child first begins to speak, his grammatical mistakes are not considered to be important and all of his efforts are greeted with praise and encouragement.

This is, of course, nothing more than a specific instance of rewarding approved behavior by verbal praise, but it is singled out here because of its relationship to the general attitude of the Ashanti toward speech. Speaking is a particularly valued activity which is encouraged and rewarded. It is something to be concerned about and measures are consciously and deliberately adopted to foster interest in it on the part of children to the extent that no unpleasant experiences such as correction are connected with the acquisition of speech. All efforss are rewarded, even those which will later be rejected because they are grammatically or otherwise incorrect. This last factor causes a certain amount of discontinuity to be built into the process of language acquisition for an Ashanti child, as it entails a shift from a very permissive and encouraging atmosphere in the early stages to a more critical one when the child reaches the stage at which conformity to adult standards is required.

Bara Rite

Another occasion characterized by expressions of praise is that of the bara rite. During that part of the ceremony which occurs after the girl has been bathed in the river, the participants all attempt to convey to the girl notions of some of the functions of womanhood through dancing, gestures, and words. Everywhere, both inside and outside the house, the singing and dancing are interspersed with group shouts of exhiliration and thanksgiving. At this time there is usually a great deal of praise for the father of the girl for his material support of the proceedings, his good relationship with the girl's mother, and for his special spiritual relationship to the girl, based on her participation in his ntoro. This differs from the other instances of praise discussed here insofar as this is not directly addressed to the person being praised, but is rather said about him in his absence.

Conclusions

All of the examples of praise, then, serve to reinforce values and behaviors which are culturally approved. This is apparently true even of prayers, in which the spirits are praised for qualities, characteristics, and functions which promote the well-being of the Ashanti people. To the extent that praise serves this function and creates an atmosphere which makes repetition of the rewarded act or pattern worthwhile, it may be said to complement ridicule as a means of social control. It is not clear, however, how complete the complementarity is. The force of ridicule is sufficient to create among the Ashanti a certain dread of incurring such a penalty and to prevent acts which evince this response from being readily repeated. It seems probable that fear of incurring ridicule might at times be the sole and sufficient motive for refraining from or engaging in certain kinds of behavior. The data do not permit the inference that praise, on the other hand, is sufficiently important that the desire for it would constitute sufficient motivation by itself for performing specific acts. It may in fact play a role of this importance, but only more data would make validation of the inference possible. Indeed the evidence seems to indicate that praise actually does not carry the weight that ridicule does, and that the ~~positive~~ positive aspect of social control is actually a much weaker aspect than is the negative one.

TABLE 30 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: PRAISE

Setting	Participants		Ends		Act Sequence	Channel
	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes		
PRAYER	any Ashanti	some supernatural	reinforce characteristics, qualities, and functions of addressee that promote well-being of speaker		In course of prayer speaker praises some quality of addressee	voice
Reward of well-behaved child	older person, usually parent	child	reward and reinforce good behavior		older person praises child who has behaved well	voice
Child learning to speak	same	same	reward and reinforce efforts to speak		adult speaks to child child speaks, adult encourages and praises him	voice
Bara rite	women	all present			Women praise father of girl celebrating bara	voice

Deception

In spite of the ban on lying, there are a few instances in which the Ashanti are permitted, even expected, to lie. It has been mentioned elsewhere that adults will sometimes persuade children to deceive such visitors as tax collectors if they do not wish to speak with unwelcome callers. It has also been mentioned that children under ten years of age are usually not punished for lying. These represent instances of lying which are tolerated, although they are not particularly encouraged and certainly not required.

Other occasions on which the practice of deception is definitely encouraged are those connected with correction of children and also handling their questions concerning sex, pregnancy, etc. With regard to the correction of children, if the parent wishes to interrupt the child in the performance of some unacceptable act, he does so verbally with expressions such as "Stop that! Don't say that," "If you do that a ghost will catch you," "The policeman will arrest you," "If you don't stop the doctor will come again and give you another injection." Frequently a person outside the house or room will collaborate by changing his voice and calling, "Who is that child crying (or misbehaving)? I shallcome there just now if he doesn't stop." Obviously the object is to frighten the child so that he will refrain from engaging in the kind of behavior which causes the threat to materialize.

Deliberately deceptive replies are also given to young children who question their parents about sexual matters. A child who questions his pregnant mother's size is told that she has pillows under her clothes, or has eaten too much. When the baby arrives thus unannounced the inquisitive child is told that babies come from one of a variety of sources such as God, the farm, the store, or abroad.

Another instance of conscious and deliberate deception being perpetrated is that which occurs when parents are trying to ward off evil from a young child, born after several other infants in the family have died. The earlier losses are considered to have been caused by harmful spiritual forces, and in an effort to deceive these forces the couple call their newborn by a name signifying "slave child." This is intended to deceive the spirits who wish to harm the parents by causing their children to die. One who is identified as "slave child" is not recognized as belonging to the couple in question by the malevolent spirits, and thus the child is left unharmed. A variant of this is the practice of suffixing the natal name with "moshi," the name of the northern tribe from whom the Ashanti formerly drew many slaves. All children in this category are known as "Begyina mma," "Come and stay children."

Conclusions

The two examples of deception which are tolerated but not actively encouraged probably represent violations of the prohibition against lying which do not incur the usual penalty because: 1) their social consequences are relatively minor, and 2) they are so common as to militate against a policy of taking punitive action at each offence of this kind.

With regard to the deceptive practices which are culturally encouraged, certain characteristics are found running through all of them. All are connected with children, and are apparently motivated by a concern for the ultimate well-being of the child or children in question. All also have a preventive effect, the first two preventing the children from continuing whatever they are doing (be it misbehaving or asking impertinent questions), the third preventing the gods from identifying the parents of the child.

From these examples it would seem that deception is permitted when it is in some way geared to secure the ultimate good of a child or children, and to prevent something which is culturally disapproved from occurring.

TABLE 31 COMPONENTS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS: DECEPTION

Setting	Participants		Ends		Act Sequence	Channel
	Addresser	Addressee	Goals	Outcomes		
Correcting misbehaving child	some adult	child	to frighten child	either child stops misbehaving or is punished	See text	voice
Child asking about sex	some adult	child	to satisfy child's curiosity without giving accurate information	either child stops asking or is punished	see text	voice
Naming come and stay children	parents	gods	Prevent gods from identifying parents of child			voice

Food and Speech

The frequency with which food figures in various speech events is striking. Food plays a role in nearly all Ashanti prayers, constituting in most of them that material element which seems to be present whenever special urgency and efficacy are required. When presented as a prayer offering, food seems to represent a valued object, something considered desirable by both the giver and receiver. Further evidence that food is valued is the fact that it is sometimes an element in rewards given to children.

The notion of hunger or fasting also appears to be especially significant in Ashanti thought. The cries of a baby under three months of age are always interpreted as indicating hunger, and the immediate response to the cries is for the mother to suckle the child. Hunger is something which must be attended to, and it is grossly neglectful for anyone to permit the child to continue suffering in his hungry state.

It has already been mentioned that subjects volunteering to be sacrificed at the funeral of their chief express their desire for execution in the words, "I am hungry." A person intending to commit a capital offence, i.e., do something which will result in his own death, indicates his intention by saying, "I shall not eat again." In both cases, the notion of deprivation of food is associated with death. This is also true of the father's threat to send his ghost to punish his son, "When I die do not fast." Here, the notion of voluntary fasting is suggested as a way of expressing grief at the death of another. Indeed, these three examples seem to indicate that the desire to be with the dead is related to hunger. The person about to secure his own death either by offering himself as a sacrifice or by committing a capital offence, communicates his intention by using words expressing the fact that he is deprived of food, "I am hungry," "I shall not eat again." The son who is disrespectful to his father is ~~xxxx~~ warned not to fast at his father's death because his conduct clearly indicates that he does not truly love his father. It would be hypocritical for him to pretend when his father dies, that he longs to be with his father's spirit.

If hunger is an expression of a desire to join the spirit world, this notion would add urgency to the desire of the Ashanti to satisfy the hunger of a crying child. If the child's hunger is in some way associated with longings to return to the ghost world from which he came this is all the more reason for suckling the child and relieving his hunger as quickly aspossible.

Just as hunger and fasting seem, then, to be related to death, so too a full stomach can also be fatal if nourishment is obtained by illegal means. Thus it is said that "a witness dies because of his belly" when someone lies under oath for a bribe,signifying that one who commits this crime out of greed will be struck dead.

Conclusions

The desire for the life of a young baby is very, strong in the Ashanti and food, which is associated with life is offered to the child whenever he expresses hunger, which is related to death. Whenever death is desired, hunger is permitted to go unrelieved. Prayers, which are always in some way connected with the life and fertility of the society, are often accompanied by food offerings. Again the relationship seems clear. In the normal course of events hunger and fasting are associated with death and the desire to be with the spirits. Food and satiety are associated with life. The means by which life is preserved, however, must be culturally approved. It is permitted to petition certain people and spirits for food, and of course, it is accepted that each family is free to use its resources to keep its members well fed. If illegal means are used, however, the consequences are severe. Such activity constitutes an inversion of the prescribed order of things, and thus it is not surprising that the outcome is also distorted. Specifically, the agreement to lie under oath in exchange for which a bribe is accepted constitutes an illegal means by which to increase one's resources. The consequence of such an act is not the usual incceased life and fertility, but rather death, the penalty attached to this perversion of accepted modes of behavior.

Privileged Speakers

Sacred Persons

Certain of the Ashanti occupy a special position with regard to speech. The chief is one of the most outstanding of these. He is generally immune from contradiction, and it is expected that any speech of his is both final and authoritative. The Ashanti prefer that their chiefs ~~may~~ not speak hastily or impulsively, but deliberate carefully before making any remarks. "Ka preko," "Say once"is a common title for a chief (Rattray 1929:87-88).

All sacred persons, including of course, the chief, are kept from having direct verbal contact with those in a secular state. Drummers while they are in the act of drumming are considered to be such persons, although while not actually performing this sacred character is not attributed to them. Thus it is forbidden for anyone to annoy, interrupt, or assault anyone while he is in the act of drumming.

Those whose offices render them sacred are also released from the obligation of swearing fetish oath when giving testimony in court. They are expected to speak as truthfully as if they were under oath, and any sacred person found to be guilty of lying in court is deprived of his office, and thus also of his sacred character.

Persons Who Have Direct Verbal Contact With Sacred Persons

Spokesmen:

Another class of persons who enjoy special speech prerogatives includes those who are permitted direct verbal intercourse with the sacred members of the community. Foremost among these are the spokesmen whose function has been briefly described in the section on proscribed speech. Ordinarily, at all public assemblies an Ashanti spokesman sits to the right of his chief. He must never remain seated when speaking in public except when someone other than the chief is addressing him. It is not always necessary for the spokesman to repeat an entire utterance of the chief word by word, particularly if the speech is long. In such cases, the spokesman, who stands with the gold or silver cane which is the symbol of his office in his hand while the chief speaks, concludes by saying, "Se ohene se ni," "So says the king." Frequently, however, the spokesman speaks much more extensively, and although he is forbidden to add fresh matter to the chief's words, he may enlarge upon certain phrases and reconstruct the sentences, interspersing the speech "with some of the celebrated witty and philosophical reflections for which they are justly celebrated to the credit of both himself and his chief" (Danquah 1928:42). The spokesman who is considered accomplished in his role is not only adept at the art of rhetoric, but he exhibits a mastery over gesture and a thorough knowledge of the whole history and all the proverbs of the particular clan he represents as well. He is an expert on court etiquette, and may even be called upon to instruct a new chief or king.

At religious ceremonies, the spokesman is expected to exclaim "Yo!" in a deep voice from time to time as the chief recites the prescribed prayers and makes the traditional offerings. The function of these exclamations has not been explained, although it appears that the spokesman is here voicing his assent to the action and words of the chief. This assent seems to represent that of the entire community assembled for the ceremony.

When duly authorized, a spokesman may represent his chief and act for him as plenipotentiary or legate. Some are empowered to give expression to the chief's views at any time or place. Because of the high intelligence required of spokesmen, they are regarded as the chief's private advisers and counsellors. So important is this advisory function of the spokesman that the success or failure of any government is generally attributed to him rather than to the chief, as is indicated in the popular proverb: "Kuro ebo a, efiri 'kyeame, Kuru gyina a, efiri 'Kyeame," "If a town becomes broken, it is the fault of the okyeame; if a town stands, it is due to the okyeame" (Rattray 1927:77).

It is significant that one who commits adultery with the wife of one of the Ashanti king's spokesmen is guilty of a particularly grave offence, formerly punished by death. If the culprit in such a case were a chief, however, the death penalty would usually be levied on his spokesman, who, as his adviser and counsellor, is regarded as keeper of his master's conscience (Rattray 1927:277).

The queen mother and all priests also have their own spokesmen whose relationships to their masters are similar to those between the chief and his spokesmen.

Minstrels:

Another category of persons who enjoy direct verbal contact with the chief are his kwadwumfo, two minstrels who on all state occasions drone in nasal tones the names and deeds of dead kings and queens as far back as tradition has a record directly into the ears of the presiding chief. He listens as they sing, and it is said that his heart fills with sadness for the dead as he hears their deeds recounted. These eulogies and condolences are set pieces, but the minstrels are free to develop various manners of delivery and a high value is placed on a distinct and eloquent presentation. According to Danquah, each minstrel holds his mouth or jaw between the index finger and thumb of his left hand as he recites the traditional accounts (1928:55).

The speech of minstrels has certain characteristics in common with that of spokesmen. In both cases the topic is dictated by something outside the control of the speaker. For minstrels, it is always concerned with traditional figures and events in Ashanti tribal history, and the speaker is not free to introduce matter which does not pertain to this. In the case of spokesmen the topic is of course determined by whatever the chief or his subject actually says. The spokesman, however, apparently plays a larger role in determining the topic than does a minstrel, because of his role as adviser and counsellor to the chief. This role enables him at least to some extent to shape policy and determine the content of a chief's communication with his subjects. The chief is not a mere puppet, however, and although the spokesman is frequently blamed for any failures and difficulties which beset a town, it is the chief who is subject to deposition in the final analysis. To the extent that the chief is not merely a passive figurehead in the hands of the spokesman, then, the spokesman has only limited power to determine the topics of his official speech acts.

Both spokesmen and minstrels, however, have quite a bit of freedom with regard to the actual message form of any given speech act. Both are expected to develop eloquence and a generally pleasing style of delivery, and are permitted to be spontaneous and original in choosing the precise language in which their messages are uttered.

Heralds:

One group who definitely enjoy privileges in their speech with the chief is constituted by the stool heralds. It is not clear whether these men have direct speech withthe chief, although the evidence seems to indicate that this is the case. Many heralds are hunch-backs, and in former times, it was almost inevitable that any hunch-back would become an esen, or herald. Their first duty is to maintain order in any assembly or tribunal, or in any gathering in which the chief is present. As one way of accomplishing this duty, heralds frequently punctuate the addresses of any assembly with cries of "Tie! Tie! Yentie! Odedew!" "Listen! Listen! Let us listen! Too much noise!" (Rattray 1927:279).

In the days when Ashanti was a war-like nation, heralds were frequently used as spies, or sent as their master's envoys when war seemed imminent. In this latter capacity they would deliver the master's terms to the enemy. They are also used to proclaim new edicts as described in the sections on announcing and pronouncing, and to otherwise make public the decisions and policies of the government. In addition to these rather serious functions, the role of the herald has its lighter aspects. As the more or less official court jesters among the Ashanti, heralds are privileged to say very much what they like to their masters. They are the only men other than eunuchs permitted near the king's harem because of their special status. The king of Ashanti in fact refers to his heralds as his wives (Rattray 1927:279).

Children:

The characteristics apparently common to all those permitted directed verbal contact with sacred figures considered thus far, then, include the following:

1) The speaker holds a special status in the society, in the cases cited, an official status
2) The speaker is limited, at least to some extent, as to topic
3) The speaker is acting, at least much of the time, for someone other than himself when he is in verbal contact with the sacred.

All of these characteristics are in a sense also true of the final group enjoying this privileged contact under certain circumstances: children. It has already been noted that the wife of a weaver (whose position is religious in nature), is forbidden to speak directly with her husband while she is menstruating. All verbal communication must occur at this time through a child. The child's status in Ashanti society is special in many ways. There is a general attitude that considers the pre-pubertal child to be a kind of harmless, neutral being, incapable of participating in forces which are either good or evil. This is reflected in the utilization of a child as intermediary between religious and unclean persons.

Besides having this unique neutral status, the child is also limited as to topic by the speech of whichever party he is acting for and he is always in this role, acting not for himself, but for another person.

Children and heralds have another trait in common insofar as neither is associated with the sexual role ordinarily expected of adults. In the case of children the notion of sexuality does not appear to be present in connection with their role as intermediary. With regard to heralds, it is present, but they are associated with female rather than male sexuality, as evidenced by their freedom to enter the king's harem, and the fact that they are referred to by the king as his wives.

Oaths

Children enjoy another speech privilege in that they are seldom punished for swearing oaths. This tolerance seems to stem from the notion that they do not realize the import of what they are saying. Similar toleration is extended to anyone who is inebriated. If a man accused of misusing an oath can convince others that he had been drunk at the time he is usually excused from the ordinary penalty attached to such behavior.

In addition a general relaxation of the taboos against oaths is permitted anyone fighting in a military campaign as described above.

Queen Mother

The one adult female who enjoys speech privileges is the queen mother. She is free to criticize, contradict, or rebuke the chief whenever she feels that his behavior warrants this, and she may also address the court on her own initiative if she so desires. No one else in Ashanti society is entitled to such prerogatives.

In general, the utterances of women seem to be given more credence by the Ashanti than do those of men, and this fact may be related to the rights accorded the queen mother. Danquah's observations concerning the evidence given by a woman in court have already been noted. Possibly the explanation for the special privileges of the queen mother lies in the fact that she is in some sense representative and symbol of all Ashanti women, and as such embodies the truthfulness ordinarily associated with female speech. (This will be discussed further in the section on Male and Female Speech.) The queen mother may rebuke or contradict the chief be cause her remarks will be based not on jealousy or malice as may those of a man, but rather on justice and truth, the qualities which are apparently characteristic of feminine speech.

Male and Female Speech

Throughout the literature on Ashanti speech, several references to the importance of verbal skills occur. Whenever the speaker is identified these are always associated with male speakers. It is pointed out that rhetoric is highly valued by the whole society, but particular mention is made of the importance of a mastery over rhetoric and gesture for xkx spokesmen. Eloquence is also mentioned as one of the criteria upon which selection of the Nkwankwaahene, male spokesman for the commoners, is based. That eloquence is important in courtship and marriage is indicated by the fact that a shy suitor often avails himself of an intermediary in proposing marriage. Courtroom oratory is said to be particularly elaborated, and again, this would seem to emphasize masculine speech, as most of the officials in court are male. Females are not wholly excluded, however, for it is specifically reported that the speech of witnesses is also characterized by oratorical elaboration, and of course, some of these witnesses are women. Even here, however, the emphasis seems to be on masculine speech, for it is pointed out that even young boys of eight or ten years commonly address the jury in able, self-assured language. Young girls are not mentioned.

Great communicative skill is required of drummers of the talking drums, all of whom are male. They must be able to beat out the various rhythms precisely, and to embody in these rhythms accurate narrations of the traditions, genealogies, and other tribal lore which constitute their repertoire.

Skill and accuracy are demanded of anyone responsible for recounting Ashanti traditions and history, and this applies to both males and females as the queen mother is sometimes called upon to do this. Recitation at the various rites and ceremonies must be word perfect, and penalties for errors are very severe. If a chief is recounting past events in which his ancestors participated, he must speak in the first person, as if he himself had played the role he is describing.

These stipulations about formal recitations constitute one of the few instances when ~~stipulations~~ regulations are made about a woman's speech. Actually, of course, these are standards set down , not about feminine speech, but about the recounting of history,' and they happen to apply to women as well as to men. The only other example of a restriction placed on a woman's speech aside from menstrual taboos, is the prohibition against women calling a man a fool. This prohibition may be related to the general tendency among the Ashanti to believe a woman's speech. If this is so, then a man who is called "fool" by a woman is particularly offended not only because he is thus abused, but also because he is compelled to take seriously what a woman says. An insult from a woman casts doubts upon a man's self image as well as merely insulting him in the ordinary sense.

In general it appears that more pressures to measure up verbally are exerted on men than on women. Women seem to be more attuned to the correct use of speech than are men, and less attention is paid to speaking competence in regard to feminine speech acts than masculine ones. This tendency seems to be related to the relative places of men and women in the larger context of the whole society. The status of women is evidently more secure than that of men, and the ease and relaxed air with which women fulfill their role contrasts strikingly with the generally much more tense and competetive atmosphere surrounding male roles. This does not hold true when a woman fails in her role, of course, as when she fails to bear children, or she is completely replaced in her husband's affection by another woman. The point is that women's successes and failures are much more clear cut ~~thatn~~ than those of men. A woman may fail, but she always knows when she has failed. The demands made on men are much more nebulous. Their obligations are full of qualifiers and modifiers. Man must not only do x; he must do x well, or eloquently, or bravely, or solemnly, etc. A man is unable to produce something as a mother produces a child and say "I have fulfilled my duty," as she can. He must always examine how he has produced, evaluating the mode of operation, the materials used, the impression made on others at each stage in the process. As this applies in other realms, so too, it applies with gxx regard to speech. Men are required to speak well, or eloquently, or truly, etc. There are always several standards which must be met, if a man's speech act is to win approval. With a woman, for the most part, it is enough that she speak. It is taken for granted that she will speak well, and her speech will be approved.

An example of this difference in the security of men and women in Ashanti society and its ramifications with regard to speech may be seen in the culturally determined reactions to the surprise exclamations of males and females. It has already been noted that for a boy to exclaim "Oh mother!" rather than "Oh father!" is a great disgrace and makes him the object of much ridicule, while a girl may use either expression without incurring disapproval. The girl in fact, wins special admiration if she exclaims "Oh father!" The female, then, is right regardless of which exclamation she uses. There are only two possible reactions to her speech act: 1) ordinary acceptance, or 2) special respect and admiration. The male's speech situation is much more precarious. His exclamation may evince: 1) ordinary acceptance or 2) rejection, scorn, and disapproval. Not only is the girl's second alternative, that of winning respect and admiration not accessible to a male, thatx he is also threatened with the possibility of his speech being greeted with ridicule and abuse. With regard to this particular speech act, a female is always right, and she also has the possibility of being more than right, i.e., particularly admirable. A male is deprived of this possibility and threatened with the possibility of being completely wrong in his speech. The situation may be formalized as in Table 32

In this example it is clear that woman's speech role, at least with regard to surprise exclamations, is much more secure than that of men. It appears probable that this statement can be made of their speech in general, and not merely of this specific speech act. Men's speech is talked about more, has more standards against which it is measured, and a greater range of qualities by which it must

Table 32: Male and Female Surprise Exclamations

		Oh mother!	Oh father!
ACCEPTANCE	male	-	+
	female	+	+
SCORN	MALE	+	-
	female	-	-
RESPECT	male	-	-
	female	-	+

+ indicates present
- indicates absent

The only one who can have a plus for respect is a female. The only one who can have a plus for ridicule is a male. The only one who can have a minus for acceptance is a male.

be characterized than does women's speech because men in general occupy a more precarious position in society than do women. Everything men do is accompanied by various pitfalls, which bring disgrace and ridicule if one falls into them. Speech is included in this. Men are constantly being called upon to prove themselves--in battle, in politics, in the marriage bed, in speech. Women's success are taken or granted. Their life is in a sense simpler, more relaxed, certainly more secure.

Fortes has reported that one of the most common topics of conversation among modern Ashanti is the resentment felt toward the restraints and frustrations which they attribute to observance of the rule of matrilineal descent (1950:258). Some of these "restraints and frustrations" may indeed by the maintenance of an atmosphere in which males are required to earn their social position by meeting various criteria at every level and at every stage of their development while women more or less determine the possibilities and alternatives available to men. It is true that the male lineal group, the ntoro, is recognized by the Ashanti; but nearly all rights and duties are dependent on the female line. In many subtle ways, then, the Ashanti are a society shaped by women; and the men must adjust accordingly. This entails a general insecurity in many areas and speech is not the least of them.

Public Speech

All speech which has particular bearing on the progress of the social order is apparently considered to be public speech by the Ashanti. This includes all announcements and pronouncements, oaths, all of the ridiculing acts in which there is a material as well as a verbal component; the covert ridicule embodied in some stories, abusive speech sanctioned by the society, and all of the speech acts which are prohibited because of their social consequences. In addition, of course, all the speech acts contained in any public ceremony or state celebration are public rather than private. Public speech is governed by many restrictions and regulations, as one would expect because of its relationship to the national well-being.

Private speech is that which takes place on a non-official level between individuals. The consequences of private speech do not extend beyond the lives and immediate surroundings of the participants and their close associates. Private speech is also carefully regulated, however, because it is susceptible of being madepublic by any participant. Should one of them swear an oath or introduce gossip or other prohibited subject matter, or engage in abusive speech, the conversation immediately takes on a public character because of the consequences associated with all of these acts.

The classification of speech according to public or private domains depends among the Ashanti, not so much on the setting or the identity add/or numbers of participants as on the nature of the topic and the ends involved. If the topic is such that it entails consequences which involve the maintenance or disruption of the social order, the speech act is regarded as public even if there are only two participants associated with it.

TABLE 33 PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SPEECH

	Participants	Ends Goals	 Outcomes	Act Sequence
PUBLIC	Irrelevant	to give public character to one's speech	the maintenance or disruption of the social order are involved and the speech act becomes public	Topic involves subject which has important consequences for the whole society
PRIVATE	individuals conversing at non-official level	Vary. Never to affect social order	Only participants and their immediate surroundings and close associates are affected	Topic involves subject which has consequences only for individuals, not for whole society

Confession

The literature includes one clear reference to a speech event in which confession plays an important part. This happens when a woman is having difficulty while in labor, an occurrence which is attributed to adulterous behavior on the part of the woman. This is a crime for which it is believed the woman will die unless she confesses. It appears that the mere utterance of the name of the woman's lover is sufficient to remove the obstacles to a normal birth and permit the delivery to proceed in the normal way. The midwives exhort the woman to name the man with whom She has committed adultery. Although one might at first suspect that this application of very strong pressure on the pregnant woman by the midwives, accompanied by threats of dire consequences, might be merely a means by which their curiosity is satisfied, the impression given by Rattray is that the women sincerely believe that the speaking of the man's name is the only antidote which can mitigate the evil consequences of the adultery. This impression is reinforced by the fact that if the woman fails to disclose the name of her alleged lover, the women address the unborn child, saying: "If your father be So-and-so, come forth," running through a list of possible candidates. The man whose name is being uttered at the actual moment of delivery is assumed to be the father, and presumably it is only the speaking of his name which removes the obstacles to the birth of the child.[9]

There is also a confession element in many divorce proceedings, especially those which are based on accusations of adultery. In order to initiate divorce proceedings, the husband must ascertain from his wife the fact of her adultery. To do this he usually hands her over to her relatives who ask her to swear by the national fetish as to her fidelity to her husband. If she confesses, her family sends to that of the correspondent for compensation. The adulterer's family consult him, and if he acknowledges guilt, he is required to pay a fine. If he denies having committed adultery with the woman he must state under oath all that he knows sexually of her. If it is discovered that he is suppressing information he is said to be guilty of Nsankyee, "rigid denial." Danquah, who reports this material, does not describe the penalty for this (1928:166-169). Frequently the husband does not divorce a woman who confesses to adultery, but rather binds her under pain of violating an oath not to have further relations with her lover.

In both cases cited, the confession is related to adultery. In the first case it is required of the woman only, but in the second, both parties are obliged to confess. The confession, in both instances, seems to have power to remove the consequences of an evil act. In the childbirth confession, the confession overcomes the obstacles to delivery which endanger the mother's life, and which are apparently the direct result of adultery. In the divorce confession the confession results in the payment of compensation to either the family or the husband of the woman. The fine thus paid in a sense restores a measure of justice to the woman's relationship with her husband and makes it possible, although certainly not mandatory, for him to accept her back as his wife and still maintain his self-respect and that of society.

Confession, then, is an efficacious speech act, powerful and capable of evincing specific behaviors in those to whom the confession is directed. The identification of those who have collaborated in the crime or sin confessed is of particular importance, although there is no evidence that the information is received with particular relish or in a spirit of gossip. Indeed, all the norms of the society would seem to militate against this. Inview of the many restrictions against discussing the affairs of others, confession is apparently one of the few verbal means by which informatikon concerning misconduct is communicated. It would be of great interest to know more about what is done with the information, for example, what are the consequences of rigid denial, and what is the reaction to the woman's confession in labor, but unfortunately the data do not supply this kind of information.

Communication with Beings other than Humans

It is evident that the Ashanti attribute powers of communication to various kinds of beings other than humans. Nature and all the manifestations of nature are said to possess the ability to speak, the newly dead and the gods speak, and fairies communicate by whistling. Some men are especially trained or equipped to be able to enter into these other modes of communication, although the means by which this is done, the codes used, and the channels by which the messages are transmitted have not been described.

Communicative Ability of Foetuses and Young Infants

Included in any consideration of communication with non-humans must be a discussion of the Ashanti belief in the communicative ability of a foetus. The practice of midwives directing questions as to the identity of its father to a foetus has already been described. The practice may indicate a certain expectation that the unborn child is able to understand speech and suggests that the foetus is believed to know who has fathered it. The foetus is also directly addressed by its father when he bestows a name on his child before it is born. Although it may be true that the Ashanti believe the foetus capable of understanding Twi, it is certain that another communicative code is believed to be used by children in the womb as well as by new born babies up to the age when teeth begin to erupt. The cooing of these young babies, who are known as "Akoda nga," is called "the language of the ghosts," (Rattray 1927:57), and the "mota," or foetus is considered capable of understanding this language. The Ashanti give this fact as the reason why no young infants are permitted in the room where a woman is giving birth, for such a child might use the cooing language to tell the unborn baby about the troubles of this world, causing the labor to be long and difficult (Kaye 1962:53).

Young infants are also addressed in Twi, and again the expectation seems to be that the baby understands what is said. This occurs during the Ntetea ceremony when the mother bends over the child and thanks it for not having caused her death. Twi is also used to abuse and ridicule the bodies of infants who have died before they are eight days old, and to pray to these ghost children and their ghost mothers.

Spirits

At funerals many prayers and speeches are addressed to the deceased, and Rattray remarks that the mourners believe that the spirits of the dead understand everything that is said (1927:158). The recently deceased can in turn communicate with the living as has been indicated in the section on codes.

All the spirits which make up the Ashanti pantheon, namely the supreme god, Nyame, various abosom or gods, departed spirits and ghosts, and numerous suman (a word usually translated "fetish" which includes such things as charms, amulets, and talismans), communicate with human beings quite regularly. Their voices, however, can be heard only with special training. This kind of training is particularly important for priests, because the oracular aspect of the priest's function is extremely important. It is the priest who is usually consulted at times of illness, misfortune, barrenness, etc, and he must be able to understand and interpret the messages of the gods. Thus a priest candidate is made to undergo a three-year novitiate before he is recognized as one fully qualified in his profession.

Priest's Training Period:

Most men and women who become priests do so because of a discovery that they are subject to spirit possession. The Ashanti priest-candidate usually has an experience in which, during the course of his daily tasks, or more often while at some religious ceremony, he becomes subject to a sudden convulsive-like seizure, or he goes into a trance. A qualified priest or priestess is then called in to interpret the phenomenon, and it is usually attributed to the spirit of a particular god who wishes to marry the person. The subject of the seizures is then usually persuaded to enter and train for the priesthood. The candidate who so chooses enters the service of some full-fledged priest of the particular god whose spirit is supposed to have manifested itself in him. He undergoes the skeptical scrutiny of the village headman and priests, being examined for family background, health, intelligence, aptitude, moral character, and his general knowledge of the requirements of this vocation. If he survives this screening he is pronounced ready for training, and is permitted to make vows to the gods and to the community.

He then begins the three-year novitiate incumbent on all candidates for the priesthood. During this time he is forbidden to marry, and if he is already married he must refrain from cohabiting with his wife. If this celibacy vow is violated, the novice must not only offer sacrifice to his own god and that of his priest-mentor, but he must also begin his training all over again. He must observe all the taboos of his god as well as those of his master's god. He is early taught to remain perfectly silent whenever a shrine is placed on his head, and he is expected to know whenever this silence is required of him.

The novitiate period is divided into three sessions of one year each. During the first year the novice is kept under constant observation by the older priest. He is not told anything very secret, and if he does not prove obedient and attentive to the instructions, his family is informed that he is not likely to make a good priest, and the training will cease. On all ceremonial days of his god he will sit beside his shrine and strive to listen to the god's voice. Instruction during the second year includes several admonitions, some of which concern speech. As has been mentioned, the novice is warned never to gossip, quarrel, adjure his god to kill anyone, or to attend the chief's court. Water-gazing and divining are taught during the third year. At this point the novice learns how to impregnate charms with various spirits, how to hear the voices of the trees, the stream, and the mmoatia or fairies, and what trees should be greeted, and in what manner.[10] At the end of the third year, the candidate enters the status of full priesthood after a rite in which he dances all night to the accompaniment of drums and singing.

During this three-year period, the candidate must also achieve proficiency in the ceemonial language spoken by the priests. This has been identified as an archaic dialect of Twi, and most Ashanti profess not to understand it (Lystad 1956:171). The priest must also learn rituals, songs, dances, drumming, diagnosis of illnesses and prescriptions for cures, and the insight and wisdom to solve personal problems and relieve anxiety for those who come to him. Above all, he must learn to maintain some sort of control in even the most excited states. If a priest laughs, or even smiles at any incident during a fetish, for example, it is said that he is not truly possessed. He is taught not to speak lightly of a patient's illness, or to suggest that the sick person might get well. Akesson reports that an Ashanti priest must always indicate that the patient's condition is very grave in words such as, "He will die, but I am going to try" (Akesson 1950:241).

Interview with a Priest:

Akesson has also given an example of an interview of a married couple disturbed over their childless state with a priest through his spokesman. The session went as follows:

Priest: (Shaking hands with the husband) Mema wo akye.
Good morning.

Husband: Yaa awura.
Good morning, sir. (In a form indicating that he is of coastal origins).

Priest: Mema wo akye.

Good morning.

Wife: Ya awusi

Good morning, sir. (In Ashanti form).

Priest: Okyeame, minua nua bi na ote ho yi.

Spokesman, my brother (referring to the wife's god), is sitting there.

Okyeame, merekohwe won nkyi enti wonnkoda na 'kenya mema won muae.

Spokesman, I am going to visit their town. Therefore, let them go and sleep. I shall give them an answer tomorrow.

The spokesman then inquired the names of the towns from which the couple had come. While this conversation was going on, the priest laughed as if he were in communion with someone other than those present and did not hear what they were saying. It is not clear from the report whether the priest had been told prior to actually meeting the couple, what their problem was. The tone of Akesson's paper suggests that this is not the case, and that one of the more subtle aspects of Ashanti priesthood involves the ability to gain information from others without ever asking directly for it. At any rate, the priest in this particular session did promise to have an answer for the couple without having been asked a direct question by them during the interview. On the following day the interview was begun with a proverb, the form in which an Ashanti priest always gives answers to clients:

Priest: Okyeame, ka kyere no se ohomfo a otoo aboa tuo no onya aboa no akyi di a womfa no abofo.

Spokesman, tell him that one does not take a dead animal in the bush if the hunter who shot it has not forsaken or stopped looking for it.

Husband: Kyeame, ka kyere no se obea yi ne okunu na wowo ho na ogyea aware no na mekofaa no.

Spokesman, tell him (the god) that this woman was living with her husband but she sought a divorce before I married her.

Wife: Kyeame, ka kyere no se obarima yi asem a oreka no nnim. Aware no mannya angyae anwie koroa enti se obosom yi ahu asem no na oreka a fa no nokware ma no.

Spokesman, tell him (the god) that what this man is saying is not true. I was not completely divorced. If this obosom has pointed it out, then justify him.

Priest: Kyeame, ka kyere no se menua nua na ogyina ho yi na kwaseabu a wabu no nti na ade no resee.

Spokesman, tell him that my brother (the god of the woman) is standing there. It is on account of the fool he (the husband) has made of him that he is spoiling the "thing."

Wife: Mekae kyere no se oma yenfa obosom guan nkoma no no ose mema yenko mpoano mera ansa.

When I told him to let us take the sheep to the god, he said we must first go to the coast.

Priest: Kyeame, ma onkofa nsa ma yenmo mpae ma obosom no.

Spokesman, let him bring wine to pray to the god for him.

Husband: Kyeame, miguane toa "nana" na oma me aduru bi.

Spokesman, I implore the old man (god) to give me some medicine (Akesson 1950:326-~~28~~ 327).

Whatever the priest says in such an interview is understood as being the message of the priest's god or the god of the client, and is usually complied with.[11]

Worship of the gods:

The Ashanti do not have a formalized liturgy except the praises and prayers of the songs and the language of the drums. The main features of public worship are changes in the songs and in the drum pieces which correspond to changes in the movements of the priests. The gods are said to be sensitive to the language of the music, and the Ashanti say that the gods would like to come down and see "their children," if only the music were pleasant to them. It is because of this belief that singers and drummers exert themselves to the utmost at religious ceremonies (Nketia 1963b:99). Here it would seem that music is believed to possess a power to communicate with the gods which speech does not have.

Corporate worship of the gods normally takes place on dabone (unlucky days), when festivals such as Adae are held. and during annual state festivals such as Odwira, or during special festivals of the gods (Nketia 1963b:27). Extraordinary ceremonies or meetings can be arranged for other days, but only when there is a matter of great urgency. During these corporate ceremonies, the activities of worship take the form of a drama with the priests and priestesses filling the most important roles. Periods of drumming and singing are interspersed with brief pauses for rest during which the priests go around shaking hands with the people, and verbally greeting those they cannot reach.

Individual worship among the Ashanti takes the form of an interview with the priest as described above, for communications of individuals are not readily heard or answered by the gods except through a priest. As in the situation already mentioned, drumming, singing, and dancing are all omitted. There are a few examples of prayers addressed by lay persons to these spirits, as in the prayers of the mother during a bara celebration, but these are all instances of contact with the spirits which is one sided. The petitioner prays, but does not expect to hear the voices of the spirits in response. Even such one sided prayers spoken by lay persons directly to the spirits are relatively rare, and for the most part, all such contact is through a priest.

Communication with the Ancestors:

The ancestors constitute the one class of spirits whose members are frequently worshipped without benefit of priests, and it is common for elders to approach them directly for whatever they most need. Significantly, Rattray points out that formerly these prayers were usually that members of the elders' households might never say anything that might bring trouble upon them (1929:14). In some instances, however, especially those which involve attempts to interpret the will of the ancestors, a priest is called in to officiate.

Fairies and Monsters:

The mmoatia or fairies are little forest people about one foot in height, with backward-pointing feet. They exist in three varieties: red, black, and white. It is said that they communicate by means of a whistling language. Whether they also understand and speak Twi, or whether certain Ashanti learn the whistling code is not clear, but it is known that some medicine men claim to have learned their art from the mmoatia. It is probable that this might be effected by means of Twi as that is the language in which prayers are addressed to the fairies.

Other medicine men claim to have learned their subject from monsters in the forest. There is not a grdat deal of information concerning these beings although both Rattray (1927:27) and Masters (1950:216) describe the most prominent monster, Sasabonsam. Covered with long hair, and possessed of large blood-shot eyes, long legs and feet pointing in both directions, Sasabonsam sits in high trees, dangling his legs with which he occasionally snatches up unwary hunters. Hostile to men, and especially to priests, this monster is said to be in league with all workers in black magic, i.e., with all witches and fairies.

A young man who wishes to practice medicine must retire alone into the forest for a considerable period (on the order of forty days and forty nights according to one example), during which he studies nature. He does not inform his friends and relatives of his intentions when he does this, and is usually given up for dead. Eventually he emerges from his retreat, and he is received as one returned from the dead. He then tells his family and friends that he has not been dead, but merely serving an apprenticeship to become a medicine man under the tutelage of either fairies or forest monsters.

Fairies are capable not only of instructing man in the art of medicine, but also of bringing about the death of specific enemies if they are approached and prayed to in the correct way. The manner of approaching the mmoatia and the prayer directed to them for this purpose have already been described.

Social Control

In general it may be said of the Ashanti that they much prefer verbal methods of exercising social control, maintaining discipline, and effecting settlement of disputes to any other. This is true even with regard to children. A father usually has a small piece of antelope skin for chastising a child on the buttocks for pilfering ~~axx~~ or speaking abusively. More frequently, however, verbal means are employed to maintain discipline, particularly in the first instance of a given misdemeanor. Lazy children, for example, are tongue-lashed by their father, and only if this does not suffice, they are whacked with the hand or with a stick. Similarly, an older child who persists in crying after repeated attempts to make him stop will be first verbally threatened, then threshed, and only as a last resort, subjected to a rectal suppository of red pepper and ginger.

These three modes of punishment are the most common forms used by the Ashanti to discipline their children. Threats are also frequently utilized as described in the section on culturally approved deceptions, and in other forms as well, such as when a mother threatens her daughter that she will reach menarche during the daytime if she does not behave. This is a most unlucky and evil omen in Ashanti eyes and constitutes a serious threat.

Drums

In the code inventory the use of a verbally derived drum code as a speech surrogate has been noted. According to Nketia (1963b:17), this type of drumming is only one of three modes commonly used, which include : 1) signalling; 2) communicating linguistic messages; and 3) accompaniment for dancing. All three are important, and although the second mode is perhaps the most striking to the western observer, the other two cannot be ignored. Danquah notes that the Ashanti have specific drum music for various occasions and situations, for example, war, peace, praise, condolence, glad tidings, funerals, earthquakes, and eclipses. He also reports that drum music exists for "all natural phenomena" and "every emotion" (1928:54).

Drums are an integral part of public worship and constitute a portion of the ~~means~~ nexus by which links are established between priests and spiritual beings, and between priests and devotees. They must be used for summoning judiciary meetings or any assemblies convened for the settlement of urgent transactions. Certain drums are set aside as tribunal drums so that whenever ~~xxxhxtxxxx~~ they are beaten, everyone knows that court will be in session. In this case, each tribunal drum beats out three calls, each of about one minute's duration, with an interval of about one hour between calls (Nketia 1963b:123). It is not clear whether these calls are verbally derived, having semantic content, or whether they are merely signals without such derivation or content.

The various drumming patterns are formed by utilization of one or more of a range of intensity differences, duration differences, and/or tone differences. Contrasts such as low pitch versus high or intermediary pitches, light sound versus clear or imitative tones, are all called into play. Differences are dictated by the need for a variety of sounds to which functions of a musical or social importance can be assigned. A tonal classification of the most common Ashanti drums may be found in Table 34.

TABLE 34 TONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DRUMS

Imitative	Low and Heavy	Moderately Low	Intermediate (dull)	Intermediate (bright)	High
Etwie (snarl of leopard)	bommaa (also called from, and twenekesee)	atumpan (standard size)	petia	operenten apentemma	akukua akukuadwo ose (also called apirede)
aburukuwa (bird)	byamadudu	mpintintoa	nkrawiri kusukurum	mpebi asafotwene	aburukuwa adedemma
akukuadwo Z(clockbird)			(master drum of apirede)	donno (also called nnonka)	pasoo

(After Nketia 1963b:177)

Drums are not themselves objects of worship, although they are offered libations and they carry prohibitions because they are repositories of the spirit of the wood and other materials from which they are made, and carry associations with the ancestor drummers. This is why drum performances are always begun with invocations to the spirits of these materials and to any spirits capable of interfering with the work of the drummers.

As a rule, women have nothing to do with drums. They do, however, play the donno drums at the girls' puberty rites.[12] All important Ashanti chiefs have special drum music whichis played for them on state occasions. Much of this music is provided by drums which are kept in the chief's palace and regarded as part of the stool regalia (Nketia 1963b:19).[13]

Techniques

The general term "twene"is sometimes applied to all drums, although each specific type has its own peculiar name and taboo. With the exception of the etwie drum, which is played by rubbing the drum head with a stick, all drums are played by making an impact on the drum head. The technique by which this is done varies according to the drum and mode in use. Four different methods are employed. The hand technique enables the drummer to vary the tone quality and pitches of the drum by using various parts and shapes of the hand, such as the base of the palm, the palm, the fingers, etc. The stick-and-hand technique entails use of a stick in the right hand while the left hand is used either to mute the beat of the stick, or to strike a note. The third technique, restricted to the hourglass drum, is the stick-and-armpit control technique. The drum is held in one armpit and is hit by the stick held in the free hand.[14] The fourth technique, the stick technique, is for the Ashanti the most important of the four. Usually two sticks are used.

Drum signals are usually produced by the stick technique. Those drum sounds which constitute "talking" may be made by all four techniques. Each technique has its own peculiar set of advantages. The hand technique is good for producing a wider range of pitches on the same drum than is possible with any of the other methods, but the stick technique produces sounds which carry farther. There is a prescribed technique for each drum , and the drummer is expected to use that technique and exploit its possibilities (Nketia 1963b:18-20). A classification of drums by technique follows in Table 35.

Talking Drums

The mode of playing the talking drums is characterized by a steady flow of beats, often lacking regularity in phrasing, but distributed within a framework of two tones. The rhythms are played in groups which are separated from each other by pauses of longer duration than they contain within themselves. The atumpan is considered to be the principal talking drum by the Ashanti (Nketia 1963b: 28-29). All talking drums belong to the chief, and are housed in a special room in the chief's house. They are used to communicate many different kinds of messages by means of a verbally-derived code based on a direct transfer of the spoken language elements such as tone and some phonetic features into a musical medium. This constitutes what Rattray has called a "tympanophonetic" as opposed to a "tympanosemantic" means of communication (1923:243). Tones, accent, stress, pauses, speed, and variation between loudness and softness which represents the gestural accompaniment to speech are all employed to transform Twi effectively into a drum dialect. Rattray reports that the drummers themselves say they use only two tones: the low, or male tone, and the high, or female tone (1923:248).[15]

Nketia stresses that the ultimate goal in all of this use of talking drums is always communication of a verbal type. The requirements of intelligibility call for employment of poetic forms in the transmission of messages by drums. Many Twi word stems are monosyllabic, and the bare occurrence of a single beat could therefore mean any number of things. Because of this the context of the word is expanded with paraphrastic formulas such as proverbs or honorary titles

TABLE 35 CLASSIFICATION OF DRUMS BY TECHNIQUE

	Hand	Stick and Hand		Armpit Control	Stick Only
DRUM	apentemma	brenko	(minor fontomfrom drum)	donno	from (also called bommaa)
	operenten	apentemma	(minor fontomfrom drum)		atumpan
	awaa drum mpintintoa	asafotwene			apedemna pasoo akukuadwo nkrawiri mpebi kantamanto petia, etc.

(After Nketia 1963b:177).

which characterize various persons or animals, etc. Thus it is not a single beat, but a particular rhythmic and melodic motif which identifies the subject.

Rattray has described the various classes of messages which are ordinarily transmitted by the Ashanti drummer. These include the names and deeds of each king or chief who has occupied the tribal stool for as far back as tradition remembers, the messages addressed to the various materials of which the drum is made, the best known proverbs, any alarms, especially if there is a fire, and war messages. The use of talking drums in connection with a chief's funeral has already been described. In all great calamities the drummer of the talking drums is expected to be at his post throgghout the duration of the calamity for the purpose of expressing in song the feelings of the king and the people, and to invoke the sympathy of the ancestors. On such occasions, the talking drums are played alone, without any kind of accompaniment.

In spite of the elaboration of the drum code, it is not easy to understand without some study. In practice, both sender and receiver should have some familiarity with the phrases drummed (Rattray 1923:257).

Drum Signalling

When the drums are used for signalling, they are played in short, repetitive rhythms or in a broken series of beats played at one level of pitch. The Ashanti refer to such drumming as "short drumming" (Nketia 1963b:27). One example of such signalling is the adidi 'twene, the dinner drum played at midday when any one might enter the palace and eat.

Drum Accompaniments

Drums used as accompaniment for dancing include talking drums on which texts concerning any of four set subjects may be drummed at dances and festivals. These include: 1) invocations to spirits, creatures, deities, and ancestors; 2) panegyrics or eulogies; 3) greetings, warnings, congratulations, emergencies, announcements; and 4) proverbs. All of these texts are traditional, but for the listener, the ability to appreciate the music of the drum and to make the appropriate bodily movements or other responses counts far more than the ability to translate, though enjoyment and participation are enhanced if this too is possible (Nketia 1963b:48-49).

At all state celebrations there are open dances at which the spectators encourage and congratulate the dancers both verbally and by means of gesture. Whenever a new individual steps into the dancing ring he is saluted on the drums. The greatest moment occurs when the chief steps into the ring. The talking drums welcome him with praise and a warning to others to make way. For effective use of the drums on such state occasions, court drummers are specially appointed. The drummers themselves are organized into six groups, each specializing in the music of one set of drums. State drumming is the peak of all drumming in the Ashanti community, and some of the best and most complex forms of drumming are heard on state occasions (Nketia 1963b:151).

Training of Drummers

Drummers participate in an annual drum festival always held a fortnight before the Odwira Ceremony. At this time young drummers who have hitherto been receiving private training are brought to the drumhouse for practical lessons. At the close of the festival, all drums in the drumhouse except the tribunal drum, are put away to rest until Odwira. None of the drums may be used until the opening of that ceremony.

In former times, the training of a state drummer was a serious undertaking. The candidate would be taken to the drums early in the morning, and formally instructed in the art along with other prospective drummers. Instructors would speak the rhythms either in intelligible utterances of in nonsense syllables. In modern times, when drumming does not pay so well as it once did, less emphasis is placed on a rigorous apprenticeship for young drummers. The drummer is officially a servant of the court, and the office is usually given to households of commoners or of chief's sons. Although it is not strictly a heritable office, it is believed that a father's drumming skill passes from him to his son, and thus it often happens that the office is inherited by a son from his father. It is also possible that an infant may show signs that he has been born to be a drummer by drumming with his fingers on the back of the one carrying him. A father never teaches his son the art of drumming, but always engages some other drummer to do so. This is because it is believed that should a father teach his son, the older man would die as soon as the younger drummer became proficient (Rattray 1923: 263).[16]

The training of a drummer includes not only the technical side of learning how to beat out the various rhythms, but also instruction in the Ashanti traditions, genealogies of all kings, and tribal folklore. The Ashanti themselves insist that drummers should be very intelligent and gifted people (Danquah 1928:54). As the national poets for a people who value tradition, drummers in the act of drumming are considered sacred, and are immune from assault, annoyance, and interruption. Although when not drumming they do not have the privileges and prerogatives of sacred persons, all of these are accorded them when they are actually performing. If a drummer makes a mistake he attributes this to interference by an evil spirit, and all such errors are punishable by a fine of a sheep.

Some Traditional Beliefs about Drummers

Drummers are known as Odomankoma 'kyerema, "the Creator's drummers." The Ashanti have a myth which says that the creator made in earliest times a herald, a drummer and an executioner. Precedence at court is observed in that order. Those who play the talking drums are considered the greatest of all drummers because of the breadth of knowledge and skill demanded by their work. These drummers are said to be closest to the ancestral spirits, and to nature from whom they conjure up the spirit of creation, and from whom the components of the drums are obtained (Nketia 1963:154).

Many Ashanti claim that the man in the moon is a drummer. Children are told not to gaze at him too long lest they see him lay his drum sticks on his drums, and thus die themselves (Rattray 1927:282). A drummer never carries his own drums, for it is believed that this would cause him to become insane.

Horns

As has been mentioned above, horns are another instrument used communicatively by the Ashanti. Although communication by means of the horn is much less elaborated than that of the drum, there are still several kinds of horns and special horn calls which have a great deal of significance. One of the major distinctions made is that between the speaking horns, Aseseben and Asokoben, which are capable of repeating every saying or proverb, and Mmontia, which are short horns used for single airs and signalling. There are also some special elephant horns known as owuo (death), the name being imitative of the note they sound. These are always played at executions and funerals, but may be used at other times as well.

Each paramount chief has his own particular horn call and every Ashanti can identify by the notes sounded just which chief is approaching. Similarly, each army divisional leader has his own horn calls which were formerly used to rally scattered units. When the Ashanti are at war one officer traditionally remains behind to look after the town or village while the chief accompanies his men to battle. This officer has for his horn call: "Esa akyi eye ya," "To remain behind when they have gone to war is hard" (Rattray 1929:137).

Gesture

The Ashanti code repertoire quite definitely includes a gesture code, although the ethnographic materials include fdw details about it. It is reported that the gestures which comprise the code should always be made with the right hand. The left hand is used to hold the anus-wiping stick, and it is considered particularly insulting ever to point with, or take anything from another with this hand. There is even an Ashanti proverb, "Only the fool points at his origins with his left hand" (Sutherland 1961).

A few examples of the use of gestures which have been described include that by which a priest greets his elders, that which signifies abuse, and that which is used to encourage dancers. In the first case, the priest bends his right knee and touches the ground with his right hand in salutation. The gesture which signifies abuse is made by placing the closed fists together with the thumbs extending upwards. That which is used in connection with cheering on the dancers at a public dance is made by stretching out the arms, with all fingers except the middle forefingers clenched.

In this latter example, the gesture is definitely accompanied by verbal expression. It is not known whether speech is used in connection with the other two gesture forms. Other specific questions about the gesture code arise in relation to the gestures used during the bara ceremony to convey to the young girl some ideas of her role as a woman, and also those used by the spokesman. It is stated in the data that these gestures occur, but no further information about them is given. Besides these there are several general questions concerning the whole composition of this code and its relationship to other communicative codes used by the Ashanti.[17]

Tones

In a few instances it is reported that special tones or manners of delivery are used by the Ashanti in certain specific speech situations. The spokesman, for example, is said always to speak his affirming "Yo!" in a deep voice, while the herald delivers his admonitions for all to be quiet and listen very shrilly. The significance of these styles is not entirely clear, although the shrill quality characteristic of the herald's voice is probably related to the king's reference to him as wife and a general attitude toward his role as feminine.

Shouting

The delivery of a newborn is greeted by the midwives with shouts, as are the feats of the various performers at public celebrations. When the pregnant women of an area ridicule a woman who has died in childbirth, they also shout their insults and abuse. In general, shouting seems to be peculiar to situations in which many people are involved and a state of strong feeling and high excitement prevails.

Lowering the Voice

Children are supposed to lower their voices when responding to adults as a mark of respect, and Rattray remarks that his informant spoke forbidden abusive expressions to him in an undertone, snapping his fingers about his ears throughout. It has also been reported that the Ashanti drop their voices almost to a whisper when pronouncing the euphemisms by which they refer to death.

The lowering of the voice, then, seems to be a factor in speech acts in which respect, awe, and fear are communicated as well as the actual subject matter of the message. In all three examples there is a real danger that someone, either the addressee ~~axx~~ or some person or spirit who hears the words spoken, might take offence and cause harmful consequences to befall the speaker. In no case are these consequences clear-cut and readily definable, but in all three examples it is clear that they would be unpleasant and possibly seriously so. The fact that children must lower their voices when speaking to adults seems to indicate that children might experience a fear and awe of their elders which is analogous to that felt by Ashanti toward the unknown world of spirits and magical forces.

Singing

In addition to these instances, it is also specified that certain communicative acts are uttered in the form of song rather than the spoken word. Most of these have already been described in various sections. They include the singing by women at the birth of twins, during a Bara and also the Apo ceremony, and among co-wives working together. Also included are songs at the end of a priest's novitiate, at funerals, and the insulting songs of children involved in the ridiculing of a child guilty of bed-wetting.

In addition satirical songs are sung at young people's gatherings during which youths and girls sing these against each other, often making up original verses based on traditional poems concerning love, nature, kings, and the gods, When a girl is attracted to a particular boy she makes this known by composing and singing songs about him during the Singing and dancing each evening.

One other occasion on which it is reported that songs are sung is at a child's bed time. This is the only exception to the general tendency of the Ashanti to sing only during activities which are communal. Other than this, most singing occurs in the contexts of corporate worship. State celebrations, communal work, and the performance of rituals, intimately connected with the life and well-being of the society such as Bara, Apo, the birth of twins, and funerals. Obviously, it is not characteristic of all such rituals and events, for many more could be enumerated. Neither is this the exclusive setting for singing as is indicated by the use of songs at children's bed time, and the bed-wetting rite. This latter represents the only example of songs being sung as a means of social control.

Names

Because names are particularly important to the Ashanti, it seems appropriate that some space be given to a discussion of the various kinds of names which might be received by a person in this society.

Natal Names

The use of a natal name determined by the day of birth has been described. Attachment of certain special appelations to the natal name has also been mentioned. These latter usually signify a particularly valued or important circumstance surrounding the birth of the person concerned. For example, children born on the day before an Adae ceremony, at xxx which the spirits of dead Ashanti rulers are commemmorated and propitiated, have that fact indicated in their natal names. The day itself, considered to be a good or lucky day, is called "Adapa," and always falls on either a Tuesday or Saturday. Thus the child born on such a day simply has added to the name for Tuesday or Saturday the word, "Adapa," For example, a male born on Tuesday before Adae Wednesday is called "Kobina Dapa." Similarly, the third, sixth, and ninth child of a particular union, considered to be under the special protection of the god, abammo, will have the name of the god added to his day-name. The names of come-and-stay children are included in this category also.

Patronymic

The bestowal of the patronymic, which usually occurs eight days after birth has been treated, and the importance of this name has been touched upon. This importance is further evidenced by the fact that the Ashanti give as the reason for cross-cousin marriage, their preferred form of marriage, the desire to perpetuate certain names. Thus one man mxx remarked, "If my niece does not marry my son, but marries a man not of my ntoro, then I cannot call any of her children after myself or my ancestors" (Rattray 1927:324).

Other Names

The strong name, which honors some great man or a heroic deed, is optional, but in those cases where it is given this usually takes place about two weeks after birth. The context and manner of bestowal of this and answer names have not been reported. Table 36 gives a schematic representation of the naming process and the names borne by most Ashanti.

TABLE 36 NAMES

$$\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{Natal name: day of birth}\\ \text{(Special name: circumstance of birth)}\end{array}\right\} \rightarrow \left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{Natal name}\\ \text{(Special name)}\\ \text{Patronymic}\end{array}\right\} \rightarrow \left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{Natal Name}\\ \text{(Special name)}\\ \text{patronymic}\\ \text{(Strong name)}\end{array}\right\} \rightarrow \left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{Natal name}\\ \text{(Special name)}\\ \text{Patronymic}\\ \text{(Strong name)}\\ \text{(Answer name)}\end{array}\right\}$$

Special Communicative Acts and Relationships

Within the Family

Within the family certain courtesies are observed which often involve verbal etiquette. Grandparents are always treated with great reverence, as the repositories of the ancient wisdom of the Ashanti people, and symbols of descent continuity. Most especially, the mother's mother's brother is tendered particular respect as he is usually the head of the lineage segment. It is not proper for men to associate informally with their mothers-in-law, and although absolute avoidance does not seem to be practiced, there is a great deal of circumspection in their relationships. Ashanti men often engage in mother-in-law jokes and they are frequently heard repeating well-known sayings on the subject as, "Ase fie yenko," "You don't catch us going to mother-in-law's hut," or again, "Be shy of your mother-in-law" (Rattray 1927:99).

The relationship with one's own mother, however, is very different. There are many sayings and proverbs which express the individual's attachment to his mother and the general importance of mothers in social life. This importance is of course in part a reflection of the whole social organization and the general feeling expressed in the common saying," Wo na awu a, wo abusua asa," "If your mother dies, you have no lineage kin left" (Fortes 1950:164). For a man, his mother is his most trusted confidante, especially in intimate personal matters. He also entrusts weighty matters to his sister, but never to his wife. His affairs concerning property, money, public life, legal suits, and even the future of his children are discussed with his sister, and she keeps the confidence, telling no one of her brother's business. A man also uses his sister as intermediary with a secret love, knowing that she will never betray him to his wife.

Outside the family

Ashanti commoners have village associations called mmerante which do not hold regular meetings, but discuss all matters of importance with which the elders deal. The mmerante has a recognized leader or spokesman, the Nkwankwaahene, (from Nkwankwaa," "young men"). This is not a hereditary office. The Nkwankwaahene is chosen by members of the mmerante, and he is selected for his courage and eloquence. Disputes are submitted for his arbitration, and he presents the commoners' views on any important question to the elders. All public opinion and criticism of the government is ordinarily expressed by the villagers through this spokesman.

Story-Telling

The Ashanti spend many of their evenings gathered around a fire, reciting traditional tales. These tales, comprising droll stories, tales with a moral, and just-so stories accounting for physical characteristics of man and beasts, are called Anansesem, after Ananse, the spider, the Ashanti culture hero who is the predominant figure in the tales. These are not to be confused with historical myths, the sacred and xxxxx carefully preserved possession of a few chosen elders. The Anansesem may be told only after dark, except at the funeral of some famous story-teller. They are preceded with a public disclaimer as to the truth of their content: "We don't really mean to say so...." Subjects ordinarily sacred in Ashanti culture, such as the sky-god, lesser gods, fetishes, spirit ancestors, the sick, chiefs, and sex, are treated profanely in the tales. They are replete with beasts, birds, fishes, and insects, some of which may be interpreted at face value as elements of genuine beast fables. Many, however, represent persons who are for some reason the object of the story-teller's scorn, resentment, or ridicule.

These are never selected at random. Each animal or bird used in this context is cleverly chosen for some particular characteristic or set of characteristics thought to reflect the personality of the person thus ridiculed. Frequently story-tellers take the parts of various characters in the tales, evoking much laughter in the audience. Children are permitted to be present at these evening sessions, and etiquette rules governing the behavior of children in the presence of adults are usually relaxed. Thus, children are encouraged to tell stories themselves, and they are listened to by all.

Witches

Although the Ashanti often call in a priest in times of sickness, they do distinguish among the okomfo (priest), the bonsam komfo or Bayi 'komfo (witch-doctor), and the sumankwafo dunseni, or oduyefo (all names for medidine man) (Rattray 1927:39). Bonsam 'komfo and Bayi 'komfo are both translated "priest of witchcraft," "Bonsam" being the term for a male witch and "Obayifo" for a female. This witch doctor is the only one in Ashanti society who can deal with the effects of witchcraft. He uses the techniques of black magic in order to defeat and control evil spirits, usually resorting to indirect methods of treatment which are more oriented toward destruction of the cause of whatever sickness the patient has than merely toward symptomatic treatment. One of the most potent factors with which the witch doctor must contend is the witch's power of verbal command, believed by the Ashanti to be tremendously efficacious. Witches can cause striking instances of unnatural phenomena simply by ordering nature to obey, and it is with such phenomena that the witch doctor is frequently called upon to cope.[18]

Conclusion

From the foregoing it seems clear that the existing ethnographic materials about the Ashanti provide sufficient data to permit formulation of some generalizations concerning their communicative systems, and the models underlying them. That speech is important to the Ashanti is evidenced by their high valuation of rhetoric and oratory, their preoccupation with certain verbal formulas such as oaths, abusive expressions, direct reference to certain subjects such as death, etc., and their various other taboos concerning speech. Indeed a very real anxiety about speech, and the efficacious power of lingu istic utterances appears to be an important factor in the way the Ashanti organize and regulate social intercourse at many levels.

No one must say anything which will offend the ancestral spirits. The taboo against swearing an oath is specifically motivated by the fact that it is offensive to the ancestors to remind them of past calamities. Similarly, each Ashanti is expected to keep in mind the power of speech and avoid mentioning catastrophic events in a manner which might cause them to recur. It is significant that traditionally the most common prayer of the Ashanti elder has been that no member of his household might say anything which would bring trouble to the group.

The taboo against direct speech between the sacred and the purely secular is another example which reflects this underlying anxiety. Verbal interaction can contaminate the holy, and thus is avoided by those whose office renders them sacred. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

The conviction that verbal utterances can effect what they in fact say is probably at the basis of much of this anxiety. It almost certainly is connected with the Ashanti's fear of witches whose power of verbal command has been described. The general use of euphemisms to refer to such events as ~~[illegible]~~ Cursing the king and death undoubtedly has its foundation here also. This tremendous power of speech has its advantages as well as disadvantages, as can be ~~xxx~~ seen by the general attitude toward confession. The power to mitigate the harmful effects of sin attributed to confession during childbirth, for example, has been mentioned. Even this advantage may contribute to anxiety, however, for it causes a strong social pressure to be exerted on those who might wish to conceal something, for whatever reason.

Speech also has a tremendous power to disrupt the social order, and the sections on silence and proscribed speech point out the various ways in which this can be accomplished. Prohibitions concerned with specific communicative acts are usually designed to prevent this abuse of speech.

Both men and women are capable of using speech disruptively, but each sex does this in a different way. Woman's power to do this is related to the fact that she is the one who determines the shape of society. She gives birth, nurtures, admonishes, governs (whether directly or indirectly), and is ultimately responsible for the form which the social order assumes. Because of the importance of the matrilineal line it is woman who determines what man can do. The alternatives and possibilities open to any one man are dependent on and limited by the identity of his mother. As she is the one who delineates possibilities and defines alternatives, in short, determines what is and what is not, what will be and what will not, woman's evaluation of things is extremely important. This is why it is a wholly different thing for a man to be called a fool by a woman than by a man. Woman in a sense determined truth. When a woman says to a man, "You are a fool," he is a fool. Woman is forbidden to do this in terms of her own code which prohibits disruptive speech, and carefully regulates the use of speech forms which effect what they say.

Man, on the other hand, must meet the standards and norms determined by woman. His abuses of the speech faculty are concerned with violating these norms. His socially disruptive speech is just that because it goes against society as defined by woman. Woman's socially disruptive speech is such because it redefines society. Lying represents an attempt on the part of the speaker to re-set the norms which define society by perpetrating a deceptionoon another. The liar in a sense changes what is, and by so doing, changes the limits and regulations of the social order. Women can do this without lying, but men and children are helpless to do so. Young children are not taken seriously, so their lies are tolerated. They do not constitute a real threat to the social order because their re-definitions are of no real consequence due to their own immaturity. Children over ten, however, are in much the same position as man in this regard. They cannot really determine social limits, for only women can do this. They can, however, attempt to misrepresent facts, and their chances of success are fairly good because they are considered sufficiently mature to distinguish truth. Because of this ability to deceive successfully, children over ten are punished for lying.

In many of the speech events described by Rattray and others, the tendency to verbalize about what is occurring, even though the proceedings are obvious to all, is especially striking. Thus, at the birth of a child the midwives declare that the baby has arrived once the umbilical cord has been cut and the delivery is considered to have been completed. At a bara rite, the singers repeatedly mention the fact that the girl has reached puberty, even though everyone present knows this. At funerals, the mourners say over and over again that so-and-so has died, again an obvious fact. Even in addressing the spirits, the Ashanti usually prays by first stating a fact, for example declaring that there has been an accidental killing (a fact which is known by everyone in the vicinity), before addressing his petition to the gods or ancestors. These are but a few of the many instances in which this kind of verbalization occurs. Although one would wish more data before drawing definite conclusions, it seems fair to generalize tentatively that the Ashanti regard such utterances as being in some way necessary to confirm the fact or event which they are witnessing.

Along with this recognition of the power of the spoken word there is among the Ashanti a tendency to take offence at speech which might result in this power being used harmfully. Thus verbal offences constitute a large portion of disputes settled both in and out of the courts. Conversely, verbal ridicule is the most effective means of social control possessed by the Ashanti.

It is not surprising that all this concern for speech and communication in general is accompanied by a great many set formulas for various occasions which, by their stylized nature, to some extent relieve the speaker of some of the responsibility for his words. Particularly speech acts which have unpleasant overtones such as reporting what others have said or done against one's fellow abusua member, admonishing the chief at his enstoolment, communicating orders for arrest, delivering a sentence, and the swearing of any oath, are all performed in terms of standardized formulations. Another communicative form which has been similarly standardized is that of announcing. Although there is a variety of modes used for announcing, each particular ceremony or event has its own distinctive announcement which is immediately identifiable. Prayers, involving interaction with the spirit world, something which is always at least potentially dangerous, are also generally codified, and it appears that the Ashanti need never resort to spontaneous prayer unless he wishes.

In general, the basic attitude of the Ashanti toward speech seems to indicate that speech is fundamentally and essentially related to the social order. It is in one sense the stuff of which society is made. Without there can be no society, but with it, because of its tremendous power to disrupt there is also the danger that society will be destroyed by it. Great anxiety characterizes the Ashanti conception of speech, which is necessary, but also potentially dangerous. These two qualities seem to underly the sharp discontinuity in the Ashanti attitude toward speech and language acquisition in a child. The early permissive atmosphere is at first maintained because speech is necessary and children must be helped to acquire it. The later stage of correction, repression, and regulation occurs because speech is also potentially harmful. Children who show a tendency to actualize this potency must be corrected and, if necessary, punished.

Good speech is that which builds up the society, or is related to events which promote the well being of the Ashanti. Bad speech is harmful to society either because of its immediate effect on persons or its indirect adverse effects caused by annoying the gods or other spirits.

Within this basic dichotomy there is also a general hierarchy of speech genres, with oaths the most solemn and efficacious communicative acts recognized by the Ashanti. Public speech is always of greater consequence than private, and that which is supplemented with some~~thing~~ material element is more efficacious than that which is not. In general, negative speech seems to be more potent than positive, as is exemplified by the relationship between praise and ridicule. This again reinforces the general attitude of anxiety with which the Ashanti seem to regard speech.

Other codes are only supplementary to the basic speech code, and the next most important to Twi is the verbally derived drum code. Even its uses are confined to occasions when ritual is desired and a reliance on standardized texts is permitted. There ~~is~~ are not sufficient data on the other codes to determine their full scope, but it certainly appears that they play secondary roles to the more important Twi and drum codes.

The limitations of trying to derive an ethnography of communication from reports not written from that point of view or to that end have already been mentioned. It is clear that such an approach is no substitute for field work and will always leave some questions unanswered. It is, however, a method which can be very fruitful, even within these limitations, and as such one which should not be overlooked. In terms of both the questions such research raises, and the information it provides, it is a useful means of culling data already collected and published in disparate places which are relevant to ethnographies of communication. Until many more field workers can collect first-hand material relevant to such a theoretical perspective, it would seem that this kind of library investigation is an important means of obtaining the kinds of information which must be understood before cross-cultural statements about the roles of communicative systems within different cultures can be made.

Notes

[1] Among the Bété, whose family life is characterized by a great deal of rivalry between a woman and her in-laws, a widow is abused verbally by her husband's family at his funeral. If she stops weeping, even momentarily, she is commanded, "Weep, sorceress! Weep, you evil one....You will never find his equal in your life" (referring to the deceased) (Paulme 1962:81-82).

[2] In terms of Ashanti tradition, it seems reasonable to assume that one who is considered "great" is so esteemed because of a political or religious importance which causes his interests to be identified with those of the nation at large.

[3] During the naming ceremony, the child is very much the focus of attention among the Ashanti. This is in contrast to the Nupe, who also bestow names on the eighth day after birth. Among the Nupe, the bestowal of the name takes place with only the family present, but tribal markings are incised on the child's body at the large reception which immediately follows. At this reception guests ignore the cries of the child. Their behavior is characterized by much chatting among themselves and enjoyment of the music which is usually provided, with no heed paid to the one whose naming has provided the occasion for the celebration.

[4] In some cases the father will give permission for his wife to use the answer name when addressing the son also, but this permission must be explicitly given before she may do so.

[5] Rattray, who reports this ceremony, does not indicate who is the speaker of this particular formula, although his translation suggests that it is the mother of the dead child.

[6] Yoruba co-wives appear in general to be more overtly antagonistic toward one another than are the Ashanti. Each wife tries to get the upper hand in arguments by the pitch and eloquence of her speech, and by dramatic gestures. The Yoruba women have been described as orators and logicians (Ward 1937:38-39), but like the Ashanti, they seldom come to blows in their arguments.

[7] Whatever be the origin of this practice, the role of spokesman is present among many Kwa speaking groups. Among the Yoruba, for example, the king usually holds a specially prepared cow's tail of spotless white in front of his mouth when speaking, for "it is considered in bad form to see him open his mouth in public." The tail is an emblem of peace and grace. The king speaks sotto voce and it is the task of the chief eunuch to repeat his words to the assembly in a loud voice (Parrinder 1950:51).

[8] In contrast to this attitude is that of Yoruba women who consider the time spent in preparing meals together the ideal setting for gossip. Particularly the older women, who tend to monopolize conversation, engage in a great deal of gossiping at these times (Ward 1937:38). Similarly, Nupe women gossip freely among themselves about the amorous affairs of the more prominent among them (Nadel 1942:153).

[9] The Ga apparently share the Ashanti notion that confession will ease a difficult labor, and at times, is the only measure which will save the life of a guilty mother. Unlike the Ashanti, however, Ga attendants do not encourage the woman to reveal her sins and in fact, a woman in labor is frequently gagged by relatives to prevent such revelations (Field 1937:168).

[10] If the novice is a woman, special ingredients must be added to her formulas for divining. This is because of the fact that a woman's memory is thought to be less retentive than that of a man (Akesson 1950:243).

[11] The Fanti priest, who apparently functions in much the same manner as that of the Ashanti, speaks on such occasions in a gutteral voice to transmit the message from his god, and it is said that this speech is intelligible only to his' trained spokesman (Christensen 1959:262).

Although the Yoruba priest acts as intermediary between the gods and men, an actual session in which persons solicit help from him differs somewhat from the Ashanti interview. The session begins with a prayer, but the Yoruba does not then listen for the voice of his god as does the Ashanti priest. Rather, he interprets the god's will by casting down two chains of palm kernels and cowries and analyzing the various patterns formed. Each of the two hundred and fifty-six possible positions has a specific meaning which communicates the message of the god to the priest. A similar method is used by the Nupe (Clarke 1939:235-236; Paulme 1962:574).

[12] This is contrasted by the Nupe custom of permitting women to play drums on an equal basis with men.

[13] Similarly, among the Nupe, there are special drum rhythms and songs linked with certain noble families and important officials. As soon as a family or a a man comes to power, the drummers supply him with a musical salute (Nadel 1942: 130). The Ashanti are much more exclusive than the Nupe in the number of people for whom special drum music is provided. They specifically prohibit village headmen from having drums, reserving this right for important chiefs only.

[14] Although the Ashanti apparently use the armpit or donno drum only for musical accompaniment, the Yoruba use it as both a "talking" and a "singing" drum (Nketia 1963b:19).

[15] Although many Kwa speakers and related groups of the Guinea Coast have talking drums, each group does not always translate the drum code into its own language or dialect. For example, the Ewe of Togo, who learned this mode of communication from their Twi neighbors, do not transpose the code into Ewe, but rather drum Twi (Herzog 1945:217).

[16] This contrasts with the Nupe practice of keeping the art of drumming quite strictly within the family, with the skill ordinarily being handed down from father to son (Nadel 1942:301).

[17] Among the Nupe, the gesture system appears to be more highly elaborated than that of the Ashanti, particularly in greeting situations when men of equal rank are expected to bow low for about half of a minute while exchanging words of greeting~~s~~, and if they are well acquainted they stretch out their hands several times in succession and lightly touch one another's fingers. Women of equal rank kneel on one knee when greeting each other (Nadel 1942:129). No such formalities at greeting have been reported for the Ashanti.

[18] There is no evidence that such verbal power is attributed to Ga witches, and the Ga conception of the role of speech in witchcraft appears to differ sharply from that of the Ashanti. There is among the Ga much less preoccupation with witches than among the Ashanti, and in fact there is no Ga word for witch. The expression commonly used is "aye," a Fanti word."Aye" is also used by the Ga to refer to people whose extreme cleverness or charm is attributed to some beneficent medicine. In this context the word has no harmful connotation. If the Ga wish to be exact in describing that quality which is essential to a witch, however, they use the Twi word, "Obeye." Manoukian's report (1950) strongly suggests that Ga witches must always do something to effect their ends rather than merely say something as the witch may according to the Ashanti belief. The Ga do hold that to curse something or someone by verbally calling down the destructive activity of some god or spirit may be an efficacious act, and the words themselves may effect the destruction mentioned in the curse. Field reports encountering a witch who claimed to have this power (1937:151). Field remarks, however, that it is the woman's obsession with her own power in this matter which marks her as a witch, and not the efficaciousness of her curse, for the Ga do not associate special powers to effect goals verbally with witches.

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APPENDIX D

ABIPON

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AN EXPLORATION INTO THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF SPEAKING OF THE ABIPONES

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been much interest among linguists, sociologists and anthropologists in the related and overlapping fields of sociolinguistics, ethnolinguistics and the ethnography of speaking. Valuable theoretical and methodological contributions to the subject have been made by such scholars as Basil Bernstein, William Bright, Dell Hymes and William Labov. Nevertheless, Bright, in an article appearing as recently as Spring, 1966, writes that

> on the level of linguistic behavior or 'parole,' we still have no 'ethnography of speaking' (to use Hymes' term) for even the simplest kind of community. (1)

Since then, Hymes has written an analysis of some aspects of the ethnography of speaking of the Wishram Chinook. (2) It is the purpose of this paper to explore the ethnography of speaking of the Abipones of the South American Gran Chaco.

The Ethnography of the Abipones by Martin Dobrizhoffer is well-known. Dobrizhoffer was an Austrian born, Jesuit missionary who lived among the Abipones from 1750 to 1762. He learned their language quickly and frequently discussed the Abipon way of life with members of the community. Extremely intelligent and sensitive to different cultural patterns, Dobrizhoffer objectively captured the detail of many aspects of Abipon life. In 1784, he published *Historia De Abiponibus, Equestri, Bellicosaque, Paraquariae Natione*, which was translated into German and English. Known for his

colorful renderings of personal experiences, Dobrizhoffer was a popular figure in the court of Maria Theresa, after the expulsion of the Jesuits from America. Julian H. Steward and Louis C. Faron, in their *Native Peoples of South America*, write that "Dobrizhoffer's book on the Abipón, written in 1784, is undoubtedly the best complete description of any singly Indian group." (3)
Since Dobrizhoffer was very aware of the use of speech in various cultural contexts, his material lends itself to restructuring and reanalysis with the aim of framing an Abipon ethnography of speaking.

Although most of the paper is dedicated to a description of speech among the Abipones, it is also my hope to help develop a method for making precise, explicit statements about speech and the relationship between speech and the rest of culture. In this way, a case study will be provided which will be valuable for cross-cultural comparisons and generalizations. In order to focus on speech, the concept of the speech event will be used.
As outlined by Jakobson and Hymes, every speech event must be examined for relations among its components; eg. participants (senders and receivers), means (code and channel), setting, message form, topic, interactional norm(avoidance, agreement, etc.) and purpose. In the first chapter: "Abipon Speech Events," it will be shown that it is possible to write explicit rules, in terms of these speech event

components, which predict or 'generate' the behavior of the members of the Abipon speech community.[1] In order to study the relations among components and to write the rules of behavior, it is useful to analyse the speech event components in terms of distinctive features. The concept of distinctive features has been used by linguists in phonology and more recently in semantics. Rules of speech usage among the Abipones can be made explicit by speaking of senders in terms of the features: male, shaman, spirit, child, etc.; of means in terms of the features: Abipon language, music, body movement, etc.; and of interactional norm in terms of the features: avoidance, agreement, etc. These features will be identified in the course of the chapter: "Abipon Speech Events." The form of the rules of speech usage and certain notational conventions will be discussed.

In writing grammars, linguists often assume that the socio-cultural organization of the speech community is irrelevant to their work. Thus, they describe what is common to all members of the community, regardless of age, sex, occupation, setting, etc. In this study of Abipon speech, on the other hand, I begin with a description of the community and study the relationship between the organization of this community and speech usage. The rules of the grammar of the language are but a subset of the entire set of rules for speech use which must be known by all individuals. Speaking in terms of speech events, grammatical rules are part of the component: means. By studying the relationship among the various components of the speech event, including the means, we are able to describe explicitly differences in the behavior of individuals in the same community according to differences in sex or age, setting, purpose, etc.

The first chapter of the paper will be a description of Abipon speech events. First there is a brief discussion of the social organization of the Abipones, in order to identify the social variables which are important in describing speech use. Then follows a discussion of the type of rules which can explicitly describe speech behavior in terms of the components of speech events. The speech events themselves are grouped into six types: 1) those that occur at social gatherings. 2) the taunting of one individual by another. 3) greetings. 4) communication with the ancestral spirits. 5) lament for the sick or dead. 5) speech events having to do with warfare.

The second chapter is a general discussion of various social and cultural aspects of Abipon life which are intimately related to language and speech, although they cannot be described in terms of speech events, i.e. attitude toward language and speech, geographic dialects, and social dialects.

The reader will no doubt be aware of one basic flaw pervading the entire discussion of speech among the Abipones. Since the data is taken from Dobrizhoffer, who did not focus on speech as such, but only mentioned it in conjunction with the traditional subcategories of culture, it is impossible to answer many important questions. Although Dobrizhoffer's study is excellent, it is not complete insofar as the purposes of this particular paper are concerned. In order to handle this problem, the following procedure will be followed: rules will be formulated describing the behavior involved in speech events. When particular details of events are not known, this fact will be made explicit by specifying the left side of the rule and indicating the right side by a question mark: ?. In this way, the reader will know what qualifies as a complete description and where the present study is lacking because of insufficient data.

I would like to thank Dr. Ruben Reina for encouraging me to write this study, and Dr. Dell Hymes for helping me to sharpen my thinking as I wrote it.

(To the members of the Seminar)

THE ABIPONES

The Abipones lived in the Gran Chaco of South America and spoke a Guaicuruan language, closely related to the languages of other Chaco tribes — the Mocoví, Toba, Pilagá, Payaguá and Mbayá. In the 17th century, the Abipones acquired the horse and expanded southward from the northern banks of the lower Bermejo river. After the expulsion of the Jesuit missionaries in 1767, the Abipones gradually submitted to colonializing Spaniards — many were killed, others became part of the Creole population. Dobrishoffer reported that the Abipones numbered 5,000 during his stay.

The Abipones, like other Chaco tribes, subsisted mainly by collecting wild plants and hunting animals. Both were collective tasks — the former belonged to the women; the latter, to the men. The introduction of the horse apparently had a profound effect on all aspects of Abipon life. They became the scourge of nearby Spaniards, looting farms and ranches, threatening communities, cutting communications and generally hampering colonialization. From Dobrishoffer, it is somewhat difficult to reconstruct all the details of the Abipon social organization. People lived in small bands, consisting perhaps of several extended families — the chief of these bands was chosen primarily on the basis of skill and courage in warfare. The salient features of Abipon culture should become

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apparent in the course of this paper.

All examples from the Abipon language are left in the orthography used by Dobrizhoffer. This orthography is based on the Latin alphabet with slight modifications. Dobrizhoffer's orthography could possibly be amended by careful comparison with studies of related languages by other scholars. I have chosen not to do so here, however, since it would contribute nothing to the main theme of the study.

CHAPTER I ABIPON SPEECH EVENTS

In order to study the relationship among the various components of speech events and to formulate rules of speech use among the Abipones, it is necessary to take the Abipon community as a whole as a point of departure. Certain aspects of the Abipon socio-cultural system must first be described.

From Dobrizhoffer, we learn that the most important social variables among the Abipones were sex, status and occupation; age was also functional in certain contexts. Boys and girls were separated from birth. A boy was immediately considered a man and, as soon as he was able, began to learn a man's role by spending time with his father, watching and imitating his behavior. Similarly girls remained with their mothers, learning the woman's role. The men were warriors — fighting a type of guerrilla warfare against nearby Spaniards and Tobas; and hunters — providing meat for band consumption. The women were gatherers — sometimes leaving the village for extended periods of time to collect what edible vegetable matter was available in the area. They also prepared food and especially the alcoholic beverage which was consumed at drinking parties; only men were permitted to drink this beverage.

The Abipones placed great emphasis on strength and courage. There was much competition in battle to determine who was the best warrior; there were also competitive games like horse racing in which individuals could demonstrate their skills. It seems that all persons were born non-Höcheri (successful warrior) in status and joined the Höcheri status, solely through individual distinction in battle. Wives of warriors joined the Höcheri through the deeds of their husbands. Alongside the great stress on competition, however, we also note the importance of group solidarity. In battle, in spite of the individual nature of the fighting, it was necessary for the men to aid each other. Female gathering expeditions collected food for the entire band and not for individual nuclear families. The Abipones seemed to view themselves together with their ancestors, now spirits, as one group opposed to all other persons, who form another group.

The various roles possible for Abipones were shamans or gatherers and food preparers for women; band chief, hunters and warriors, shamans or criers for men. The band chief was a Höcheri; the criers were old shamans, usually not members of the Höcheri.

As stated earlier, children were considered adults from the time of their birth and expected to act out their adult roles as soon as they were able. There were no puberty rites for boys; puberty rites for girls signified that they had reached a marriageable age. Although the older members of the Abipon society formed no special subgroup, there are slight indications that they were considered to be different from the others.

Thus we can identify certain basic characteristics of Abipon life — strict separation of the sexes; emphasis on individual success in battle, culminating in membership in the Höcheri; and the importance of group solidarity. In recent work in phonology and semantics, it has proven useful to study the relationship between units in terms of distinctive features. This has enabled scholars to write explicit rules for linguistic behavior and has maximized the generality of these rules. (4) Similarly, in a study of speech usage, it seems useful to identify the variables of social organisation (sex, status, role, rank, age, etc.) in terms of distinctive features.

The participants in Abipon speech events can be characterized as follows:

1) their sex is either male or female
2) their role is either: warrior, chief, shaman or gatherer
3) their rank is either Höcheri or non-Höcheri (it is important to note that not all warriors are Höcheri — warriors can become Höcheri through success in battle)
4) Their marital status is either married or unmarried
5) Their age status is either: adult, elder or child — the child status is problematical since although Dobrizhoffer stresses that children were considered adults from

birth, one of the participants in puberty rites is a "young girl" who has reached marriageable age.

6) They are either spirits or living

7) They are either a group or an individual

This information is summarized in the following chart:

SEXUAL STATUS	ROLE	RANK	MARITAL STATUS	AGE STATUS	SPIRIT OR LIVING	GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL
male	warrior	Höch.	married	child	spirit	group
female	chief	non-Höch	unmarried	adult	living	individual
	shaman			elder		
	gatherer					

Since all warriors are men and all gatherers are women, and the distinction between the two roles and the two sexual identities is never reported as relevant to speech, we need only specify sex as a variable. Since male implies not female, it is sufficient to specify whether or not an individual is male. The dichotomy holds for Höcheri and non-Höcheri, group and single individual, spirit and living Abipon, married and unmarried. We can thus construct the following chart of the social variables which are functional in speech events in terms of distinctive features:

SEXUAL STATUS	ROLE	RANK	MARITAL STATUS	AGE STATUS	SPIRIT OR LIVING	GROUP OR INDIVUAL
+ male	+chief	+Höcheri	+ married	+child	+spirit	+group
- male	-chief	-Höcheri	- married	-child	-spirit	-group
	+shaman			+adult		
	-shaman			-adult		
				+elder		
				-elder		

As will be seen later, in the description of speech events, many rules of selection between components can be explicitly stated by discussing the participants in terms of the above features. A treatment of the other components in terms of distinctive features is also useful.

It is possible to subdivide the reported Abipon speech events into six categories: (1) "social gatherings" (2) "taunting" (3) "greeting" (4) "conversation with ancestral spirits" (5) "lament for the sick or dead" (6) "warfare."

Under "social gathering" are grouped those speech events which take place either in someone's house or at drinking parties. The participants are in most cases only men whose main reason for having gathered seems to be to take part in some kind of social intercourse. The speech events to be discussed in the category: "social gathering" are: (1) "group conversation" (2) "victory celebration" (3) "oratory" (4) "male singing." The names for these events, as those for all events discussed in this paper, have been chosen on the basis of Dobrizhoffer's description. It would be preferable to be able to provide native terms for these events; unfortunately, Dobrizhoffer does not indicate them. Although the names used for events will sometimes appear arbitrary, they are necessary both for reference to particular events and for writing explicit rules for speech usage.

The speech event category: "taunting" includes three speech events in which one participant taunts or insults the other and the latter is not permitted to reply. Here we have: (1) "girl's puberty rites" (2) "shaman's reproach to individual guilty of some crime" and (3) "parent's taunting of children."

"Greeting" refers to the speech interaction between two people who happen to pass one another.

The speech event category: "communication with ancestral spirits" includes three events in which one participant is an ancestral spirit: (1) "group communication with spirit" (2) "female shaman communication with spirit" and (3) "male shaman communication with dead man's spirit."

Closely related to communication with the spirit is "lament" in which again one participant is an ancestral spirit or spirits and the topic is sickness or death. The speech events of this category are: (1) "sick man's lament" and (2) "mourning ceremony."

Finally, under "warfare," there is a discussion of four speech events pertaining to the Abipon art of war; (1) "scout talk" (2) "war council" (3) "battle report" and (4) "initiation of warriors."

Dobrizhoffer's discussion of speech is always within the context of traditional cultural categories. In this study, the data have been reorganized into speech event categories. This reorganization brings together material that Dobrizhoffer's organization separates; a formal or structural analysis of speech events shows that certain types of behavior, separated by a more traditional analysis, belong together.

It is a basic goal of this paper to show that it is possible to formulate explicit rules of speech usage in terms of the components of speech events. There are various forms which these rules might take. In the course of working with Dobrizhoffer's data, many types of rules and rule conventions were experimented with. The rules which appear on the following pages are then but a suggestion of one of a number of possible ways of presenting the data. It is hoped that general conventions will be adopted for future studies so that cross-cultural comparisons can be made.

As stated earlier, rules of Abipon speech will be formulated in terms of the components of speech events. The types of components to be used here are the following (organized in this manner for mnemonic advantage in English):

S: Setting, Scene. Time and place. Situation.

P: Participants. Defined as appropriate to the analysis. Senders and receivers, Addressors and Addressees, Hosts, Guests, etc.

E: Ends (purposes, goals).

A; Act sequence. Form and content of what occurs. Message form; Topic; what is quoted or reported.

K: Key (tone, manner). In what spirit act is done.

I: I Instrumentalities. Means, agencies, wherwithal. Channel(s), Code(s).

N: Norm(s) of Interaction. Specific behaviors and general mode of behavior. Conventional attitudes and expectations.

G: Genre. Kind, category, type of speech act, event.

In order to describe the behavior involved in speech events, the rules must convey two types of information: (1) generalizations about various components of the speech event which hold for the entire event or for parts of it. For example, in "group conversation," the participants are all male and the setting is within the house of the host. It proves useful to think of these generalizations as the 'Lexicon' of the speech event. The rules of the 'lexicon' will be generalizations about components which are context sensitive, the context being either the event as a whole (G:Genre), or else a part of its sequence (A:

Act Sequence), as defined in rule (1) of the 'Syntax' below. Thus the rules of the 'Lexicon' will be of the form:

Component $\longrightarrow$ x / A

where the component is: S, P, E, A, K, I, N, or G; x is the generalization; and A is the context.

(2) How the behavior is acted out: These rules must describe the form or order of the behavior involved in the speech event and are therefore ordered in order to predict explicitly or 'generate' this behavior. These rules are called the 'Syntax' of the speech event. The first rule of the 'Syntax' will define the Act Sequence of the the event, e.g.

A $\longrightarrow$ A B C D

Each following rule will describe the behavior involved in a particular speech act within an event; rules occur in the same order as these acts.

The division of the rules into 'Lexicon' and 'Syntax' is a separation of the form of the event ('Syntax') from the values of the elements which constitute the form ('Lexicon'). There are precedents in anthropology and sociology for making such a distinction.(5)

Since the rule format just outlined is but one of a number that was experimented with in the writing of this paper, several other possible formats will be described. The different rule formats will be presented for one speech event: "group conversation," the first speech event to be discussed and, in many aspects, the most interesting.

SOCIAL GATHERINGS

1) Group Conversation

In group conversations, a group of men gather inside a particular man's house, forming a circle of which the owner is a part. During the conversation, it is considered extremely impolite to contradict someone, no matter how much one may disagree. Speaking in terms of speech events, we might say that the interactional norm of "group conversation" is 'agreement.'

Dobrizhoffer does not describe a formal structure for the opening or substance of these group conversations; he is quite explicit, however, about the closing and leave taking:

> When tired of a conversation, they never depart without taking leave of the master of the house. The one who sits nearest to him, says: Ma chik kla leyà? Have we not talked enough? the second accosts the third, and the third the fourth in the same words, till at length the last of the circle, seated on the ground, declares that they have talked enough: kla leyà, upon which they all rise up together at one moment. Each then courteously takes leave of the master of the house in these words, Lahikyegarik: Now I am going from you; to which he replies, La micheroà: now you are going from me. (6)

Following the rule writing conventions discussed earlier, we can formulate explicit rules which describe the behavior involved in group conversation.

Lexicon:

(1) S → {house of host}

(2) P → {hosts} + {guests} → {+male} / G.C. (Group Conversation)

(3) N → {agreement}

(4) E → {?}

(5) I → {Abipon language: oral} /G.C.

{sitting} / Opening, Body, Closing

{rising and standing}/ Leave taking

Syntax:

(1) A → {Opening} + {Body} + {Closing} + {Leave taking}

(2) Opening → {?}

(3) Body → {?}

(4) Closing → {Question} + {Answer}

(a) Question → {P} + {Form/Content}

(a1) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}

(a2) Addressor → {ith person on α side of host where α = left or right (not known), and i = 1, then 2, then 3 ... 1 = n-1, consecutively, where n = the number of guests}

(a3) Addressee → {n-1th person on α side of host}

(a4) Form/Content → {"ma chik kla leyà?"/Have we not talked enough}

(b) Answer → {P} + {Form/Content}

(b1) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}

(b2) Addressor → {n-1th person on α side of host}

(b3) Addressee → {all guests except sender ?}

(b4) Form/Content → {"kla leyà" we have talked enough}

(5) Leave Taking → {Initiation} + {Response}

(a) Initiation → {P} + {Form/Content}

(a1) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}

(a2) Addressor → {all guests individually}

(a3) Addressee → {host}

(a4) Form/Content → {"lahikyegarik"/ now I am going from you}

(b) Response → {P} + {Form/Content}

(b1) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}

(b2) Addressor → {host}

(b3) Addressee → {all guests individually}

(b4) Form/Content → {"La micheroà"/now you are going from me}

While reading the rules of the 'syntax,' it is important to remember to refer to the 'lexicon' for generalizations. Thus although only P and Form/Content are specified in the rules of the 'syntax,' the 'lexicon' provides the specification of S, N, E, etc. The generalizations are stated once in the 'lexicon' in order to avoid repeating them for every rule of the 'syntax' to which they apply. Thus certain components may be specified in the 'lexicon' in the rules of one speech event (because they can be generalized for this event) and in the 'syntax' in the rules of another speech event (because they vary from speech act to speech act within this event).

Thus, making use of the concept of the speech event and its components, we have been able to write rules which explicitly predict or 'generate' the behavior described by Dobrizhoffer in the passage cited above. The explicit nature of the rules will enable us to compare precisely various speech events within Abipon culture, as well as to make cross-cultural comparisons.

Earlier, it was stated that several rule formats would be presented for "group conversation." The first, presented above, displays the 'lexicon':'syntax' distinction that will be used throughout the study. Another possibility is to present all the information in a kind of 'lexicon,' indicating the values of the elements of the structure of the event, but specifying its actual form only in the expression of the act sequence. For "group conversation," then, we would have the following:

$$\text{Group Conversation} \rightarrow (S)+(P)+(E)+(A)+(K)+(I)+(N)+(G)$$

(N.B. Dobrizhoffer's data never enables us to specify K for a speech event; for this reason it is always lacking in the rules).

$$A \rightarrow \{\text{Opening}\}+\{\text{Body}\}+\{\text{Closing}\}+\{\text{Leave Taking}\}$$

The remaining rules might be context sensitive with respect to the various parts of the Act Sequence. Thus:

$$\left.\begin{array}{l} S \longrightarrow \{\text{house of guest}\} \\ P \longrightarrow \{\text{Hosts}\}+\{\text{Guests}\} \longrightarrow \{+\text{ male}\} \\ N \longrightarrow \{\text{agreement}\} \\ E \longrightarrow \{?\} \end{array}\right/ \quad \text{G.C.}$$

$$\begin{array}{ll} I \longrightarrow & \{\text{Abipon language: oral}\} / \text{ G.C.} \\ & \{\text{Ab. llg.: oral, sitting}\} / \text{ Opening, Body, Closing} \\ & \left\{\begin{array}{c}\text{Ab. lg.: oral, rising and} \\ \text{standing}\end{array}\right\} / \text{ Leave Taking} \end{array}$$

Although these rules tell us a great deal about the components of the speech event: "Group conversation," they do not predict or 'generate' the actual behavior.

Another possibility is to collapse the 'lexicon': 'syntax' distinction by mixing rules which provide generalizations (our 'lexicon') with rules which define the actual structure and order of acts (our 'syntax'). The rules would then occur in a single sequence as follows:

(1) G.C. → {Opening}+{Body}+{Closing}+{Leave Taking}

(2) Opening → {S}+{P}+{E}+{A}+{N}+{Form/Content}

(a) P → {men}

(b) S → {house of guest}

(c) I → {Abipon lg.: oral, sitting}

(d) N → {agreement}

(e) A, E, Form/Content → {?}

(3) Body → {S}+{P}+{E}+{A}+{N}+{Form/Content}

(a) P → {men}

(b) S → {house of guest}

(c) I → {Abipon lg.: oral, sitting}

(d) N → {agreement}

(e) A,E, Form/Content → {?}

(4) Closing → {S}+{P}+{E}+{A}+{N}+{Form/Content}

(a) P → {men}

(al) men → {Addressor}+{Addressee}

(ala) Addressor → {ith person on α side of host, etc.}

(alb) Addressee → {n-1th person on α side of host}

(b) S → {house of host}

(c) I → {Abipon lg.: oral, sitting}

(d) N → {agreement}

(e) E → {?}

(f) Form/Content → {discussion of having talked enough}

(g) A → {Question}+{Answer}

(gl) Question → {S}+{P}+{E}+{A}+{N}+{Form/Content} (g1a) P $\longrightarrow$ {men}

(g1a1) men $\longrightarrow$ {Addressor} + {Addressee}

(g1a1a) Addressor $\longrightarrow$ {ith person on ♂ side of host}

(g1a1b) Addressee $\longrightarrow$ {n-1th person on ♂ side of host}

(g1b) S $\longrightarrow$ {house of host}

(g1c) I $\longrightarrow$ {Abipon lg.: oral}

(g1d) N $\longrightarrow$ {agreement}

(g1e) E —— {?}

ETC.

In this sequence of rules, the skeletal structure of every act is presented; the 'Immediate Constituents' of an act are the string of components of which it is comprised. Although certain rule conventions may be adopted to avoid some repetition (e.g. P $\longrightarrow$ men; men $\longrightarrow$ Addressor + Addressee), the model requires that each act be expanded into the string of components. The obvoius disadvantage of this approach is the failure to distinguish explicitly between general and specific rules. Thus, we shall use the first rule format.

2) Victory Celebration

Drinking parties, in which only men participate, while the women are absent or set apart in a group, are very common among the Abipones. The beverage consumed is prepared by the women; only the men, however, drink it. Drinking parties occur in various cultural settings and, apparently, for varied purposes. Focusing on Abipon speech, one observes that within the same setting, ie. drinking parties, speech events of quite varied natures can occur. For example, after a battle there is a drinking party, the purpose of which is to celebrate the victory. Each warrior talks of his own feats in battle, always trying to exaggerate his particular success at the expense of his fellows. This leads to verbal and then physical fighting among them. It is interesting to note that it is considered wrong for one Abipon to contradict another except in the context of these "victory celebrations." It is at this point that all kinds of personal differences come to the fore, especially those concerning valour in battle. The purpose of the event is to stress the individual courage and strength of the members of the group and, it seems, to afford the men an opportunity to demonstrate that they should be in the Höcheri (successful warrior) rank. Thus, an important difference between "victory celebrations" and "group conversations" is that in the former, the interactional norm is disagreement;

while in the latter, it is agreement. The rules for the "victory celebration" are as follows:

Lexicon:

(1) S ⟶ {drinking party}
(2) P ⟶ {+ male}
(3) E ⟶ {stress individual courage}
(4) I ⟶ {Abipon language: oral}
(5) N ⟶ {disagreement}
/ V.C.

Syntax:

(1) A ⟶ {vaunting} + {vaunting} + ... + {fighting}
(2) vaunting ⟶ {P} + {Form/Content}
  (a) P ⟶ {addresser} + {addressee}
  (b) Addresser ⟶ {any participant ?}
  (c) Addressee ⟶ {other participants ?}
  (d) Form/Content ⟶ {individual achievement, downgrading others}

Although not much is known about the 'syntax' of "Victory celebrations," the generalizations stated in the 'lexicon' enable us to understand the place of the event in Abipon culture.

3) Oratory

There is another event at which battle deeds are the subject; this event, which can be called Abipon "oratory," does not occur after battle, but at what seem to be regularly defined times, although Dobrizhoffer does not tell us exactly when. The function of speech is quite different here from in the "victory celebrations." In the "victory celebrations," speech is used to express individual valor and deride others. In "oratory," speech is used to praise the efforts of the group as a whole; each man speaks for about half an hour, relating some event of war. The others not only listen attentively, but assent at every sentence, making a loud snort as a sign of affirmation, which is also expressed every now and then with the words: "quevorken (certainly)," "cleerà (very true)," and "chik akalagriten (I don't in the least doubt it)." With the words "Ta yeegàm" or "kem ekemat" they interrupt the speaker in the midst of his discourse, as a sign of great respect. It is very ill-mannered on these occasions to interrupt a speaker to contradict him. (note: striking contrast with "victory celebrations"). Only the stylized exclamations of affirmation just described are permitted. This event promotes solidarity among the Abipones as a group, encouraging them to be good fighters and to treat the "outsider" as the enemy. The speeches deal with an exaltation of the Abipones in comparison with their enemies at war. Speakers are generally allotted a certain period of time and then yield to others. This procedure is characteristic of "group conversation" and "oratory."

A discussion of Abipon speech events in terms of components enables us to distinguish precisely between "victory celebrations" on the one hand, and "group conversation" and "oratory" on the other. In "oratory" and perhaps "group conversation" (Dobrizhoffer's data is insufficient), the purpose (E) of the event is to stress Abipon solidarity by expressing group valour; the interactional norm (N) is agreement. In "victory celebrations," however, the purpose is to stress individual strength and valour in contrast to the cowardice and weakness of one's fellows; the interactional norm is disagreement. Thus, two important and sometimes almost contradictory characteristics of Abipon culture: group solidarity and individuality are expressed as the component: E (Ends) in speech events. E is related to another speech event component: interactional norm (N). The relationship can be shown by means of a selectional rule between the two:

E is {stress on group solidarity} →
N is {agreement}
E is {stress on individuality} →
N is {disagreement}

These selectional rules are not part of the sequence of rules describing any particular Abipon speech event but are rather generalizations which can be stated about all of them. The rules for "oratory" are as follows:

Lexicon:

(1) S → {center of village ?}
(2) P → {+ male}
(3) E → {stress group solidarity} / Oratory
(4) I → {Abipon language: oral}
(5) N → {agreement}

Syntax:

(1) A → {Half hour period} + {Half hour period}.....
(2) Half hour period → {Speech} + {Interrupting affirmation}
(3) Speech → {P} + {Form/Content}
  (a) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}
  (b) Addressor → {one participant}
  (c) Addressee → {other participants}
  (d) Form/Content → {events of war}
(4) Interrupting affirmation → {P} + {Form/Content}
  (a) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}
  (b) Addressor → {Addressees of rule (3)}
  (c) Addressee → {Addressors of rule (3)}
  (d) Form/Content → {snort, "quevorken, cleera, kem ekemat"/ statements of agreement}

4) Male Singing

"Male singing" is a public festivity held every year in memory of victories. Again, the festivities occur in the context of a drinking party. For three days before the event, one of the public criers, covered with an elegant cloak, goes up and down all the tents. At the entrance of each, he is greeted by the women with a festive percussion of the lips. In this rare instance of permitted communication between men and women, only the lip movement is permitted. The crier's spear is received by the mother of the family; it is returned to him at his departure. The crier, on entering the house, sits down on a cushion prepared for him; he then, in a set speech, invites the father of the family to the public celebration of victories. On parting, he is again saluted by women with the percussion of lips. The drinking party itself begins in the morning. Men sing two at a time, varying their voices from high to low and alternating solo and duo performances. One of the singers rattles a gourd filled with maize to the time of the music; the topic of the songs is always warlike expeditions. No one is permitted to sing of the death of an Abipon. While the songs are sung, none of the listeners may utter a word. The women, who stand in a group separated from the men, signify to the vocal pair, after a while, that it is time to stop. They do this by repeated percussion of the lips and by pronouncing the words "Kla leyà (it is enough)." This is another case in which women are permitted to be receivers of male messages and in turn, may be senders to men. One suspects that we are dealing with married men and women only (perhaps members of the Höcheri); Dobrizhoffer is not specific. In any case the respective roles of men and women in the event are clearly distinct: At the women's signal, the singers conclude their performance with "Gramackka akam (such then we are)." Another pair follows the first, and in this manner, the singing continues until the following morning. The rules for "male singing" are as follows:

Lexicon:

(1) S ⟶ {drinking party (center of village?)}
(2) P ⟶ {+ male}, {- male}
(3) N ⟶ {?}
(4) E ⟶ {stress importance of warfare}

Male Singing

Syntax:

(1) A ⟶ {Male part} + {Female part}
(2) Male part ⟶ {P} + {I} + {Form/Content}
  (a) P ⟶ {Sender} + {Receiver}
  (b) Sender ⟶ {2 singers} → {+male}
  (c) Receiver ⟶ {other participants? -- only men?}
  (d) I ⟶ {Abipon language: oral singing
    Music: drums and gourds}
  (e) Form/Content ⟶ {Warlike expeditions}
(3) Female part ⟶ {Signal} + {Conclusion}
(4) Signal ⟶ {Part} + {I} + {Form/Content}
  (a) P ⟶ {Sender} + {Receiver}

(b) Sender ⟶ {+ group - male}

(c) Receiver ⟶ {2 singers}

(d) I ⟶ {body movement: percussion of lips
Abipon language: oral}

(e) Form/Content ⟶ {"kla leya" / it is enough}

(5) Conclusion ⟶ {P} + {I} + {Form/Content}

(a) P ⟶ {Sender} + {Receiver}

(b) Sender ⟶ {same as rule (2)}

(c) Receiver ⟶ {same as rule (2)}

(d) I ⟶ {Abipon language: oral}

(e) Form/Content ⟶ {"Gramackka akam"/ such then we are}

As will be evident throughout this paper, music and body movements are frequently important aspects of speech events (as instrumentalities). Discussing speech events in terms of components and writing explicit rules enables us to identify when music and body movement are functional parts of speech usage, and when they are not. In "male singing," for example, percussion of the lips was used at regular intervals by the women as a signal to the men to stop singing.

TAUNTING

1) Girl's puberty rites

When an Abipon girl reaches marriageable age, which is about twenty, she is marked according to custom by an old woman (female shaman). She reclines her head on the lap of the woman who pricks her in order to beautify her. If the girl groans or turns her face away, she is loaded with reproaches, taunts, and abuse. The old woman says: "No more of such cowardice," "You are a disgrace to our nation, since a little tickling with thorns is so intolerable to you," "You are descended from those who glory and delight in wounds," "You will die single be accured." WHhich of our heroes would think so cowardly a girl worthy to be his wife?" The girl is in great pain, but must not say one word during the ceremony. This speech act has two participants — the old woman, who does the speaking, uttering certain ritual threats, and the young girl, who must not speak. The purpose of the event is:1) to give the girl an occasion to manifest her courage and bravery by not speaking, although in pain. Not speaking is an exercise of self control, similar for the Abipones to not eating. 2) to express ritually the Abipon cultural themes of individual courage and necessity for a girl to marry.

not-speaking shows strength

In all instances of "taunting," the "taunted" is not permitted to reply to the "taunter." In terms of speech event components, the interactional norm is "showing courage."

As will be seen later, in the discussion of "greeting," unmarried men and women are not permitted to speak to one another. Although the interactional norm (N) leads to silence in both cases, the purpose of this silence is quite different in each. Unmarried men and women are not permitted to speak in order to maintain strict separation of the sexes before marriage. Just as young boys and girls do not swim together or play together, they do not speak together. On the other hand, in "taunting," the addressee's silence is a sign of courage, an indication that the individual is capable of abstaining from the important resource of speaking. The avoidance between members of the opposite sex is mutual; that between the "taunter" and the "taunted" is one sided -- the "taunter" speaks; the "taunted" does not. The rules for "taunting" at girls' puberty rites are as follows:

silence as show of strength vs male-female tabu

Lexicon:

(1) S ⟶ {shaman's house ?}

(2) P ⟶ {- male + shaman}, {- male + child}

(3) E ⟶ {manifestation of courage on part of girl, ritual expression of value of marriage and individual courage} / girl' puberty rites

Syntax:

(1) A ⟶ {Reproach} + {Response}

(2) Reproach ⟶ {N} + {I} + {Form/Content}

(a) P ⟶ {Addressor} + {Addressee}

(b) Addressor ⟶ {Female shaman}

(c) Addressee ⟶ {Young girl}

(d) ⟶ {taunting}
(e) ⟶ {Abipon language: oral}
(f) Form/Content ⟶ {"no more of such cowardice, etc."}
(3) Response ⟶ {P}+{N}+{I}+{Form/Content}
(a) N ⟶ {show courage}
(b) I ⟶ {silence}
(c) Form/Content ⟶ ∅

These rules express an important aspect of the Abipon attitude toward language and speech: its use on certain occasions is a sign of weakness.

2) Shaman's reproach

After a death, failure in battle, sickness, etc., it is the task of the shaman to isolate the guilty individual and frequently, to punish him. When a man is guilty of a minor offense, a shaman will call him to his house and reproach him in the name of the "grandfather," or ancestral spirit. The shaman pierces and tears his flesh with the jaw of the fish palometa. The man, on the other hand, is not permitted to utter a word; to complain would be a sign of cowardice, a crime against the "grandfather" and therefore against the sacred traditions of the Abipones one of the most important of which is individual courage. Once again, we see that the addressee is not permitted to respond to taunting; he may not defend his innocence or complain of pain. The rules for the "shaman's reproach" are the following:

Lexicon:

(1) S → {shaman's house}
(2) P → {+male +shaman},{+male − shaman} / Shaman's Reproach
(3) E → {punishment of guilty individual}

Syntax:

(1) A → {Reproach} + {Response}
(2) Reproach → {P}+{N}+{I} + {Form/Content}
  (a) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}
  (b) Addressor → {shaman}
  (c) Addressee → {man}
  (d) N → {taunting}
  (e) I → {Abipon language: oral}
  (f) Form/Content → {reproach in name of "grandfather"}
(3) Response → {P} + {I} + {N} + {Form/Content}
  (a) N → {show courage}
  (b) I → {silence}
  (c) Form/Content → {ϕ}

The similarity between the "taunting" at girl's puberty rites and the "shaman's reproach" becomes striking when one compares the rules which describe each.

3) taunting of children

Dobrizhoffer mentions in various places that children learn mainly by imitation of their parents; language is not used as a means of inculcation. In one discussion, he mentions a use of speech which in fact neatly parallels the two instances of "taunting" just described. Children are sometimes teased or verbally abused; they quickly learn that what is expected of them in return is silence. Thus speech is used here, not to present verbally some information, but (one can infer in the light of the two instances of "taunting" described above) to teach the child that to abstain from speaking when one is abused is a sign of individual strength. It is by writing explicit rules for the behavior involved in speech events that we are able to see the parallel between the "taunting" events just described and this Abipon socialisation technique. We might say that the Abipones teach their children the receiver's role in "taunting" by inventing a similar situation for them. The rules for the "taunting" of children" are as follows:

Children trained in taunting

Lexicon:

(1) S ⟶ {in home ?}
(2) P ⟶ {+adult} {+child}
(3) E ⟶ teach child attitude toward speech and how to manifest courage

/ taunting of children

Syntax:

(1) A → {Taunting} + {Response}
(2) Taunting → {P} + {I} + {N} + {Form/Content}
    (a) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}
    (b) Addressor → {parent}
    (c) Addressee → {child}
    (d) N → {taunting}
    (e) I → {Abipon language: oral}
    (f) Form/Content → {tease, abuse}
(3) Response → {P} + {I} + {N} + {Form/Content}
    (a) N → {show of strength}
    (b) I → {silence}
    (c) Form/Content → {Ø}

Despite the scanty date (Dobrizhoffer mentions the event only briefly), we are able to write rules for this event and to understand its place in Abipon life.

GREETING

When two Abipones meet each other, the speech event that ensues displays three characteristics of Abipon culture — group solidarity, the maintenance of the Höcheri and non-Höcheri distinction, and the separation of sexes. No two individuals may pass one another without a greeting, with the exception of unmarried persons of the opposite sex, who may not speak at all to each other. Two non-Höcheri greet one another with the words: "Là navichi?(Have you come?)" The reply is "Là ñavè (I have come.)" If it is a Höcheri who is addressed, he must be saluted in these words: "Là návirin (Have you come?)." He replies (with proper modulation of the voice according to Dobrizhoffer) "La ñaverinkie (I have come)."

"Greeting" is an excellent example of the need of taking the social context as the point of departure in studying linguistic behavior. Without considering the sex and rank of the participants, it is impossible to predict the forms which they will utter. On the other hand, if we describe the speech event in terms of its components, thus placing it in its social context, we are able to write rules which explicitly predict or 'generate' the behavior just described. The rules for "greeting" are the following:

Lexicon:

(1) S → {anywhere ?}

(2) E → {?}

(3) P → {anyone}

(4) I → {Abipon language: oral}

(5) P are {β sex - married} where β sex means opposite sex → N is avoidance and Form/Content is ∅

(6) P are ∼ {β sex - married} → N is compulsory speaking

Greeting

Syntax:

(1) A → {Initiation} + {Response}

(2) Initiation → {P} + {Form/Content}

(a) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}

(b) Addressor, Addressee is {+ Höcheri} → Form/Content is {"Lâ nàvirin"/have you come}

(c) Addressor, Addressee is ∼ {+ Höcheri} → Form/Content is {"Là navichi"/ have you come}

(d) Form/Content → {question as to whether person has come}

(2) Response → {P} + {Form/Content}

(a) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}

(b) Addressor, Addressee is {+ Höcheri} → Form/Content is {"La ñaverinkie " / I have come}

(c) Addressor, Addressee is Höcheri → Form/Content is {"Là ñavè"/ I have come}

(d) Form/Content → {statement that one has come}

Rule (5) and rule (6) of the 'lexicon' state explicitly the fact that unmarried persons of the same sex or married persons of opposite sexes or the same sex must greet one another in passing and the fact that unmarried persons of different sexes are not permitted to greet one another. It is important to note that the fact that the N of a speech event or speech act is avoidance does not necessarily imply that the Form is ϕ. Although this implication is true in the Abipon culture, it is not true everywhere.(7)

In order to describe adequately the behavior involved in "greeting," it proved useful to include selectional rules such as (5) and (6) of the 'lexicon' and (1)(b) and (c) and (2)(b) and (c) of the 'syntax.' In a study of Abipon speech usage, such selectional rules are needed only for the speech event: "greeting." Perhaps the particular nature of such rules requires that they be given a special place in a sequence of rules describing speech behavior.

The reader may wonder if rules (5) and (6) of the 'lexicon' need to be so complicated. Another possibility would be to limit the rule which specifies participants so that unmarried persons of the same sex are not included. Then the Interactional norm, rule (5), would be: compulsory speaking. The rules of the revised 'lexicon' would then be the following:

Revised lexicon:

(1) $S \longrightarrow \{\text{anywhere ?}\}$

(2) $E \longrightarrow \{\ ?\ \}$

(3) $P \longrightarrow \sim\{\beta\text{sex} - \text{married}\}$ where βsex means opposite sex

(4) $I \longrightarrow \{\text{Abipon language: oral}\}$

(5) $N \longrightarrow \{\text{compulsory speaking}\}$

This sequence of rules is of course much simpler than the one given earlier. It has the important disadvantage, however, of not indicating a fact which Dobrizhoffer seems to stress. ie. that unmarried persons of the opposite sex actually do communicate with one another by purposely avoiding one another. This fact is specified by the more complicated 'lexical' rules given earlier.

COMMUNICATION WITH ANCESTRAL SPIRITS

1) Group communication with spirit

The Abipones, like other Chaco Indians, worshipped spirits from whom they thought they were descended. The most important spirit is called ""Aharaigichi" or "Queevèt" and is given the title "Groaperikie," our grandfather. Dobrizhoffer does not provide information concerning the relationship between the various spirits he talks about. We would want to know if they all referred to the same entity (our grandfather?) or if rather there were more than one "spirit." We would also want to know in what contexts each of the terms was employed. "Groaperikie" is represented in the heavens by the Pleiades; when he disappears from the sky he is supposed sick and people fear he may die. In May, when the Pleiades are once again visible, the Abipones welcome their "grandfather" back; they treat him as a person who has returned after an illness. They shout joyfully and play pipes and trumpets, congratulating him on the recovery of his health. Some of the phrases used are cited by Dobrizhoffer: "Quemen naachic latenc! layàm navichí enà? Ta yegàm! Layamini! (What thanks do we owe you! and have you returned at last? Ah! you have happily recovered!)" This event might be labelled "group communication with spirit." The participants are: 1) addressor members of community who as a group shout above utterances and play instruments and 2) addressee: ancestor who has recovered from sickness. The instrumentalities here are two: 1) speaking Abipon and 2) blowing of pipes and trumpets. The purpose of this speech event is to maintain the relationship with the ancestors of the tribe. The rules for "group communication with the spirit" are as follows:

Lexicon:

(1) S → {center of village ?}

(2) E → {maintenance of ties between living Abipones and their ancestors, now spirits}

(3) P → {+ spirit}{+ group}

(4) I → {Abipon language: oral; Music: blowing of pipes and trumpets}

(5) N → {?}

group communication with spirit

Syntax:

(1) A → {?}

(2) group communication with spirit → {P}+{Form/Content}

(a) P → {Addressor}+{Addressee}

(b) Addressor → {Abipones as group}

(c) Addressee → {spirit}

(d) Form/Content → {"Quẹmen naachịch latenc! layàm navichi enà?. Ta y̆egàm! Layamini!, etc."/ discussion of health of spirit}

At this point the reader may wonder how one decides whether or not the use of music is a functional part of a speech event. In a study of Abipon culture, the analysis of speech events in terms of components and the writing of explicit rules enables us to answer this important question. As can be seen by comparing all the sequences of rules music is a feature of the component: Instrumentalities (I) only when the Addressee is an ancestral spirit and the Addressor is either a female shaman or group of Abipones. This fact can be stated as a selectional rule among components: Addressee is $\{+\text{spirit}\}$ and Addressor is $\{+\text{group}\}$, $\{-\text{male} + \text{shaman}\} \longrightarrow$ I is $\{\text{music}$, Ab. lg.: oral$\}$

It must be stressed that this rule does not only imply that the only role of music in Abipon society is as an auxiliary part of speech events. It rather enables us to identify precisely when music has this role by stating explicitly the fact that female shamans and Abipones as a group must use music in order to communicate with the ancestor. This selectional rule is not a part of any rule sequence describing a particular speech event; it is rather a generalization which can be formulated after writing all such sequences.

2) female shaman communication with spirit

When it is felt that "our grandfather" has something to report to the group, his message must be transmitted first to the old women who are able to speak to him -- they are probably female shamans. The old women assemble in a huge tent and strike two large drums. One of the women mutters a kind of mourning song. The surrounding women, with their hair disheveled and their breasts bare, rattle gourds, beat pans and loudly chant funeral verses, continually moving their feet and tossing about their arms. they pass the entire night in this fashion and in the morning, after having received gifts, they report what the "grandfather" has said. This event can be broken into three parts.

In the first part, the old women, through their chanting and music, communicate with the "grandfather." The participants are the old women as addressors and the "grandfather" as addressee. The means of communication (I) is a combination of speaking, singing, body motion, shaking of gourds and beating of pans. That these actions are all truly features of the component: Instrumentalities (I) is shown by the patterned regularity with which they appear whenever female shamans communicate with spirits. The actual form of the message, unfortunately, is not revealed by Dobrizhoffer, although one suspects that the utterances are similar if not the same as those used in mourning and funeral lamentations. The similarity between those events and the one under discussion is striking. The explicit nature of this similarity should become apparent upon comparison of the sequences of rules which describe the events.

The second part of this speech event is the "grandfather" spirit's reply to the shamans. It is not stated explicitly by Dobrizhoffer in what language he replies to the shamans, but the evidence from the various instances of "communication with ancestral spirits" leads one to feel that the Abipones believed that spirits, their own ancestors, spoke the Abipon language. This fact should become clearer after all speech events have been described and overall patterns have been established.

The final part of the event is the report by the female shamans to the rest of the Abipones about the spirit's message. The purpose of "female shaman communication with the spirit," as that of similar events, is to maintain continuity with the past by stressing the importance of the spirit(s) in present events. The rules are as follows:

Lexicon:

(1) S ⟶ {tent of female shamans}

(2) E ⟶ {maintenance of ties between living Abipones and their ancestors} / female shaman communication with spirit

(3) N ⟶ {?}

(4) P ⟶ {-male +shaman} {+spirit}/female shaman's talk to spirits

⟶ {male +shaman} {+ group}/female shaman's report

Syntax:

(1) A ⟶ {Female shaman's talk to spirits} + {Female shaman's report}

(2) Female shaman's talk to spirits ⟶ {Question} + {Answer}

(a) Question ⟶ {P} + {I} + {Form/Content} (a1) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}

(a2) Addressor → {female shaman}

(a3) Addressee → {spirit}

(a4) I → {Abipon language: oral
Music: pans and gourds
Body movement: disheveled hair, bare breasts, waving arms and feet}

(a5) Form/Content → {Questions about future}

(b) Answer → {P} + {I} + {Form/Content}

(b1) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}

(b2) Addressor → {spirit}

(b3) Addressee → {female shamans}

(b4) I → {Abipon language: oral}

(b5) Form/Content → {future events}

(3) female shaman's report → {P} + {I} + {Form/Content}

(a) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}

(b) Addressor → {female shamans}

(c) Addressee → {Abipones as a group}

(d) I → {Abipon language: oral}

(e) Form/Content → {future events}

Again we see that music is a necessary feature of the means of communication in communication with the ancestral spirits. Similarly, the use of the body is not haphazard, but, as will be seen when all speech events have been described, it occurs whenever female shamans communicate with spirits. This fact leads us to formulate another selectional rule among speech event components:

Receiver is {+spirit} and sender is {-male+ shaman}
⟶ I is {Abipon language: oral}
{Music: pans and gourds} {body movement: disheveled hair, bare breasts, waving arms and feet}

3) Male shaman communication with dead man's spirit

A third speech event in which a spirit is a participant is the interesting discussion carried on by male shamans. The spirits of the dead possess knowledge of the future but can reveal this knowledge only to shamans (we have just seen an instance of a report by the "grandfather" to female shamans). The setting here is similar to the female consultation with the "grandfather;" but the way the actual conversation is carried out is quite different. A crowd of people go to the tent of a shaman, desirous of learning about the future. The shaman goes behind a bull's hide and speaks with two different styles — one, the mournful style already noted as that used by women to communicate with spirits; the other, pronounced in a commanding voice, represents the report of the dead man's spirit. He questions the spirit in the mournful voice and replies in the commanding one. The observers claim to be able to see the dead man. Earlier the

shaman as channel for spirit's message

question was posed as to what language is used in communication with spirits, Now that an actual conversation has been described in which Abipones were understanding observers though not participants, it becomes clear that the language used is Abipon, but that there is a special style (mourning style) which must be used. The spirit also has a style, ie. the "commanding voice" used by the shaman to represent him. The rules for "male shaman communication with dead man's spirit" are as follows:

Lexicon:

(1) S → {shaman's tent}
(2) E → {maintenance of ties between living and dead Abipones}
(3) E → {Abipon language: oral}
(4) P → {male + shaman}{+ spirit}{+group}

/ male shaman communication with dead man's spirit

Syntax:

(1) A → {Shaman talks} + {Spirit talks}
(2) Shaman talks → {P} + {N} + {Form/Content}
  (a) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}
  (b) Addressor → {shaman}
  (c) Addressee → {spirit}
  (d) N → {"mournful style"}
  (e) Form/Content → {future events}
(3) spirit talks → {P} + {N} + {Form/Content}
  (a) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee} + {Audience}

(b) Addressor ——→ {spirit}
(c) Addressee ——→ {shaman}
(d) Audience ——→ {group of Abipones}
(e) N ——→ {"commanding style"}
(f) Form/Content ——→ {future events}

It is important to note that in rule (3) of the 'syntax' the Addressor is the ancestral spirit even though Dobrizhoffer records that the shaman himself is actually speaking. The rules must represent the Abipon viewpoint, not that of the observing ethnographer.

It seems useful here to treat 'style' as a feature of the norm of interaction: one might rather want to consider it as the form of the message or perhaps to create a new speech event component to handle it. The word "style" is all too often used in discussions of languages as a catchall term which covers all kinds of socio-linguistic variation.

LAMENT

This section consists of a description of three speech events which indicate some aspects of the Abipon attitude toward death and sickness.

1) Sick man's lament

At the report that a man is dying, all the old women related to him and those famed for medical skill (ie. the female shamans) flock to his house. They stand in a row around the sick man's bed, with disheveled hair and bare breasts, striking a gourd and moving their feet and arms, making loud vociferations. One of the old women stands nearest the dead man's head and strikes an immense drum. An analysis of this speech event into components and a comparison of those components with those identified in other speech events enables us to distinguish its distinctive features. The senders are the female shamans. The means of communication is not only speaking Abipon, but once again, disheveled hair, baring of breasts, and striking of gourds and drum. The receiver, though not indicated by Dobrizhoffer, can be inferred from the co-occurrence pattern of the components of the event. When female shamans are the senders and disheveled hair, bare breasts, waving arms and legs, striking of gourds and beating of drum are features of I ; [illegible]; then only the ancestral spirits (probably the "grandfather") could be the receiver. The purpose of the event seems to be to cure the disease. The rules for the "sick man's lament" are as follows:

Lexicon:

(1) S ⟶ {sick man's house}
(2) E ⟶ {cure disease}
(3) P ⟶ {+ male + shaman} {+ spirit}
(4) N ⟶ {vociferative style ?}
(5) I ⟶ {Abipon language: oral
Music: beating of gourds and drum
Body movement: disheveled hair, bare breasts, waving of arms and legs}

Sick Man's Lament

Syntax:

(1) Sick man's lament ⟶ {P} + {Form/Content}
(a) P ⟶ {Addressor} + {Addressee}
(b) Addressor ⟶ {female shamans}
(c) Addressee ⟶ {spirit}
(d) Form/Content ⟶ {?}

Although many aspects of this event are not known, one important fact is clear: when female shamans communicate with spirits, the means of communication (I) which is specified for this and similar events must be used.

2) Mourning ceremony

The ritual mourning ceremony for the dead, when described in terms of the components of speech event, is found to share several features with the "sick man's lament." In this ritual, only women participate — the same ritual is performed on two occasions: 1) immediately following the death of an Abipon. 2) at certain prescribed times, in order to mourn for those who have been deceased for some time. The mourning is as follows: at stated hours, both in the forenoon and afternoon, all the women assemble in the market place, their hair scattered about their shoulders, their breasts and backs marked. They walk up and down the market place in a long row, continually tossing their arms and moving their feet. Again the features: disheveled hair, bare breasts, hand and foot motion, necessary for communication with the spirit, can be observed. It must be stressed that these actions are not to be understood as individual expressions of emotion that happen to coincide with the ceremony; they are rather culturally prescribed features of the speech event; without them, the "grandfather" and other spirits would not receive the message, just as they would not receive it were it not delivered in the proper language and in the proper form. Some women strike gourds containing various seeds to the measure of their voices; others beat pans covered with does' skins. To every three or four gourds, one of these drums answers. Although Dobrizhoffer's description of the musical aspect of the ceremony is by no means adequate, our analysis should make it quite clear that the music, here as in other events that have been described, is a necessary feature of the speech event. The mourners modulate their voices and make trills and quavers mingled with groans — thus, there is a prescribed style which must be used in this event, just as earlier it was noted that there was another style used by male shamans to communicate with the spirit of a dead man. After chanting some mournful staves in this manner, they all cease at intervals, changing their voices from the highest to the lowest key, and suddenly utter a very shrill hissing. The hissing indicates that they are seized with rage; they utter all sorts of imprecations against the author of the death, whoever he might be. At this point, the style has changed, and with it, the receiver — now, the author of the death — and the purpose of the event — now, cursing this author for having committed the murder. Sometimes, within this event, they recite a few verses in a declamatory tone, in which they extol the good qualities and deeds of the deceased, and in a querulous voice endeavour to excite the compassion and vengeance of the survivors. Again the style has changed, varying with the receiver — this time the receiver is the group of living Abipones, witnessing the "mourning ceremony." The following relation holding between the "style" of the message and its receiver can be stated:

$$\frac{\text{"style}}{\text{receiver}} - \frac{\text{mournful wailing}}{\text{"grandfather"}} : \frac{\text{cursing hissing}}{\text{author of death}} : \frac{\text{declamatory chant querulous voice}}{\text{group of survivors}}$$

The rules for the "mourning ceremony" are as follows:

Lexicon:

(1) S ——→ {?} / mourning ceremony
(2) E ——→ {mourn for dead}
(3) P ——→ {- male + shaman} {+ spirit} / wailing
{- male+shaman} {- spirit} / cursing author
{- male+shaman} {+ group} / talk to survivors

Syntax:

(1) A ——→ {Wailing} + {Cursing author} + {Talk to survivors}
(2) Wailing ——→ {P} + {I} + {N} + {Form/Content}
 (a) P ——→ {Addressor} + {Addressee}
 (b) Addressor ——→ {shamans}
 (c) Addressee ——→ {spirit}
 (d) I ——→ {Abipon language: oral
 Music: gourds and drum
 Body movement: disheveled hair, bare breasts, waving of arms and legs}
 (e) N ——→ {mournful wailing style}
 (f) Form/Content ——→ {?}
(3) Cursing author ——→ {P} + {I} + {N} + {Form/Content}
 (a) P ——→ {Addressor} + {Addressee}

(b) Addressor → {shamans}
(c) Addressee → {author of death}
(d) I → {Abipon language: oral}
(e) N → {cursing, hissing style}
(f) Form/Content → {?}

One suspects here that the "author of the death" is not a spirit since only language is used as the means of communication with him.

(4) talk to survivors → {P}+{I}+{N}+{Form/Content}
(a) P → {Addressor}+{Addressee}
(b) Addressor → {shamans}
(c) Addressee → {survivors}
(d) I → {Abipon language: oral}
(e) N → {declamatory chant, querulous voice}
(f) Form/Content → {talk of vengeance}

In the above sequence of rules, certain facts were included in the 'syntax' which might rather have been included in the 'lexicon:' e.g.: the fact that the addressor was always female shamans. The purpose of writing rules is to provide an explicit and clear representation of the behavior involved in the events under discussion. The decisions made in writing them are based on both criteria: clarity and simplicity. It was the criterion of clarity which led to the repetition of the specification of the Addressor as female shamans. It must be stressed that there are many ways of writing these rules: data from other cultures will no doubt lead to a choice among rule formats.

It is interesting that while the women perform the mourning ceremony, the men take part in a drinking party, preliminary to battle. The details of this drinking party will be described in the section on warfare. Towards evenihg, the women assemble in a hut, one of the female shamans presiding and regulating the chanting and other rites. She strikes two large drums alternately and signs a song, the other women following her, exactly. The "mourning ceremony" lasts till morning; it is repeated for eight days without variation. On the ninth night, the pans are broken, the tragic lamentations give way to a more festive chant, interrupted at intervals by the presiding shaman, with out-stretched jaws and a deep voice. During this time, as mentioned above, the men engage in drinking party preliminary to battle; it is organized by the nearest male kin to the deceased who leads his group into the revengeful battle following the "mourning ceremony." Thus a change in the style of the message (which we have treated as a feature of the N), from "mournful wailing" to "festive chant." in Dobrizhoffer's words, marks the transition from the period of mourning to the period of warfare.

WARFARE

The speech events discussed in this section have to do with Abipon warfare. Some speech events related to warfare have already been described, eg: "victory celebrations, oratory, and male singing." The four events grouped in this section are placed here because of a lack of significant parallelism with any of the speech event categories already discussed.

Warfare was one of the most important aspects of the culture of the Abipones. Most of our knowledge of Abipon warfare concerns the history since contact with the Spaniards; it deals with a successful guerrilla warfare carried on against both the Spaniards and nearby Indians. Warfare played such a prominent role in Abipon life, however, that one suspects that it was important even before the arrival of the Spaniards. It functions as a means of avenging the death of a deceased member of the group, providing a context for displaying individual daring and courage in order to qualify for the rank of Höcheri, and, more recently, a means of obtaining a supply of horses.

1) Scout talk

Before battles, war scouts were sent out in groups of two or three to report on the condition of the enemy. Since surprise is such an important element in this guerrilla type warfare, it was essential that these scouts not be noticed. In order to communicate with each other, they used bird or animal sounds with given meanings or broken boughs of trees or high grass knotted in different ways. This type of communication satisfies our concept of a speech event in that the components can be specified; its dissimulative purpose is quite obvious. It is interesting to note that several other South American Indian groups use whistling, branch tying or other means of "non-speech" communication when engaged in such activities as hunting and warfare. A cross cultural study of this type of communication might shed light on the question of which cultural activities need language in order to function; it would perhaps provide insight as to the date of the origin of human language. The event under discussion might be called "scout talk." The message form is either imitative animal calls or twisting of plants; and the code is probably some type of derivation from the Abipon language. The rules for "scout talk" are as follows:

Lexicon:

(1) S → {near location of enemy}
(2) P → {+male}
(3) E → {dissimulation}
(4) I → {special Abipon code}
(5) Form/Content → {"plant twisting, imitative calls"/ situation of enemy}/

/ Scout talk

(6) N $\longrightarrow$? / scout talk

Syntax:

(1) A $\longrightarrow$?

Nothing can be said about the 'syntax' of"scout talk," since Dobrizhoffer does not specify its structure.

2) War council

Before actually going into battle, the Abipones have a council of war. This takes place at a drinking party, so common in South American cultures. For the Abipones, the drinking party is entirely a man's affair. Only the men are permitted to drink, although the women prepare the beverage, and on most occasions, only the men participate in the associated activities. In the case of the "war council," the women are meanwhile engaged in the ritual "mourning ceremony." In the course of drinking, the band chief, or cacique, delivers his opinion of the situation and demands that of the others. There is much shouting, singing, and playing of drums and gourds. The subjects of the songs are the heroic deeds of ancestors and former victories. In this case, it is somewhat difficult to decide if the music is a feature of the speech event or is a separate event in itself. The purpose of the "war council" is to work up the courage of the Abipones and again, to maintain a continuity between the past and the present. The rules for the "war council" are as follows:

Lexicon:

(1) S → {drinking party, center of village?}

(2) E → {work up courage of warriors, maintain continuity between past and present}

(3) P → {+ male}

(4) M → {Abipon language: oral
Music: singing and playing}

(5) N → {agreement ?}

war council

Syntax:

(1) A → {War Council ....}

(2) war council → {P}+{Form/Content}

- (a) P → {Addressor}+{Addressee}
- (b) Addressor → {cacique}
- (c) Addressee → {other warriors}
- (d) Form/Content → {heroic deeds of past, present decisions}

Once again, our data are too limited to provide much of the structure of this event. It seems to display similarities with some of the events discussed in the section: "Social gathering" and should perhaps be included there. Because of its relevance to warfare, it is placed in this section.

3) Battle report

Another speech event associated with warfare is the "battle report." During a battle, a horseman is sent forward to announce its progress to the members of the band. As soon as the messenger is seen from a distance, a crowd comes out to meet him, striking their lips with their right hands; the crowd accompanies him to his house. He maintains absolute silence and leaps from his horse to a bed, from which he announces the the events of the battle with a grave voice. If a few of the enemy are killed and wounded, he begins his story with "Halamichiriñi,(they are all slaughtered)" which he utters with a severe countenance and declamatory tone. He then enumerates those that he himself has slain in battle. At every mention of an enemy slain in battle, the spectators cry, "kom ákomat," "ta yeegàm!" The number of captives, wagons, and horses that have been taken are given in detail. It is only following this that he proceeds to elicit the names of his fellow soldiers that have been wounded in battle. At every name the by-standers groan and utter the word "Tayretà." Since the narrator is not permitted to utter the name of a dead person, he makes use of such circumlocutions as "Yoalè eknam oanerna Hámelèn lanevok là chit kaekà (the man, husband of the woman Hamelèn, is now no more)." At this point, all the women unloose their hair, take up gourds and drums, and begin the mourning ceremony already described. The rules for the "battle report" are as follows:

Lexicon:

(1) S → {house of messenger}
(2) P → {+ male}{+ group}
(3) I → {Abipon language: oral}
(4) E → {recount battle progress}
/ battle report

Syntax:

(1) A → {Arrival of messenger}+{Messenger's report}

(2) Arrival of messenger → {N}+{Form/Content}
  (a) N → {avoidance}
  (b) Form/Content → ɸ

(3) Messenger's report → {Fate of enemy}+{Fate of Abipones}
  (a) Fate of enemy → {Report}+{Response}
    (a1) Report → {P}+{N}+{Form/Content}
      (a1a) P → {Addressor}+{Addressee}
      (a1b) Addressor → {messenger}
      (a1c) Addressee → {group of Abipones}
      (a1d) N → {?}
      (a1e) Form/Content → {"Malamichiriñi...." /fate of enemy}. personal slayings
    (a2) Response → {P}+{N}+{Form/Content} elicitation of spoils
      (a2a) P → {Addressor}+{Addressee}
      (a2b) Addressor → {group of Abipones}
      (a2c) Addressee → {messenger?}

(a2d) N → {?}
(a2e) Form/Content → {"kem ékemat" "ta yeegàm!"}
(b) fate of Abipones → {Report} + {Response}
(b1) Report → {P} + {N} + {Form/Content}
(b1a) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}
(b1b) Addressor → {messenger}
(b1c) Addressee → {group of Abipones}
(b1d) N → {circumlocution ?}
(b1e) Form/Content → {"Yoalè eknam oanerma Hámelèn lanevek là chit kaekà," etc.}
(b2) Response → {P} + {N} + {Form/Content}
(b2a) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}
(b2b) Addressor → {group of Abipones}
(b2c) Addressee → {messenger ?}
(b2d) N → {?}
(b2e) Form/Content → {"Tayretà"}

4) Initiation of Warriors

The reward for individual courage and success in battle is membership in the Abipon noble or successful warrior rank. Anyone joining this rank receives a new name, the right to use the Höcheri dialect, and great respect from other members of the group. The role speech plays in the initiation rites for the warrior rank is interesting since it sheds additional light on the function of speech among the Abipones and the attitudes toward it. When the Abipones decide that some individual is worthy of becoming a member of the Höcheri, they make a trial of his fortitude. A black bead is placed on his tongue and he is ordered to sit down at home for three days, without speaking, eating, or drinking. Here, in a sense, speaking is placed on a par with eating and drinking in the sense that it is a resource available to and necessary for everyone; to abstain from speaking, as from eating or drinking is to show that one can go without the resource, thereby manifesting extreme strength. On the evening preceding the actual initiation ceremony, all the women of the band flock to the outside of the candidate's tent. Baring their breasts, disheveling their hair, waving their arms and legs and sounding gourds, they stand in a long row and lament for his ancestors. Once again, we observe that the baring of breasts, agitation of arms and legs, striking of gourds and disheveling of hair are features of [illegible] I [illegible] when women communicate with the spirits. The lamentations of the women continue till dark. At dawn, the candidate, holding a spear, leaps on a horse and gallops northward, followed by a troop of Abipones. He swiftly returns and approaches the tent of the old female shaman who is the priestess of the ceremonies. Some female members of the Höcheri hold his spear, while others strike their lips as a sign of approval. The candidate listens to a short address from the shaman. This same procedure is then repeated as he rides to the south, east and west and returns for the shaman's speech. Finally, they enter the shaman's tent for the initiation ceremony. First the candidate's hair is shaven by the shaman. Then she pronounces some words, setting forth the noble actions of the candidate, his warlike disposition, his knowledge of arms and horses, etc. so that he may appear worthy to be declared a Höcheri. Finally, the new name is promulgated and festively pronounced by a band of women striking their lips with their hands. The ceremony is concluded with a male drinking party. It is interesting to note in these rites that the male becomes a Höcheri through a ceremony in which only women are present. The women communicate with his ancestors; a female shaman recites his deeds and women pronounce his new name. The rules for the "initiation of warriors" are as follows:

Lexicon:

(1) E ⟶ {initiation of man into Höcheri}/ initiation of warriors

(2) P ⟶ {+male}/ trial of fortutude
{−male}/ mourning ceremony
{−male + shaman}/ shaman's speech
{+male}{−male + shaman}/ initiation
{+male}{−male + group}/ promulgation of new name

Syntax:

(1) A → {Trial of fortitude} + {Mourning ceremony} +
{Shaman's speech} + {Initiation} +
{Promulgation of new name}

(2) Trial of fortitude → {N} + {Form/Content}

(a) N → {avoidance}

(b) Form/Content → ∅

Here the candidate is the only participant; rule (2) is a statement of his avoidance of speaking.

(3) Mourning ceremony → cf. earlier description

It is interesting to note here that, in a sense, one speech event is embedded in another.

(4) Shaman's speech → {P} + {I} + {N} + {S} + {Form/Content}

(a) S → {outside shaman's tent}

(b) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}

(c) Addressor → {shaman, four times, once after each ride}

(d) Addressee → {candidate}

(e) N → {?}

(f) I → {Abipon language: oral}

(g) Form/Content → {?}

(5) Initiation → {P} + {I} + {N} + {Form/Content}

(a) S → {inside shaman's tent}

(b) P → {Addressor} + {Addressee}

(c) Addressor → {shaman}

(d) Addressee → {candidate}

(e) N → {?}

(f) I → {Abipon language: oral}
(g) Form/Content → {actions of candidate}
(6) Promulgation of new name → {P}+{I}+{N}+{S}+{Form/Content}
(a) S → {inside shaman's tent}
(b) P → {Addressor}+{Addressee}
(c) Addressor → {group of women}
(d) Addressee → {others present? ... candidate ?}
(e) N → {?}
(f) I → {Abipon language: oral
Body movement: strike lips
with hands}

(g) Form/Content → {new name}

CHAPTER II ABIPON LANGUAGE, SPEECH AND CULTURE

The main goal of this study was to help develop a method for making precise, explicit statements about speech and the relationship between speech and the rest of culture. The proposed method was exemplified in the first chapter: a presentation of Abipon speech events. The second chapter consists of a brief discussion of various social and cultural aspects of Abipon life which are intimately related to language and speech, although they cannot be described in terms of speech events. The subject matter can be divided into two areas: 1) dialectology and 2) attitude toward language and speech.

DIALECTOLOGY

In the presentation of Abipon speech events, two factors were found to be important features of social organization: sex (male vs. female) and rank (Höcheri vs. non-Höcheri). The Höcheri—non-Höcheri distinction is maintained through the use of what we might want to call Abipon "social dialects." The suffix -in must be used with all nouns and verbs when speaking to a Höcheri; it is always used by Höcheri themselves when speaking, whether the receiver is a Höcheri or not. The Höcheri also use certain words which are not permitted to non-Höcheri. The former say "Lichia (mother)" while the latter say "latè." The former say "Illalèk (son);" the

Höcheri
vs
non-Höcher
speech

latter say "Laetarat." This information is probably best presented as a general rule in a dictionary of the Abipon language:

Either participant in any speech event is {+ Höcheri}

N or V ⟶ {N - in,}, {V -in}

The relevant vocabulary items could simply be labelled + Hocheri or - Hocheri, respectively.

Dobrizhoffer noted no distinctions between men and women's language in Abipon: grammatical differences based on the sex of the speaker are frequently found in South America. He cites, however, one lexical item of interest: the word for yes. Although all speakers say "yna" for no; for yes, men and young boys say "hee;" all women say "haa;" and old men pronounce what Dobrizhoffer called a loud snort. This information could be presented in the Abipon dictionary by indicating that "hee" is {+ male, - old adult}, "haa" is {- male,} and "snort" is {(+ old adult, + male).}

different words for yes according to age, sex

Dobrizhoffer notes a phenomenon among the Abipones which students of language might want to label "geographic dialects." They differ from the social dialects already described in that they are based on geographic rather than social distance. The Abipon case is interesting, however, in that the geographic factors were no longer operative at the time of Dobrizhoffer's description and it is questionable whether they ever were. One might rather want to treat the phenomena as a case of "ethnodialectology." According to this Abipon "ethnodialectology," all the Abipones are divided into three subgroups; the explanation of the division is geographic origin. The three groups are the Riikahes or plains people, the Nakaigetergehes, or woods people and the Yaaucanigas, or survivors of another tribe. The lin= guistic dintinctions are to be found in the realm of vocabulary. The Riikahes call gnats "ayte;" the' Nakaigetergehes, "apataye.: To drink for the Riikahes is "neet;" for the Nakaigetergehes, "nanam." The Nakaigetergehes call a head, "Lapanik;" the Riikahes, "Lemarat." The Yaaucanigas call the moon "Eergraik: (a star); the others, "Gravek." The Yaaucanigas call a rainbow "Apich;" the others, "caheta." The actual history of these dialect distinctions is not clear. What is evident, however, is that by the time Dobrizhoffer studied the Abipones, his informants revealed the existence of an "ethno-dialectology: which explained the variants geographically. Again this information could be presented in the Abipon dictionary by indicating the dialect in question by placing it in brackets after the form, e g. "Eergraik" {Yaaucanigas}.

ATTITUDE TOWARD LANGUAGE AND SPEECH

In discussing the Abipon attitude toward speech, it is helpful to take a brief look at the Abipon world view, using a model something like Redfield (1952).

In terms of both people and things, the Abipones make a sharp distinction between Abipon and non-Abipon. Everything Abipon is viewed with great pride and seen in the tradition of the Abipon emphasis on courage and strength, begun by ancestors who are now spirits and continued by warriors today. Just as they take pride in their methods of warfare, they take pride in their language. Since contact with the Spaniards, they have used their own language to describe items of European origin, taking advantage of what seem to be productive morphological processes. Some examples which are unfortunately unanalyzable are: horse: "ahëpegak," ox: "ỹúihàk," bull: ỹúikàk lepà." A church is called "leakal lëërìki (house of images) or "natahĕnřeki, (where thanks are given to god (spirit?));" A gun is "netelřanře (bow from which arrows are cast)," gunpowder is"notelřanřē leenře (flour of the gun)," a book, "lakatka (tongue, speech word)." Any printed paper is called "elorka" which is the otter skin which women paint with red lines. Watermelon is "kaáma lakå (food of the Spaniards)." Cotton is"aapařaik (cloth)." Wheat is called "etantå lpetå (grain of bread);" bullets, "notelřanře lpetå (grain of gun);" and silver money, "lekacháole (little metals)."

pride in lg.

Dobrizhoffer and other missionaries had difficulty learning the language from informants since after saying the same thing two or three times, the latter became angry at the interlocutor for not having learned the form, and refused to speak. It seems as though they could not tolerate the mistreatment of their Abipon language.

In addition to the distinction between Abipon and non-Abipon, the Abipones also seem to sharply distinguish between Abipon people, including the spirits of ancestors, and all things. Things, which include all kinds of food, herbs, edible animals, musical instruments, Spaniards' horses, and, as was noted several times in the discussion of Abipon speech events, language, are treated as resources which exist in this world only for the use of the Abipones. The use of these things is not haphazard but must be learned --- overuse or misuse can be dangerous; since these things might be beneficial to the Abipones, they possess some kind of potential power. An example of the proper use of language is the shamanistic cure of desease, which is carried out by words alone. Another example is the "shaman communication with the spirit" in order to discover knowledge of future events. A case of misuse of language is complaining in moments of pain, for to do so shows weakness, which no Abipon should ever show. Since properly used language gives one power, going without language, like going without food, is a sign of strength and courage (cf. speech event category: "taunting"). All Abipones learn to use language properly in the course of growing up. No distinction is made

lg. as resource

non-use of lg. sign of strength

between those who speak better or worse than others, that is to say, no special emphasis is placed upon "speaking well." We have seen that "speaking well" is not a criterion for any desired role — Höcheri and caciques are chosen solely on the basis of success in battle; and the office of public crier is despised by all; it usually falls upon an old male shaman who is not in the Höcheri rank.

no emphasis on "speaking well"

Associated with death is a custom which indicates some aspects of the attitude toward language, and has possible repercussions for linguists interested in the Abipon language from both the synchronic and the diachronic points of view. Although the Abipones believe that they can communicate with the spirit of a dead person, they eliminate all the appurtenances which characterized this person as a live and functioning member of the group. All his utensils are burned on a pile. His horses and cattle are killed. His widow and children move elsewhere. Of special interest to us is the following: it becomes a serious offense to utter the name of this recently deceased person. Any mention of the individual must take the following circumlocutious form: "the man that does not now exist." Often the man's name was derived from a noun in the language; in this case, the word is abolished from the language by public proclamation and a new one is substituted for it. It is the task of the old women to invent these new words, which are then quickly diffused among the members of the group. All friends and relatives of the deceased also change the names they formerly had; their new names are bestowed upon them at special naming ceremonies. The vocabulary changes are announced by a public crier. The treatment of the names of the deceased fits rather well into the hypothesis stated above that the Abipones consider speech to be a resource which exists for their benefit but which must be used with caution. To use a noun which belonged to another man (since he used it as his name) would be just as dangerous as to sleep in his house, use his horse, or eat with his utensils. All have become contaminated since his death. We know from Dobrizhoffer that such words ~~as~~ for 'jaguar' and 'snake' were publicly abolished as the result of the death of an Abipon who had these names. A key question, but one to which Dobrizhoffer unfortunately provides no answer, is whether these words disappear from the language forever, or whether they reappear periodically from time to time. It is also questionable whether a word banned in one band is also tabu in others, ie. dialect differences were probably produced by this ritual interdiction on the use of words. The implications of these questions for the hypothesis of the existence of a basic core vocabulary which changes at a constant rate are obvious. Of course, many of the items

cf Wishram

assumed to be "basic" are not often used as names, eg: "i," "you," etc. Nevertheless, it would be a valuable endeavour to look at societies other than the Abipones (where the data is scanty) in which "public" or "private" abolition of words occurs fairly frequently, in hopes of discovering which areas of vocabulary are likely to be affected. One suspects that it is the morphs rather than the morphemes which are affected (that is, as in most cases of semantic change, the system remains the same). Dobrizhoffer's examples are the following:
"kahamâtek (oxen)" was replaced by "négerkatà;"
"apañigehak (jaguar)" was replaced by "nihirenak;"
"kaeprhak, (crocodile)" was replaced by "peûe."

NOTES

(1) Bright, William, "Language, Social Stratification, and Cognitive Orientation," in *Sociological Inquiry*, Volume 36, Number 2 Spring, 1966 313.

(2) Hymes, Dell, "Two Types of Linguistic Relativity," in William Bright, editor, *Sociolinguistics*, The Hague, Mouton, 1966.

(3) Steward, Julian H. and Faron Louis C., *Native Peoples of South America*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1956, 413.

(4) Chomsky, Noam, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, Cambridge, M.I.T., 1965
Goodenough, Ward H., "Componential Analysis and the Study of Meaning." *Lg.* 32: 195-216
Halle, Morris, "Phonology in a Generative Grammar," *Word*, 18 (1-2): 54-72

(5) Interest in the precise form of social behavior has had a tradition in Sociology from Simmel through Erving Goffman.

(6) Dobrizhoffer, Martin. *An Account of The Abipones, An Equestrian People of Paraguay.* London, John Murray, 1822. Volume II 137,138.

(7) Among the Yahgan of South America, a man and his son-in-law are not permitted to speak to one another. The son-in-law, in order to communicate with his father-in-law speaks in a loud voice as if not addressing anyone. The father-in-law, squatting before his fire, talks as though to himself, saying what he wants his son-in-law to know.

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APPENDIX E

"LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF COMPARATIVE POLITICAL RESEARCH"

LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF COMPARATIVE POLITICAL RESEARCH

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INTRODUCTION

For the student of language, the world's diversity of language is an opportunity. For the student of politics, such multiplicity may be an obstacle if not a curse. The very diversity which offers the linguist a testing ground for theory may seem to the political scientist something which interferes with testing. The data of comparative research must of necessity come from users of different languages, yet the sophisticated political scientist is aware that such data may be uncertainly valid, uncertainly comparable, just because the languages are different.

Put rather crudely, there are two questions:

(1) Does language affect politics?

(2) Does language affect what one finds out about politics?

The first question has to do with the role of language as a determinant of political thought and behavior. In one sense it is a question in the sociology of knowledge, and in any case it is methodological: one's research strategy will vary with one's answer. The second question has to do with choice of language in which to work -- translation, interviewing, and the like -- matters of method which arise when one must work in another language, whatever one's strategy.

In this paper I shall take up the two general questions in turn, sketching a series of critical and practical considerations. At the end I shall suggest that in coping with diversity of language a comparative political science may encounter not only problems, but opportunities as well.

I

INTERPRETING LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY

It is hard to imagine political life without speech. Without speeches, perhaps; but not without the coordination and control, the modes of influence, persuasion, and conflict which speech makes possible. But if use of language is a prerequisite of human social life, and hence of its political dimension, does it matter which language is used? Does acquisition and use of one language, rather than another, shape thought and values in a particular way? Is political life in French different from political life conducted in Swahili, just because of differences between the two languages?

We touch here on a question that has had a long history and many names. During the eighteenth century there began a shift from an emphasis on the universal logic of all language to a deepening concern with the individuality of each language. In this as in much else, Herder was a seminal figure. In his philosophy of history Herder focussed his concept of development upon

> "...the Volk, as the most 'natural socio-political unit, identifying it with a community sharing the consciousness of its own distinctive socio-cultural traditions, the determinate feature of which he sees in the possession of a common language. ...The chief medium of transmission in this educational process of social interaction is language which...Herder regarded as the most distinctive element in a Volk's cultural heritage. It is through language that a community's sense of its separate existence is both awakened and sustained. Language and education, therefore, constitute for Herder the most determinate factors in the fashioning of a community's social consciousness

> by which it becomes aware not only of its own existence but also of that which differentiates it from the rest of humanity.... A _Volk's_ language, for Herder, was not something detachable, for he saw in it the embodiment of a _Volk's_ inner being, its inner Kraft, without which it ceased to exist."[2]

Here we find two viewpoints which were to become fundamental to a long line of subsequent thought, not only political, but also linguistic and anthropological: equation of a people's identity with linguistic identity, and singling out of language as a central embodiment of a people's psychological character.

In the early nineteenth century Herder's mode of thought was developed by Wilhelm von Humboldt in such a way as to make him the classic reference point for all subsequent concern for the relation of linguistic differences to other differences among mankind. From W. von Humboldt effectively stems the tradition of seeking clues to national character in specific types of linguistic feature. The tradition played a major part in the foundation of social psychology by Lazarus and Steinthal; in the work of the man who presided over the birth of experimental psychology, Wilhelm Wundt; entered into the theoretical basis laid for modern French sociology and anthropology by Durkheim and Mauss; and motivated the work which signals the beginning of modern American linguistic anthropology, Boas' _Handbook of American Indian Languages_. In recent years in the United States the subject has been variously referred to as the Whorf, Whorf-Lee, and Sapir-Whorf hypothesis; the Weltanschauung problem (the German name being recognition of the role of von Humboldt); linguistic relativity; and has been the whole or partial subject-matter of "metalinguistics", "psycholinguistics", "ethnolinguistics".[3/]

The surge of American interest in the nineteen-fifties, sparked by posthumous attention to the writings of Whorf, has been followed by relative neglect in the nineteen-sixties, the linguistic Zeitgeist having shifted from a Herderian focus upon the differences among languages to focus upon what languages have in common, accompanied by a revival of interest in the logical and rationalist standpoints of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (dubbed "Cartesian linguistics"). Shifts of Zeitgeist, however, tend to dispose of problems by forgetting, not answering, them. The problem of the shaping role of language remains a genuine one for serious comparative knowledge of the determinants of social and political life.

I cannot pretend to thrash out the entire problem here, but I can sketch the perspective that I believe evidence and experience to warrant. My ultimate purpose will be to refocus the problem, by showing that it is fundamentally a problem, not just of the content of a language, but of its use. The content of languages, however, is what has been typically at issue, and must be considered first. If one imagines a political scientist who is planning research in another country, and who has been apprised of some interesting facts about the language of the people he intends to study, one will be considering pretty much the position from which most of the theoretical discussion of the Weltanschauung problem has been conducted. It has been essentially the "study of culture at a distance." Even when the discussant has obtained his own data in the field, his or her interpretation of the data is usually made at home. Sometimes superficial, sometimes profound and penetrating, Weltanschauung discussion has been pretty much an armchair one of interpreting cognitive import of reported linguistic traits in the light of general assumptions about the distinctive and central role of language. Scholarly interest has usually been more sophisiticated and systematic than lay interest, but on this score it has most of the time been methodologically in much the same boat.

SOME COMMON PITFALLS

Let me now review some of the considerations that arise if one attempts to interpret linguistic traits as signs and causes of thought and behavior. Put otherwise, given some interesting facts about the language of a people one intends to study, in what ways can one go wrong in assessing them? Ten topics can be distinguished (somewhat arbitrarily) with ad hoc labels. All are variants on the theme of not interpreting data out of context.

(1) Presence of a word. It has long been a popular habit to single out striking facts about particular words. It has been maintained, for example, that a key to German national character lay in the existence of a word, Schadenfreude, for which other languages lacked equivalent. Some have said that Russian aims could be better understood when one realized that for them to seek mir could mean not only "peace" but also "world". One might recall that St. Thomas Acquinas thought it necessary to the perfect bliss of those in heaven that they be able to observe the suffering in hell; and succeeded in having and expressing the thought in the trans-European tongue of the time; and I wonder if it has occurred to the Russians that for an American to speak of his world goal as peace might involve a double entendre in English too.

It is not that certain words may not be crucial in the shaping of action and to its understanding. The French lexicologist Matore has done interesting work on the mots clef of periods in French history,[4] and Raymond Williams introduces his valuable study of English Culture and Society, 1780-1950 with the observation:

> In the last decades of the eighteenth century, and in the first half of the nineteenth century, a number of words, which are now of capital importance, came for the first time into common English use, or, where they had already been generally used in the language, acquired new and important meanings. There is in fact a general pattern of change in these words, and this can be used as a special kind of map by which it is possible to look again at those wider changes in life and thought to which the changes in language evidently refer.[5]

The words Williams traces are industry, democracy, class, art, and culture. Notice that the social history of England is not read off from the presence of the words; rather, the words are used as foci for investigation.

(2) Absence of a word. The report that people X have no word for Y has been taken sometimes as indicative of the absence of a concept. American Indian languages usually had no word answering to our "freedome"; must they not have been unfree? This type of question has been reinforced by the habit among linguists and anthropologists of speaking of a language's lexicon as an index to culture, of language as a "perfect symbolism of experience." The truth of the matter is that a language is always a selective index to a culture, always a partial symbolism of experience. Language itself is a clear example. Every competent speaker of a language operates daily with an intuitive knowledge, complex and precise, of grammatical concepts, e.g., transitive, negation, nominalization, etc. Yet for most of human history no language has had terms to denote such concepts. The principle holds for social life

generally. Basic concepts of entitlement among the islanders of Truk, for instance, have no Trukese labels.[6]

Perhaps it would be convenient for comparative research if a dictionary could be treated as a complex index to concepts. The fact that a lexicon is a partial index, if less convenient, is however ultimately scientifically more interesting. Automatic lexical expression would be a sort of miracle to be accepted on faith. Selective lexical expression permits controlled comparison and covariation to get at the dynamics underlying the role of vocabulary in social life. If in a given society the shared understandings and concepts pertaining to political life may be, but need not be, lexically tagged, it becomes possible to study the conditions under which lexical tagging does and does not occur, thus perhaps adding depth to one's understanding of political process.

Linguistics and anthropology have no general theory of vocabulary to offer at the present time. Studies of semantic change, of lexical acculturation, and of semantic fields contribute insights into the basic factor, communicative need. The central question would seem to be, what needs determine the degree to which a message must be explicit? Sapir states the principle with regard to interpersonal communication: the more two participants share by way of understanding of a situation, the less their messages need be explicit about it. The same principle might apply to the role of vocabulary in the use and storage of information in the brain, if one views knowledge of words as a way of communicating with oneself over time. Number and kind of audiences (including onself), of settings, for the transmission and retrieval of lexically coded information would be the key.

Many other types of interpretation of vocabulary are variations on the theme of presence or absence of a word. Some can be singled out here.

(3) Many-one explanation in dictionary style. It often takes several words in one's own language to explain a single word in another. This fact has often been exploited for amusement and sometimes for intellectual inference, the implications being that the other language is interestingly odd in the presence of a single word for the elaborate meaning in question. It is important to notice how much the interest of the examples depends upon the style of presentation. Sometimes the style is straightforwardly humorous, as when one Yiddish word is explained as meaning "a guy who's always trying to get ahead of you", and a second as "a guy who's so far ahead you'll never catch up and still keeps trying to get ahead of you, because hat's the kind of guy he is." Sometimes the style is more patently dictionary in vein, as for the Kiowa Indian word translatable as "the hair on the back of a baby buffalo's knee". The gloss is a suitably rhythmic phrase. A typical Indian explanation: "hair, a kind of hair; you find it on baby buffalo on the back of the knee; they're the only ones that have that kind of hair" would be less likely to amuse. And if English had a single word equivalent (no doubt rural or dialectal), there would be no question of interest arising; one would simply say that the Kiowa word ______ means (e.g.) "tarl", just as one casually says that German Kopf means "head". In either case (humorous or dictionary style) the interest depends partly on the explanation fitting aptly into a verbal genre of our own culture. Such aptness itself is no guide to the semantic values of the word in question, any more than would be a felicitous account in Navaho of the meanings of English brown-nose or lapel.

Clearly the number and kind of meanings of a word, the oddness or obviousness of its main meaning, its humorousness, quaintness, or richness do not depend upon the glosses that can be imagined for it in another language. Its semantic values depend upon its place in its own system. In point of fact, a specification of the ways in which common, analogous words (e.g., the counterparts in various languages of democracy and socialism) are not quite equivalent might be far more revealing. In any case, when an important word is without close equivalent in one's own language, it still is necessary not to focus upon it alone, rich and ineffable as the word may be, but to work both ways between the two most nearly corresponding sectors of the vocabularies in question.

(4) Opposite meanings. This type of absence of an expected word has gained special attention. Freud was much impressed by the researches of a nineteenth century philologist, Abel, into Coptic, an extinct language of Egypt. Coptic seemed often to express two opposed meanings in one word. Freud and others have seen in such cases an example of a more primitive mode of thought. The difficulty is that the appearance of two opposed meanings packed into a single word depended upon translation into a language in which the two meanings were expressed by separate words. Consider Latin altus, which is translated into English sometimes as "high" (e.g., the sky), sometimes as "low" or "deep" (e.g., the sea). What of the possibility that the Latin word indicates not two things, but one, having to do with magnitude of distance from a vantage point, and hence rendered as "high" or "low" according to the context (e.g., as seen from below, "high"; as seen from above, "low")? Such is in fact the case. The Latin word has a consistent semantic value within its own system. Latin is not lacking a word where it needs two, but merely

using a word with different semantic value. (Nor would it be just to say that English is using two words where it needs but one without comparing the two systems of reference as wholes).

(5) Confusion of meanings. The interpretation of Latin altus as equivalent to English "high" or "low", according to context, illustrates a general phenomenon. A classic example has been with regard to color terminology. Many American Indian languages, such as Navaho, do not have separate terms for what is distinguished in English as "blue" vs. "green". Are the Navaho unable to distinguish the two? Apparently not; if a distinction is wanted, they use their single term (X) in the phrases "sky X" for "blue", "grass X" for "green".

(6) Concrete vs. abstract terms. Differences in vocabulary have often been interpreted in terms of this over-worked dichotomy. Some languages have been said to have many concrete terms in an area of experience, but to lack abstract terms; inferences as to cognitive abilities have been drawn. Several points can be briefly made. First, it is often possible to develop abstract terms in a language, if the occasion arises. Boas succeeded in having Indian informants abstract kin terms from the elements for personal relationship with which they normally occurred. Second, the noticing of a lack of abstract term depends upon the linguistic background of the observer. From the standpoint of some Indian languages, English lacks common terms for "writing-instrument" (covering pen, pencil, etc.) and "flying thing" (covering airplane, butterfly). Third, the presence of an abstract term may be missed, because of the common practice of using the term for the most typical member of a set as the term for the set as a whole as well. Compare English duck, "female" as opposed to the male Drake, but also serving for both when sex is indifferent or abstracted from; man "male" as opposed to the female woman, but also serving

for "human being" in general. (Technically the term restricted to a single role is called the marked term, and the term which may serve two roles is called unmarked).

Finally, the notion of the abstract may itself be misleading. One must distinguish vagueness of reference from superordination.[7] A term designating a vaguely defined area may be a bstract without being proof of intellectual prowess. Plenitude of particular terms may show power of observation and analysis. What is pertinent is the elaboration of terminology such that one term subsumes others, as in our examples of man: man, woman, and duck: duck, drake, or as in English parent: father, mother. The test for superordination is that one can ask the correlative questions, "What kinds of X (e.g., parent) are there?" and "Of what is Y (e.g., father) a kind"? and receive standard answers. (Much current anthropological work in semantics has gone into exploration of structures of this kind.) With superordination one has definite evidence of cognitive relationships, and rather well worked out techniques for getting at them, although the proper cognitive interpretation may well require going beyond the structure of superordination itself.[8]

To return to "concrete" vs. "abstract": the most interesting and illuminating recent comparative treatment of the issues to which the contrast is addressed is La Pensée Sauvage by Claude Levi-Strauss. The main point to be made here is that the seeming predominance of concrete or abstract terms is not in itself an index of cognitive capacity or charactor. The adequacy of existing terms in a language can be evaluated only in relation to the needs the terms serve. Depending on needs, preponderance of either type may be equally well adaptive or maladaptive. We know only too well that abstract terms may unify a nation but equally well condone a crime.[9]

(7) Poverty and elaboration of vocabulary. This topic is a more general form of those preceding it. It has often been noted that languages differ in proliferation of terms for different sectors of experience: the Lapp have many words for reindeer, the Nuer for cattle, the Aymara for potatoes, the Ponape for yams, the Samoans for elite communication, and, (the classic example) the Eskimo have several words for kinds of snow. Such proliferation would seem to reflect a focus of cultural interest. Conversely, paucity of terms would seem to reflect a lack of cultural attention.

There is a great deal to be said for close examination of the degree of elaboration of terms for a given sector, say, political roles, types of leadership, elite communication, and the like. The topic is one of the most important in a general theory of vocabulary, and has come to be called technically the question of the degree of terminologization.[10/] In the interaction between political systems of different origins, differences in the degree of terminologization of political life might be quite significant.[10a/] In the making of comparisons, however, a serious caution must be exercised. The apparent richness or poverty of a set of terms may be an artefact.

The Australian aborigines provide an important example of specious richness of terminology. The elaborateness of Australian terms for kinship has often been contrasted with the relative sparseness of American kinship. The comparison has been thought to refute evolutionary theory, which should expect the more "primitive" Australians to be simpler in such respects. Recently the comparison has been shown to be misguided. The Australian terminology serves not only as a way of keeping track of kin, but also as a verbal matrix for most of the statuses and roles in the society, which are handled in terms of the idiom of kinship. The proper comparison is not to American kinship terms alone, but to the American status and role terminology as a whole. When this comparison is made, elaboration of terminology is seen quite obviously to go hand in hand with socio-economic complexity.[11]

For specious poverty of terminology, there is a revealing African example. The legal terminology of "primitive" peoples has often been held to be sparse or non-existent. At first glance the Barotse would seem a case in point. There is etymologically but one basis term for the concept of property and ownership. One may suspect some mistake when one realizes that the Barotse have a quite thoroughgoing system of jurisprudence. The mistake lies in overlooking the fact that the Barotse are not dependent upon "property" terminology for handling disputes about property. They have a highly developed terminology for rights and statuses of persons, and when the basic concept of property relationship is placed in the context of specific relationships among types of person, its implications become accurately defined for the case in hand.[12] Similarly, the forms of Trukese entitlement, while unlabelled, are inferrable from the named forms of transaction which give rise to them.

Often enough one cannot freely compare whole societies and languages. Brown has pointed out that American skiers as well as Eskimo have quite an active vocabulary for types of snow.[13] With regard to the elaboration of terminology for elite communication in Samoa, Goodenough has pointed out that there exist sectors of American society into whose terminology the Samoan terminology is easily translated.[14] Indeed, one of the basic facts about linguistic evolution since the emergence of modern science is that there exist specialists whose collective responsibility it is to provide a tag for everything in the universe. In principle, no plant should go unnamed by botanists, no artifact by students of material culture, etc.

In general, then, one must establish the functional equivalence of what is compared in each language, partly by specifying the social group whose use of each language is in question.

(8) Metaphor, dead or alive. Cognitive interpretations of linguistic differences often cite descriptive expressions which imply a particular orientation. One example discussed in the literature is the Chircahua Apache expression for a "dripping spring", analyzed literally as "as whiteness, water moves downward".[16/] No doubt the Chiricahua who coined and accepted the phrase thought of whiteness, and of water as embodying it. There can be no certainty that a Chiricahua who uses the term today connects a dripping spring with whiteness, or with any particular assumption about the mode of relationship between a quality and that which manifests it. The description may be a dead metaphor.

Consider an English example. How often does one think of a morning meal as the breaking of a fast? The written word can be seen to contain "break" and "fast", and the connection might be joked upon ("Breakfast at our house is a fast break, all right"). For most intents and purposes, the original description is lost and one has but a single term, a frozen idiom. The make-up of the world enables us to infer something about the outlook of the past, not the present, users of the language.

Every language has a sector of such frozen idioms. Their constituents display one facet of the general fact that a language deploys its stock of morphemes in multiple ways, and that specialization in separate uses may divert different occurrences of a morpheme from any common meaning. To find a political term recurring in some other field of discourse is not in itself warrant for using the meanings of the one to illuminate those of the other. Consider a Martian linguist, trying to interpret Republican politics on the basis of Grand Old Party, Grand Central Station, grand piano, grandfather, and ten grand.

The leading edge of live metaphor in a language is an important source of insight into the orientations of those who do the coining and accepting, but what is live and to whom must be established.

In interpreting expressions in another language, we may be misled also by metaphors and descriptive terms of our own devising. Having restated facts in grammatical terminology, we may read into the terminology a cognitive significance which it does not have. Not too long ago, for example, a linguist sought to interpret concepts of possession among the peoples of a number of Pacific islands. He did so by examining the ways in which nouns in the language were marked by for "possession". Goodenough has shown that the "possession" of nouns and the concepts of property and possession of the Trukese (one of the peoples in question) have nothing to do with each other. In fact the concepts of property and possession must be analyzed first in their own terms before their linguistic expression can be properly understood. The so-called "possession" for nouns is quite analagous to the case in English, where I do own "my book", and perhaps "my life", but hardly "my father", "my school", "my church", or "my hometown". The so-called possessive is a relational category, some of whose uses do involve ownership, but many of whose uses do not.

This point brings us to the problem of grammatical categories, on which has been concentrated much of the interest in inferring cognitive characteristics from language. The description and interpretation of such categories is extremely complex. Here I can only continue in the same vein and point out certain methodological considerations.

(9) Part-whole. This label may suggest two common problems that beset inferences from grammatical categories. The first is illustrated by the gender of nouns in several European languages. All nouns are assigned to a gender, and some cases clearly show a correlation with sex, hence the sexual labels, "masculine, feminine, neuter" are extended to the whole. For the larger portion of the vocabulary, however, and in most uses, there is no sexual force to the gender. This fact has led some to dismiss semantic interpretation of such categories as arbitrary, and others to deny any relation between such categories and thought: does a person whose language has sex gender think more about sex? The case is more subtle and difficult. The existence of clear cases of sexual meaning for the gender classification makes it possible for such meaning to be extended and exploited. The force of the classification is a possible, rather than a certain, thing.[18/]

The case seems to be similar with gender classification in other languages. The Algonquian language, Ojibwa, for example, has two major classes of nouns: "animate" and "inanimate"; that is, these labels are assigned to the classes as wholes on the basis of clear cases. The word for "stone" belongs with "animate" nouns. In point of fact, stones may be treated sometimes as if inhabited by spirit. The grammatical classification is seemingly a rod along which the semantic lightning may or may not flash.[19/]

The second "part-whole" problem has to do with linguistic typology. In the development of cognitive interpretation of differences among languages, the classification of languages as belonging to one or another grammatical type played a major role. From it stem such typological terms as isolating, agglutinating, inflectional, polysynthetic, and the like, and the standard use of Chinese, Turkish, and Sanskrit as contrasting examples. The type of a language, however, was sometimes defined in terms of the makeup of the verb. The error is the same as that made in comparing Australian kinship terms to American kinship terms. The verb word is not functionally equivalent in all languages. Some psychologists, for example, have talked about English in terms of tense, since tense is the category most obviously marked in the verb word itself (*run*: *ran*, *talk*: *talked*). In the theory in question English was held to be developmentally more advanced than a language whose major category was aspect (designating, not the time of an action, but its character as completed, incomplete, beginning, etc. Yet the grammatical categories of the verbal type in English depend not on the verb alone, but on a set of words in the predicate as a whole (as a complex example, consider the predicate of "(I) *would* *have* *been* *about* *to* *get* *going*"). The English predicate has modal and aspect forms of importance, and some aspect markers which might well seem to represent the growing edge of the system, as having but recently been specialized in aspect function ("*keep* going", with *keep* no longer the same form as in "keep it", but marking continuative aspect; "*get* going", with *get* no longer the same form as in "get it", but marking inceptive aspect.)

The main point is that no one portion of a form class or a sentence can suffice *a priori* for judging the cognitive capacity or character of a language. The relation between functions and means is not one to one, but a multiple mapping in both directions. Proponents of cognitive differences have often seized upon the fact that the same means, say, the verb, may serve different functions in different languages. Too often it has been ignored that different languages may serve the same functions by different means. A meaning or relationship not marked in the verb may be marked in the noun or pronoun, or by order of words, or lexically. It is possible to say something about the cognitive cut of a language, but only on the basis of a more comprehensive consideration of its resources.[20]

(10) Multiple resources and codability. The matter of resources brings us to the major issue for any attempt to infer behavior or thought from language. The difficulties taken up so far might all in principle be met. Rash inference from presence or absence of a word, or the style in which a word is explained; rash imputation of a special type of thinking (opposite, confused, concrete or abstract); misleading comparison of poverty and elaboration of vocabularies; misreading of metaphor and etymological connection; inappropriate taking of a part for a whole---suppose one were to avoid all such difficulties, what then? Would languages appear so variable and complex that nothing could be said about cognitive differences among them?

I do believe that languages have characteristic cognitive differences, and that such differences may play a part in the cognitive worlds of those who use the languages. There are so many common ways of making too simple an approach, however, that one has to be especially scrupulous, both to be accurate and to avoid raising the hackles of those who have reacted against such errors by preferring to view languages as almost wholly independent of such considerations.

We can get to the heart of the matter by taking up what has been a focus for serious students, the question of obligatory categories. Suppose all difficulties of ethnocentric perception removed. Languages would still differ in their grammatical cores. Even if it should be demonstrated that all languages share certain underlying universal grammatical features, the salient differences would remain. And of some of these differences it can be said that they are obligatory for users of the language. One may choose to be silent, but if one speaks, one will in English almost always have to specify a noun as singular or plural, a verb as present or past in form; in Russian, a noun as to gender, a verb as to perfective or imperfective aspect; in Kwakiutl, a verb as to whether the information is directly known or hearsay; and so on. Presumably children learning a language in which their attention is forced to certain categories will be more attentive to those categories than will children learning languages for which the categories are marginal or absent. Presumably as adults they will reflect this learning experience in those modes of thought and behavior dependent upon linguistic means.

There has been comparative research that has yielded positive results. In the American Southwest Navaho is a language in which the use of a verb may require one to specify one among a set of categories for the shapes of objects; Zuni is a language for which this is not the case. Users of Navaho have been found in fact to sort objects more frequently according to form or shape than users of Zuni; and insofar as bilingual, to do this in direct proportion to the extent to which Navaho is their dominant language.[21/]

Another important line of research has concerned lexical categories, such as common terms for color. Such terms are not obligatory in the same sense as grammatical categories, but within their own domain are analagously so. It has been shown that the speed with which colors are named, recognized, and recalled varies with their degree of "codability" in the language used by the subjects, that is, the degree to which the colors are good instances of the portions of the spectrum designated by the simple color terms. The effect is particularly striking when a color central to a simple term in one language falls between the colors central to two simple terms in another language. If the color is, say, a yellowish-orange that is a "good" instance of a standard Zuni term, users of Zuni will name, recognize, and recall it much more readily than will users of English, who will also have difficulty agreeing on what the name should be (yellowish-orange", "orange yellow", "sort of between yellow and orange", etc.).22/

There is indeed a good deal of evidence that particular differences in linguistic habits go together with particular differences in thought and behavior. It would be strange if it were not so, if so thoroughly practiced a set of tools were without effect on what was done with it.

Where, then, is the difficulty? If one knows that a language has particular categories of grammar and lexicon, on the one hand, and one knows that particular differences in linguistic habits can make a difference, why hesitate to put the two together, and to anticipate thought from language? The difficulty lies in considerations indicated by the tag, "multiple resources and codability."

Take codability first. Tests of color perception have found little or no difference among users of different languages intheir ability to discriminate. Potential ability to recognize, recall and name shade of color is much the same throughout mankind. Where language may make a difference is in the ease and readiness with which a particular shade of color will be handled. Much of the job of language in ordinary life is to enable us to recode the infinite variety of experience into the finite set of conventional categories on which we usually rely, making such discriminations as suffice in the context of what is taken for granted. Commonly it is enough to ask for the red book (not the blue or green one) without concern for the exact shade of red. We could not and need not be continually as exact in reporting as our abilities permit us to be in perceiving. It is in "naming as we run", recoding experience into habitual categories, that language can and does most influence our thought and behavior. But: it always remains possible to be more exact and to go beyond the habitual verbal means. It is also possible to go beyond the habitual verbal means in speaking, by being more flexible, employing a tactic of identifying something to another person by whatever ad hoc attribute will suffice, or resorting to some strategy, such as an elimination of possibilities in a certain order, etc.

It may be that the habitual means (including here perhaps the habitual ways (additional words, supplementary phrases) of being a step more precise) prevail. Indeed, in daily life to persist after more precision than common understandings call for is to annoy, perhaps disrupt. In the potentiality of transcending habitual verbal means there might seem only a margin for adaptation and change that does not much qualify the general effect of the habitual means at a given time. One could accept then without further probing the position which I take to have been that of Boas: in the long run, a language adapts to cultural needs, not conversely, but in the short run, a language does shape the thought of those who acquire it. On a Herderian view of the cultural distinctiveness and centrality of a language, such a position would be justified. In terms of what we know about communication in culture and society, however, the Herderian view is inadequate. There may indeed be cases to which it is a close approximation, and the recognition of potentiality of change would not be alien to Herder's belief that individuals must both acquire and struggle against their inherited culture. But the plain fact is that the potentiality of going beyond the fixed grooves of one set of habitual linguistic means is not constantly employed cross-culturally: it varies with the language situation of a community, and the attitudes and energies of those who compose it. Since it can neither be postulated in advance nor inferred from language as such, it must be investigated in its own right.

The potentiality of which I speak may indeed work either way, away from or into the grooves of a particular code. A semantic possibility, usually dormant (e.g., gender), may be vitalized, say in poetry; a semantic habit, usually fixed, may be transcended (say, in poetry). It may be possible to specify for a given community or set of persons what the degree of potentiality in either direction will typically be; but to do so requires a knowledge beyond that of the language itself, as has been said. Once such questions have been broached, one is launched into the investigation of habits of speech as well as habits of language, and beyond that, into the investigation of the particular place of any one set of language habits within the range of communicative means available to the community in question.

A SECOND TYPE OF DIVERSITY: USE

Such a step breaks with the Herderian assumption that has so long been characteristic of American linguistics and anthropology. To put the matter in terms of what Kenneth Burke would call "representative anecdote", the Herderian view takes as norm the case of "one language - one culture". It ideally imagines a world parcelled out among a set of such "language - culture" units, each developing through time its distinctive way of viewing and organizing the world. Notice, too, that the view of the importance for thought and culture of the differences in the content of two languages implicitly assumes that the functional role of language in the two cases is the same, namely, that of shaping thought and culture. Relativity based on content presupposes a functional universal; but in fact this functional role is itself the subject of a second, more fundamental sort of linguistic relativity.[22/] Much fine work has been done in terms of the Herderian tradition, and probably it is not accidental that the tradition has been so prominent in the idiom of a scholarship strongly German in background, and much concerned with the description of patterns about to be levelled out of existence by the spread of industrial civilization. Then, too, a central methodological problem has been to obtain validity through accurate knowledge of categories different from one's own, and the one language - one culture idiom lends itself to that kind of problem readily. Nevertheless, the Herderian tradition elevates to the status of theoretical norm what is at best one empirical possibility, with regard to the central role of language, and, more particularly, of a language. (What I shall now say on this point may seem obvious, but it has not been obvious in the context of discussions of the social role of language, either in anthropology or sociology (see, e.g., the discussion of the problem in the first major American book on the sociology of language).[23/]

With regard to the central role of language as such: a language is never the only means through which members of a society acquire their habits of thought, and the degree to which it is the means varies. Basic adult skills and understandings may be verbally transmitted, or may be acquired almost wholly by observation and imitation (e.g., among the Athapaskan-speaking Kaska of northwestern Canada). The central religious effort in a young person's life may be elaborately prepared and instructed verbally, or verbal preparation may hardly enter at all (as among the Souian groups, the Hidatsa and the Crow, respectively). Socialization pressure may be withheld until the child is old enough for accompanying verbal explanations (the Wishram Chinook), or may be imposed before the child can be able to understand (the Hopi and Zuni). The presence of children in settings in which political matters are verbalized, as in adult gatherings generally, will vary. The prospective importance of verbal skill in political matters is likely to vary as between male and female children, as does the importance of verbal skill generally. (In many societies public discourse is almost entirely a male prerogative, and women may be able to take public communicative roles only in the privileged guise of singing (Araucanians of Chile), chanting (Bihar of India), or providing a vehicle for the supernatural (again Araucanians). Explicit verbal training of boys for political discourse may be emphasized (Ashanti of Nigeria, Araucanians) or nil (the Abipon of Argentina). And so on. In general, then, the role of language in socialization with respect to sectors of life may vary within a society, and between societies; this holds for the role of language in political socialization as a special case.[24]

Not only may such involvements of language vary, but so also may the attitudes toward a language. Contrasting outcomes of acculturation among American Indian groups indicate that language has had differential value for them. Some have held onto their language at the expense of territory; some have held onto territory and let language go. Some regard their native language with pride, cultivating its use; some regard their native language as useful only for excluding whites; some experience ambivalence. The attitudes toward language in relation to statehood seem quite different in Africa today than in India and than in nineteenth century Europe.

Cultural practices indicate that verbal means are differentially valued. Some societies elaborate verbal explanation of their customs, others not (e.g., the Hidatsa and the Crow, respectively). The sensory modality given first rank in during ceremonies may be verbal (prayer, incantation, etc.) or not (e.g., a tactile means such as pulsing). Normal conduct may call for filling uncomfortable silence with talk or for avoiding unnecessary talk with silence.[25]

Such considerations point to the fact that language is not magically ubiquitous, but a resource which different societies allocate differently. It is but one of the communicative resources available. There is the accompanying code of vocal gesture in intonation, tone of voice, and the like; manual gesture; visual art; dance; instrumental music; and the genres built partly or wholly out of the resources of language, but organized at levels not necessarily reflecting its internal structure, such as song, myth, and drama. As a selectively utilized resource, language if never the adequate expression of the whole thought of a people. That it might in principle suffice, as urged by many theorists, has to be set beside the face that it never does suffice. It would indeed be difficult to account for the existence of the actual plurality of modes of communication if all but one were superfluous.

Even in a one language - one culture situation, then, one must first assess the patterning of the use of the language before being able to assess the opportunities the language has for shaping thought and behavior. As a first approximation, one would expect the content of language to be less influential the less it entered into a sphere of activity. Such a consideration might not be expected to affect the comparative study of political life, if political life is thought of as preeminently verbal. It may be the case, however, that the understandings basic to political life are not verbalized, or that they derive from sectors or activities relatively unmediate by language.

What gets talked about as politics may be exactly what is not most important to understanding and shaping what is said. In any event there is no assurance that political discourse is assigned the same role in every society. Its place among other speech events, as to style and function, may vary from full "semanticization"--language being used to its cognitive utmost--to a heavy loading of aesthetic and entertainment values. Its weighting relative and conjointly with other modes of communication (visual, symbols, music, etc.) may vary.[25a/] (A typology of modes of political communication may exist; if so, I apologize for not citing it and should like very much to see it).

Perhaps the most salient inadequacy of the one language - one culture tradition is the fact that there never is but effectively one language, if by one language is understood a homogeneous grammatical and lexical system uniformly used. There are two scores on which this point must be made. First, there is obviously the prevalence of multilingualism over much of the world. In most areas the question for comparative research cannot be, "Does language affect thought?", but "Do the languages affect thought?" (and if so, which how much?). The national political life of a good many countries is carried on in a language not the first language of many of the participants.[25b/] Before one can assess the influence of language, one must learn the linguistic history of the individuals and communities concerned.

Three examples from comparative research on the Whorfian hypothesis can be briefly cited. Recall that the degree to which bilingual Navaho were influenced by the shape categories of the language varied with the extent to which Navaho was their dominant language. It has also been shown that the degree and nature of bilingualism affects the structure of semantic associations among Navaho.[26/] Finally, a particularly interesting case has recently been examined more closely by Bright and Bright. In northwestern California have lived several Indian peoples of quite similar culture and quite distinct languages. The case has provided a stock instance of noncongruence between culture and language; what does such an instance indicate for the Whorfian emphasis on the role of language? Contrasting two of the peoples (the Yurok and the Athapaskan-speaking Smith River), the Brights found that linguistic structure does correlate with a difference in cognitive style. Yurok syntax is flexible, and so is Yurok handling of folk taxonomies (lexical classifications of the plant and animal world); Smith River syntax is rigid and so is Smith River handling of the folk taxonomies in question. The general contents of the folk taxonomies of the two peoples, however, are quite alike. No doubt the similarity has been partly induced by the common elements of the environment, but no doubt it has been significantly influenced by intertribal bilingualism, itself no doubt carried in large part by inter-marriage. (As David Aberle has pointed out to me, the intercoordination of the kinship systems among these linguistically different communities must reflect the same process.) Bilingualism, then, can induce a commonality of semantic structure superficially belied by contrast of syntactic and phonological form.

Bilingualism is indeed not a unitary thing. No single assessment of its influence can be made, since such influence must vary with the variety of conditions of its occurrence. (e.g., the distinction between "compound"and "coordinate" bilingualism, i.e., between cases in which the semantic systems remain essentially distinct and cases in which there is merger or assimilation). The crucial difference that bilingualism makes to the Whorfian interpretation of language content can be quickly summed up, however, in a hypothetical example. Imagine having an account of interesting facts about a major language of an African country, and inferring a distinctive cognitive outlook from them. Imagine then learning that the white man from whom the data came had first learned the language at age 35 and used it only in visits to the local capital. H ow much of the distinctive cognitive outlook is likely to be his?

The hypothetical example is in fact close to the mark for all the cognitive characterizations of language which have been associated with the Whorfian hypothesis, including my own work with Wishram Chinook. For Wishram I have found several lines of evidence pointing to a particular cognitive orientation, one which tends to express experience in terms of relationships between two poles or terminals. (The word coined in the nineteenth century for "window", for example, is quite distinctive: "They-two-see-each-other-through-it"). Yet I hesitate to impute the orientation to the men living now from whom the data came. They are bilinguals who hardly have occasion to use the language apart from answering questions of a visiting anthropologist.

In such a case one can see both the justice and the limitations of the tradition of concentrating upon the cognitive implications of obligatory categories and descriptive words. The fact that languages differ significantly in these regards must mean that selective modes of reporting of experience have over time become incorporated in a common instrument. On the basis of appropriate linguistic data, we can characterize languages cognitively as historical products. What we cannct co on the basis of language alone is to characterize the users.

Less glaring than multilingualism, but at least as important is the fact of diversity of use within a single language. The general structure of a language is something like a checkbook which users cash in various ways. Some ways become socially standardized, so that one must recognize styles, levels,

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varieties, registers, keys and the like (to mention some of the terms that have been employed).

In even the most homogeneous of speech communities there are at least formal, common, and slang levels of usage, associated with distinct attitudes, occasions, and individuals. Within a complex society what is considered one and the same language may be associated with systems of usage, speech codes, which are quite different in their cognitive import. Perhaps the most often cited study of this sort in the United States is that by Strauss and Schatzmann on cross-class interviewing.[28] Basil Bernstein has used English experience and sociological theory to develop an "ideal-typical" contrast of major significance, between "elaborated" and "restricted" codes. Restricted codes are considered to be oriented toward the status basis of a social relation, and to limit the verbal signalling of personal difference; given the social context, the verbal component of the message is highly predicatable; new information is made available through extraverbal channels, which become objects of special perceptual activity; discrete intent can be transmitted only through variations in such extra verbal signals; through such restrictiveness the code reinforces the form of the social relation. In ideal type an elaborate code is the opposite, being oriented toward the personal basis of a relation, and the signalling of personal difference and intent; the verbal component is not highly predictable, and the verbal elaboration of experience is focussed upon. The one is associated with a positional social control (couched in terms of status, social category), the other with a personal social control (couched in terms of personal traits).

It is Bernstein's contention that children of equivalent intelligence, but inducted some into the one type of code, some into the other, will differ markedly in their abilities to perform on the usual intelligence tests, to perform in certain social roles, etc., and he has found evidence for the contention. His work is the most striking demonstration today of the fact that not language structures, but socially organized patterns of use of language, are what is critical.[29/]

Bernstein is properly concerned to keep the concepts of elaborated and restricted codes from becoming simplistically identified with middle-class ("good") and working-class ("bad") modes of speech, respectively. Wherever the appropriate social relations exist, either of the two types may emerge in varying degree, and all of us enter into one or the other in different situations. Much greeting and organizational communication is in a form of restricted code. A striking example of relevance to political behavior is found in an account of factional conflict in an Egyptian village.[30/] Most communications within the village are stereotyped in verbal form, which is attended to only to the extent of noting that the form and the sender are acceptable according to traditional norms. What is closely attended to are qualities of voice, accent, modulation of words, and the like, phenomena which are taken as conveying "friendliness" or "enmity" with regard to shifting factional alignments. Messages from the government tend to be interpreted in these terms, whether heartd over radio or from being read aloud in the coffee-house by a literate villager. Communications from persons of other cultures are evaluated in the same way, and drastically different receptions may be accorded them, depending on how they mesh with the local mores. Complimentary remarks may be taken as disdainful, slighting remarks as friendly.

Let us sum up the question of the effect of language in the following way. With regard to the principle of linguistic relativity associated with Whorf, and having to do with differences in the structure of languages, we can say this: there is a more fundamental principle of linguistic relativity, that of difference in the functions and uses of languages. Insofar as the issue has been posed as lying historically between the Herderian and the Cartesian traditions, we can see that both traditions fall short. Both have a portion of the truth: there are indeed distinctive cognitive patterns crystallized in the structures of languages (the Herderian emphasis) and there are universal cognitive patterns (the Cartesian emphasis) underlying these. Both traditions, however, and linguists generally, have tended to pose the question as if the role of language were everywhere the same and the whole story, so that different linguistic structures would mean different minds, like structures like minds; either that, or language would have to be said to have nothing to do with the matter. We have seen that no universal answer is to be given. Since the role of language is not everywhere the same nor ever the whole story, the question changes from one of the place of language in culture to one of the place of speech codes in societies.

When the question of the effect of language is posed in terms of speech codes and use, I think that a significant effect may indeed be found. We have seen some evidence of that. I share the view of most anthropologists and linguists that in the long run of history, the exigencies of human needs and situations generally prevail to control the instrumentalities by which they are expressed. In the short run, however, there is always dependence on present needs and situations, and the communicative means already in play. Spontaneous wholesale change is no more usual here than in other spheres of life; to a great extent the existing means are relied upon, and so persist, and so shape common discourse and reflection, while being gradually, more or less unreflectingly adjusted through changing use. Change that is intentional and even sudden may occur, and a conscious struggle may be waged to determine the communicative terms in which political life will be conducted, froma matter of the speech code as a whole to a matter of a set of terms with (as Jeremy Bentham pointed out) each its own implicit valuation of what is supposedly being neutrally described. Such struggle in itself dramatizes the point: the possibility of human action to shape communicative means, the assumption that such means, once shaped, themselves play a shaping role.

The answer to the question, "Does language affect politics?", has dealt mostly with the relations of language and thought, and has been a qualified "yes". Clearly languages as symbols of identity, and as boundary mechanisms, also have important political effects, and there is here a recognized and important field of investigation. Something more will be mentioned relevant to these matters in the next section. In all these respects comparative research must concern itself first of all with discovery of the sociolinguistic patterns of the groups to be studied. On this score, the answer to the second question, "Does language affect what one finds out about politics?", is a strong "yes". The relative strength of the "yes" in each case may be due to an impression that there is danger of overestimating the effect in the first case, and of neglecting it in the second. In any case, let me now turn to considerations of the second sort.

II COPING WITH LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY

The matters to which we now turn have long been discussed by linguists, but have not been at the center of linguistic interest in the present century. The main concern of modern linguistics has been with analysis of the structure of language, such structure being conceived as autonomous, and the science of its study as autonomous also. The virtue of autonomy has tended to develop into the vice of isolation, or at least into an attitude of rejecting much having to do with speaking and the actual diversity of speech communities as unworthy of a structuralist's concern. The nature of the social role of language has been taken for granted, or rejected as of no concern to linguistics, or its investigation put off as not opportune. Recently these tendencies have been counteracted by interest in what is now called "sociolinguistics" (earlier, "sociology oflanguage") in some respects, "ethnography of speaking" and of communication in others. Much of the current effort has had to go into establishing the relevance to linguistics of social factors, and into conceptual rethinking.

There thus exists no synthesized body of sociolinguistic research and theory on which to base "engineering" recommendations. There do exist a variety of studies and experiences that bear on what I take to be the two primary (and interrelated) questions confronting the political scientist in planning comparative research: what code (or codes) to use? and, how to use it (them)?

Choice of code. In choice of code the essential questions have to do with (a,b) functional scope (demographic, topical) and (c) value:

(a) whether, and to what extent, a given code is known;

(b) whether, and to what extent, the topics under investigation are easily, naturally expressible in the code;

(c) whether, and to what extent, the symbolic connotations of the code affect responses in and to it.

Let us consider first the question of what code or codes will be needed simply to communicate with those one wishes to study. The question might be viewed as one of determining the language of the country or region. Such an approach might be encouraged by the practice of mapping languages and dialects on flat maps with solid lines between them and solid colors distinguishing them, as if the language world were parcelled out in such a "flatland" way. As we know, such is hardly the case. Every country is sociolinguistically complex, not only as to historically derived linguistic resources (dialects and languages), but also as to their organization into functional varieties (levels, styles).

The sort of difficulty that may arise simply in determining what relation holds between linguistic affiliation and cultural and social identity is well illustrated in a recent paper by Moermann on a people of Thailand. Moermann shows that ethnic affiliation is impermanent in that individuals, communities, areas, change their identification, and that where the origins of groups are political, as in parts of Africa and in Thailand, one should expect changes to be fairly common. Moreover, it cannot be assumed in advance what institutions and criteria will be essential to ethnic identification, and that where the non-members of a group are likely to use ethnic terms differently, either as to literal meaning, or as to semantic system in which contrasted, or both. In situations of "ethnolinguistic mosaics", interpenetration, or continuous variation, "objective ethnical characteristics", including language, are likely to fail, and one's best strategy is to analyze the folk taxonomy, the labels used by the people themselves, as a guide to the real entities together with the actual boundaries and networks of communication with regard to types of interest.[31/] Moermann quotes from the late S. F. Nadel's account of the Nuba a statement which applies among the Northern Thai (and no doubt elsewhere):

> We shall meet with groups which, though they are close neighbors and possess an almost identical language and culture, do not regard

> themselves as one tribe...; and we shall also meet with tribes which claim this unity regardless of internal cultural differentiation....Cultural and linguistic uniformity, then, does not imply, and cultural and linguistic diversity--at least within certain limits--not preclude, the recognition of tribal unity.[32]

The key terms in linguistics for demarcation of units are "language" and "dialect". Yet, as Einar Haugen has discussed in a very useful article, no simple answer can be given to questions such as "How many dialects are there in this country?" The two terms, to quote Haugen, "represent a simple dichotomy in a situation which is almost infinitely complex."[33] In terms of the utility of a dialect in communication, purely linguistic measures of similarity and difference will not suffice. Whether or not the dialect of one group will be understood and accepted among others is mutually a function of linguistic differences and of attitudes toward them. A linguist working in Nigeria, for example, found that members of one group declared themselves unable to understand the speech of another as soon as they had heard enough to recognize it.[34] In terms of the convention of regarding mutual intelligibility as evidence of belonging to the same language, one would have to regard the two dialects as separate languages; yet obviously the lack of intelligibility is due to social attitude, not linguistic difference. In contrast one may find mutual intelligibility maintained in the face of considerable linguistic difference.[35] Where linguistic similarity is a simple index of mutual intelligibility, it is likely to be in cases of a dialect continuum within which mutual intelligibility is directly proportional to geographical distance, and not directly related to political and standard language boundaries.[35a]

The language which will reach the greatest number can not be chosen always on the basis of its prestige. Sometimes a pidgin without prestige in the eyes of any of its speakers will be the lingua franca of an area. Nor will prestige always accrue where one might expect it, e.g., in urban centers as against hinterlands. In some respects Arabic peoples may regard the language of the nomads superior to that of the city-dwellers.[36] Sometimes so much of actual talk may be in a contact language as to excuse the investigator from dealing with the native language, whatever the respective status of the two in native eyes. On the other hand, lack of prestige may pose a problem for use of a language or dialect in research. The choice may put one in the position of having taken sides. A prime example is the type of situation analyzed by Ferguson under the heading of diglossia. There may coexist a high and a low form, specialized to distinct contexts, with the high form being used in written communication, including that of the government, on formal and public occasions, and in the classical literature that provides a focus for cultural values and identity. The low form will be originally confined to oral use and usually the first learned form. Only some of the population will have learned the high form through special training in schools. The large sector of the population not literate can be reached directly only through the low form, yet attitudes towards the low form may discourage its use (it may not be considered really a language at all) or identify the researcher with the modernizing wing of political life. As a case in point, one investigator in India had great difficulty in having schedules printed in the colloquial forms of Telegu and Tamil appropriate to his purpose. Equating graphic form with high form, the printers attempted to "Sanskritize" the schedules (that is, emend them so as to represent the literary language). (See Ferguson's excellent discussion of the linguistic and sociopolitical characteristics of diglossia situations, and their likely political futures.)[37]

In a diglossia situation those who control the high form also usually control the low, switching back and forth as occasion requires (even in the course of ordering in a restaurant, reading the "high" form from the printed menu, and asking the waitress for the corresponding "low" form). Such code-switching is a commonplace in many societies, quite apart from diglossia proper. Notable work on it has been done by Gumperz, who has compared a North Indian and a Norwegian village community in this regard. Gumperz defines two types of switching, associated with two types of interaction, the transactional and the personal (the two concepts are close to Bernstein's concepts of restricted and elaborated codes in terms of the underlying social relations distinguished, but cross-cut, in that either transactional or personal switching might employ either restricted or elaborated use of a code).

Fundamental to Gumperz' work, and to a sociolinguistic perspective, is his notion of verbal repertoire. Such a notion breaks at once with the one language in one culture outlook, and takes as its starting point actors in a social system of whatever degree of linguistic complexity. Whether multilingual or monolingual, persons have repertoires comprising distinguishable varieties of usage. (The ways in which shifts within verbal repertoires covary with topic, networks of relationship, and other factors of speech situations almost amount to a definition of the field of sociolinguistics for some of its pioneers.)[38] One result obtained by Gumperz is that in Norway differences in code-switching correlate with membership in different types of friendship network, "closed" (friendships restricted to the village) and "open" (having relations with both villagers and city dwellers). Members of "closed" networks carried on discussion among themselves entirely in the local dialect, regardless of topic (switching to standard Norwegian only in the transactional situation of dealing with outsiders), whereas members of "open" networks used a high proportion of standard Norwegian forms among themselves wherever the topic was supralocal, e.g., national politics. This usage might be judged as "putting on airs" by others, as allusion to sophistication by themselves.

One must look behind the labels for codes to the exact nature of the linguistic differences between them. Analogous differences in function may be maintained by quite diverse degrees and kinds of linguistic difference. The diacritic indications of a shift in code may range from alternate shapes for common morphemes (e.g., "going" : "goin'"), and modifications of the frequency of certain consonants and vowels (e.g., in the mutual adaptation of Czech conversation between standard and colloquial, or in the value-laden levels of speech in New York City); through shifts in vocabulary and syntax; to shifts as between whole languages. One of the most pervasive and important kinds of shift is that on the dimensions of what Roger Brown has called "solidarity and power"--between a level typically used between intimates and to subordinates, and a level typically used between those not intimate and to superiors (the subject is of course more complex than this brief summary). Speakers of French choose between pronouns and verb endings ("vous etes", "tu es", etc.); it has been proposed that Paraguayans choose between Guarani and Spanish in the same way. Sometimes the appearance of shift between the whole languages may be misleading; syntax and pronunciation may remain the same, for example, and only vocabulary shift, as in some Indian communities bilingual in Dravidian Kannada and Indo-Aryan Marathi.[39]

The historical circumstances under which a multilingual situation has developed may profoundly condition the uses to which a given code is naturally or even possibly put, as diglossia, for example, shows especially well. In his analysis Ferguson has taken into account the ways in which modernization brings a pressure for national affairs, including politics, to be discussed in the "low" form of language, but such effort may not be fully successful. Social scientists must not be misled by the slogan of modern linguistics that "anything can be said in (translated into) any language." This slogan refers to the potential equality of all languages, as expressions of human nature. As expressions of social and historical experience, languages are not equivalent. One must reckon in research with the actual inequality of languages. Not only is it easier or more difficult to say some things in some languages; within the present resources of a language it may be impossible to say certain things that can be said in another. The officials of developing nations themselves recognize this fact in their planning of language use in education and administration in the light of financial means, dempgraphy, international ties, requirements for skilled personnel, and the like, sometimes opting for training in a language not native to those who will use it as against the long delay of developing a native language to the point at which it can be used in the same function. On political matters, Alexandre (see n. 10a) has observed (what follows is an abstract):

> "European colonization established administrative and political systems in Africa which are today manned by leaders of the new states; the diffusion of native languages capable of expressing these systems has not always followed a parallel development. The result is a situation marked by discontinuity, in fact, if not intention, between the political expression at the top (i.e., leaders who use European languages), and the political expression at the base (i.e., the

> mass of the population who know only African languages, often highly diversified). In fact, the African languages, worked out in a given social structures, do not permit, at least in their current state, expression of political doctrine in European terms. The introduction or transference of political techniques often is made with such speed that there is not time for the conceptual instrument to be "Africanize

As was indicated in the preceding section (I), languages are not neutral instruments, but are subject to evaluation by their users like every other aspect of a culture. Pride in a language, loyalty to it, concern for a given standard in its pronunciation and other facets, all these dimensions of attitude are cross-culturally variable. The choice of a language, or of code level within a language, carries with it inevitably a semantic value, for the speech code will be associated in the minds of respondents with the persons, purposes, and situations for which it is typically used. As the Spanish - Guarani, Norwegian, and diglossia situations show, members of a community may themselves choose among speech codes to express these meanings, thus defining identities, intents, and occasions.

Clearly it is not enough to know in a general way "the language of the country". To plan comparative research wisely, one needs to know the set of languages and dialects; the semantic resources, topical scope, of each; the symbolic meaning of each. One needs to know, in short, how the standard verbal repertoire is organized and utilized.

The ideal handbook for planning comparative research would contain a complete set of national sociolinguistic profiles along these lines. For each country of the world the profile would indicate what languages are in use, their spheres of use, what part of the population uses them. Typical verbal repertoires for each significant sort of social group would also be given. Nothing of the sort exists. For the characterization of nations in terms of major languages and their spheres of use, Charles Ferguson has been developing formulas and standard modes of description.[40] The work so far can give one a good idea of the types of national linguistic situation one may encounter. With regard to use of languages, some new statistical measures for estimating the linguistic diversity and commonalty of a population have been developed.[41] For perspective on multilingual situations, a recent collection of papers is helpful, including an outline typology, and discussions of specific situations.[42] Still a basic work, and especially stimulating, is Weinreich's Languages in Contact.[43] For a survey of linguistic phenomena from a social point of view, the best book-length special treatment remains one in French, that by Marcel Cohen.[44] With regard to types of verbal repertoire, and their modes of use, little is formally known in the literature. Insofar as political science research demands knowledge of such matters, political scientists may find themselves contributing to sociolinguistics, by investigating such phenomena themselves, or by reporting information obtained from others.

USE OF CODES

Let me now turn to the question of how codes are to be used in research. I take it that the question of how to evaluate information obtained in a code is to be answered in terms of one's knowledge of how such information would be evaluated by those who normally participate in the use of the code. The criterion is of course a prophylactic one. The scientist may and should be able to discern a great deal that would escape the layman, but he must first be sure of reading signs that are there, not signs imagined to be there because of ignorance of communicative conventions. Is someone's silence a sign of hostility, inattention, ignorance, or respect? Is the key information in a speech in the words, in the manner of delivery, in the fact that it is given at all, or here, or now, or in all of these? And so on. Cross-cultural examples are badly needed. One need only reflect how one evaluates political performance and response in one's own society, and assume that matters are no less ramified elsewhere. Still, knowing that matters are complex is not the same as knowing how the complexities work. We broach here the more general subject of communication, as a perspective within which to assess the use of language. Whatever one's instrument or approach, one is coming from a background that makes one set of assumptions, implicit as well as explicit, about the patterning of communication into a community that may well make quite another set of assumptions. There arises the problem of what may be called communicative interference--misinterpretation of the import of features of communication, by reading another system in terms of one's own. Obviously the interference can be mutual, investigator and respondent misreading each other. It seems unlikely that all communicative interference can be avoided, but it seems quite possible that its effect can be controlled and allowed for. Control and allowance call for political ethnography as the prerequisite of other modes of research.

I am conscious that my anthropological background may bias my standpoint, but I can see no alternative to this strategy. Whatever else one wants, presumably one wants validity. And validity depends upon one's ability to assess a hierarchy of factors that enter into statements of opinion and attitude that in turn depends upon the underlying communicative patterns of a community. I know no way to obtain the necessary knowledge of communicative patterns (with special reference to political life) other than by the type of intensive investigation of cultural milieux for which ethnography is the technical name.

It is my impression that many social scientists approach cross-cultural research from the other end. Concern with stimulus equivalence and particular instruments takes primacy. The main focus of attention becomes one in which the realities of cultural diversity are not interesting and revealing, but obstacles to be wished away, so that certain canons can be observed, certain instruments used. It is my impression that two factors tend to reinforce such an approach. One is a belief that to be scientific one must follow certain models of measurement and design, coupled with the conviction that one must be scientific in the sense in question; from this tends to follow a strategy in which one's instrument determines one's problem, rather than the reverse. A second factor is the availability of large sums of money for research that can purport to provide "scientific" results as to matters on which policy-makers must decide or be informed. The prospect that American-sponsored opinion research could obtain the true views of much of the world's population at the present time may strike one as ludicrous; but the needs and purses and policy-makers, and the needs and careers of aspiring investigators, have combined to deny the ludicrous before. One can only hope that the dominant trend in American social science will be to place the accuracy and adequacy of what this country knows about the rest of the world ahead of misguided expertise in superficial instruments and specious results.

The nature of the control that the comparative researcher must excercise can be shown in terms of a set of interrelated questions that can be conflated as follows:

Whether (in what degree, on what terms) something is possible (acceptable, appropriate) in the local situation.

Given material originating in a speech code not a local one, the questions ask:

(a) whether it is possible to find equivalents in the local code, that is, to translate at all;

(b) given possible equivalents, in what degree these equivalents are acceptable in local discourse--by local criteria of acceptability, how do the equivalents scale as to oddity, normality, difficulty or ease with which grasped, etc.;

(c) given acceptable equivalents, on what terms are these equivalents judged appropriate or inappropriate to the circumstances of their intended use--here enter factors of context and rules of speaking (a) some material may not be presently translatable into a local speech code without changing the code itself through loanwords, new formations from native morphemes, altered syntactic patterns and distributions; (b) possible translations may be harmfully odd or awkward; (c) acceptable translations may be inappropriate to the circumstances of one's work in ways that color results.

The general assumption to be made is that exact equivalence cannot be obtained, and that validity is to be achieved through control of the factors that affect equivalence.

It is useful to distinguish three levels of equivalence (the levels could of course be subdivided):

(1) message-form;

(2) conceptual content;

(3) communicative context

That is, message as form; message as content; message as act.

(1) Message-Form. Here we are concerned with words and sentence patterns purely as forms that may or may not be equated as between two speech codes.

Some sort of equivalence of message-form obviously is indispensable to the use of any verbal instrument or material comparatively, and an exact and stable equivalence looms large for those for whom stimulus equivalence is a major consideration.

Cross-cultural researches have generally employed the technique of "back translation". The original material is translated into the local code. The translated version is then translated back into the original code. The original and the retranslated versions of the material are compared. This comparison reveals sources of difficulty and inaccuracy.

In its conscious attention to problems of translation, this technique certainly is superior to what Anderson calls "the naive approach" of those who pass over the subject with a reference to having a native speaker translate and a second bilingual perhaps check the first.[45] But back translation must be considered more a detector of difficulties than a solution to them.

There would seem to be four types of response to the difficulties, discrepancies, detected by back translation. One is to abandon the technique, judging some features of one's questionnaire or whatever simply as untranslatable in equivalent scope (Phillips 1959-60).[46]

Now, it is important to emphasize this matter of equivalent scope. The common history of some parts of the world has given rise over time to a high degree of intertranslatability among languages, both with regard to semantic content and with regard to its expression in conventional elements of similar size (words, phrases, sentences). Even in Europe of course serious difficulties may arise (cf. the discussion by Deutscher (cited in n. 1) of "friend": *Freund*: *Bekannte*, *ami*; *connaissance*, *amigo*: "know" vs. *connaitre*: *savoir*, *kennen*: *wissen*). As between European languages and the rest of the world, difficulties are even greater. The many oversimplifications of cognitive differences between speakers of different languages should not lead to obliviousness their real existence. It remains true, however, that very much is ultimately translatable "had we world enough and time". The greatest obstacles arise when one is attempting to attain precision in small compass. Then the absence of a way of rendering plainly the difference between "many" and "too many", "much" and "too much" in Arabic, or of equivalent for "may or may not" as a check-list response in French, may prove painful. (The examples are from Blanc 1956: 208 and Hunt et al. 1964: 66 by way of Deutscher). While it has been argued that comparative data on Poles and Americans would be difficult to obtain in terms of questions about reading, because English has one verb, Polish some twelve (to read habitually, completely, aloud, to a group, the same thing, a meaning into a text, burying oneself, etc.), notice that by enlarging one's scope from one word to a verbal phrase in English, one can utilize the very glosses given above to explain the Polish verbs ("to read habitually ", "...completely", etc.) and also exploit such English expressions as "to finish reading", "to give a reading", "to reread", "to read into", "to pore over", etc. With a paragraph with which to work, and sufficient comparative cultural knowledge, one could hope to specify rather precisely just the matching of senses desired. With no constraints of time and cost, one could hope to enable most Polish and English speaking respondents to understand perhaps most questions that could be phrased in either language, although not all. But constraints of time and cost, and the related constraint of scope--a single question or set of alternative phrases-- may make such validity impractical.

A second response in the use of back translation is to seek to eliminate differences among versions. Let me introduce here two abbreviations, SL for the language from which something is translated (source language), and TL for the language into which something is translated (translation language, or "target-language" in the term used by C. F. Voegelin in articles on translation in the early 1950's in the International Journal of American Linguistics). A given item in an SL may give rise to more than one version in a TL; conversely, retranslation may give rise to multiple SL versions. Schachter 1954 (cited, as are subsequent references without footnote, in n. 46) sought to eliminate differences among back translations (SL versions), for example. The goal presumably is to attain an invariant relationship between SL and TL in message-form, in words and sentence structure.

The difficulty is that invariant equivalence in form is no guarentee whatever of the conceptual relationship. In Nigeria Ashanti are reported regularly to translate a native term in English as "lie", yet the standard situation to which the term applies is one of telling something which is true. What would seem to have happened is that the Ashanti and English speakers use their respective terms for utterances that contain a common feature having to do with social action rather than truth value. In English we do not apply "lie" to all utterances which lack correspondence with truth; consider "an official denial", "putting a good face on things", "whitewash", "polite excuse", and even "little white lies". Plain "lie" seems to imply a statement told to harm or deceive (and notice that "falsehood" and "untruth", referring literally to the relation between statement and fact, lack the force of "lie"). A "lie" is or may be an injury; not only truth value but also social consequences are part of its import. Among the Ashanti one is obligated to inform one's mother's brother of any act or word to his harm, and that positive responsibility is designated with a distinct term; one is obligated not to inform others, especially non-relatives, of whatever is said or done within one's family, and to do so is designated by the term that Ashanti translate in English as "lie". Ashanti interpreters seem to have struck an equivalence between what is the major breach of verbal responsibility in their society and what they take to be the major breach among English speakers--to tell what is so to those who should not be informed in one case, to tell what is not so to those who should be informed in the other. One can imagine the spurious reliability with which Ashanti would agree that it was a most serious thing to "lie" (as well as the odds against finding out about intrapersonal family affairs by direct questioning).

A third response to the versions produced in back translation is to consider them as "alternate forms which approach measurement of the same conceptual realm with somewhat different linguistic irrelevancies" (Anderson, cited n. 45). Back translation would be used actually to generate added versions of the original material:

> "Back translation, when used as an iterative procedure with a new translation for each iteration, will produce a population of items in each language with heterogeneous and random errors. A random sample of items in each language, or use of different versions with randomly selected subsamples of subjects, should provide equivalence save for random error." (Anderson, cited n. 45).

Under some circumstances this procedure might work, e.g., where the alternate versions were regarded by respondents as stylistic choices without referential or social implication. Such circumstances, however, can be known to obtain only when positively investigated, and never can be guarenteed in advance. Thus the proposal takes for granted precisely what is in question, what must be treated as problematic: the semantic and social import of changes in message-form.

A fourth response is to regard the versions produced by back translation as providing evidence of stylistic, semantic, and social factors operative in responses to the original material, and to analyze the evidence so as to control for differences. It is this response which I consider to be the only adequate one. It may be, indeed, that the instrument with which back translation began is itself abandoned (when Phillips ceased translating his questionnaire, he did not cease field work and translation in the generic sense of finding ways of making sense of Thai conceptions in English academese), or radically modified. Mitchell states:

> "Agencies in the field which are aware of this (need for considerable knowledge of local culture and language to attain conceptual equivalence) are becoming increasingly opposed to what some of them refer to as "canned questionnaires sent from the United States." They feel that a client's attempt to preserve the exact form of his questions, especially precoded ones, can only lead to major errors. One agency now insists that clients attach a paragraph of explanation or a rationale to each question submitted. Once the agency discovers the intention behind a question--that is, the kind of answer which is desired and how the question will be used--it formulates its own version. (Mitchell 1965: 677-8 (cited in n. 46), as quoted in Deutscher).

Thus, there would seem to be widespread realization that back-translation, insofar as it achieves equivalence, must aim beyond equivalence of message-form to conceptual equivalence, and that conceptual equivalence entails both ethnographic knowledge of the local milieu and a willingness to abandon or to constantly control for the effects of fixed message-form. Such is the import of the discussion by Blanc of interviewing in Israel, by Hudson of his interviewing in the Arab Middle East, of Schachter in his "random probe" technique (all cited in n. 46), and the general conclusion reached in his review by Deutscher.

Once one reaches this conclusion, the possibility of a variety of techniques for probing equivalence becomes more salient. Back translation tends to focus attention on the most superficial aspect of the work, the equivalence of overt form. When one seeks to understand underlying conceptual structures and behavioral rules, techniques which deliberately seek to violate expectations in order to disclose their boundaries and character, for example, become possible. The total behavior of respondents becomes, not mostly a distraction, but a source of potential insight into the semantic and social dimensions of the activity in which respondents and onself are mutually engaged in constructing and maintaining. (On this score I have in mind the sociological work of Erving Goffman, Harold Garfinkel and Aaron Cicourel).[47]

(2) Conceptual equivalence. Much of the problem of conceptual equivalence has emerged in the discussion of equivalence of message-form, and much is too technical for elaboration here. Certain points should be made, however, as to the implications of some current work.

First of all, it should be clear that bilinguals as such offer no magic solution. Our discussion of Ashanti "lie" has indicated as much. Some have thought to hav bilinguals respond to both language versions (SL, TL) as an indication of equivalence. This approach may work, and it is a useful source of evidence. The fact, however, is that bilingualism is not a unitary phenomenon. There are different types of relationship among the semantic systems of bilinguals, such that sometimes the two semantic systems are kept independent, and sometimes merged. The degree of merging can vary. Also, the two languages are often not affectively neutral, but evaluated in ways that affect perception of and response to materials and persons associated with each.[48] Bilinguals must be used (preferably beginning with the investigator himself), but it must be possible to assess and control for the type of bilingualism and for its adequacy.

An instrument that is widely employed is the semantic differential. In its original use by Osgood and his associates the semantic differential taps conotational, rather than referential, meaning, and is intended primarily to reach universal dimensions, rather than to reveal cultural peculiarities. Useful understanding of cultural peculiarities may still emerge (cf. Ervin-Tripp on Navaho reconnotative judgments in n. 26). Osgood has had success in getting varied respondents to make the forced choices of often arbitrary nature that the method requires. While the factor-analytic technique originally has been questioned, it seems entirely likely that useful indications of the movement of opinion along broad lines can be obtained. Osgood once reported, for example, that during the Soviet-American alliance of World War II responses placed the Soviet Union as more positive on all good counts, including being perceived as more Christian.

The original device consists of seven-interval scales and a set of words ("concepts"). Each scale is intended as a polar contrast: good-bad, strong-weak, active-passive, sweet-sour, sharp-dull, clean-dirty, etc. Respondents are asked to rate each concept on each scale, the concepts ranging across anything of interest: kinsmen, political figures, self, abstract concepts. The results are factor-analyzed. Major factors found have been evaluative (good-bad and those scales that cluster with it), activity (active-passive, and those scales that cluster with it). Sometimes the second and third scales seem to coalesce as a dynamic factor. Not all the same scales fall together in all cultures, and the placement on scales of course may vary. Clean-dirty is highly evaluative in our culture, but a Navaho may rate a grandmother as relatively dirty in a dispassionate descriptive sense). It can be seen that the semantic differential only indirectly discloses much of the actual cognitive structures of political life in a society, but that its limitation to connotative evaluations of a rather universal sort enables it to escape many of the difficulties confronting semantic understanding of detailed cognitive structure.[49]

The discussion of Whorfian and other topics in part I of this paper has suggested some of the pitfalls that may beset translation. There has developed in recent years an important ethnographic literature on methods for determining semantic categories, their dimensions, and relationships. Anyone concerned to control the terminology of a sector of political behavior, would do well to consult this literature. As an introduction to the perspective underlying it, three articles may be especially recommended: Goodenough (1957), Frake (1962), and Sturtevant (1964). More technical indications of what is done can be found in articles by Conklin (1962, 1964) and Frake (1961), and in contributions to a volume on formal semantic analysis edited by Hammel, of which the essays by Pospisil, D'Andrade, and Wallace may be most pertinent to our present concerns.[50] Of special interest for study of political behavior may be a methodological article by Black and Metzger on "Ethnographic description and the study of law" (cited in n. 8).

The fundamental principle of such semantic work is paradigmatic contrast within locally valid frames. It is in this respect that such semantics goes consciously beyond back translation. Back translation asks for utterances in some way paraphrases, or quasi-paraphrases, of the original material. The responses are likely to illuminate problems of hononymy, synonymy, superordinate vs. subordinate terms, and personal and social connotation, that is, problems centering around the original utterance as a sort of magnetic nucleus. Full semantic control requires obtaining also the set of terms or utterances that are linked with the original in the given frame of reference, not because of positive association, but because of negative contrast. One needs to know not only that respondents might in the circumstances consider "pale", "clear", "light" as possible alternatives for something originally intended as "white", but also that in the given frame whatever is "white", etc., is precisely not "black" (cloudy, dark, etc.). In assessing responses the investigator has inevitably in mind a set of alternatives from among which a given response is implicitly or explicitly chosen. Research to that end employs the concept of what I have referred to as paradigmatic contrast, and is well illustrated in the work cited in the preceding paragraph. One seeks to determine the set of contrasting responses that can occur within a given frame, the dimensions on which the responses contrast, and the principle or implicit question that defines the frame. In the course of such research one discovers other aspects of the semantic organization of native terms also.

One can readily see that stable equivalence of message-form may be quite misleading if the underlying set of possible contrasts, and their dimensions of contrast, are different as between the two languages. Exact matching between paradigmatic sets cannot be expected very often, but knowledge of their nature enables one to control evaluation of responses made in terms of them. Often enough divergencies can be allowed for within the material itself, if qualifying phrases "but not...", "just the...", etc., can be added.

Conceptual equivalence is not a matter of semantics in the ordinary linguistic sense alone; that is, it is not a matter only of reference to objects, ideas, persons, etc., but also of indication of attitude, intent, expected consequences, and the like. All this appears simply from consideration of what might be taken to be the simplest responses, "yes" and "no". The linguist and anthropologist Stanley Newman once gave orally a paper on the multiplicity of ways of uttering "yes" in English. These ways are tacitly known and utilized by members of the community, and hence must be explicitly known and controlled, or allowed for, by the investigator. (It can be observed in passing that the problems of comparative research apply within our own society, where the usual speech code of investigators cannot be taken as identical with that of their respondents, and where the communicative interference may be all the more damaging because overlooked).

Edmund Glenn states (citing the Arab linguist E. Shouby as his source) that Arabs tend to interpret simple English "no" as "yes", and simple English "yes" as a polite "no".[51] A genuine "no" would have to be emphasized (and, by implication, so would a genuine "yes"). We have then a little paradigm of the interdependence of conceptual content and full message-form. Since an affirmative or negative response can itself be a sentence, let me illustrate the paradigm by labelling the words that occur as "Sentence-form", and the additional features of message-form that determine manner in which said as "Key". We have, then,

SENTENCE FORM

		"yes"	"no"
KEY	Polite	no	yes
	Emphatic	yes	no

Recall here the Egyptian Arabic village cited as an example in part I of this paper. It is indeed a general principle that when the sentence form of a message is contradicted by its expressive form, it is the expressive form that is overriding in determining the true import. (I am using "expressive form" here as a shorthand label for whatever features of style, voice, gesture and the like that may be integrated into the marking of key as polite, emphatic, mocking, brusque, and the like).

Within every speech code it is possible to indicate degrees of deference and demeanor, of intimacy and distance, of respect and authority. In some cases such as the Japanese and Javanese, the very choice of sentence form must take into account the appropriate marking of such things in different personal relationships. Cases in which the marking intrudes into the overt grammatical form of what we normally write down must not blind us to the presence of the same functions in features that we do not normally write or attend to as linguistic.

The great linguist Ferdinand de Saussure stressed early in this century that a comparative standpoint in linguistics must comprehend both lexicon and grammar, since what was expressed by grammatical means in one language would be found expressed by lexical means in another. The principle must be generalized to communication as a whole. From a comparative standpoint, the conceptual import of an utterance, what one is taken as having said, always will depend on sentence-form taken together with other signals; and just where particular imports are conveyed may vary from one group to another. The English sociologist Basil Bernstein has stressed the differences in this respect within the same society, depending on class, family and situation. We know too little systematically and comparatively, but techniques for study of vocal signals, body idiom the handling of spatial relationship, have been developed.[53]

These considerations bring me to the fact that an utterance is a matter not only of form and conceptual content, but of social action as well. In an interview as in ordinary conversation, one operates in terms of a system of communicative acts as well as in terms of systems of communicative forms and contents. To this I now turn.

(3) Communicative context. Groups differ in their patterning of communication and in their use of verbal means within such patterning. So much is a truism. Anthropologists and linguists, unfortunately, have far to little to offer by way of basic knowledge as to such patterning. Their insights have tended to remain scattered and even unpublished. Even linguists directly engaged in communicative change, those of the Summer Institute of Linguistics whose goal is to introduce the Bible into more than 2000 diverse speech communities, fail to take systematic account of the communicative matrices in which they work. Present formal models of communication are of little help as well, since they impose limited, a priori designs, concealing just what is diverse and problematic cross-culturally, and offerring no heuristic to the discovery of systems of communication that actually obtain. To illustrate: the formal models known to me all are satisfied to posit two participants, a speaker and a hearer (source and destination, etc.). The merest acquaintance with ethnographic fact shows the importance and diversity of ways in which three parties determine communicative rules: various patterns of addressor, addressee, and auditor; addressor, addressee and spokesman; addressor, addressee and interpreter; and the like.

As a heuristic device for discovering ethnographically the local rules of communication the following set of factors, keyed mnemonically to the word "speaking", may be useful.[54] (The approach is developed in somewhat more detail in other papers).

S: Setting, Situation, Scene. Both temporal and spatial setting may be determinative; psychological setting, or scene, must be considered as well.

P: Participants, Persons. From one to many. A particular rule may specify the presence of just one person of a certain type, of two, of three, etc.

E: Ends. Two senses of "end" are coupled here: end in view (intent, purpose), and end as outcome. Communicative acts are often to be distinguished in terms of the purpose and/or expected outcome. Of course one distinguishes conventional purposes, actual motives, latent and manifest functional outcomes, etc.

A: Act Sequence. Two aspects of communicative acts are coupled here: the form, as the overt signals that occur (or are to occur), and the content the signals manifest. Two field activities that roughly correspond are transcription (form) and translation (content). The distinction answers to the notion of "saying the same thing (content) in different ways (forms)"; conversely, the Song of Songs read with and without reference to Christ's church. With regard to status as an act, "Is that (form) a threat (act) or a promise (act)?"

K: Key. The manner in which done: seriously or in jest; perfunctorily or with commitment; with eloquence or awkwardness; impetuously or with hesitation; willingly or reluctantly. While this factor is closely linked to purpose, being commonly taken as evidence of intent, there are conventional ways of displaying manner, so that manner and intent can differ, as in the relation between acting and naive expression, or Michael Flanders' line, "Always be sincere, my boy, whether you mean it or not".

I: Instrumentalities. Here are coupled two main aspects of communicative means: channels (auditory, visual) and codes.

N: Norms of interaction and of interpretation. By norms of interaction are meant such things as a requirement that participants not interrupt each other (vs. communicative norms by which interruption is permissible), that speaking time be allotted approximately equally (vs. norms that some have no claim on speaking time), that none present should leave before a certain point (as in church services), that speech not part of the scheduled focus of an event can occur if whispered (as often in our society, vs. Maori pracetice, where no attention to scheduled speechmaking need be paid at all); that the asker of a question has a right to speak again; etc. By norms of interpretation are meant shared understandings not otherwise expressly provided for, things under the heading of "what everybody knows"; the use of background information, "common sense", the rationality of everyday life. Obviously this category comprises things referrable to others singled out here, and beyond that is something of a promissory wastebasket. The work in progress of the sociologists Harold Garfinkel, Harvey Sacks, Emmanuel Schegloff, and others, however, is rapidly giving it content, and developing it as a perspective on the whole.

G: Genres. Here are intended the varieties of communicative event and act: oratory, poetry, conversation, announcing; interviewing; a joke, a request, insult, promise, threat; etc. Communicative behavior is entirely accountable for in terms of a series of communicative acts. Acts are independent of events, in that the same type of act may be imbedded in different types of larger-scale act or event, e.g., a joke may occur in a conversation, a poem, a speech, a sermon.

While no heuristic scheme can provide in detail for a local situation, experience with ethnographic materials has shown the scheme just given to provide for all types of factors noted so far. It is not that every local rule will depend on all the factors, but rather that one needs a comprehensive scheme so as not to overlook factors which may be relevant. (One needs also of course the understanding that there is a system of rules to be discovered. In my experienc some cross-cultural investigators (missionaries and anthropologists) remain ethnocentric when it comes to communicative patterns, failing to grasp rules that their own anecdotes show to have been staring them in the face. To cite two examples that have come to my attention this past month: that in some New Guinea groups it is not accident or "gossip" when, getting nowhere directly in one's problems with a local leader, one finds discussion with the leader's associates to clear the way for understanding, but going through the local proper channels; or that in an Indian university it is not an affront when a head official sends an intermediary to discuss directly behavior that has upset him, but a kindness, since to come himself would mean dismissal).

Most local rules will be specified in terms of a few factors. Sometimes just two components will be involved, as when politics is disucssed in a particular code (content/code), sometimes three, as when politics is discussed in one code in an office or other public place, and in another code at home (content/ scene/code), or in a different code as between officials and friends (content/participant/code), or only by certain persons (content/participant/ code). More complex relationships of course may obtain, as when in a certain setting before certain persons only certain other persons can discuss politics, and that in a specific code to a particular purpose.

While the general wisdom and knowledge of social science in the study of interpersonal behavior is relevant here, a useful rule-of-thumb for communicative rules is a formula analogous to that in terms of which this section is organized: form/content/context (corresponding somewhat to the semiotic formula of Charles Morris, syntactics, semantics, pragmatics). A feature of concern, such as a code, a topic, a type of statement, a setting, is to be considered a form, contrasting with others of a set of such forms (other codes, other topics, other types of statement, other settings, etc.). Some sort of meaning or import will be attached to the choice of one rather another of the set, just in virtue of contrast within the set, some standard or conventional contrast being implied. Further import will be attached to the choice of a given form, and its associated meaning, in the light of the context in which the choice occurs, and special "marked" meanings can be conveyed by manipulating the relationship between form-meaning composites and contexts. Thus in many communities, if not all, there is a choice among a set of styles of modes of address and speech (forms), each considered proper, observing usual social norms (meanings) in contexts defined by one or more other factors of speaking (participants, setting, topic, etc.) (contexts). When these modes are arranged in a hierarchy as to respect, one can mark flattery, compliment, derogation, and insult by manipulating the relationship between the styles and their usual meanings, on the one hand, and contexts on the other. Humor, mockery, etc., of course may also be thus expressed, and it will vary with other factors, and the community as a whole, as to whether manipulation of such relationships is taken as directed at an auditor (say, an interviewer), and when simply expressive of the speaker, when a comment on the topic, etc.

From a linguistic standpoint one is speaking here of context-sensitive rules, rules which specify the character of an element in dependence on contexts in the form $x \rightarrow y/z$ (e.g., Code is to be taken as Bahasa Indonesian in the district administrator's office), or, where alternates are concerned,

Code [Indonesian] [District administrator's office]
[Minangkabau] [District administrator's home].

Or, one can be thought of as describing a "communicative lexicon", specifying the features of form, of meaning, and of contextual selection of communicative elements just as a dictionary specifies the shapes, meanings, and contextual restrictions of words (e.g., love : /ləv/, "zero score" (tennis)).

The concern of the comparative student of political life will be with the rules that most directly affect discussion of politics and the asking of questions about it. Given that one's behavior will be assessed in terms of the local system of communicative acts, one will be particularly concerned with rules governing what may be generically called interrogative behavior. The sort of scheme and rules just discussed points toward discovery of just who can ask whom, in what way, by what means, when and where, about political attitudes and activities, and with what intents and what likely effects. The general set of questions posed earlier in this section applies: what is possible? what acceptable? what appropriate?

The local system may be such that certain communicative acts and genres are excluded from the outset. Various scholars have pointed out that the questionnaire and the formal interview are far from universal, and as types of acts may either be unintelligible or interpreted in ways injurious to results. High proportions of no answers, don't knows, and undifferentiated responses, and of self-contradicting results, may reflect deficiencies in message-form and conceptual equivalence, but also, very likely, reflect problems of the nature of acts by which information was obtained. One must know how members of the community obtain information from each other--obtaining information from others is surely universal--and be guided accordingly.

An anthropologist working in Chiapas, Mexico, found the Mayan residents to respond to direct questioning with a simple "nothing". Clearly it is not that they are unable to obtain information from one another. The likely explanation is that direct questions, as a form of statement, carry the meaning of rudeness. (It is common enough in American Indian, as in other languages, to have two forms of request or command, one polite (say, a future) and one not (say, an imperative). Similar distinctions extend to ways of mentioning topics in many communities (in Bihar, India, a wife is expected to complain in general terms about the food her husband's family provides, but to mention a particular food is an insult to them), and generally to ways of conducting communication.

Often enough the interpretation of an investigator's acts in terms of the local system will not be so helpfully revealing of failure as "nothing". An answer will be given. While one scholar finds justification for doubting that research methods elaborated in the West are suitable at all for South-East Asia, another believes that the standard techniques of the West are applicable, if one overcomes the distorting effects of the pervasive courtesy bias by not asking questions for which there is any obviously pleasing answer. Having entered into the interview situation, a respondent from these societies feels obligated not to distress the interviewer; moreover, an interviewer from the same society is under the same obligation with respect to the respondent. Obviously results of such research cannot be taken at face value, but once the local norm is understood, materials can be designed and can be interpreted so as to allow and account for the effects of the norm.

A complementary bias often likely to result from the use of interviewers from the same society as the respondents is that the interviewers will be just those newly educated, upwardly mobile young persons most concerned to show their distance from those they interview.

Among the many ways in which local rules can affect investigation of political life, I shall single out only one more specific to interviewing, that of what may be called communicative routines. Just as there are rules for sentences, so also there are rules for longer stretches of discourse, either by one person or between persons--rules for interchanges of welcome and farewell, narration, prayer, speech-making, petitioning, and the like. Extended information-seeking thus involves not only rules governing a single act, but patterns extending over a string of such acts. Sometimes there may be a local pattern that might be put to advantage; Tibetan nomads, for example, have a well worked out system of question and answer for obtaining information about the location of other groups. There may be a strong feeling about the observance of norms for extended discourse: among the Ngoni of Africa someone who violates the norms for reporting experiences may be told to go back and begin again. Certain underlying assumptions may rules out types of sequential behavior employed in our own society, as when the Araucanians of Chile value accuracy of speech and memory in such a way that to ask a person to repeat orally is to imply inaccuracy and thus insult him. Among the Toba of Argentina an initial direct answer indicates that the potential respondent is busy and has no time for questions; if he has time, he will not give a direct answer right off. (Expectations as to the structure and direction of verbal sequences may of course conflict within our own society, as in the study by Strauss and Schatzmann mentioned earlier).

Considering the importance of sequential organization of discourse, it is striking that there are almost no descriptions of it. One suggestive account has been given by Frake as to "how to ask for a drink in Subanun"; a pioneering essay that permits one to see a set of such routines in the context of cultural values is that by Albert on the Burundi. Sociologists such as Sacks, Schegloff, and others are analyzing conversational routines and their assumptions in our own society. Cross-culturally, however, an anthropologist or linguist has typically referred to the importance of a sequentially structured activity, such as gossip, in such a way as to make it clear that there are rules as to how one does it in the society in question, to leave us none the wiser as to what the rules are. It seems likely that knowledge of local patterns for reporting experience will help researchers seek information in locally meaningful sequences, and help interpret responses to other instruments. (A "no response", for example, may reflect a local sense of non sequitur). Knowledge of such local patterns may guide research strategy, by indicating what sorts of information might be expected to emerge spontaneously from unguided discourse, and what types of information, being omitted from normal discourse style, would have to be sought in other ways.

There always remains the possibility, of course, that certain topics--perhaps politics--are neither spontaneously elaborated nor acceptably questioned about in direct form. This fact brings us to a brief consideration of the notion of communicative type.

So far our discussion of communicative context has dealt mostly with particular rules and patterns, especially such as would affect the planning and managing of an interview or other immediate situation for obtaining information. I believe it likely that communities can be characterized at a more general level as to patterning of communication, so that eventually a comparative typology will be possible. Such a typology would include two features of special importance to political research focussed on verbal means and verbal data: the place of verbal communication about political life in the community, and the general relation of verbal communication to the rest of behavior.

With regard to the place of verbal communication about political life:

(a) it has been proposed that verbal investigation of political opinion is in fact inappropriate as an act to most of the populations of many countries. In Southeast Asia the formation and expression of opinion is found to be restricted to relatively small portions of the population (Wuelker, 1963, cited in n. 46). It would seem that armed struggle, hunger strikes, refusal of taxes, etc., are expressions of opinion, but of course what is meant is verbal response of a certain type. In my view, opinion is universal. What varies should be stated as who has the right (or obligation) to express opinion, to whom, under what circumstances, etc., e.g., the rules of political communication. Not long ago in our own society women did not have legitimate public political opinions, and national polls today do not usually consult school children, although the children sometimes poll themselves. What is at stake presumably is the nature of the opinion present in different sectors of the society, in relation to the communicative structure of the society: how informed (detailed) is the opinion, and what are the outcomes, consequences, of the persons in question having opinions?

In the mutual management of the situation between investigator and respondent, the respondent may well have good reason to calculate the consequences of disclosing opinion, or even of having opinion (cf. Negroes in the American south in the presence of local whites). The matter is also sensitive when an answer implies a commitment, not just of the respondent, but also of some larger group for which or to which one is responsible.

Insofar as comparative political research is concerned with opinion, then, it is mandatory to analyze the communicative structure of the society in question with respect to the handling of opinion before proceeding to the design and use of materials.

To cite briefly the Maori as an illustration: white officials sometimes call public meetings of Maori to consider matters affecting them; often the Maori express no opinion at the meeting, the officials conclude that the Maori lack interest in the matter, and proceed to decide it themselves. The Maori then react with annoyance at not having been consulted.

In point of fact expression of opinion among the Maori is governed by a variety of rules, consistent and understandable in themselves, but different from offical expectations in ways that produce communicative interference. For the Maori expression of opinion is governed by a concern to avoid hasty decision, a concern for consensus among those affected by a matter, and a respect for elders and the self-respect of others generally. Thus, arrangements for a marraige must be discussed at great length just to show proper respect for the couple. Someone who comes to a quick judgment on a matter is suspected. Matters that affect a group as a whole are intensely discussed at length, but while still under discussion probably would not be talked about with outsiders; certainly individuals would not feel free to express individual opinions that might seem to represent the group as a whole. Once consensus has been reached, an elder person would normally voice it, just as a man does not normally express an opinion in the presence of an elder brother. Notice also that one does not indicate disapproval of a proferred idea in so many words, but by failing to talk about the idea at all.

Thus at a public gathering one will not find free and general discussion of opinion before others. There may very well be no discussion at all, possibly indicating disapproval, and often indicating, not lack of interest, but as yet lack of consensus. Only if a public meeting happened to occur after the lengthly, independent processes of the Maori community had themselves resulted in consensus would it (the meeting) evoke the expression of opinion expected by officials. Commonly Maori come to such meetings, are silent, resume afterwards their own discussions at length, and are frustrated when there is no way for the eventual result to reach the officials. An interviewer or survey-taker among the Maori would presumably find himself in much the same relation to them as the white official.

(b) the relation of verbal statement to beliefs and action varies as between cultures. Running through our discussion has of course been the implicit question of what it means to say something to an outsider. Among the Navaho it is a cardinal sin to lie to a fellow Navaho, and practically an obligation to deceive a Zuni. Among the Lue of Thailand deceptive eloquence is an admired accomplishment and has no simple relationship to what we consider lying. Beyond this are more general valuations of the use of language. Among the Wishram Chinook (an American Indian group), statements about the future were not willingly made in unqualified form unless the matter referred to were assured of happening. There was a general orientation toward the use of language as something not casually done, toward formal discourse as requiring certainty and as enacting, confirming that which it stated. Such general reticence in the use of speech is characteristic of a number of societies, contrasting with a loquacity in others that suggests that most speech is considered cheap.

A test for matters crucial to political research would be to discover if verbal acts can be withdrawn, and if so, which, how, and to what extent. Are responses to an interviewer under the heading of verbal acts that imply commitment in local terms, or acts that can be disowned, perhaps as soon as uttered?

A concept of importance of that of performative utterances. Some verbal statements themselves do what they say, e.g., to say "I promise" can be to do the act of promising itself. Communities and contexts differ as to the performative status of particular statements, and as to the general pervasiveness of performative status.

We have only the bare beginnings of a comparative typology of societies as to the organization and valuation of speech. A pioneering anthropological treatment is Margaret Mead's account of three Pacific Island groups. Two of the groups represent a cross-cultural extension of the Bernstein contrast between personal and positional social control mentioned in section I, in that in the one public opinion is a matter of gatherings in which reasoning and merit of argument tend to prevail in open discussion; in the other the fate of an opinion is determined by the social status of the holder. The Keesings have treated elite communication in Samoa, and Barth has analyzed maintenance and loss of authority associated with contrasting communicative patterns among the Pashto and Baluchi.[55/] The work of Edward Hall (cited in n. 43) is especially valuable in calling attention to nonverbal dimensions of cross-cultural communication. A variety of cultural factors that can play a part in communicative modes are surveyed by Doob from the standpoint of persuasion, but systems are not analyzed.[56]

It seems likely that there are areal patterns in communicative type (cf. the Southeast Asia courtesy bias mentioned above). Alan Lomax has discerned areal patterns in musical communication that are suggestive for communication generally. An areal classification on a world scale would certainly be desirable, but requires much more sociolinguistic, folkloristic and communicative ethnography than as yet exists.

III. CONCLUSION

My task has been to consider what linguistics can offer to the political scientist, as a basis for assessing the role of language in political life, and as a basis for the conduct of research. It would be pleasant to be able to say that one could expect to obtain the services of linguists specialized in the problems we have considered. Given an initial sophistication with regard to linguistic problems, the political scientist could turn the technical applications over to an expert. Our discussion has indicated that this ideal situation is far from being the case. The linguistic aspects of comparative political research entail the application of a basic science that does not yet exist, one that is only slowly coming into being under the rubrics of sociolinguistics, ethnography of communication, and the like.

Partly this situation is the fault of the linguist. There continue to be many linguists who would not regard the problems discussed in this paper as part of linguistics at all. For them, the science of linguistics is not the science of language, but of some formal partial model of language as an essence virginally detached from existence. Indeed, linguistics has always tended to be a somewhat separate, "alienated" discipline. It began in the history of Western civilization with the study of forms of language put forward as the norms of an elite, justifying ideologically a political rule. In modern terms it has striven for independence in terms of assumptions which single out a normatively ideal form for study, abstracted from context and use, and the attractiveness of the patterning of linguistic form has helped justify attention to structure at the expense of function. This state of affairs is beginning to change, as increasing attention is being paid to function. One wonders if the corresponding attention to verbal detail and language will come to be paid by the political scientist, and the social scientist generally, in ways informed by modern linguistic knowledge. The social scientist has typically not had the linguistic skills to deal with verbal data in technically adequate ways, and has tended to regard language as something linguists describe in grammars, or as an immaterial medium of more serious matters, such as politics, economics, religion, or as all three at once. Just as the linguist has tended to concentrate on content, abstracted from use and form. Thus the patterning intrinsic to speaking, to the use of language--the materials of a comparative rhetoric, logic, poetics, sociolinguistics, and, incidentally, of a basis for an applied comparative political science--a general theory of the role of language in society based on adequate empirical studies--all this has gone neglected. The social scientist has been intent upon seeing through language to other things, the linguist upon stopping at grammar's edge.[58]

Yet it remains the case, in political life as in other aspects of life, that:

> "The language we use to enquire into and negotiate our actions, is no secondary factor, but a practical and radical element in itself.
>
> [illegible]
>
> [illegible]

> To take a meaning from experience, and to try to make it active, is in fact our process of growth. Some of these meanings we receive and recreate. Others we must make for ourselves, and try to communicate."[59/]

Given that one cannot speak glibly of the one language of a society, but must specify the particular speech codes in use among a group of people, and the relation of these linguistic means to other communicative means, it remains that once such specification has been made, it becomes possible to trace ways in which the means available shape thought and action. One may even try to explicate the insights of those who have commented on the quality of the language of political life--Orwell in "Politics and the English language"; various writers on the consequences for German of Nazism; the linguistic crisis of confidence in the time of Thucydides, discussed as *paracharaxein* (defacement of the coinage) by Gilbert Murray; what one reviewer has dubbed the political philology of Sukarno's Indonesia; and to evaluate the adequacy and honesty of language from the standpoint of what the historian of the functional view of language, Verburg, has seen as language's chief function, delosis (clarity).[60/] Such tasks are beyond the linguist as pure linguist and yet as well beyond the social scientist who has no linguistic control of the society he studies. Perhaps the interest of political scientists in language as a means for comparative research will lead them to an interest in language as ameans of political life, and "political philology", or whatever one wishes to call it, will take a vital place in the new understanding of the role of language in human experience now promising to emerge.

Even if the interest of the political scientist remains limited to linguistics as a means, let me hope that this will result in an effective interest in the linking of linguistic training and social science training, for only through such linking can the necessary personnel and basic resources be produced.

For the foreseeable future it seems all too likely that there will come a point in most pieces of comparative research at which some of the practical linguistics required must be supplied by political scientists themselves. Control of the meanings in the data in hand, the concrete particulars of the communicative situation one is in, will require personal sophistication in linguistics and linguistic (communicative) ethnography. In many cases perhaps one can obtain the advice of persons with experience in the area. Since it will not have been the purpose of such persons to accumulate just the information one needs, one must expect to have to grapple with the adjustment of investigative means and ends onself.

As a concept for the linguistic portion of this process, Robert Holt has suggested the notion of a linguistic pre-test. A linguistic pre-test would undertake to assess the local situation as to choice of speech code--the repertoire of local codes, their scope, and symbolic connotations; and patterns of the use of the codes and of communication generally--who can communicate what to whom, in what way, etc., and to what extent, and with what degree of acceptability and appropriateness. A number of suggestions that might find a place in such a pre-test have been made in the course of this paper, and there are others in the literature on translation and cross-cultural research. No general model for such a pre-test now exists, and it is important to keep in mind that the work the political scientist may need to do for his practical ends, may contribute to the building of basic theory at the same time.

As ideal guidelines, summarizing the viewpoint of the present paper, I would stress the following:

(1) general knowledge of the cultural setting and local speech codes;

(2) open-ended exploration of the local communicative behavior, expecially with regard to the kinds of materials and events by means of which one expects to obtain information (note here the critical anlaysis of survey research by Cicourel, cited in n. 47);

(3) a view of discrepancies, difficulties, variations, spontaneous comments, and the like as evidence for the local system that governs respondents' statements and other conduct, and their assessment of one's own;

(4) emphasis on validity rather than on stimulus-equivalence or reliability, such that one does not expect to find exact equivalence in codes, message-forms, contents, and acts as between the local community and that which is the source of one's inquiry, but does expect to be able to calibrate the two interacting systems so as to control and allow for lack of equivalence;

(5) controlled covariation as the principle strategy for discovering local rules and their effects on validity of responses (what difference does it make if code X is used rather than code Y, and what underlies the difference? if word X, rather than word Y? if intonation X, rather than intonation Y? if routine X, rather than routine Y? if setting X, rather than setting Y? etc.).

Let me close by observing that if sophistication in linguistics and ethnography can help the political scientist to do a better job, the job he does may contribute in turn to a general social science of language. Work done for practical ends can contribute to the building of basic theory at the same time and to the closing of the gap between linguistics and social science that makes difficult a true understanding of language itself.

FOOTNOTES (containing references)

1 I should like to thank Robert Holt for inviting me to participate in his seminary at the University of Minnesota, and those who took part in the seminar for their comments, especially James Jenkins and Pertti Pelto. In revising this paper I have had the benefit of a draft of a long, thoughtful report by Irwin Deutscher on his inquiry into the relevance of language and linguistics for sociology. The title shows its relevance here: "Notes on language and human conduct. Some problems of comparability in cross-cultural and interpersonal contexts" (Part I treats "Asking questions cross-culturally", Part II develops the thesis that the same problems obtain in research within our own society). [1968, In Howard S. Becker, David Reisman, Robert S. Weiss and Blanche Geer (eds.), Institutions and the Person: Essays presented to Everett C. Hughes. Chicago: Aldine.) I am happy that our perspectives are quite similar, and am grateful to Deutscher for references to the sociological literature otherwise unknown to me. In the preface to his report Deutscher writes: "From my perusal of relevant research and polemics, I can only assume that political scientists are all but oblivious to the role of language in behavior--both from a methodological and a substantive perspective...". The statement encourages me to think that the present paper useful, while the present volume yet shows the statement to be already in need of qualification. In this effort to present for students of political science a line of thinking that has originated in a quite different enterprise, Professor Holt has been especially stimulating, and any success is partly due to him.

2 F. M. Bernard, *Herder's social and political thought, from enlightenment*

to nationalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 117, 118, 142.

3 For survey of the development, see especially Harry Hoijer (ed.), *Language in Culture* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954); Joshua Fishman, "A systematization of the Whorfian hypothesis," *Behavioral Science* 5: 232-239 (1960); and references in Dell Hymes (ed.), *Language in Culture and Society* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 150-153. (*This collection is cited hereafter as LCS*).

4 G. Matore, *Le vocabulaire et la société sous Louis-Philippe* (Geneva-Lille: Droz, 1951); *La Méthode en Lexicologie* (Paris, 1953).

5 Raymond Williams, *Culture and society*, 1780-1950 (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1960), p. xi.

6 Ward H. Goodenough, "Property and language on Truk: some methodological considerations," in LCS 185-188.

7 Roger Brown, *Words and things* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), Ch. 8, considers "concrete" : "abstract" in terms of subordination - superordination, and I have adopted the basic point from him. Brown's discussion of "Linguistic relativity and determinism," ch. 7, remains probably the best cautious introduction to the subject.

8 For studies exploring the methodology and content of such relationships, see A. Kimball Romney and Roy G. D'Andrade (eds.), *Transcultural studies in cognition* (Special publication, *American Anthropologist*, 66 (3), Part II, June 1964); Eugene A. Hammel (ed.), *Formal Semantic Analysis* (Special publication, *American Anthropologist*, 67 (5), Part II, October 1965); and Mary Black and Duane Metzger, "Ethnographic description and the study of law," in Laura Nader (ed.), *The ethnography of law* (Special publication

American Anthropologist 67 (6), Part 2, December 1965), pp. 141-165.

9 E.g., a point made by George Orwell in his well known essay, "Politics and the English language," first published in the late English journal Horizon, and cited here from Denys Val Baker (ed.), New English Writing (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947), pp. 189-205.

10 See Uriel Weinreich, "On the semantic structure of language," In Joseph Greenberg (ed.), Universals of language (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1963).

10a Pierre Alexandre, "Sur les possibilities expressives des langues africaines en matiere de terminologie politique," Afrique et Asie 56 (4): 23-29 (1967).

11 Elman R. Service, "Kinship terminology and evolution," American Anthropologist 62: 747-763.

12 Max Gluckman, "The technical vocabulary of Barotse jurisprudence," American Anthropologist 61: 743-759.

13 See Brown, Words and Things, pp. 255-256.

14 Ward H. Goodenough, Review of Felix and Marie M. Keesing, Elite communication in Samoa, Language 33: 424-429 (1957).

15 Eric H. Lenneberg, "Cognition in ethnolinguistics," Language 29: 463-471 (1953), pp. 464-465; Brown, Words and things, p. 231.

16 Goodenough, "Property and language on Truk".

17 See A. Meillet, "The feminine gender in the Indo-European languages," translated in LCS, p. 124; notice also the disucssion by Marcel Mauss, "On language and primitive forms of classification," LCS, pp. 125-127, elaborating significantly on the social origin of categories.

18 Susan M. Ervin, "The connotations of gender," Word 18: 248-261 (1962).

19 A. Irving Hallowell, "Ojibwa ontology, behavior, and world view," in Stanley A. Diamond (ed.), *Primitive views of the world* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 56.

20 See discussion in Hymes, "On typology of cognitive styles in language (with examples from Chinookan)," *Anthropological Linguistics* 3(1): 22-54 (1961).

21 See Howard MacLay, "An experimental study of language and non-linguistic behavior," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 14: 220-229 (1956); John B. Carroll and Joseph B. Casagrande, "The function of language classifications in behavior," in Eleanor Maccoby, T. H. Newcomb, E. L. Hartley (eds.) *Readings in Social Psychology* (3rd edition), (New York: Henry Holt, 1958, pp. 18-31; and discussion in Hymes, "Linguistic aspects of cross-cultural personality study," in Bert Kaplan (ed.), *Studying Personality Cross-culturally* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1961), pp. 313-359.

22 Roger W. Brown and Eric H. Lenneberg, "A study in language and cognition," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 49: 454-462 (1954); "Studies in linguistic relativity," in Maccoby, Newcomb, Hartley, pp. 9-18.

22a See Hymes, "Two types of linguistic relativity," in William Bright (ed.), *Sociolinguistics* (The Hague: Mouton, 1966, pp. 114-167.

23 Joyce O. Hertzler, *A sociology of language* (New York: Random House, 1965).

24 A point I have discussed in several contexts, e.g., "A perspective for linguistic anthropology," in Sol Tax (ed.), *Horizons of Anthropology* (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1964), pp. 92-107; and the article cited in n. 21. Systematic cross-cultural study of such differences is now being launched by Susan Ervin-Tripp, John Gumperz, and Dan Slobin of the University of California, Berkeley, and a preliminary manual has been prepared; a re-

lated guide, drawing on ethnographic illustrations, has been prepared at the University of Pennsylvania by myself and others.

25 For an interesting contrast, see J. L. Fischer, "The Stylistic significance of consonantal sandhi in Trukese and Ponapean," American Anthropologist 67: 1495-1502 (1965).

25a See the account of verbal and nonverbal channels for ideologies, and the general analysis, in James Peacock, Rites of modernization. Symbolic action in Indonesian proletarian drama (Chicago: University of Chicao Press, 1968). [IN PRESS NOW] On expressivity in Indonesian political language, note Denzel Carr, "Homorganicity in Malay and Indonesian in expressives and quasi-expressives," Language 42: 370-7 (1966), esp. 375-6. A recurrent phenomenon, long stretches of political speech in which no new referential content occurs, has given rise to a stock story about translation. An apparently true instance of the stody is reported as follows:

Owing to the mixed composition of the Hawaiian legislature, it is necessary to employ continually two languages. All speeches in English are immediately translated into Kanaka, and vice versa. On this occasion the interpreter innocently exposed a fundamental characteristic of the native tongue in replying to a member. An Hawaiian had spoken possibly ten minutes since his last words were translated. A friend, anxious that nothing of importance should be lost, asked why the interpreter did not perform his duty and give the English-speaking members the benefit of the words just uttered. The reply was: "He has said nothing fresh yet." The speaker had simply repeated in new phraeseology the substance of his previous remarks and so skillfully was it done that the friend, although somewhat conversant with the tongue, was misled by Kanaka volubility. (Erasmus Darwin Preston, "The language of Hawaii," Philosophical Society of Washington, Bulletin 14: 37-64 (1900), pp. 56-57.)

25b See reference in n. 10a, and generally, Joshua Fishman and Charles A. Ferguson (eds.), Language problems of developing nations (papers from a conference sponsored by the Social Science Research Council Committee on Sociolinguistics at Airlie House, November 1966) (to appear).

26 See Susan M. Ervin, "Semantic shift in bilingualism," American Journal of Psychology 74: 233-241 (1961); and "Navaho connotative judgments: the metaphor of person description," in Hymes (ed.), Studies in southwestern ethnolinguistics (The Hague: Mouton, 1967). See also Joshua Fishman, Language maintenance and language shift as a field of inquiry," in his Language Loyalty in the United States (The Hague: Mouton, 1965), pp. 424-454.

28 Anselm Strauss and Leonard Schatzmann, "Cross-class interviewing: an analysis of interaction and communicative styles," Human Organization 14: 28-31 (1955); Leonard Schatzmann and Anselm Strauss, "Social class and modes of communication," American Journal of Sociology 60: 329-38 (1955). The first article is reprinted in R. N. Adamas and J. J. Preiss (eds.), Human organization research (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1960) pp. 205-213; the second is reprinted in Alfred G. Smith (ed.), Communication and Culture (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1966), pp. 442-455.

29 Basil Bernstein, "Elaborated and restricted codes: their social origins and some consequences," in John J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes (eds.), The

ethnography of communication (Special Publioation, *American Anthropologist* 66 (6), Part 2, December 1964), pp. 55-69; reprinted in Smith, *Communication and Culture*, pp. 427-441.

30 John Boman Adams, "Culture and conflict in an Egyptian Village," *American Anthropologist* 59: 225-235 (1957); I am endebted to David French for calling this case to my attention. The immediately relevant portion is reprinted in LCS, pp. 272-273, as "On expressive communication in an Egyptian village."

31 Michael Moerman, "Ethnic identification in a compex civilization: who are the Lue?", *American Anthropologist* 67: 1213-1230 (1965). The relation of language boundaries to communication boundaries in cross-cultural research, as practiced by anthropologists, is analyzed in my "Linguistic aspects of the concept of "tribe"", in June Helm (ed.), *Proceedings of the 1967 Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Society* (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1968).

32 S. F. Nadel, *The Nuba* (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 13; see also Nadel, *A black Byzantium* (London: Oxford University Press), regarding ethnolinguistic mosaics.

33 Einar Haugen, "Dialect, language, nation," *American Anthropologist* 68: 922-635 (1966).

34 Hans Wolff, "Intelligibility, and inter-ethnic attitudes," *Anthropological Linguistics* 1 (3): 34-41 (1959); reprinted in LCS, pp. 440-445.

35 An illustration of interaction between linguistic traits and cultural attitudes is given by Moermann:

"Although speakers of a Northern (Thai) dialect often seem to understand speakers of another Northern dialect more easily than they can understand Siamese (Central Thai), the genetic significance of this relative intelligibility is difficult to evaluate since Northern speakers react to and discuss dialects solely in terms of lexicon. The comparative unintelligibility of Siamese results from its Cambodian and Sanskrit borrowings rather than from differences of tonal structure which might be of greater genetic significance. Differences of tone among the Northern dialects are ignored or "automatically" compensated for by the native listeners." (p. 1226, n. 6).

Cf. Einar Haugen, "Semicommunication: the language gap in Scandinavia," Sociological Inquiry 36: 280-297 (1966). On these problems generally, see also Charles A. Ferguson and John J. Gumperz (eds.), Linguistic diversity in South Asia: studies in regional, social, and functional variation (Bloomington, Indiana: Research Center in Anthropology, Folklore and Linguistics, publication 13, 1960).

36 Laura Nader, "A note on attitudes and the use of language," Anthropological Linguistics 4 (6): 24-29 (1962).

37 Charles A. Ferguson, "Diglossia," Word 15: 325-340 (1959); reprinted in LCS, 429-437.

38 Susan Ervin-Tripp, "An analysis of the interaction of language, topic, and listener;" John J. Gumperz, "Linguistic and social interaction in two communities," in Gumperz and Hymes, The ethnography of communication, pp. 86-102, 137-153, respectively. Gumperz develops the notion of verbal repertoire in this article.

39 For examples in this paragraph, see John L. Fischer, "Social influences in

the choice of a linguistic variant," *Word* 14: 47-56 (1958) (reprinted in LCS, 483-488); work of Henry Kucera on Czech; William Labov, *The Social Stratification of English in New York City* (Washington, D. C.: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1966); Joan Rubin, "Bilingualism in Paraguay," *Anthropological Linguistics* 4 (1): 52-58 (1962); work of John Gumperz on Indian bilingualism.

40 Charles A. Ferguson, "National sociolinguistic profile formulas," in William Bright (ed.), *Sociolinguistics* (The Hague: Mouton, 1966). On theoretical considerations, see also W. A. Stewart, "An outline of linguistic typology for describing multilingualism," in Rice (cited n. 42), where some of the criteria for profile formulas are developed; and John J. Gumperz, "Speech variation and the study of Indian civilization," *American Anthropologist* 63: 976-988 (1961) (reprinted in LCS, 413-423), for a discussion from the standpoint of dialectology. Sociolinguistic surveys of East African nations are now underway, and should have important result both empirically and conceptually.

41 Joseph H. Greenberg, "The measurement of linguistic diversity," *Language* 32: 109-115 (1956); Stanley Lieberson, "An extension of Greenberg's measures of linguistic diversity," *Language* 40: 526-531 (1964); see also Uriel Weinreich, "Functional aspects of Indian bilingualism," *Word* 13: 203-33 (1957).

42 Frank A. Rice (ed.), *Study of the Role of Second Languages in Asia, Africa and Latin America* (Washington, D. C.: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1962). Gumperz' paper (n. 40 above) on India is the best concise overview of one major area. See also John Macnamara (ed.), *Problems of bilingual-* [illegible]

ism, *Journal of Social Issues* 23 (2) (1967) and *Proceedings of the June 1967 Moncton (Canada) Conference on Bilingualism*.

43 Uriel Weinreich, *Languages in contact* (New York: Linguistic Circle of New York, 1953).

44 Marcel Cohen, *Pour un sociologie du langage* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1956); see also LCS, *passim*.

45 R. Bruce W. Anderson, "Equivalence and variance in cross-cultural research: a quest for data relating to the impact of translation on comparability," paper read at the second session on sociolinguistics, annual meeting, American Sociological Association, Miami Beach, Florida, August, 1956. Revised as "On the comparability of Meaningful Stimuli in cross-cultural research ," *Sociometry* 30 (2) (1967) pp. 124-236. Anderson cites Norman D. Sundberg, "The use of the MMPI [Minnesota Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory] for cross-cultural personality study: a preliminary report on the German translation," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 57: 124-5 (1958); Harrison G. Gough and Harjit S. Sandhu, "Validation of the CPI [California Psychological Inventory] socialization scale in India," *Journal* of Abnormal and Social Psychology 32: 544-547 (1964).

[NOTE: volume nos for JASP are correct; it has two volumes per year, e.g. 52, 53 (1956), 56, 57 (1958), 66, 67 (1964).]

46 Among those who have discussed problems of translation of social science instruments are the following (listed chronologically); Susan Ervin and Robert T. Bower, "Translation problems in international surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 16: 595-604 (1953); Joseph B. Casagrande, "The ends of translation," *International Journal of American Linguistics* 20: 335-340 (1954); Eugene Jacobsen, "Methods used for producing comparable data in

the O.C.S.R. seven-nation attitude studies," *Journal of Social Issues* 10: 40-51 (1954); Stanley Schacter, "Interpretive and methodological problems of replicated research," *Journal of Social Issues* 10: 52-60 (1954); Haim Blanc, "Multilingual interviewing in Israel," *American Journal of Sociology* 62 (2): 205-209 (1956); Bradford Hudson *et al.*, "Introduction: problems and methods of cross-cultural research ," [Bradford Hudson (ed.), Cross-cultural Studies in the Arab Middle East and United States: studies of young adults], *Journal of Social Issues* 15 (3): 1-4 (1959); Herbert P. Phillips, "Problems of translation and meaning in fieldwork," *Human Organization* 18: 184-192 (1959-60), reprinted in R. H. Adams and J. Preiss (eds.) *Human Organization Research, Field Relations and Techniques* (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1961), 290-307; Florence R. Kluckhohn, "A method for eliciting value orientations," *Anthropological Linguistics* 2 (2) 1-23 (1960); Raymond Fink, "Interviewer training and supervision in a survey of Laos," [Alain Girard (ed.), Opinion surveys in developing countries], *International Social Science Journal* 15 (1): 21-34 (1963); Emily L. Jones, "The courtesy bias in South-east Asian surveys," *International Social Science Journal* 15 (1): 70-76 (1963); Gabrielle Wuelker, "Questionnaires in Asia," *International Social Science Journal* 15 (1): 35-47 (1963); William H. Hunt, Wilder W. Crane, and John C. Wahlke, "Interviewing political elites in cross-cultural comparative research," *American Journal of Sociology* 70 (1): 59-68 (1964); Robert E. Mitchell, "Survey materials collected in the developing countries: sampling, measurement, and interviewing obstacles to intra- and international comparisons," *International Social Science Journal* 17 (4): 665-685 (1965); Howard Schuman, "The random probe:

a technique for evaluating the validity of closed questions," American Sociological Review 31 (2): 218-222 (1966). Phillips' article contains a useful survey of the literature on translation. A bibliography of work on translation is given in my Language in culture and society (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 98-100.

47 Aaron V. Cicourel, Method and measurement in Sociology (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964); "Fertility, family planning, and the social organization of family life: Some methodological issues," Journal of Social Issues 23 (1967) [In Press]; Erving Goffman, "The neglected situation," in Gumperz and Hymes, The Ethnography of Communication (Washington, D. C.: American Anthropological Association, 1964), pp. 133-136; Harold Garfinkel, "The routine grounds of everyday activities," Social Problems 11: 225-250 (1964); Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1968). The article by Cicourel and some of the studies by Garfinkel are especially relevant as analyses of the methodological problems of survey research.

48 See n. 21, and articles in [John Macnamara (ed.), Problems of Bilingualism] Journal of Social Issues 23 (2) (1967), especially Wallace E. Lambert, "The social psychology of bilingualism," 91-109 ; and John Macnamara, "The bilingual's linguistic performance: a psychological overview," 58-77. See also John B. Carroll, "Quolques mesures subjectives en psychologie: frequence des mots, significativitééet qualité de traduction, " Bullentin de Psychologie 19: 580 -92 (1966), discussed by Macnamara.

49 See the article on Navaho connotative judgments by Ervin-Tripp (n. 26), and generally, Charles E. Osgood.

[A. Kimball Romney and Roy G. D'Andrade (eds.), Transcultural studies in cognition], American Anthropologist 66 (3), Part 2, (1964).

50 Ward H. Goodenough, "Cultural anthropology and linguistics," in Paul L. Garvin (ed.), *Report of the seventh annual round table meeting on linguisguistics and language study* (Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 1957), pp. 167-173 (reprinted in LCS, pp. 36-39); Charles O. Frake, "The ethnographic study of cognitive systems," in [Thomas Gladwin and W.C. Sturtevant (eds.)], *Anthropology and human behavior*, pp. 72-85; W. C. Sturtevant, "Studies in ethnoscience," [A. Kimball Romney and Roy G. D'Andrade (eds.), Transcultural studies in cognition], *American Anthropologist* 66 (3), Part 2, pp. 191-131; Harold C. Conklin, "Lexicographical treatment of folk taxonomies," in F. W. Householder, Jr. and Sol Saporta (eds.), *Problems in lexicography* (Bloomington, Indiana: Research Center in Anthropology, Folklore and Linguistics, Publication 21, 1962), 119-141; "Ethnogenealogical method," in W. Goodenough (ed.), *Explorations in cultural anthropology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 25-55; Frake, "The diagnosis of disease among the Subanun of Mindanao," *American Anthropologist* 63: 113-132 (1961), reprinted in LCS, pp. 193-206; Leonard Pospisil, "A formal analysis of substantive law: Kapauku Papuan laws of land tenure;" Roy G. D'Andrade, "Trait psychology and componential analysis"; Anthony F. C. Wallace, "The problem of the psychological validity of componential analysis," all in [Eugene A. Hammel (ed.), Formal semantic analysis], *American Anthropologist* 67 (5), Part 2 (1965), pp. 186-214, 214-228, 229-248, respectively.

51 Edmund Glenn, "Semantic differences in interational communication," *Etc.: A Review of General Semantics* 11: 163-180 (1954).

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52 See the work of Bernstein (cited in n. 29); my article, "On communicative competence," Report of the Planning Conference on Research Problems in the Study of the Language of Disadvantaged Children (New York: Yeshiva University, Ferkauf Graduate School, Department of Educational Psychology, 1967); to appear in revised and expanded form in a volume on anthropological studies of education edited by Stanley Diamond and published by Basic Books.

53 George L. Trager, "Paralinguistics: a first approximation," *Studies in Linguistics* 13: 1-12 (1953), reprinted in LCS, pp. 274-279; Charles F. Hockett, "Ethnolinguistic Implications of studies in linguistics and psychiatry," in W. Austin (ed.), *Report of the Ninth Annual Round Table Meeting of Linguistics and Language Study* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1960), pp. 175-193; R.E. Pittenger and H.L. Smith, Jr., "A basis for some contributions of linguistics to psychiatry," *Psychiatry* 20: 61-78 (1957); Ray L. Birdwhistell, "Some relations between American kinesics and spoken English," in Alfred G. Smith (ed.), *Culture and Communication* (New Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 182-189; Edward T. Hall, *The silent language* (New York: Doubleday, 1964); *The hidden dimension* (New York: Doubleday, 1966); "Adumbration as a feature of intercultural communication," in Gumperz and Hymes, *The ethnography of communication*, pp. 154-163; Hall and William Foote Whyte, "Intercultural communication: a guide to men of action," *Human Organization* 19: 5-12 (1960), reprinted in Smith, *Culture and Communication*, pp. 567-576.

54 "Models of the interaction of language and social setting," [John Macnamara (ed.), Problems of bilingualism] *Journal of Social Issues* 23 (2): 8-28 (1967); and cf. "The ethnography of Speaking," in [T. Gladwin and W. C.

Sturtevant (eds.)] Anthropology and human behavior (Washington, D. C.: Anthropological Society of Washington, 1962), pp. 13-53; "Directions in ethno-linguistic theory," [Romney and D'Andrade, Transcultural studies of cognition], American Anthropologist 66 (3), Part 2 (1964), pp. 6-56; Introduction: toward ethnographies of communication," [Gumperz and Hymes, The ethnography of communication] American Anthropologist 66(6) Part 2 (1964) pp. 1-34.

55 Charles O. Frake, "How to ask for a drink in Subanun," [Gumperz and Hymes, The ethnography of communication] American Anthropologist 66 (6), Part 2 (1964), pp. 127-132; Ethel Albert, "'Rhetoric', 'Logic', and 'Poetics' in Burundi: culture patterning of speech behavior," [Gumperz and Hymes (eds.), The ethnography of Communication], American Anthropologist 66 (6), Part 2 (1964), pp. 35-54; see also papers by James Fernandez and James Peacock in June Helm (ed.), Proceedings of the 1966 Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966).

56 Margaret Mead, "Public opinion mechanisms among some primitive peoples," Public Opinion Quarterly 1: 5-16 (1937); "Some cultural approaches to communication problems," reported by F. M. Keesing and Marie M. Keesing, Elite Communication in Samoa: a study in leadership (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956), pp. 276-279; Frederick Barth, "Ethnic Processes in the Pathan-Baluchi Boundary," in Indo-Iranica: Mélanges présente à George Morgenstiern à l'occasion de son soixante dixième anniversaire (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1964), pp. 13-20; Leonard Dobb, Communication in Africa, A Search for Boundaries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); and the ethnographic reconstruction cited in n. 22a.

58 This argument is developed in the articles cited in n. 52 and n. 54.

59 Williams, Culture and society, p. 357 (cited in n. 5).

60 Orwell, as cited in n. 9; references to German and the Greeks are mentioned in my "Directions in ethno-linguistic theory" (n. 54), p. 37; cf. Herbert Luthy, "In search of Indonesia," New York Review of Books 6 (9): 4-6 (May 26, 1966); on function and clarity, cf. Pieter A. Verburg, Taal et functionaliteit (Wegeningen, The Netherlands: Veenan and Sons, 1952), and "Delosis and clarity", Philosophy and Christianity (Kampen, The Netherlands: J. H. Kok, 1966), pp. 1-22.

LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF COMPARATIVE POLITICAL RESEARCH - Dell Hymes

To appear in Robert T. Holt (ed.) - [a book on comparative research in political science]

CORRECTIONS AND ADDENDA

p. 6, l. 17 freedom
p. 7, l. 4 complete index
p. 8, l. 12 that's
p. 11, l. 6 abstract
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p. 23, l. 17 language)).
p. 25, l. 26 unmediated
p. 27, l. 21 delete . after occurrence
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p. 33, l. 8 of language
p. 40, l. 6 Africanized."
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p. 44, l. 10 speaking:
p. 44, l. 13 (b) some possible
p. 44, l. 14 (c) some acceptable
p. 46, l. 2 obliviousness of
p. 46, l. 7 of an equivalent
p. 47, l. 11 guarantee
p. 50, l. 21 to have
p. 56, l. 6 far too little
p. 58, l. 9 Maori practice
p. 60, l. 15 styles or modes of address

p. 66, l. 19 marriage
p. 70, l. 16 use, so the social scientist has tended to concentrate on content, abstracted from use and form.
p. 71, l. 21 a means
p. 73, l. 4 expecially
p. 74, l. 2 seminar
p. 74, l. 7 some problems
p. 78, l. 14 story
p. 79, l. 19 Adams'
p. 85, l. 22 significativité et
p. 85, l. 25 "Semantic Differential Technique in the Comparative Study of Cultures,"
p. 86, l. 2 *American Anthropologist*

APPENDIX F

"LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF THE CONCEPT OF 'TRIBE'"

LINGUISTIC PROBLEMS IN DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF "TRIBE"[1]

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INTRODUCTION

To consider the concept of "tribe" from the standpoint of language, I must consider the relation of language to social units generally. I shall argue that current anthropological practice often reflects, perhaps unwittingly, a view of the relation that is untenable.

A direct way to put the matter is this: do tribes have linguistic correlates? If they do, can these correlates be used as diagnostic markers of units that are culturally distinct for purposes of analysis and cross-cultural comparison? In principle, the answer is yes. The question of linguistic correlates for tribes is a question of ethnolinguistic (or sociolinguistic) theory, and such a theory, if adequate, must include a fundamental assumption of some such sort as this:

> "each enduring social relationship entails the selection and/or creation of communicative means considered specific to it by its participants" (Hymes, mss. a, b).

If there exists a set of social relationships, then, there will exist communicative (and, by extension, linguistic) features considered specific to the relationships by their participants. It will be possible in principle to identify the features, and to use them to identify the group.

In short, it follows from the place of language in social life that for any set of social relationships one may wish to call a tribe, some set of corresponding linguistic features may be found. (Moreover, the features in themselves are cultural, so that with respect to them, if nothing else, the tribe is distinctively a culture-bearing unit.) This answer holds, whatever one's definition of "tribe", and for whatever "cultunit" is of concern.

This general answer is of small help to one who wishes to state the number and boundaries of units in a region or sample now. For one thing, the linguistic features that serve as correlates of a given type of social unit may vary greatly in number, kind, and salience from one case to another. Perhaps but a single "shibboleth" of pronunciation may be involved; or a pattern that emerges only from the differential frequency across a series of situations of certain common traits (Labov, 1966).

In general, the linguistic correlates of social relationships, the sociolinguistic structure present in a group, can only occasionally and partially be recovered from the literature. Ethnographers and linguists have usually not done the necessary work. (Indeed, the idea of sociolinguistic description as an explicit goal, theoretically motivated, has only recently come to the fore.)

To be sure, ethnologists wish usually to deal just with those social units that bear, not just some cultural features, but such masses of them as are commonly called "cultures". To this purpose, one usually wishes information as to not just some linguistic features, but as to sets considered to be of the same scale as "cultures", namely, whole dialects or languages. Typically one inquires as to the relation between cultures and languages (or dialects) as wholes. One wants an enumeration of language units, together with their full genetic classification (facts of relationship, subgrouping of dialects, mapping).

Scholars have been usefully at the business of genetic classification, as a guide to ethnic identity and origin, since at least the early eighteenth century,[2] and it is a task that is more clearly understood and more limited than that of sociolinguistic description; but it is not the answer to the problem in hand. The reason is theoretical, rather than practical. To be sure, we are far from adequate knowledge of the genetic connections for all the world's languages. There are methodological questions as to delimitation of units within complexes of dialects, as to proof of remote relationship, and as to determination of subgroups (languages with specially shared history subsequent to the breakup of a larger group to which they belong). There is sheer need for information from field work, philology, reconstruction. Even perfect knowledge of this sort, however, would not suffice.

Perfect knowledge would not suffice because it is a mistake to put the matter so. One must ask, not about genetic relationships among languages and objective linguistic demarcation of dialects, but about *communicative relationships among persons and groups*. What count for the establishment of "culture-bearing" units, and the transmission of cultural phenomena, are boundaries of communication.

In one sense, we all know this. If anthropologists continue to ask for information as to genetic classification of languages, anf purely linguistic demarcation of dialects, then, it must be because such classification and demarcation are thought to stand in some diagnostic relation to boundaries of communication. But just this assumption must be abandoned. The relation of languages and dialects to communicative relationships among persons and groups is problematic. It is a relationship that needs desperately to be investigated, both in ethnographic depth and in comparative perspective.

Naroll (1964: 291a) reports that for many anthropologists "The criterion of language is considered essential", the one reservation being that "there are serious practical difficulties in applying it". The fact of the matter is that the difficulties are not just of application, but of empirical and theoretical adequacy.

Let me consider more fully the assumptions made as to language in much recent ethnological work; indicate why they cannot be part of a theory of the relation of language to cultural units; and sketch the sort of perspective that may serve instead. (Consideration of the general relation of language to ethnic units applies a fortiori to the case of the "tribe.")

LANGUAGES AS BOUNDARY MARKERS IN RECENT ETHNOLOGY

Recent discussions of "cult-unit" and comparative ethnology in *Current Anthropology* provide a reference point,[3] but my argument is directed at widespread assumptions, not at particular authors of recent articles. Naroll's formulation will be focussed upon here because he has recently wrestled with the many grave difficulties that the widespread assumptions entail (1964: 287-8, 289a, 290b, 291a, 306a-b). He carries the effort about as far as it can go. I hope to show that if the formulation is unsatisfactory, it is because it cannot be made satisfactory.

Let me stress also that I do not argue the necessary invalidity of the sort of cross-cultural research pursued by Naroll, Driver, and others. It may well be that much research often does not depend upon the use of a fine-grained criterion for ethnic identity, linguistic or otherwise. The inevitable scatter of adequately documented cases (cf. Naroll 1964: 290b), and statistical and other controls may obviate the problem.

It remains that much attention is lavished on language (and dialect) boundaries, that indeed, field workers are urged to report in terms of them (Naroll 1964: 309c). Even if cross-cultural research should not need to rely on such boundaries, then, the present concern reinforces the mistaken assumptions on which the reliance is based. For some research, moreover, the validity of the assumption is of direct concern (for example, controlled co-variation within an area to determine causal relationships); and the validity is of central concern to anthropological theory of language.

Nature of Assumptions

The assumptions underlying the use of language as a criterion in recent cross-cultural research would seem roughly to be as follows:

(1) "one language – one culture"; that is, the ethnographic world can be divided into "ethnolinguistic" units, each associating a language with a culture.

(2) When the units are demarcated in space (mapped), the demarcation implies a break in mutual intelligibility in virtue of the language, and hence in communication in virtue of the culture.

(3) The language in question is the medium of communication for the content of interest with regard to the culture in question.

(4) These boundary relationships (language, culture, communication) have persisted in time.

A practical problem arises with regard to (2): it is one of finding an objective measure of the demarcation of language units. From such a measure, demarcation of communicative units is thought to follow. (I shall comment later on the failure to treat the practical problems arising with regard to (4).)

Persistence of Assumptions

Some or all of this set of assumptions is very old (as footnote 2 has indicated). The outlook is one which I have labelled "Herderian" (ms. c), after the great German pioneer of modern anthropology, whose view of the integral relation of language to cultural identity did so much to shape subsequent thought for both good and ill. The hold of the outlook has been reinforced in American work by the dominant neogrammarian approach to genetic relationship and the reconstruction of language history on a family-tree (*Stammbaum*) model, at the expense of the perspective of wave-theory (*Wellentheorie*) or mesh principle (Swadesh 1959); and by the structuralist practice of abstracting grammar from ethnographic context, and of positing a homogeneous speech-community as object of description.

In recent ethnological literature one finds Driver (1966: 158) writing of the troubles over ethnic units:

> "If we had a more accurate classification of languages with quantitative guides for such labels as dialect, language, subfamily, family, and phylum, *we could accurately group all ethnic units according to their position in such a scheme* [my emphasis] ....because neither classification [language, culture area] is sufficiently refined, there is no immediate solution to the ethnic unit problem."

Later Driver observes (1966: 160b): "As is apparent, I prefer to regard all mutually unintelligible languages as separate ethnic units" (citing another study (1965: 328-9)).

In his review of discussions of the culture-bearing unit, Naroll singles out as a common thread the conception of the unit as one in which a common language is spoken, and himself repeatedly points out this agreement on the importance of language (e.g., 291a in his Summary, and in his Abstract). At the same time Naroll adds that none of the writers he reviews thinks that speech community alone can be relied on to define the basic culture-bearing unit, although they do not agree on what else needs to be considered. (Notice the implicit equation of common language with speech community.) Naroll stresses the serious practical difficulties of defining and measuring the intelligibility of dialects, of marking boundaries along linguistic continua, and of classifying multilingual speakers; at one point, indeed, he writes of his own concept:

> "The cultunit, I submit, generally resembles fairly closely at least *some* operating social unit within the society wherever these units have sharp boundaries. Its most arbitrary element is its delineation of boundaries along linguistic continuums from a bibliographic vantage point..." (289a).

His final definition of the basic culture-bearing unit to be used in cross-cultural studies, however, selects language as one of three criteria, together with political organization and territorial contiguity. And it must be noticed that the four cultunit types are introduced as emerging when one considers the interrelations of two kinds of boundaries, a linguistic boundary and a communication-link (state or contact group) boundary, a cultunit boundary being formed by either of these two boundaries. The communication-link boundary is thus in effect a linguistic boundary too, being defined by a common lingua franca (state) or common distinct language (contact group). Where there is no state ("a territorially ramified territorial team whose leaders assert and wield the exclusive right to declare and conduct warfare" (286)), then

> "*linguistic boundaries only* [my emphasis] are followed unless contact gaps occur which break up speech communities into cultunits within which speech communication presumably flows freely but between which speech communication presumably is rare and unimportant; [later, reference is made to]...the speech communication groups thus defined..." (288a).

My purpose here is not to exposit or discuss Naroll's classification of types of units, but to indicate the way in which linguistic terms and criteria enter into it. The passages just cited make clear that linguistic boundaries and boundaries of speech communication are equated. That in general Naroll intends his criterion of linguistic boundaries to demarcate communication boundaries is indeed made explicit:

> "My approach has been rather to identify communication units (*assuming* [sic] that, since culture is constantly changing, these units will tend to be culturally distinct)" (307b).

This passage recalls an earlier statement that

> "The communication nets through which these [cultural] changes are passed from "mouth to mouth" — i.e., from mind to mind — are obviously key elements in defining the culture-bearing group. A speech community tends to form such a communication net, even though its boundaries may be blurry..." (problems of translation, political states, distance are then alluded to) (289a-b).

Such concepts as communication net, communication unit, speech community, speech communication group, linguistic boundary, common distinct language, communication-link boundary, mutual intelligibility (interintelligibility) unit within which cultural changes accumulate — all these appear to be regarded as pretty much equivalent in delimiting what is wanted.

The operational test for delimitation is discussed in terms of the measurement of mutual intelligibility by objective criteria of lexical similarity between dialects. *Percentage of lexical similarity, mutual intelligibility, language boundary, communication boundary, thus are effectively equated.*

In keeping with this equation, several comments indicate that the problem with the use of language as a criterion in ethnology is not after all empirical or theoretical, but one of application. The problem is not one of the relation between lexical percentages and mutual intelligibility; of the relation between mutual intelligibility and language boundary; or of the relation between language boundary and communication boundary. Rather, the problem is one of obtaining sufficient information to make the objective measurement of all of these at once that in principle is possible. In its reference to a "bibliographic vantage point", the comment quoted above on delineation of boundaries within linguistic continua implies lack of reported information as the difficulty (cf. 209b). In an itemization of eleven serious linguistic classification problems (284a-b, 285), the stress is upon the extremely technical and difficult nature of defining mutual intelligibility operationally; existing ethnographic materials are found to make the definition often sheer guess work. When a practical working method for comparative ethnologists is proposed (287), it is in terms of percentages of "recognizable cognates" on word lists (80% or more implying mutual intelligibility, less than 80% lack of it (286a-b)). Where comparative word lists are not available, statements by informants or ethnographers about intelligibility can be followed; the primacy of the objective lexical measurement is implied in the comment that such judgments can probably be trusted to agree with the "recognizable cognate" word-list method, except when the dialects concerned are in the "partially intelligible" class.

In sum, while there is frank recognition of difficulties posed by the notion of language as boundary-marker, and by the testing of boundaries by lexical percentages, it is on this package that one falls back.

The attention to lexical percentages probably is an American, rather than international, propensity, because of the greater attention given lexicostatistics here. It is worth pointing out, therefore, that even if one does not rely on lexical measures of boundary and subgrouping, the considerations to be presented still apply. Use of phonological isoglosses, grammatical criteria, shared innovations of whatever sort, combinations of linguistic features of diverse sorts, all have in common the fact that they are diacritics whose relation, as markers of language boundaries, to mutual intelligibility and communication boundaries remains problematic, as will be shown.

CRITIQUE (I): EXCEPTIONS

The commentators in *Current Anthropology* themselves provide something of a running series of empirical illustrations of the failure of linguistic unity and separateness to coincide with cultural units in various parts of the world: Western desert of Australia (Berndt, 292b), northeast Arnhem Land (Berndt, 292b), Chinese Moslems (Bessac, 293b), Tumet Mongols (Bessac, 293b), Northern Cayapó (Dole, 294b), Nyul-Nyul and Bard of northwestern Australia (Dole, 294b), Upper Xingu region of Brazil (Dole, 294c), China (Sjoberg, 303c), together with flat objection (Moore, 300c) and some criticism of the operational criteria (Driver, 294b).

Nuba: ethnolinguistic mosaic

To these examples others, well-known, can be added. Nadel on the Nuba has already been cited in connection with this problem by Moerman (1965: 1220):

> "We shall meet with groups which, though they are close neighbours and possess an almost identical language and culture, do not regard themselves as one tribe...; and we shall also meet with tribes which claim this unity regardless of internal cultural differentiation. Cultural and linguistic uniformity, then, does not imply, and cultural and linguistic diversity – at least within certain limits – not preclude, the recognition of tribal unity." (Nadel, 1947: 13)

Yir Yoront: personal network

Lauriston Sharp's portrait of the Yir Yoront, Koko Bera, and Kut Taiori, three language groups of Australia, is well known for its conclusion that there does not exist among them a "tribe" as an organized society or community which holds territory; that clan membership, not speech affiliation, is the basic element in determining a person's geographic associations and social relations; and that the language community, such as Yir Yoront, is purely a linguistic category, comprising people who in no sense constitute a corporate or organizaed entity. There is Yoront speech (or Koko Bera speech, or Kut Taiori speech), but not such a thing as Yoront country or Yoront customs. The Yir Yoront form of social organization is one in which three speakers of the same language based in the same language area, may each have an essentially different interaction network along a geographically different circuit. The situation is representative of the organization of more than one hundred different named speech communities investigated by Sharp throughout all north Queensland.

Eastern Niger Delta: ethnic, linguistic, intelligibility boundaries

A particularly cogent example of the non-identity of ethnic group, language group, and mutual intelligibility — all three — is provided by Wolff (1967). In the Eastern Niger Delta ("Rivers" area) hinterland several languages have diverged from a common ancestor in a contiguous territory. The result is that ethnically, from west to east, there are found three groups, the Ogbia, Odual, and Abua. Linguistically, from west to east, there are found three groups, but not the same three: Ogbia, Kugbo, and Odual-Abua. Kugbo is the language of a group of four villages among the Odual; the language, while closely related to Odual, is distinct. Odual proper and Abua, on the other hand, are divergent dialects of the same language. With regard to mutual intelligibility in terms of language, from west to east, there are three groups again, but again not the same three: the western Ogbia dialects; the eastern Ogbia dialects and Kugbo; and Abua, with mutual intelligibility that is less than satisfactory, with Odual. Schematically, one has:

Type of Unit			
Ethnic	Ogbia	Odual	Abua
Linguistic	Ogbia	Kugbo	(Odual — Abua)
Intelligibility	W.Ogbia	(E.Ogbia — Kugbo)	(Odual ?-? Abua)

The example shows that there may be mutual intelligibility, despite difference of language (E. Ogbia — Kugbo), and mutual non-intelligibility, despite oneness of language (W. Ogbia — E. Ogbia) (cf. discussion of intelligibility below).

Such examples might be thought to dispose of the question. Clearly language classification cannot be taken for granted as boundary marker of units at once ethnic and communicative in nature. Clearly the relations between the units classified by linguists as languages, and the communicative units of ethnology, are problematic. Apparently the examples do not suffice. The felt need for an ethnological criterion, and the underlying, persistent assumptions about the isomorphic relation of languages to cultures seem to withstand citation of exceptions, however numerous. Let me come at the matter in a different way.

From a theoretical standpoint, *each language-involving term in the proposed definition of cult-unit — and any language-involving term in any* *definition of ethnic or cultural unit — is to be regarded, not as a constant, but as a variable.* No such term can be taken for granted as having fixed value with regard to communicative boundaries. Each such term can be realized by more than one kind of circumstance, entailing more than one kind of consequence for the boundedness of communication.

CRITIQUE (II): COMPONENTS OF CULTUNIT

The definition of cultunit enumerates "domestic$_1$ speakers$_2$ of a common$_3$ distinct$_4$ language$_5$" (numerals supplied). I shall consider each in turn.

(1) *domestic*: there may be more than one language of the home, each linking the family in a different direction. Voegelin (1964: 304a) raises the question of situations in which the language of the parents is not that of the child. The code relevant for communicative boundary with respect to certain cultural features may not be definable in terms of domestic use, but may be an "argot" (Gumperz, 1962) specialized to use outside the home. In general, in a world of multilingual societies, codes are specialized in use, and choice of code is governed by rules, these rules depending upon features such as scene, participants, end in view, topic, channel, and the like — in sum, upon different opportunities, and contents of communication. (Cf. discussion in Hymes, 1967). Which of a group's codes is relevant as defining its communicative boundary may vary with the cultural or social content of one's problem.

A very striking and interesting case in point is reported by Arthur F. Sorensen. The central northwest Amazon, straddling the Brazilian-Colombian border, is an area homogeneous in culture. One level of social organization of the peoples within the area may be termed the tribe. Such a tribe is a nemed politico-ceremonial unit, consisting of certain sibs, and associated with other tribes within an exogamous phratry (that has no function other than exogamy). The tribe has a unique history and is identifiable with a discrete language. Its members are expected to have used the language as principal language in their childhood nuclear family. That language of tribe and longhouse, however, is a "father-tongue". The mothers (each from a different tribe, due to exogamy) retain their separate tribal identity, and while using the husband's language when talking directly with their children, usually have several other women from their own tribe in the longhouse with whom to use their own "father-tongue". Each longhouse may have a characteristic repertoire of languages, determined by the origins of its wives. All individuals of the longhouse will control the repertoire, amounting commonly to at least four languages. Multilingualism is the norm and expectation. There is a spurt in active command of languages during adolescence; augmentation of the repertoire and of competence in it continues throughout life. These languages are mutually unintelligible, and often quite different in character. Persons are unselfconscious about their multilingualism, using it purely instrumentally with regard to the language of their interlocutors and locale. One of the languages, Tukano, serves as a lingua franca throughout much of the area. The commonalty of patterns of apeaking, as in greeting conversation, is such that Sorensen has witnessed and participated in many occasions in which the language of a longhouse was unknown either to him or to some of his Indian travelling companions, yet it was perfectly clear to all what the content was of the sequence of bilingual statements being made (cf. mention below of *Sprechbund*, or speech area).

In sum, we have here a striking case in which cultural unity is independent of both political and linguistic hegemony. Communicative unity extends throughout the region through a cultural pattern of multilingualism, and areal patterns of speaking. The patterns are supported by attitudes toward the acquisition and use of languages that extend multilingualism into the domestic residence in a patterned way, and link longhouses along the rivers in continua, not of dialect, but of overlapping code-repertoires. With regard to tribe and language, there is complete correlation between tribal identity and a given language, yet the fact in isolation would be quite misleading as to the actual communicative and cultural relationships.

(2) *speakers*: the term "speakers" is usable only as a surrogate for the set of possible relationships to use of a code that permit intercommunication. As a general term, *users* may be preferable. One may find speakers, hearers, writers, readers, and all possible combinations. Which mode of use, or which set of modes of use, is pertinent in defining a communicative boundary will vary with one's problem. (I do not understand why Naroll (1964: 309c) wishes to ignore both the use of written Chinese as a lingua franca, and its former wider distribution as such; both facts would seem pertinent to communicative links and boundaries.)

In north Queensland (Sharp, 1958) one finds communicative and cultural unity based on shared understandings, shared hearer's rules of interpretation. Such unity of understanding is compatible with diverse overt forms for signalling. Sharp writes:

> "While most of the six hundred people of these three language groups (Yir Yoront, Koko Bera, Kut Taiori) speak only one of the languages mentioned, a majority of them also understand or 'hear' a second language, and many, a third. The 'network ...of understandings' thus exists which might serve, regardless of language differences, as a basis for a society or for a community of interests. ...everywhere there is flux or overlap of people with their mutually understood but different behaviors." (Sharp cites these facts in the context of making the point that such communicative understanding is not associated with any boundedness of territory, or political or other social demarcation into fixed units of the "nation" or "tribe" sort.)

(3) of a *common*: the remarks under (1) *domestic* as to specialization of codes, and the remarks just made about shared understanding in the absence of shared speaking, apply here. Note that specialized codes may determine a communicatiøe boundary without being common to a group as a whole. A certain number of users of a given code may be both necessary and sufficient to ensure the communication into a group and spread throughout it of some cultural features of interest. (The fact that the distribution of myths in North America does not correlate with language boundaries implies a series of bilingual links leading to the common sharing of narratives among tribes most of whose members did not know each other's language.)

(4) *distinct* (i.e., mutually intelligible to speakers of a stated dialect): the concern here is to make boundaries of mutual intelligibility demarcate distinct languages.

The Niger Delta example has already shown that equating "interintelligibility" with a fixed degree of linguistic difference is in error. I must stress this point. An enumeration and classification of languages will not suffice as an index of communicative boundaries, quite apart from any question of correlation with ethnic units, recent shifts of language or ethnicity, and the like. Even if one could demarcate all languages objectively, one to a group, there is no univocal relation between the linguistic facts anf facts of communication.

One might think that the more closely related two dialects, or two languages, the easier would be communication through their use; or, the more recently it would have lapsed, and hence the more commonalty of culture through communication ought there to be. It is impossible, however, to identify mutual intelligibility and the existence of communication by means of any measure of linguistic distance alone (cf. Wolff, 1959: 559). The most common index (that considered by Naroll) is one in terms of percentage of lexical cognates. Such an index may be useful for tracing the past connections of languages in and of themselves; no such measure can be guaranteed as a measure of communicative boundary.

There are several intersecting reasons. First, objectivity is not possible without attention to "subjective" factors of attitude. Depending on attitude, users of closely related codes may refuse or disdain to understand each other (Wolff, 1959); users of distantly related or unrelated codes may make special effort and succeed in understanding. Haugen (1966) has discussed the way in which attitudes incorporating aesthetic evaluations of related languages (Danish, Norwegian, Swedish) may affect the degree of communication through them.

Second, the patterns as to the organization and content of speech must be taken into account. Just as adjacent languages may belong to a common linguistic area (*Sprachbund*) through sharing of common features irrespective of genetic relationship, so adjacent communities may belong to a common speech area (*Sprechbund*) through sharing of common patterns of speaking, irrespective of code relationships. Presumably where retention of features is not the explanation, such areas come about through the mediation of bilinguals; but they extend to monolinguals. Where speech areas exist, speakers of different dialects or languages share understandings as to what is to be said, as to what to say or expect to be said next. One and the same degree of objective linguistic distance thus may be associated with quite different degrees of mutual intelligibility, depending on the degree to which the patterns of speaking differ. Some speakers of Czech feel themselves to share a common "speech area" with Hungarians, Poles, and Germans, but not with the English, quite apart from knowledge of the respective national codes. (I owe the example, concept and term to Jiří Neustupný.) Recall also the northwest Amazon case cited earlier.

Third, the different sectors of a languages need not sort identically as between groups. There may, for example, be shared phonology and syntax; and only lexicon may differentiate two languages in a community, as shown by recent work of John Gumperz on the Marathi and Kannada in certain Indian villages. There may be shared semantic systems expressed through different grammars, as between the Algonkian Yurok and the Athapaskan Hupa of northern California (Bright and Bright, 1965). In general there may be likeness in one sector and not in others; likeness in two and not in a third; etc. Phenomena investigated under the too much neglected leading of "linguistic area", or "areal linguistics", attest to this. A striking example is that of Australia. Voegelin et al. (1963: 24) observe:

> "Something special is going on in Australia. To draw attention to this we use the term FAMILY-LIKE LANGUAGE for Australian languages having neighbor intelligibility but otherwise having as low a cognate density as exists between languages in the usual language families of the world."

The languages are so similar in phonology and grammar as to be considered closely related dialects of one languages, yet so diverse in vocabulary as to suggest distinct languages. This phenomenon has been reported in many parts of Australia by several observers (Miller, 1966). (The interintelligibility probably depends not only upon the phonological and grammatical resemblance, but also upon attitudes of acceptance toward differences of dialect, and great commonalty of what is said, when, to whom, etc., permitting predictability of content despite lexical differences (recall Sharp on north Queensland).)

One may compare to this the situation in parts of India (mentioned above) wherein switching from one language to another is a switch from one lexicon to another, retaining common patterns of syntax and pronunciation.

Fourth, the linguistic changes separating dialects or languages may be asymmetrical in their effect on communication. The distance is objectively the same in either direction; but users of one may be better able to understand users of the other than the converse. (The phenomenon has become known as non-reciprocal intelligibility; cf. Olmsted (1954) for a review.) The effect of change is perhaps always complicated by attitudes, patterns of speaking, and metalinguistic practices: the differences may be valued or disvalued (cf. Haugen 1966 on semicommunication in Scandinavia); folk equations between cognates may be developed that facilitate understanding (Garde, 1961; on Slavic dialects) or not.

Fifth, language learning is not merely a question that poses difficulty for classifying speakers. It is a universal consideration, whether the differences between communities are in terms of dialects, related languages, or unrelated languages. Voegelin (1964: 304b) calls attention to the question of the length of time needed to learn the form of language across a language barrier. Among the Zapotec there is a folk taxonomy of dialects in terms of the number of days required to learn them. Such a question must of course be investigated in terms of what is regarded as an acceptable criterion of knowledge and use of the languages or dialects concerned. The Zapotec conception implies that one must deal not only with continua of dialects, but also with continua of acquisition and competence.

In general, then, given pairs of dialects or languages, equally distant, there may be special learning (some degree of bilingualism) in one case, and not in another; and where learning occurs, it may be in one direction only. For any case of language or dialect distance, then, there are four possible cases of communicative relationship with respect to just this fact alone:

(a) no learning in either direction;
(b) learning in one direction;
(c) learning in the other direction;
(d) learning in both directions.

The cases may be complicated by differential degree and specialization of learning in one or both directions. The topics and circumstances to which a language is specialized within a multilingual situation may differentiate cases otherwise alike with regard to the linguistic distance between dialects or languages. There may be free communication of whatever there is to talk about to the extent that it can be talked about; or, there may be no communication with regard to one or more aspects of culture, discourse on such aspects being restricted to another code, on one or both sides.

It has been cited as one problem of demarcation that "Although Yahgan dialects are said to be mutually intelligible, they are also said *contradictorily* [my emphasis] to differ as much as Scotch and Cockney" (Naroll, 1964: 285a). It should be clear that there is nothing contradictory in such a situation. The cases cited from Australia, the Niger Delta, and elsewhere, together with the theoretical considerations, show as much. Mutual intelligibility depends upon a complex of factors, including lexical relationship, phonological relationship, grammatical relationship, relationship of patterns of speaking, and social attitudes toward such differences as exist.

It is not surprising that efforts to measure mutual intelligibility by a single device, such as percentage of lexical differenee, have failed. Even efforts to measure dialect distance by the so-called "test the informant" method, wherein ability to translate tapes of other dialects is assessed in terms of percentages, can be vitiated, if such factors as learning and the patterns of the content and use of speech, are not controlled. The "ask the informant" method does not give a measure, only a judgment, to be sure, and such judgments can be biased as well as inexact; but such judgments are likely to reveal with rough accuracy the resultant in actual communication of all the impinging factors. I would trust an informant's judgment in preference to any one objective measure, and would take such a judgment as staarting point for analysis of the situation.

In sum, facts of language condition communication across dialect and language boundaries, but do not control it. Indeed, *to rely on facts of language to determine boundaries of cultural communication amounts to a form of strong linguistic determinism.* Laxical, phonological, and grammatical facts cannot be ignored, to be sure, and they do condition communication across boundaries; there are interesting and important questions to be investigated as to the nature of such conditioning. Such facts have here the same role as human instrumentalities generally; they are means of social action, not its master. People use languages, not the reverse. (Cf. the relation of structures to functions, discussed with regard to structural ethnography in Hymes 1964: 43-44; and with regard to inference of cognitive style in Hymes 1966: 116-123, 157-158; and with regard to the course of linguistics in Hymes ms. b.)

We come now to the last terminological variable in the definition of cultunit, namely,

(5) *language*: from all that has been said, it is clear that "language" cannot be regarded as invariant for the delimitation of cultural boundaries in terms of communication. In effect, the term is too gross. From a historical standpoint, one regards language as differentiated into dialects (on some of the problems, see Hockett (1958) and Haugen (1966)); and we have seen cases in which a communicative boundary divides dialects assigned to the same language (western and eastern Ogbia).

From a synchronic standpoint, one must regard a language as a variable system of codes, specialized in function; not all of these codes will be intelligible to all members of a community (e.g., "languages of concealment" in ritual, courtship, and the like, derived perhaps by rules of permutation and deletion from the normal variety; or by substitution of forms not present in the normal variety).

What one wants is a term that can be defined as implying mutual intelligibility, communication, among those who share it in virtue of their sharing of it. Of terms available in the literature either "variety" or "code" might serve. Here I shall adopt "code".

Such a term permits one to treat just those sets of linguistic habits that are specific to one or another communicative function within and across group boundaries; and it is this that is at issue. One can also readily recognize that cultural features may be communicated through codes other than linguistic ones: gesture, objects, music.

The terms "language" and "dialect" may be reserved for the historically delineated sets of features usually intended by such terms as "English", "French", "Navaho", "Marathi" and the like. The resources of the English language, say, will be found to be differently organized into functional systems of codes in different sectors of the "English-speaking world". Not all speakers of English will be able to understand each other in English.

It should be clear that the five language-involving terms of the definition of cult unit deal with variables, not with constants that can be taken for granted. The analysis should have indicated that any such set of terms must be regarded in the same way. In order to determine communicative relationships among persons and groups, one must begin with persons and groups, the codes they share, and the purposes to which the codes are put.

I do not know whether or not a single general definition of cultural or communicative unit, suitable for ethnology, can be devised. It does seem clear that more than one kind of unit must be taken into account. So far as language is the means of communication, the most general requirement for the presence of a communicatiev unit may be expressed as the *sharing of rules for the interpretation of speech.* It must be stressed that such rules include not only rules for the interpretation of codes (in the sense of grammars) but also rules for the interpretation of the use of codes; and that knowledge of the two sorts of rules need not coincide. The concept of *speech area* was introduced earlier to designate a situation in which there was shared knowledge of rules for the interpretation of the use of codes, apart from shared knowledge of any one code. Conversely, those who share knowledge of a code may fail to share knowledge of a given set of rules for its use.

I would tentatively define the basic notion of *speech community* in terms of shared knowledge of rules for the interpretation of speech, including rules for the interpretation of at least one common code. Common rules of use but none of code would imply a *speech area*, as just discussed. Common rules of code, but not of use, might be taken to imply one aspect of *speech field*, that range of settings in which one's knowledge of rules makes communication potentially possible. For a given person or group, one would have to investigate empirically the variety of settings in which the *personal* (or *group*) *repertoire* of codes and rules of use would permit communication. A distinctive hierarchy, or array, or profile of speech fields might result. In this respect one might want also to distinguish *speech network*, as the particular linkages of communication actively participated in by a person or group.[4]

Whether or not these notions prove adequate in their present form, it is clear that some such set of notions is needed. What much ethnological thought has joined together, we must now put asunder, developing concepts adequate to the actual diversity of the phenomena.

ASSUMPTIONS REVISITED

My analysis so far has dealt most directly with the first two of the assumptions found to underly use of language boundaries as criteria in ethnology, those having to do with (1) the division of the world into "one language = one culture" ethnolinguistic units, and (2) the equation of the boundaries of such units with boundaries of mutual intelligibility and communication. The language-involving terms of the cultunit definition have seemed most directly to implicate these two assumptions. With each assumption one finds that the relationship in question is not certain, but problematic.

I must now take up the third and fourth of the assumptions. The silence of the discussion of cultural units on these assumptions suggests that they are taken for granted; here again the relationships in question must be taken as problematic.

Third assumption

It cannot be taken for granted that a language or code is the medium of communication for particular cultural features. First of all, not all cultural features are acquired or communicated verbally; what is so communicated may differ from one group to another. Some cultural features may require language (e.g., myth); some may not be communicable apart from personal observation, imitation, and practice. For some features verbal means may be optional. Religious training, say, may not involve verbal instruction, as among the Crow in contrast to the Hidatsa (cf. Hymes 1966: 126-131). Secondly, the repertoire of a community may comprise several codes, and a given content may be specialized to but one of them. It is likely to be that code, rather than any other, whose distribution and boundaries are relevant; if other codes are relevant, through bilingualism and translation, those relationships must be determined in the given case. In medieval Europe it was the distribution of Latin, not of the domestic languages, French, English, and the like, that was most important to the communicative boundaries of religious culture.

We know little systematically about the ways in which specialization of topics among codes may affect communicative independence of groups; a good deal of work is needed before much can be said. It may be necessary to consider that a code can be instrumental to communicative boundaries with regard to cultural features indirectly as well as directly. That is, a code may not be a means for communication with respect to certain features, but may be the communicative instrument basic to a group or relationship within which communication about the features occurs. A code such as Crow might thus demarcate the communication of religious behaviours apart from its use for the purpose. In studying religion, one will need to take into account both what codes are "languages of religion" and what codes unite and bound groups significantly distinct with respect to religion.

Fourth assumption

The time depth relationship between a code, contents, and a community cannot be taken for granted, but must be empirically determined.

First of all, there can be no assurance that the present association between a code and a community has a time-depth sufficient for the degree of historical independence that is needed. Moerman (1965) has shown for the Lue of Thailand that ethnic affiliation may be impermanent in ways that make language likely to fail as a criterion of past boundaries. A striking example of deceptive present-day association between language and social unit is reported by Salisbury (1962). Among the Siane of New Guinea utterances in some situations must be repeated in a second language; both languages are known by the participants, and the requirement of repetition is not for intelligibility, but for formality. The proportion of primary speakers of each of the two languages in question appears to have shifted in the recent past, so that what is now the dominant language was once not so. The shift amounts to a shift in which language is to count as first language, which as second, in formal settings. Everyone continues to know both (there is in fact a general enthusiasm for acquiring languages). Yet the shift is tantamount to shifting the community from one side to the other of a linguistic boundary that would imply more than a millenium of communicative separation, if linguistic distance could be automatically so taken.

A related situation can be found in North America, according to Jacobs' interpretation (1937) of language distributions in the Pacific Northwest. Here one finds many small groups; connected through trade, and local exogamy, the villages are linguistically mixed. Jacobs interprets the present distribution of languages as the result of a recurrent process of shifts in boundaries in a downriver direction at the expense of the original languages of the more favored locations. (That language shift may go against the apparent gradient of social prestige, wealth, and numbers, due to the respective structures of communicative relationships, is attested by Barth (1964) in a careful analysis of a Near Eastern situation.) Jacobs states:

> "There must have occurred gradual changes in the percentage of speakers of one or another language in smaller bilingual upriver border villages; in a bilingual border village the percentage of upriver dialect speakers increased, the percentage of lower river dialect speakers diminished. The changing percentages reflect the greater attractiveness of certain locations and the larger numbers moving in such directions."

The actual outcomes depended on the original locations of the groups, and the relative size and number of communities on various rivers (the most populous communities on the coast and Willamette river resisting language shift). The hypothesis of the one recurrent process gives a unified interpretation of many puzzles as to location, and makes sense of the diffusion of certain linguistic traits. Here again equation between present linguistic boundaries and boundaries of social units with time depth would be quite misleading: the language boundaries have shifted over communities that have themselves remained in place. From this standpoint many Northwest aboriginal communities mapped as having quite distinct languages cannot be regarded as communicatively independent. Many more such cases could be adduced.

While shift in the association between communities and languages as wholes is striking, shift in the association between a community, a retained language, and cultural contents may be important also. One of a community's languages may be found restricted in scope; but the restriction may be the result of encroachment of one or more other languages, such that contents no longer associated with the retained language once were, e.g., the Indian languages of New Mexico, Arizona, Chihuahua, and Sonora (Spicer, 1962). Conversely, a language now associated with the communication of certain cultural contents may once have been more restricted in scope. The creolization of pidgins and trade jargons into full-fledged languages is a salient case in point; there is also the emergence of dialects into the status of written, literary, and/or standard languages. It seems likely that the most dramatic of such phenomena are restricted to the recent centuries of European expansion, but only a validated theory able to associate particular processes of linguistic change with particular types of social relationship could assure the ethnologist of this. We have no such theory at present; it seems unlikely that shifts in the roles of codes will be found to be wholly excluded from the world with which the ethnologist deals.

A communicative field may be left intact by a change of language, language boundary, or language use. One instance is the New Guinea trade network in which Neo-Melanesian seems to have been replacing an earlier pidgin (Harding 1967: 6, 186). The Siane, discussed just above, seem clearly to be such a community. The effect of such changes, then, as well as the fact of their occurrence, must be considered with regard to the specific history of each case.

Such time perspective, assessment of communicative history, is strangely absent from recent ethnological discussions. Demarcation of present-day boundaries between languages and dialects seems to be relied upon, backed up, if at all, by genetic classifications at remoter levels. This approach would suffice only if it were true that genetic classification of languages and dialects mirrors communicative history, and if present demarcations of distance and closeness had come about by one, irreversible process of divergence. Perhaps it is just some such image that is implicitly in mind. The downward branching trees of language families may be unconsciously taken as representing the whole of linguistic and communicative history. If so, it must be pointed out that genetic relationship is generally a poor guide.

Two limitations of genetic relationship are particularly worth mention here. First, the evidence for placing languages in genetic families consists of less adaptive features, i.e., those most resistant to reflecting the communicative adaptations of the users of the languages. The greater the time-depth of the relationship the smaller the portion of the present-day features of languages that are pertinent to the genetic connection, and the less likely it is that the genetically interesting features reflect communicative ties. The loanwords in a language, the loanwords from it in other languages, and all features showing diffusional connections within a linguistic area, are more important often to an assessment of the past communicative history of a language in a community. The greater the time-depth of the genetic relationship in question, the greater the importance of diffusional phenomena as indications of communicative relationships.

Second, the present closeness or distance of dialects and languages usually does not reflect a unilinear divergence over tiem, but a complex ebb and flow. The actual historical relations and subgroupings of related dialects are difficult to establish, and the use of percentages of lexical similarity, or any one line of evidence, is likely to be quite misleading. Dialects may diverge lexically, then converge (cf. Gudschinsky 1955); once converged, they may diverge yet again. Use of all the available lines of evidence is required, if the course of development is to be sorted out.

Particularly interesting consequences of divergence are the emergence of stable new codes, such as the Greek *koiné*, based on a range of Greek dialects; and pidgins (some ultimately becoming creoles) based on extensive admixture of unrelated languages. It is important to note that in at least some cases lexical percentages may imply a depth of independence for a pidgin that is greatly exaggerated.

In short, the present-day alignment of dialects and languages does not necessarily mirror even purely *linguistic* history, let alone the communicative history of the communities in which the dialects and languages are found.

In effect, we must act on Boas' understanding that in an historical context "the problem of the study of language is not one of [genetic] classification but...our task is to trace the history of the development of human speech" (Boas 1920: 368). From this standpoint, genetic classification and reconstruction are but one portion of a general investigation of the history of languages and their uses. Much can in fact be done to infer past communicative fields, boundaries, links, through the resources of ethnohistory, areal linguistics, archaeology, and ethnology. There is a fair amount of direct testimony to the past existence of linguistic communication through the presence of diffused features in languages, and of features diffused through languages (such as myths). One might even hope eventually to reconstruct something like a series of maps of communicative fields for an area such as North America. Such work would be the necessary implication of the recognition (e.g., D'Andrade 1966: 152a-b; 1962a) of communicative independence as an aspect of validity in comparative ethnology.

The set of assumptions

The consequences of the analysis of the four assumptions can be summed up in a restatement such as the following:

(1) The ethnographic world is divided into "sociolinguistic" or communicative units, composed of repertoires of codes and rules of code-use; these units intersect or overlap; their associations with persons, groups, communities, and language varies.

(2) Between such units, mutual intelligibility and communication depend on a complex of factors, of which sameness or similarity is but one.

(3) Whether or not a particular code is the communicative means instrumental to particular cultural features is problematic.

(4) The time depth of an association between a particular code and particular cultural features is problematic.

CONCLUSION

We have seen that the language-involving terms of definitions of cultural units must be regarded as variables, and that the assumptions entailed by use of language as a criterion in ethnology are all problems for investigation, requiring specification in each case. In all probability the hope of a single classification of the cultural world into units for all purposes of comparison must be abandoned, if such a classification requires communicative units indexed by languages. The field worker who is to contribute information to the ethnologist must be advised to look beyond language and dialect boundaries to the factors governing the uses and boundaries of codes both within and between communities. The ethnologist himself must turn to a different perspective for an adequate conception of the relation of languages to cultural units. In so doing, one may contribute not only to the better practice of ethnology, but also to the foundations of anthropological theory. Most usual anthropological statements about language are an inferior sort of fairy tale, spun from unexamined assumptions of the sort I have called "Herderian". We need to build a theory of language that starts from what we can see to be actually the case in the world, man's polymorphous (and to the ethnologist, perhaps perverse) capacity to communicate in codes other than language, to use more languages than one, to make shifting choices as to codes and communication over time.

In short, if ethnology requires assumptions and inferences as to the role of languages in communication, then ethnology must concern itself with the description and history of sociolinguistic systems. Such a concern will join with an ongoing critique of received notions as to the relations between languages, communities, and speech in linguistics itself. A fair amount of literature has recently been devoted to this critique, and to indicating lines along which a more adequate perspective can be constructed (e.g., Ferguson and Gumperz, 1960; Ferguson, 1966; Gumperz, 1961, 1962, 1966; Hymes 1961, 1962, 1966, 1967; Labov, 1966).

From the standpoint of such an enterprise, the causes noted in this paper are not embarassments, but opportunities. Once the attempt to use languages as demarcations in an a priori way is abandoned, the really interesting problems appear. One is faced with basic research into the very nature of the relationships in question. Rather than try to patch up a list of exceptions, one can take the seeming exceptions as part of the empirical range of possibilities, and investigate their nature. What do they tell about the relation of languages to cultural units? about the types and systems of relationship that may occur? What can be said about the distribution of such types and systems? of their history? about the consequences for historical and comparative inference of the presence of each?

Let me repeat at this point that for many cross-cultural studies, the inadequacy of language boundaries as boundary markers of communicative units may be circumvented or compensated for. Nor is it the case that all use of genetic groups as variables must be eschewed. Interesting results may be obtained (as by Driver, 1966). The point is that it is one thing to discover what features of culture correlate with genetic linguistic groupings (cf. Jorgensen, 1966: 18[illegible]b), and to seek to explain why (since retention alone cannot be taken for granted as the cause); it is quite another to rely on such groupings as evidence of past communicative boundaries. Moreover, the requirement of flexibility with regard to choice of relevant codes and boundaries, depending on the cultural features being investigated, seems quite in keeping with the view of several cross-cultural specialists that the appropriate units of study may differ from one problem to another (D'Andrade, 1966: 151-152; Ember, 1964: 296c; Whiting, 1964: 305a). (In some comparative studies, indeed, one will not seek boundaries to mark the historical independence of units, but seek to define a common baseline or opportunity against which to assess differential response, or covariation, and so select units within boundaries of communication.)

Regarding 'Tribes'

My remarks have had to be directed at the general problem of the relation of languages to cultural units. With regard to the specific question of the tribe, the answer will depend upon the ethnologist's decision as to the appropriate definition of "tribe". It is clear now that use of the term "tribe" for peoples hither and yon has no likelihood of finding support in a consistent linguistic correlate. If the approach to the concept of "tribe" suggested by Fried (1966) is adopted, an interesting and perhaps quite specific possibility arises, one whichwill have the constructive effect of reversing the common ethnological fixation on genetic diversification of languages.

Let me first point out that as a major process of linguistic change, genetic diversification is limited to one portion of human history. It is typical of the process of the gradual peopling of the regions of the world, of periods of migration and local differentiation. It will seldom occur again. The great triumphs of comparative linguistics in method, and the great nineteenth century interest in tracing origins, should not blind us to the fact that the major process of linguistic change is now, and for some time has been, functional reintegration of diverse languages within complex communities. Especially since the spread of European society over the face of the earth, there has begun an interconnected series of processes of linguistic acculturation, pidginization, creolization, language obsolescence and loss, creation of international auxiliary and technical idioms, emergence of lingua francas and world languages, etc.

The emergence of tribes as secondary phenomena, as reaction formations, fits easily into such a perspective. From a linguistic standpoint, one's interest in the formation of tribes would not at all be a concern to associate each tribe with a linguistic boundary. One's concern would be with the much more interesting question of the way in which the formation of a tribe is reflected in, and conditioned by, the organization of linguistic resources among the peoples in question. That is the sort of linguistic perspective that is relevant today both to science and to practical affairs. Let us cease to think of languages as if they should reflect some primitively given demarcation of the world, and learn to think about them instead as instruments of human action.

NOTES

1. I want to thank Morton Fried for the opportunity to prepare this paper, and those who commented on it at the meetings.

2. Some illustrations of the principle and of awareness of empirical problems may be found in the work of Leibniz (1704; see Slotkin, 1965: 234), A. L. Schlözer (1735-1809) (see Butterfield, 1960: 50, 59), and Jefferson (1785; see pp. 96-97 of the 1964 edition).

3. The commentators on Naroll (1964) and Driver (1966) are cited by name and year, but not listed separately in the References. Those cited are Roland Berndt, Frank D. Bessac, Gertrude E. Dole, Harold E. Driver, Melvin Ember, Frank W. Moore, Gideon and Andrée F. Sjoberg, C. F. Voegelin, and John W. M. Whiting (commenting on Naroll, 1964); and R. G. D'Andrade, and Joseph G. Jorgenson (in reference to Driver, 1966). Citations from *Current Anthropology* include the column (a, b, c) as a convenience in locating specific passages.

4. One sort of interrelation between speech field of a community and personal speech networks of community members is noted by Harding (1967) in an interesting study of a New Guinea trade system. In pre-contact communities "there were always a few men, as there are now, who knew the languages of particular alien communities" (203). The trading dominance of the Bilibili islanders (a group of about 200-250 traders and pot makers in Astrolabe Bay) was associated with a collective knowledge of the languages of the communities with which they had economic relations, such that "the islanders as a group could serve as informants for most

of the languages of the area" (196). In addition to these diversified personal repertoires, there was use of a pidgin form of the Siassi language as a lingua franca (203).

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APPENDIX G

"ON COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE"

ON COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE

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I. Introduction. Theoretical and practical problems of studying language development of children converge. Relevance of current linguistic theory. Notions of homogeneous speech-community, perfect competence, independence of sociocultural features; depreciatory view of speech.

II. Heterogeneous speech-community, differential competence, constitutive role of sociocultural features.

III. Notions of competence and performance. Confusion in latter; competency for use.

IV. Notions of grammaticality and acceptability. Scope of latter. Set of three distinctions (possibility, feasibility, appropriateness) generalized.

V. Communicative (sociolinguistic) interference. Repertoires, routines, domains.

VI. A tentative practical framework.

VII. Multiple modalities; "where the information is".

VIII. Sociocultural assumptions.

IX. Conclusion; existential adequacy.

ON COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE[1]

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I

This paper is theoretical. One connotation of "theoretical" is "programmatic"; a related connotation is that one knows too little about the subject to say something practical. Both connotations apply to this attempt to contribute to the study of the "language problems of disadvantaged children." Practical work, however, must have an eye on the current state of theory, for it can be guided or misguided, encouraged or discouraged, by what it takes that state to be. Moreover, the language development of children has particular pertinence just now for theory. The fundamental theme of this paper is that the theoretical and the practical problems converge.

It is not that there exists a body of linguistic theory that practical research can turn to and has only to apply. It is rather that work motivated by practical needs may help build the theory that we need. To a great extent programs to change the language situation of children are an attempt to apply a basic science that does not yet exist. Let me review the present stage of linguistic theory to show why this is so.

Consider a recent statement, one that makes explicit and precise an assumption that has underlain much of modern linguistics (Chomsky 1965: 3):

> "Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and erros (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance."

From the standpoint of the children we seek to understand and help, such a statement may seem almost a declaration of irrelevance. All the difficulties that confront the children and ourselves seem swept from view.

One's response to such an indication of the state of linguistic theory might be to ignore fundamental theory and to pick and choose among its products. Models of language structure, after all, can be useful in ways not envisioned in the statements of their authors. Some linguists (e.g., William Labov, Peter Rosenbaum, Lita Gleitman) use transformational generative grammar to study some of the ways in which a speech-community is not homogeneous and in which speaker-listeners clearly have differential knowledge of a language. Perhaps, then, one ought simply to disregard how linguists define the scope of "linguistic" theory. One could point to several available models of language--Trager-Smith-Joos, tagnemic, stratificational, transformational-generative (in its MIT, Pennsylvania, Harvard and other variants), and, in England, "system-structure" (Halliday and others); remark that there are distinguished scholars using each to analyze English; regret that linguists are unable to agree on the analysis of English; and pick and choose, according to one's problem and local situation, leaving grammarians otherwise to their own devices.

To do so would be a mistake, for two reasons: on the one hand, the sort of theoretical perspective quoted above is relevant in ways that it is important always to have in mind; on the other hand, there is a body of linguistic data and problems that would be left without theoretical insight, if such a limited conception of linguistic theory were to remain unchallenged.

First, as to the special relevance of the theoretical perspective cited above: its representative anecdote (to use Kenneth Burke's term), the image it puts before our eyes, is that of a child born with the ability to master any language with almost miraculous ease and speed; a child who is not merely molded by conditioning and reinforcement, but who actively proceeds with the unconscious theoretical interpretation of the speech that comes its way, so that in a few years and with a finite experience, it is master of an infinite ability, that of producing and understanding in principle any and all grammatical sentences of language. Such a theory expresses the essential equality of potential of all children simply as human beings. It is noble in that it can inspire one with the belief that even the most dispiriting conditions can be transformed; it is an indispensable weapon against views that would explain the communicative differences among groups of children as inherent, perhaps racial.

Second, as to the limitations of such a perspective: when the image of the unfolding, mastering, fluent child is set beside the real children in our schools, the theory must seem, if not irrelevant, then at best a doctrine of poignancy. Poignant, because of the difference between what one imagines and what one sees; poignant too, because the theory, so powerful in its own realm, cannot on its own terms cope with the difference. To cope with the realities o of children as communicating beings requires a theory within which sociocultural factors have an explicit and constitutive role; and neither is the case.

For the perspective associated with transformational generative grammar, the world of linguistic theory has two parts: linguistic competence and linguistic performance. Linguistic competence is understood as concerned with the tacit knowledge of language structure, that is, knowledge that is commonly not conscious or available for spontaneous report, but necessarily implicit in what the (ideal) speaker-listener can say. The primary task of theory is to provide for an explicit account of such knowledge, especially in relation to the innate structure on which it must depend. It is in terms of such knowledge that one can produce and understand an infinite set of sentences, and that language can be spoken of as "creative", as energeia. Linguistic performance is most explicitly understood as concerned with the processes often termed encoding and decoding.

Thus, the theory of competence posits ideal objects in abstraction from sociocultural features that might enter into its description. As to acquisition of competence, that is also seen as essentially independent of sociocultural features, requiring only the presence of suitable speech in the environment of the child (and the child's survival) to develop. The theory of performance is the one sector of the theory that might have a specific sociocultural content; but while it is equated with a theory of language use, it is not essentially concerned with psychological byproducts of the analysis of grammar, not, say, with social interaction. As to a constitutive role for sociocultural features in the acquisition or conduct of performance, the attitude would seem quite negative. Little or nothing is said, and if something were said, one would expect it to be depreciatory. Some aspects of performance are, it is true, seen as having a constructive role (e.g., the cycling rules that help assign stress properly to sentences). If the passage quoted at the outset is recalled, however, and if the illustrations of performance phenomena in the chapter from which the passage comes are reviewed, it will be seen that the note persistently struck is one of limitation, if not disability. When the notion of performance is introduced as "the actual use of language in concrete situations", it is immediately stated that only under the idealization quoted could performance directly reflect competence, and that in actual fact it obviously could not. "A record of natural speech will show numerous false starts, deviations from rules, changes of plan in mid-course, and so on." One speaks of primary linguistic data as "fairly degenerate in quality" (Chomsky 1965: 31), or even of linguistic performance as "adulteration" of ideal competence (Katz 1967: 144). While"performance" is something of a residual category for the theory, clearly its most salient connotation is that of imperfect manifestation, of underlying system, even, raw behavior.

I do not think the failure to provide an explicit place for sociocultural features to be accidental. The restriction of the theory of competence to the notions of a homogeneous community, perfect knowledge, and independence of sociocultural factors does not seem just a simplifying assumption, the sort that any scientific theory must make. If that were so, then some remark might be made to that effect; some mention might be made of the need to include a sociocultural dimension in a more adequate theory; the nature of such inclusion might even be suggested. Nor does the predominant association of performance with imperfection seem accidental. Certainly, any stretch of speech is but a partial and inadequate indication of the structure that underlies it, so that to discover and make explicit the structure, one must go to intuitions of the structure as well. If one has the intuitions, of course, the arrangement might be thought of as efficient. And if one starts, not from the nature of grammar, but from the nature of speech, one might see that what to grammar is imperfect, or simply unaccounted for, may be the artful accomplishment of a social act (Garfinkel, ms.), or the patterned, spontaneous evidence of problem-solving and conceptual thought (John 1967: 5).

I take such traits to disclose an ideological aspect to the theoretical standpoint. It is, if I may say so, rather a Garden of Eden view. Human life seems divided between grammatical competence, an ideal, innately-derived sort of power, and performance, an exigency rather like the eating of the apple, thrusting the perfect speaker-hearer out into a fallen world. Of this world, where meanings may be won by the sweat of the brow, and communication achieved in labor, little is said. The controlling image is of an abstract, isolated individual, almost an unmotivated cognitive mechanism, not, except incidentally, a person in a social world.

Any theoretical stance of course has an ideological aspect, and that aspect of present linguistic theory is not its invention. A major characteristic of modern linguistics has been that it takes structure as primary and in itself, and tends to depreciate use, while not relinguishing any of its claim to the great significance that is attached to language. (Contrast classifical antiquity, where structure was a means to use, and the grammarian subordinate to the rhetor). The result can sometimes seem a very happy one. On the one hand, by narrowing concern to independently and readily structurable data, one can enjoy the prestige of an advanced science; on the other hand, despite ignoring the social dimensions of use, one retains the prestige of dealing with something fundamental to human life.

In this light, Chomsky is quite correct when he writes that his conception of the concern of linguistic theory seems to have been also the position of the founders of modern general linguistics. Certainly if modern structural linguistics is meant, then a major thrust of it has been to define the subject matter of linguistic theory in terms of what it is not. In de Saussure's linguistics, as generally interpreted, *la langue* was the privileged ground of structure, and *la parole* the residual realm of variation (among other things).[2] Chomsky associates his views of competence and performance with the Saussurian conceptions of langue and parole, but sees his own conceptions as superior, going beyond the conception of language as a systematic inventory of items to renewal of the Humboldtian conception of underlying processes. The Chomsky conception is superior, not only in this respect, but also in the very terminology it introduces to mark the difference. "Competence" and "performance" much more readily suggest concrete persons, situations, and actions. Indeed, from the standpoint of the classifical tradition in structural linguistics, Chomsky's theoretical standpoint is at once its revitalization and its culmination. It carries to its perfection the desire to deal in practice only with what is internal to language, yet to find in that internality what in theory is of the widest or deepest, human significance. No modern linguistic theory has spoken more profoundly of either the internal structure or the intrinsic human significance.

This revitalization flowers while around it emerge the sprouts of a conception that before the end of the century may succeed it. If such a succession occurs, it will be because, just as the transformational theory could absorb its predecessors and handle structural relationships beyond their grasp, so new relationships, relationships with an ineradicable social component, will become salient that will require a broader theory to absorb and handle them. I shall return to this historical conjecture at the end of this paper. Let me now sketch considerations that motivate a broader theory. And let me do this by first putting forward an additional representative anecdote.

II

As against the ideal speaker-listener, here is Bloomfield's account of one young Menomini he knew (1927 [1964]: 395):

> White-Thunder, a man around forty, speaks less English than Menomini, and that is a strong indictment, for his Menomini is atrocious. His vocabulary is small; his inflections are often barbarous; he constructs sentences of a few threadbare models. He may be said to speak no language tolerably. His case is not uncommon among younger men, even when they speak but little English.

Bloomfield goes on to suggest that the commonness of the case is due, in some indirect way, to the impact of the conquering language. In short, there is here differential competence within a heterogenous speech community, both undoubtedly shaped by acculturation. (The alternative to a constitutive role for the novel sociocultural factors is to assume that atrocious Menomini was common also before contact. If taken seriously, the assumption would still implicate sociocultural factors). Social life has affected not merely outward performance, but inner competence itself.[3/]

Let me now review some other indications of the need to transcend the notions of homogeneous speech-community, perfedt knowledge, and independence of sociocultural features.

In her excellent article reviewing recent studies of subcultural differences in language development in the United States, Courtney Cazden (1966:   ) writes that one thing is clear:

> The findings can be quickly summarized: on all the measures, in all the studies, the upper socio-economic status children, however defined, are more advanced than the lower socio-economic status children.

The point of course is not that social factors affect competence in situations of diversity only to hamper it. The differences reviewed by Cazden involve enabling effects for the lower status children just as much as disabling effects for the lower status children. Moreover, given subcultural differences in the patterns and purposes of language use, children of the lower status may actually excel in aspects of communicative competence not observed or measured in the tests summarized. And among the Menomini there were not only young men like White Thunder, but also those like Red Cloud Woman, who

> speaks a beautiful and highly idiomatic Menomini...(and) speaks Ojibwa and Potawatomi fluently....Linguistically, she would correspond to a highly educated American woman who spoke, say, French and Italian in addition to the very best type of cultivated, idiomatic English (Bloomfield 1927 [1964]: 394).

There are tribes of the northeast Amazon among whom the normal scope of linguistic ompetence is a control of at least four languages, a spurt in active command coming during adolescence, with repertoire and perfection of competence continuing to be augmented throughout life. Here, as in much of our world, the ideally fluent speaker-listener is multilingual. (Even an ideally fluent monolingual of course is master of functional varieties within the one language).

In this connection it should be noted that fluent members of communities often regard their languages, or functional varieties, as not identical in communicative adequacy. It is not only that one variety is obligatory or preferred for some uses, another for others (as is often the case, say, as between public occasions and personal relationships). Such intuitions reflect experience and self-evaluation as to what one can in fact do with a given variety.[4] This sort of differential competence has nothing to do with "disadvantage" or deficiency relative to other normal members of the community. All of them may find colloquial Arabic, say, the only medium in which personal emotion can be articulated, or classifcal Arabic the only medium in which certain subjects can be stated.

The combination of community diversity and differential competence makes it necessary not to take the presence in a community of a widespread language, say, Spanish or English, at face value. Just as one puts the gloss of a native word in quotation marks, so as not to imply that the meaning of the word is thereby accurately identified, so one should put the name of a language in quotation marks, until its true status in terms of competence has been determined. (Clearly there is need for a theoretically motivated and empirically tested set of terms by which to characterize the different kinds of competence that may be found.) In an extreme case what counts as "English" in the code repertoire of a community may be but a few phonologically marked forms (the Iwam of New Guinea). The cases in general constitute a continuum, perhaps a scale, from more restricted to less restricted varieties, somewhat crosscut by adaptation of the same inherited "English" materials to different purposes and needs. A linguist analyzing data from a community on the assumption "once English, always English" might miss and sadly misrepresent the actual competence supposedly expressed by his grammar.

A constitutive role for social factors is not a matter of diverse varieties and heterogeneous speech communities alone. There is a radical social component at the heart of a grammar in essentially homogeneous situations. Consider the California Indian language, Yokuts. Stanley Newman reports that the words he recorded were short, composed of a stem and mostly with but one or two suffixes, almost never more. Newman noticed, however, that the underlying patterning of the suffixes implied the possibility of longer sequences. He reports (Newman (1940 [1964]: 374):

> An instructive exercise...was to construct words having four or five suffixes and to ask the informant for a translation. Although such words complied with the grammatical rules and could be translated by my informant without any difficulty, they seldom failed to provoke his amusement. It was obvious that these words were impossibly heavy and elaborate. To the Yokuts feeling for simplicity they were grammatical monstrosities.

From Newman's information it appears that the longer words were not deviant (not derivatively generated (Chomsky 1965: 227, n. 2)); their interpretation posed no problem at all. Of the same degree of grammaticalness in a structural sense as shorter sequences, they were unacceptable (or marked for expressivity, perhaps humor or pomposity) due to a Yokuts demand for severe simplicity, a value that underlies Yokuts narrative style as well.

Newman contrasts the Yokuts value with an expressive value implicit in

English, and argues for the equal validity of each. To the English imagination the Yokuts style appears drab, "but, by the same token, the stylistic features of English cannot appeal to the intuitions of a Yokuts native" (377). He follows Sapir in regarding each language as "like a particular art form in that it works with a limited range of materials and pursues the stylistic goals that have been and are constantly being discovered in a collective quest" (377).

One can object to a style of explanation that personifies a language. It is the Yokuts community that works with a limited range of materials and pursues stylistic goals. Nevertheless a fundamental point is clear. If the grammatical is identified with what is structurally possible and, indeed, transparent (as were Newman's four and five suffix words), then communities may draw a line of acceptability within the grammatical on the basis of shared values, values affecting expression both in language and in such uses of language as narrative. Where the line is drawn may change over time within the community, and, by the same token, may differ between communities with identical grammars. Indeed, the drawing of the line of acceptability may be a function of personal culture (by personal culture I intend the theoretical position staked out by Sapir (1938) with regard to Two Crows, and developed in various ways by Wallace (1961) ("organization of diversity" vs. "replication of similarity"), Goodenough (1962), myself (1964b: 29, n. 8, and others). The question would apply a fortiori to the point at which a line would be drawn for degrees of grammaticalness in relation to strict subcategorization and selection (Chomsky 1965: 148-153).

The constitutive role of sociocultural factors has been stressed by Labov. Phonological features might be expected to be a case of perception and cognition determined by purely linguistic factors. Yet, reporting on perception of phonological contrasts, Labov (1965: 102, n. 12) writes:

> The contention that native speakers can hear phonemic distinctions

> much better than nonphonemic distinctions was not borne out by the evidence. Indeed, one might say that the ability to perceive distinctions is determined largely by the social significance of the distinction to the listener.

Social factors also shape response to phonological features in ways essential to the constitution of the speech community itself. When the presence or absence of /-r/ (after vowels) in the speech of individual New Yorkers is approached in terms of notions of a homogeneous speech community, its occurrence appears chaotic and New York a dialectal hodgepodge. When the occurrence of /-r/ is approached through control of contextual styles and social position, it is found to be a variable with an underlying pattern, such that New York City constitutes a speech community in terms of shared norms for the evaluation of this variable and certain others. (Notice Labov's statements that "one of the primary elements in the underlying structure of the New York City speech community (is) a profound linguistic insecurity" and that "the linguistic self-hatred which marks the average New Yorker motivates many of the other types of (linguistic) behavior that have been studied here" (Labov 1965: 479-480)). Here again phenomena that belong to the domain of linguistic competence show diversity and pattern that has a social basis.

Clearly work with children, and with the place of language in education, requires a theory that can deal with a heterogeneous speech-community, differential competence, the constitutive role of sociocultural features--that can take into account such phenomena as White-Thunder, socio-economic differences, multilingual mastery, relativity of competence in "Arabic", "English", etc., expressive values, socially determined perception, contextual styles and shared norms for the evaluation of variables. Those whose work requires such a theory know best how little of its content can now be specified. Two things can be said. First, linguistics needs such a theory too. Concepts that are unquestioningly postulated as basic to linguistics (speaker-listener, speech community, speech act, acceptability, etc.) are, as we see, in fact sociocultural variables, and only when one has moved from their postulation to their analysis can one secure the foundations of linguistic theory itself. Second, the notion of competence may itself provide the key. Such comparative study of the role of language as has been undertaken shows the nature and evaluation of linguistic ability to vary cross-culturally; even what is to count as the same language, or variety, to which competence might be related, depends in part upon social factors (cf. Gumperz 1964, Hymes 1968a, Labov, 1966). Given, then, the assumption that the competency of uses of language entails abilities and judgments relative to, and interdependent with, sociocultural features, one can see how to extend the notion to allow for this. I shall undertake this, by recasting first the representative anecdote of the child, and then the notions of competence and performance themselves.

III

Recall that one is concerned to explain how a child comes rapidly to be able to produce and understand (in principle) any and all of the grammatical sentences of a language. Consider now a child with just that ability. A child who might produce any sentence whatever--such a child would be likely to be institutionalized. Even more so if not only sentences, but also speech or silence was random, unpredictable. For that matter, a person who chooses occasions and sentences suitably, but is master only of fully grammatical sentences, is at best a bit odd. Some occasions call for being appropriately ungrammatical.

We have then to account for the fact that a normal child acquires knowledge not only of grammatical sentences, but also of appropriate ones. He or she acquires competence as to when to speak, when not, and as to what to talk about with whom, when, and where, in what manner. In short, a child becomes able to accomplish a repertoire of speech acts, to take part in speech events, and to evaluate their accomplishment by others. This competence, moreover, is integral with attitudes, values, and motivations concerning language, its features and uses, and integral with competence for, and attitudes toward, the interrelation of language with the other codes of communicative conduct (cf. Goffman 1956: 477; 1963: 335; 1964). The internalization of attitudes toward a language and its uses is particularly important (cf. Labov (1965: 84-85) on priority of subjective evaluation in social dialect and processes of change), as is internationalization of attitudes toward use of language itself (e.g., attentiveness to it), and the relative place that language comes to play in a pattern of mental abilities (cf. Cazden 1966), and in strategies--what language is considered available, reliable, suitable for, vis-a-vis other kinds of code.

The acquisition of such competency is of course fed by social experience, needs, and motives, and issues in action that is itself a renewed source of motives, needs, experience. We break irrevocably with the model that designs language with one face toward meaning, one toward sound, and that defines the organization of language as consisting of rules for linking the two. Such a model implies that reference is the sole function of speech, as if languages were never organized in the service of insults, prayer, respect, poems, the many varied forms of persuasion, direction, expression and symbolic play. A model of language must have a face toward communicative conduct and social life.

Attention to the social dimension is thus not restricted to occasions on which social factors seem to interfere with or restrict the grammatical. The engagement of language in social life has a positive, productive aspect. There are rules of use without which the rules of grammar would be useless. Just as rules of syntax can control aspects of phonology, and just as semantic rules perhaps control aspects of syntax, so rules of speech acts enter as a controlling factor for linguistic form as a whole. Linguists generally have developed a theory of levels by showing that what is the same on one level of representation has in fact two different statuses, for which a further level must be posited (both Chomsky and Sydney Lamb). A second aspect is that what is different at one level may have in fact the same status at the further level. (Thus the two interpretations of "He decided on the floor" (the floor as what he decided on/as where he decided) point to a further level at which the difference in structure is shown. The parallel interpretations of "he decided on the floor" and "she gave up on the floor" point to a further level at which the sameness in structure is shown). Just this reasoning requires a level of speech acts. What is grammatically the same sentence may be an instruction or a request; what are grammatically two different sentences may as acts both be requests. One can study the level of speech acts in terms of the conditions under which sentences can be taken as alternative types of act, and in terms of the conditions under which types of act can be realized as alternative types of sentence. And only from the further level of use can some of the relations among communicative means be seen, e.g., the mutual substitutability of a word and a nod to realize an act of assent, the necessary cooccurence of words and the raising of a hand to realize an oath.

Rules of use are not a late grafting. Data from the first years of acquisition of English grammar show children to develop rules for the use of different forms in different situation (Susan Ervin-Tripp, personal communication). Allocation of whole languages to different situations is common for children in multilingual households from the beginning of their acquisition. Competency for use is part of the same developmental matrix as competence for grammar.

The acquisition of competency for use, indeed, can be stated in the same terms as acquisition of competence for grammar. Within the developmental matrix in which knowledge of the sentences of a language is acquired, children also acquire knowledge of a set of ways in which sentences are used. From a finite experience of speech acts and their interdependence with sociocultural features, they develop a general theory of the speaking appropriate in their community, which they employ, like other forms of tacit cultural knowledge (competence) in conducting and interpreting social life (cf. Goodenough 1957 [1964], Searle 1967). They come to be able to recognize, for example, appropriate and inappropriate interrogative behavior (e.g., among the Araucanians of Chile, that to repeat a question is to insult; among the Tzeltal of Chiapas, Mexico, that a direct question is not properly asked (and to be answered "Nothing"); among the Toba of Argentina, that a direct answer to a first question implies that the answerer has no time to talk, a vague answer that the question will be answered directly the second time, and that talk can continue).

The existence of competency for use may seem obvious, but if its study is to be established, and conducted in relation to current linguistics, then the notions of competence and performance must themselves be critically analyzed, and a revised formulation provided.

The chief difficulty of present linguistic theory is that it would seem to require one to identify the study of the phenomena of concern to us here with its category of performance. The theory's category of competence, identified with the criterion of grammaticality, provides no place. Only performance is left, and its associated criterion of acceptability. Indeed, language use is equated with performance ("the theory of language use--the theory of performance" (Chomsky 1965: 9).

The difficulty with this equation, and the reasons for the making of it, can be explained as follows. First, the clarification of the concept of performance offered by Chomsky (1965: 10-15), as we have seen, omits almost everything of sociocultural significance. The focus of attention is upon questions such as which among grammatical sentences are most likely to be produced, easily understood, less clumsy, in some sense more natural; and such questions are studied initially in relation to formal tree-structures, and properties of these such as nesting, self-embedding, multiple-branching, left-branching, and right-branching. The study of such questions is of interest, but the results are results of the psychology of perception, memory, and the like, not of the domain of cultural patterning and social action. Thus, when one considers what the sociocultural analogues of performance in this sense might be, one sees that these analogues would not include major kinds of judgment and ability with which one must deal in studying the use of language (see below under appropriateness).

Second, the notion of performance, as used in discussion, seems confused between different meanings. In one sense, performance is observable behavior, as when one speaks of determining from the data of performance the underlying system of rules (1965: 4), and of mentalistic linguistics as that linguistics that uses performance as data, along with other data, e.g., those of introspection, for determination of competence (1965: 193). The recurrent use of "actual" implies as much, as when the term is first introduced in the book in question, "actual performance", and first characterized: "performance (the actual use of language in concrete situations)" (1965: 3, 4). In this sense, performance is "actual", competence underlying. In another sense, performance itself also underlies data, as when one constructs a performance model, or infers a performative device (e.g., a perceptual one) that is to explain data and to be tested against them (Chomsky 1965: 15); or as when, in a related sense, one even envisages the possibility of stylistic "rules of performance" to account for occurring word orders not accounted for by grammatical theory (1965: 127).

When one speaks of performance, then, does one mean the behavioral data of speech? or all that underlies speech beyond the grammatical? or both? If the ambiguity is intentional, it is not fruitful; it smacks more of the residual category and marginal interest.

The difficulty can be put in terms of the two contrasts that the usage manifests: (a) (underlying) competence vs. (actual) performance;

(b) (underlying) grammatical competence vs. (underlying) models/ rules of performance.

The first contrast is so salient that the status of the second is left obscure. In point of fact, I find it impossible to understand what stylistic "rules of performance" could be, except a further kind of underlying competence, but the term is withheld.

Some recognition thus seems to be given to the rule-governed nature of the use of language, while a terminological dichotomy is retained that prejudices understanding of the point. So long as the term for rules of use is also the term with which one says depreciatingly, that's just performance, one fosters the mistaken view that use of language is just imperfect realization of one system, rather than the complex interaction of several systems, as Chomsky at one point sees it to be (1965: 11; cf. Sapir 1921 [1949]: 165).

The confusion with regard to what is and is not competence, and motivation for it, seem to become clear in Chomsky's defense of work in generative grammar against the charge that it slights study of performance. He writes (1965: 15):

> There has been a fair amount of criticism of work in generative grammar on the grounds that it slights study of performance in favor of study of underlying competence. The facts, however, seem to be

> that the only studies of performance, outside of phonetics...are those carried out as a by-product of work in generative grammar. In particular, the study of memory limitations just summarized, and the study of deviation from rules, as a stylistic device...have developed in this way. Furthermore, it seems that these lines of investigation can provide some insight into performance. Consequently, this criticism is unwarranted, and furthermore, completely misdirected. It is the descriptivist limitation-in-principle to classification and organization of data, to "extracting patterns" from a corpus of observed speech, to describing "speech habits" or "habit structures", insofar as these may exist, etc., that precludes the development of a theory of actual performance.

Several things must be said. First if (outside of phonetics) only byproducts of generative grammar qualify as studies of performance, what is to be said of more than two thousand years of work in rhetoric and poetics? And of investigations of the use of language in many other spheres, as in social interaction and cultural behavior generally? If these investigations are not performance, then the equation of performance with use of language has reduced the notion of "use" so much as to include most aspects of speaking. Or, if these investigations do deal with performance subject-matter, then the term "study" is oddly restricted to just those investigations that do arise as generative grammar by-products. In either case, the notion of the study of performance, and the equated notions of theory of performance : theory of language use, have been fatally constricted from the standpoint of the communicative development of children. Only implementations of a model of grammar, viewed from the standpoint of the model, are admitted. (The paragraph ending "it is difficult to imagine any other basis on which a theory of performance might develop (other than study of performance models incorporating generative grammars)" (1965: 15) seems to suggest as much). But to take a model of grammar as the sole starting point is to prejudice ever arriving at an adequate and revealing understanding of speech.

Second, the source of the defense would seem to be the belief that "There seems little reason to question the traditional view that investigation of performance will proceed only so far as understanding of underlying competence permits" (1965: 10). This belief would seem to justify the argument that criticism is unwarranted and misdirected. The lines of psychological investigation sketched (memory limitations, deviation) seem able at least to provide some insight into performance; descriptivist limitations preclude it. In short, a theory of performance can develop only from the standpoint of underlying abilities, competence. And by definition within the theory, competence is grammar.

In these respects I think one sees the distorting effect of using the one term "performance" for two distinct things, of the correlative withholding of "competence" from the second of them, and of the recurrent dichotomy between underlying knowledge and actual performance, so that the sense in which performance entails its own underlying knowledge is obscured.[5] If the only underlying competence expressly recognized as such is grammatical, then of course only grammatical competence can fulfill the role of providing the indispensable basis for the study of the use of language. Then of course studies of the use of language conducted prior to or independently of the development of explicit generative grammar may with some justice seem irrelevant (although one might argue for them, just as Chomsky argues for traditional grammars, that much of what they say is sound). Once one makes clear the difference, within the realm of the nongrammatical itself, between that which is actual behavior and that which underlies it, the whole situation changes. The objection to merely external studies of speech still holds; competence must be the central concern. But arbitrary restriction of the domain of underlying knowledge can be ended; the methodological spirit of generative grammar can be extended to the whole of the abilities manifest in speech, as it should be. The identification of underlying competence with grammatical competence was indeed, if not a grammarian's hybris, then the product of a particular theoretical period. There was a need to establish the view that a grammatical system has a deep structure radically distinct from observed data (cf. 1965: 16), and that abilities manifest in speech cannot be explained without reference to it. This need may have motivated the primary insistence on the contrast between rules of grammar and actual behavior. Now that the battle is won, one can attend to the relation between rules of grammar and rules of use.

It remains that the present vision of generative grammar extends only a little way into the realm of the use of language. To grasp the intuitions and data pertinent to underlying competence for use requires a sociocultural standpoint. To develop that standpoint adequately, one must transcend the present formulation of the dichotomy of competence : performance, as we have seen, and the associated formulation of the judgments and abilities of the users of a language as well. To this I now turn.

IV

There are several sectors of communicative competence, of which the grammatical is one.[6] Put otherwise, there is behavior, and, underlying it, there are several systems of rules reflected in the judgments and abilities of those whose messages the behavior manifests. (The question of how the interrelationships among sectors might be conceived is touched upon below). In the linguistic theory under discussion, judgments are said to be of two kinds: of grammaticality, with respect to competence, and of acceptability, with respect to performance. Each pair of terms is strictly matched; the critical analysis of one of each pair requires analysis of the other. In particular, the analysis just given requires that explicit distinctions be made within the notion of "acceptability" to match the distinctions of kinds of "performance", and at the same time, the entire set of terms must be examined and recast with respect to the communicative as a whole.

If an adequate theory of language users and language use is to be developed, it seems that judgments must be recognized to be in fact not of two kinds but of four. And if linguistic theory is to be integrated with theory of communication and culture, this fourfold distinction must be stated in a sufficiently generalized way. I would suggest, then, that for language and for other forms of communication (culture), four questions arise:

(1) whether (and to what degree) something is formally possible;

(2) whether (and to what degree) something is feasible in virtue of the means of implementation available;

(3) whether (and to what degree) something is appropriate (adequate, happy, successful) in relation to a context in which it is used and evaluated;

(4) whether (and to what degree) something is in fact done, actually performed, and what its doing entails.

A linguistic illustration: a sentence may be grammatical, awkward, tactful, and rare. (One might think of the four as successive subsets; more likely they should be pictured as overlapping circles.)

These questions may be asked from the standpoint of a system per se, or from the standpoint of persons. An interest in competence dictates the latter standpoint here. Several observations can be made. There is an important sense in which a normal member of a community has knowledge with respect to all these aspects of the communicative systems available to him. He will interpret or assess the conduct of others and himself in ways that reflect a knowledge of each (possible, feasible, appropriate, done (if so, how often). There is an important sense in which he would be said to have a capability with regard to each. This latter sense, indeed, is one many would understand as included in what would be meant by his competence. Finally, it cannot be assumed that the formal possibilities of a system and individual knowledge are identical; a system may contain possibilities not part of the present knowledge of a user (cf. Wallace 1961b).

Given these considerations, I think there is not sufficient reason to maintain a terminology at variance with more general usage of "competence" and "performance" in the sciences of man, as is the case with the present equation of competence, knowledge, systemic possibility, and of performance, behavior, implementational constraints, appropriateness. It seems necessary to distinguish these things and to reconsider their relationship, if their investigation is to be insightful and adequate.

I should take competence as the most general term for the capabilities of a person. This choice is in the spirit, if against the letter, of the concern in linguistic theory for underlying capability. Competence is dependent upon both (tacit) knowledge and (ability for) use. Knowledge is distinct, then, both from competence (as its part) and from systemic possibility (to which its relation is an empirical matter). Notice that Cazden (1967), by utilizing the systemic possibility definition of competence, entirely separates it from what persons can do--a logical result, but one quite at variance with normal scientific usage and strangely misleading). Knowledge also is to be understood as subtending all four parameters of communication just noted. There is knowledge of each. Ability for use also may relate to all four parameters. Certainly it may be the case that individuals differ with regard to ability to use knowledge of each: to interpret, differentiate, etc. The specification of ability for use as part of competence allows for the role of noncognitive factors, such as motivation, as partly determining competence.

Turning to judgments and intuitions of persons, the most general term for the criterion of such judgments would be acceptable. Quirk (1966) so uses it, and Chomsky himself at one point remarks that "grammaticalness" is only one of the many factors that interact to determine acceptability" (1965: 11). (The term is thus freed from its strict pairing with "performance"). The sounces of acceptability are to be found in the four parameters just noted, and in interrelations among them that are not well understood.

Turning to actual use and actual events, the term performance is now free for this meaning, but with several important reminders and provisos. "Performance" is now distinct from the knowledge underlying judgments of appropriateness. The "performance models" studied in psycholinguistics are to be taken as models of aspects of ability for use, relative to means of implementation in the brain. (There seems indeed, to have been some unconscious shifting between the sense in which one would speak of the performance of a motor, and that in which one would speak of the performance of a person or actor (cf. Goffman 1959: 17-76, "Performances") or of a cultural tradition (Singer 1955, Wolf 1964: 75-6). Here the performance of a person is not identical with a behavioral record, or with the imperfect or partial realization of competence. It takes into account the interaction between competence (knowledge, ability for use), the competence of others, and the cybernetic and emergent properties of events themselves. A performance, as an event, may have properties (patterns and dynamics) not reducible to terms of individual or standardized competence. Sometimes, indeed, these properties are the point (a concert, play, party).

Having stated these general recommendations, let me now review relations between the linguistic and other communicative systems, especially in terms of cultural anthropology. I shall consider both terminology and content, using the four questions as a framework.

(1) Whether (and to what degree) something is formally possible. This formulation seems to express an essential concern of present linguistic theory for the openness, potentiality, of language, and to generalize it for cultural systems. When systemic possibility is a matter of language, the corresponding term is of course grammaticality. Indeed, language is so much the paradigmatic example that one uses "grammar" and "grammaticality" by extension for other systems of formal possibility (recurrent references to a cultural grammar, Kenneth Burke's A Grammar of Motives, etc.). For particular systems, such extension may well be the easiest course; it is much easier to say that something is "grammatical" with respect to the underlying structure of a body of myth, than to say in a new sense that it is "mythical". As a general term, one does readily enough speak of "cultural" (in a way analogous to grammatical (Sapir once wrote of "culturalized behavior", and it is clear that not all of behavior is cultural). Anthropology has indeed often viewed the grammatical as a subset of the cultural). We may say, then, that something possible within a formal system is grammatical, cultural, or, on occasion, communicative (cf. Hymes 1967b). Perhaps one can also say uncultural and uncommunicative, as well as ungrammatical, for the opposite.

(2) Whether (and to what degree) something is feasible. The predominant concern here, it will be recalled, has been for psycholinguistic factors such as memory limitation, perceptual device, effects of properties such as nesting, embedding, branching, and the like. Such considerations are not limited to linguistics. A parallel in cultural anthropology is Wallace's hypothesis (1961a:

462) that the brain is such that

> culturally institutionalized folk taxonomies will not contain more than 2^6 entities and consequently will not require more than six orthogonally related binary dimensions for the definitions of all terms.

With regard to the cultural, one would take into account other features of the body and features of the material environment as well. With regard to the communicative, the general importance of the notion of means of implementation available is clear.

As we have seen, the term "acceptable" has been used corresponding to the entire area here distinguished by questions (2), (3) and (4).

As we have seen, question (2) defines one portion of what is lumped together in linguistic theory under the heading of performance, and, correspondingly, acceptability. Clearly a more specific term is needed for what is in question here. No general term has been proposed for this property with regard to cultural behavior as a whole, so far as I know, and feasible seems suitable and best for both. Notice, moreover, that the implementational constraints affecting grammar may be largely those that affect the cultural as a whole. Certainly with regard to the brain there would seem to be substantial identity.

(3) Whether (and to what degree) something is appropriate. As we have seen, appropriateness is hardly brought into view in the linguistic theory under discussion, and is lumped under the heading of performance, and, correspondingly, acceptability. With regard to cultural anthropology, the term appropriate has been used (Conklin, Frake, etc.), and has been extended to language (Hymes 1964a: 39-41). "Appropriateness" seems to suggest readily the required sense of relation to contextual features. (Since any judgment is made in some defining context, it may always involve a factor of appropriateness, so that this dimension must be controlled even in study of purely grammatical com-

petence (cf. Labov 1966). From a communicative standpoint, judgments of appropriateness may not be assignable to different spheres, as between the linguistic and the cultural; certainly, the spheres of the two will intersect. (One might think of appropriateness with regard to grammar as the context-sensitive rules of subcategorization and selection to which the base component is subject; there would still be intersection with the cultural (cf. Yokuts example in II)).

Judgment of appropriateness employs a tacit knowledge. Chomsky himself discusses the need to specify situations in mentalistic terms, and refers to proper notions of "what might be expected from anthropological research" (1965: 195, n. 5). Here there would seem to be recognition that an adequate approach to the relation between sentences and situations must be "mentalistic", entailing a tacit knowledge, and, hence, competence (in the usage of both Chomsky and this paper). But the restriction of competence (knowledge) to the grammatical prevails, so far as explicit development of theory is concerned. By implication, only "performance" is left. There is no mention of what might contribute to judgment of sentences in relation to situations, nor how such judgments might be analyzed. The lack of explicitness here, and the implicit contradiction of a "mentalistic" account of what must in terms of the theory be a part of "performance" show again the need to place linguistic theory within a more general sociocultural theory.

(4) Whether (and to what degree) something is done. The study of communicative competence cannot restrict itself to occurrences, but it cannot ignore them. Structure cannot be reduced to probabilities of occurrence, but structural change is not independent of them. The capabilities of language users do include some (perhaps unconscious) knowledge of probabilities and shifts in them as indicators of style, response, etc. Something may be possible, feasible, and appropriate and not occur. No general term is perhaps needed here, but the

point is needed, especially for work that seeks to change what is done.

In sum, the goal of a broad theory of competence can be said to be to show the ways in which the systemically possible, the feasible, and the appropriate are linked to produce and interpret actually occurring cultural behavior.

It is too early to propose a precise model of the interrelations of the linguistic portion of competence and the rest. At least three abstract possibilities would seem to exist (Fig. 1).

[Fig. 1 about here]

It would seem, to be sure, that sociolinguistic (communicative) competence acts not only to select among grammatical possibilities, but also to select utterances that are designated as not possible. The more tightly the grammatical is defined, the more difficult it is to see sociolinguistic competence merely as acting upon its output, and the more the two seem in some way coordinate.

In multilingual communities, where choice of entire grammar may be an option, and when the resources of one grammar may be interwoven with those of another (as in Luther's Latin-German tabletalk, or the French interwoven Russian of prerevolutionary aristocracy), the priority of the social act seems to appear clearly. Ultimately a diagram of relations must envisage competence in a plurality of means (say, grammar A, grammar B, body idiom A, paralinguistics A), these being aspects of a general communicative competence.

V

We spoke first of a child's competence as "in principle". Of course no child has perfect knowledge or mastery of the communicative means of his community. In particular, differential competence has itself a developmental history in one's life. The matrix formed in childhood continues to develop and

Figure 1


(a)
Linguistic Competence
+
(other) Communicative Competence
Linguistic Performance
+
(other) Communicative Performance
(b)
Communicative Competence
Linguistic Competence
Communicative Performance
Linguistic Performance
(c)
Communicative Competence
Linguistic Competence
Communicative Performance
Linguistic Performance

change throughout life with respect both to sentence structures and their uses (cf. Labov 1965: 77, 91-92; Chomsky 1965: 202, and recall the northeast Amazon situation mentioned earlier. Tanner (1967: 21) reports for a group of Indonesians: "Although the childhood speech patterns...foreshadowed those of the adult, they did not determine them....For these informants it is the principle of code specialization that is the important characteristic of childhood linguistic experience, not the pattern of code specialization itself. (All are multilingual from childhood). Not one person interviewed reported a static linguistic history in this respect).

Perhaps one should contrast a "long" and a "short" range view of competency, the short range view being interested primarily in understanding innate capacities as unfolded during the first years of life, and the long range view in understanding the continuing socialization and change of competence through life. In any case, here is one major respect in which a theory of competence must go beyond the notion of ideal fluency in a homogeneous community, if it is to be applicable to work with disadvantaged children and with children in educational systems in much of the world. When one is dealing with children whose primary language or language variety is different from that of their school, with intent to change or add, one is presupposing the possibility that competence that has unfolded in the natural way can be altered, perhaps drastically so, by new social factors. One is assuming from the outset a confrontation of different systems of competency within the school and community, and focusing on the way in which one affects or can be made to affect the other. One encounters phenomena that pertain not only to the separate structures of languages, but also to what has come to be called interference (Weinreich 1953) between them: problems of the interpretation of manifestations of one system in terms of another.

Since the interference involves features of language and features of use together, one might adopt the phrase suggested by Alfred Hayes, and speak of sociolinguistic interference. (More generally, one would speak of communicative interference to allow for the role of modes of communication other than language; in this section, however, I shall focus on phenomena of language and language use per se).

When a child from one developmental matrix enters a situation in which the communicative expectations are defined in terms of another, mispereeption and misanalysis may occur at every level. As is well known, words may be misunderstood because of differences in phonological systems; sentences may be misunderstood because of differences in grammatical systems; intents, too, and innate abilities, may be misevaluated because of differences of systems for the use of language and for the import of its use (as against other modalities).

With regard to education, I put the matter some years ago in these words (1961a: 65-66):

> "...new speech habits and verbal training must be introduced, necessarily by particular sources to particular receivers, using a particular code with messages of particular forms via particular chanels, about particular topics and in particular settings--and all this from and to people for whom there already exist definite patternings of linguistic routines, of personality expression via speech, of uses of speech in social situations, of attitudes and conceptions toward speech. It seems reasonable that success in such an educational venture will be enhanced by an understanding of this existing structure, because the innovators' efforts will be perceived and judged in terms of it, and innovations which mesh with it will have greater success than those which cross its grain."

The notion of sociolinguistic interference is of the greatest importance for the relationship between theory and practice. First of all, notice that a theory of sociolinguistic interference must begin with heterogeneous situations, whose dimensions are social as well as linguistic (While a narrow theory seems to cut itself off from such situations, it must of course be utilized in dealing with them. See, for example, Labov and Cohen (1967) on relations between standard and non-standard phonological and syntactic rules in Harlem, and between receptive and productive competence of users of the non-standard vernacular).

Second, notice that the notion of sociolinguistic interference presupposes the notion of sociolinguistic systems between which interference occurs, and thus helps one see how to draw on a variety of researches that might be overlooked or set aside. (I have in mind for example obstacles to use of research on "second-language learning" in programs for Negro students because of the offensiveness of the term). The notions of sociolinguistic interference and system require a conception of an integrated theory of sociolinguistic description. Such work as has been done to contribute to such a theory has found it necessary to start, not from the notion of a language, but from the notion of variety or code. In particular, such a descriptive theory is forced to recognize that the historically derived status of linguistic resources as related or unrelated languages and dialects, is entirely secondary to their status in actual social relationships. Firstly, recall the need to put language names in quotes (section II). Secondly, the degree of linguistic similarity and distance cannot predict mutual intelligibility, let alone use (cf. Hymes 1968). Thirdly, from the functional standpoint of a sociolinguistic description, means of quite different scope can be employed in equivalent roles. A striking example is that the marking of intimacy and respect served by shift of second person pronoun in French (tu : vous) may be served by shift of entire language in Paraguay

(Guarani : Spanish). Conversely, what seem equivalent means from the standpoint of languages may have quite different roles, e. g., the elaborated and restricted codes of English studied by Bernstein (1966). In short, we have to break with the tradition of thought which simply equates one language, one culture, and takes a set of functions for granted. In order to deal with the problems faced with disadvantaged children, and with education in much of the world, we have to begin with the conception of the speech habits, or competencies, of a community or population, and regard the place among them of the resources of a historically-derived language as an empirical question. As functioning codes, one may find . one language, three languages; dialects widely divergent or divergent by a hair; styles almost mutually incomprehensible, or barely detectable as different by the outsider; the objective linguistic differences are secondary, and do not tell the story. What must be known is the attitude toward the differences, the functional role assigned to them, the use made of them. Only on the basis of such a functionally motivated description can comparable cases be established and valid theory developed.

Now with regard to sociolinguistic interference among school children, much relevant information and theoretical insight can come from the sorts of cases variously labelled "bilingualism", "linguistic acculturation", "dialectology", "creolization", whatever. The value of an integrated theory of sociolinguistic description to the practical work would be that (1) it would attempt to place studies, diversely labelled, within a common analytical framework; and (2), by placing such information within a common framework, where one can talk about relations among codes, and types of code-switching, and types of interference as between codes, one can make use of the theory while perhaps avoiding connotations that attach to such labels as "second-language learning." (I say perhaps" because of course it is very difficult to avoid unpleasant connotations for any terms used to designate situations that are themselves intrinsically sensitive and objectionable).

William Stewart's (1966: 11, n. 2) suggestion that some code relationships in the United States might be better understood if seen as part of a continuum of cases ranging to the Caribbean and Africa, for example, seems to me from a theoretical standpoint very promising. It is not that most code relationships in the United States are to be taken as involving different languages, but that they do involve relationships among different codes, and that the full series illuminates the part. Stewart has seen through the different labels of dialect, creole, pidgin, language, bilingualism, to a common sociolinguistic dimension. Getting through different labels to the underlying sociolinguistic dimensions is a task in which theory and practice meet.

Let me now single out three interrelated concepts, important to a theory of sociolinguistic description, which have the same property of enabling us to cut across diverse cases and modes of reporting, and to get to basic relationships. One such concept is that of verbal repertoire, which John Gumperz (1964) has done much to develop. The heterogeneity of speech communities, and the priority of social relationships, is assumed, and the question to be investigated is that of the set of varieties, codes, or subcodes, commanded by an individual, together with the types of switching that occur among them. (More generally, one would assess communicative repertoire).

A second concept is that of linguistic routines, sequential organizations beyond the sentence, either as activities of one person, or as the interaction of two or more. Literary genres provide obvious examples; the organization of other kinds of texts, and of conversation, is getting fresh attention by sociologists, such as Harvey Sacks, and sociologically oriented linguists, such as William Labov. One special importance of linguistic routines is that they may have the property that the late English philosopher Austin dubbed _performative_ (Searle 1967). That is, the saying does not simply stand for, refer to, some other thing; it itself is the thing in question. To say "I solemnly vow" is to solemnly vow; it does not name something else that is the act of vowing solemnly. Indeed, in the circumstances no other way to vow solemnly is provided other than to do so by saying that one does so. From this standpoint, then, disability and ability with regard to language involve questions that are not about the relation between language and something else that language might stand for or influence; sometimes such questions are about things that are done linguistically or not at all. (More generally, one would analyze linguistic routines, comprising gesture, paralinguistics, etc. as well).

A third concept is that of _domains of language behavior_, which Joshua Fishman has dealt with insightfully in his impressive work on _Language Loyalty in the United States_ (1966: 424-39). Again, the complexity and patterning of use is assumed, and the focus is upon "the most parsimonious and fruitful designation of the occasions on which one language (variant, dialect, style, etc.) is habitually employed rather than (or addition to) another" (428). (More generally, one would define domains of communicative behavior).

Too often, to be sure, the significance of a sociolinguistic feature, such as a code, routine, or term or level of address, is sought by purely distributional means. The feature is traced through the set of contexts in which it can be used without regard to an intervening semantic structure. Such an approach neglects the fact that sociolinguistic features, like linguistic features, are "signs" in the classical Saussurean sense, comprising both a form and a meaning (_significant_ and _signifié_). The difference is that one thinks of a typical linguistic sign as comprising a phonological form and a referential meaning (chien and the corresponding animal), whereas a sociolinguistic sign may comprise with respect to form an entire language, or some organized part of one, while meaning may have to do with an attitude, norm of interaction, or the like. (Recall the Paraguayan case of Spanish / distance : Guarani / closeness (among other dimensions)). Thus the relation between feature and context is mediated by a semantic paradigm. There is an analogue here to the representation of a lexical element in a language in terms of form (phonological features), meaning (semantic features), and context (features of syntactic selection), or, indeed, to the tripartite semoitic formula of Morris, syntactics, semantics, pragmatics, if these three can be interpreted here as analogous of form, meaning and context.

If the distributional approach neglects semantic structure, there is a common semantic approach that neglects context. It analyzes the structure of a set of elements (say, codes, or terms of personal reference) by assuming one normal context. This approach (typical of much componential analysis) is equally unable to account for the range of functions a fluent user of language is able to accomplish (cf. Tyler, 1966). It is true that the value of a feature is defined first of all in relation to a set of normal contexts (settings, participants, personal relationships, topics, or whatever). But given this "unmarked" (presupposed) usage, an actor is able to insult, flatter, color discourse as comic or elevated, etc., by "marked" use of the feature (code, routine, level of address, whatever) in other contexts. Given their tacit knowledge of the normal values, hearers can interpret the nature and degree of the markedness of the use.

Thus the differences that one may encounter within a community may have to do with (1) presence or absence of a feature (code, routine, etc.); (2) the semantic value assigned a feature (e.g., English as having the value of distance and hostility among some American Indians), (3) the distribution of the feature among contexts, and (4) the interrelations of these with each other in unmarked and marked usages.

This discussion does not exhaust the concepts and modes of analysis relevant to the sort of theory that is needed. A number of scholars are developing relevant conceptual approaches, notably Bernstein, Fishman, Gumperz, Labov. The three concepts singled out do point up major dimensions: the capacities of persons, the organization of verbal means for socially defined purposes, and the sensitivity of rules to situations. And it is possible to use the three concepts to suggest one practical framework for use in sociolinguistic description.

VI

As Dr. Edmund Gordon has said, it is hardly our task to say what the goals of the disadvantaged should be. If one prime consideration is to be chosen, probably it is jobs. From this standpoint, a rough scale can be defined in terms of the concepts of repertoire, routine and domain. For each one asks how many and what kind, moving from the minimal to the maximal requirements for use of a more-or-less standard set of speech habits. For purposes of the scale, the single concept of fluent speaker is replaced by a rough division into fixed, flexible, and fluent (or facile) use.

	Repertoires	Routines	Domains
Fixed			
Flexible			
Facile			

The minimal competence (lowest rung of fixed) could be characterized as use of a single routine in a single domain without need to switch within one's repertoire. Additional considerations might be that the channel be writing, thus permitting revision and correction somewhat at leisure, and that the demands on the one part of the repertoire be of the transactional or restricted code sort. Jobs of this sort are probably today mostly taken care of by form letters, or, in the vocal sphere, by recordings, to be sure. Perhaps the need only to receive, not to send, might be added to define the minimal rung.

The maximal competence (facile) could be characterized as use of multiple routines in many domains with facility at switching between parts of one's verbal repertoire, both sending and receiving.

Medial competence (flexible) could be defined in terms of the empirical situation, if some intermediate set of needs and abilities with regard to routines, domains and repertoires can usefully be recognized.[7]

Some such scale could be used to conceptualize and anlyze the requirements of situations, such as types of jobs; the capacities of persons; the aims and levels of a program of training.

VII

So far I have not much justified the scope implied by the word "communicative" in my title, and indeed, I shall continue to focus on language and linguistics, as central to the problems with which we deal and to modes of attack upon them. Let me now, however, consider briefly in the context of interference a principle that makes the broader perspective of communication essential.

Phenomena of intonation, tone of voice, expressive phonetic features, and other parts of paralinguistics; phenomena of body idiom, gesture, and other parts of kinesics (Goffman, 1963: 33-5); all that Edward Hall designates as the "silent language" and the "hidden dimension"; these things need only be mentioned to be recognized. Yet it is remarkable how easy it is for us to forget them. In Dr. Cazden's review article, she makes an important critical point, namely, that a common finding may easily be given two quite different interpretations. The example cited may be evidence of the point I wish to make now. Bernstein has interpreted a greater use of "I think" among higher-status subjects in terms of egocentricity-sociocentricity contrasting with "ain't it", whereas Loban has taken a like result as evidence of cognitive flexability (grouping it with "I'm not exactly sure"). The question arises: did Bernstein's English subjects say "I think" (egocentric) and Loban's California school children "I think" (cognitive flexability)? Clearly the import of data can not be assessed apart from the co-occurring set of intonational and expressive signals.

The question of communicative interference poses itself here in two ways. There is first the problem of interference between differing sets of expressive signals. Of this there are many examples in education and the transmission of information, e.g., Steven Polgar (1960:) reported some years ago that Mesquaki Fox children near Tama, Iowa, interpreted the normal loudness of voice and directness of teachers as "mean"-ness and as getting mad. Such are the problems of interference between the communicative norms of many American Indians and those of non-Indians that among the Lokota, for example, the very word for "white man" is etymologized as "fast-talking, argumentative", lit., "bad-mouth". The normal patterns of friendly interaction, verbal and non-verbal, among Negroes in Oakland may be seen by Lakota there as frightening. (I am indebted to Luis Kemnitzer for these observations).

Second, there is the problem of interference with regard to relations between co-occurring codes within a single message. The principle of concern here can be put as an instruction: "Find out where the information is." A child is making use of a set of modalities, as he or she communicates, and interprets communication, and only one of them is discursive language. With nonvocal communication, there is not only the fact that "body idiom...is a conventionalized discourse" (Goffman 1963: 34), but also the possible interdependence of kinesic behavior and linguistic structure. Birdwhistell (1967, ms) has argued for and finds among Americans both a set of particular movements (markers) that occur regularly with or in substitution for syntactic features (pronominal, pluralization, verboid, tense, expressions of area and of manner), and a kinesis stress system which expresses certain syntactic combinations. With nonverbal use of the vocal channel, one of the essential features of Bernstein's model for restricted and elaborated types of codes is that the grammatical and lexical restrictiveness of the first type is accompanied by intensified perceptual activity with regard to other cues of subjective intent, such as the paralinguistic. (I may mention that I have found Bernstein's model very useful cross-culturally when taken as defining ideal types, although one finds that t the dimensions joined in the two types prove empirically distinct). In such a case the two parties to a communicative exchange may be putting information in different places, and likewise looking for that of the other in different places. The situation is further complicated by what the late Dutch linguist de Groot called "the law of the two strata", namely that when the discursive and the expressive import of a message conflict, the latter signals the real intent. Quite possibly some teachers are not reading their students at all, and some children are reading their teachers all too well. In any case, a theory of competence that is to be of help must provide for tacit knowledge of an array of signals and a battery of functions, such that what is signalled lexically in one case may be signalled with expressive intonation in another, and so on. The theory of competence cannot be limited to the referential use of language alone.

More generally, one must reckon with the fact that any act that is subject to a rule of conduct is a communication (Goffman 1956: 475, 477), and that seemingly trivial details of situational propriety can have major consequences.

Such proprities are subsidiary to verbal discourse in our usual thinking about education, and yet their maintenance or infringement may overrule discourse content. Consciously or not, from an individual's use of the (verbal and non-verbal) idiom of social gatherings, others make inference to his regard for others and himself, involvement, motives, and, indeed, basic character and mental health (see Goffman 1963, esp. 216-248). Lack of attention due to lack of sleep may be read as rejection and hostility (and even come to be accepted by the sleepless one as a correct interpretation).

In these respects the continuity or discontinuity of communicative patterning from family to school is of crucial importance. As an example, in a Hawaiian first grade many an Anglo teacher will act on the assumption that the children should stop, become quiet, and give simultaneous attention to her, so that she need make a statement of information only once. That the children do not comply may be attributed to many things about them, perhaps, but not to lack of communicative competence on her part. In point point of fact patterns of communication in the families from which the children come militate against success of her attempt. A teacher who knows this turns to one child with the information, and so quickly attracts the successive attention of the others, accomplishing his purpose in a period of time in which another teacher would perhaps still be attempting to obtain the situation she thinks necessary for information to be given, namely, herself as absolute focus of attention (Stephen Boggs, personal communication). Clearly the motives and character of the two teachers will be differently interpreted by the children.

This most general level of the notion of communicative competence implies a concern with a corresponding theory of description, and much more needs to be said, and learned, about both. In other writings I have tried to deal with the notion of communication from an anthropological standpoint, and to sketch approaches to communicative description, including study of the acquisition of communicative competence cross-culturally by children (Hymes 1961b, 1962, 1964b, 1967a, 1967b). Having broached these matters, let me here return to a consideration of some consequences of a communicative perspective for the study of children and language (VII) and the development of linguistics (VIII).

VIII

With regard to education and children, the goal of an integrated theory of communicative description would be to guide accounts of the range of communicative settings, functions, and means, and their interrelationships, acquired by children. Of these the school setting would be one, but not the only one; and a major purpose would be to place the school setting in the context of other settings, so as to delineate the true communicative abilities of the children and to show the extent to which the performance in school settings was not a direct disclosure of their abilities, but a product of interference between the system that they bring and the system that confronts them; or a setting simply largely irrelevant to the direction their abilities and competence otherwise took (cf. John 1967 on the "gap" approach that neglects these matters). In part the problem is one of conflict of values and of perceived interests (cf. Labov 1965: 96-9). Indeed, since the beginnings of stratified society and the use of writing, it has been characteristic of much of mankind that a desired or required communicative competence has stood over against men, as an alien thing, imposed by a power not within their control. Even in the simplest case, of course, communicative competence is achieved along specific lines, not merely released. In the complex circumstances of our own society it is hard to see how children can be expected to master a second system, complementing or replacing their own, if the process is not perceived as intrinsically relevant, or enjoyable (preferably both).

What sorts of interference may occur, what sorts of learning and change may be required, cannot of course be postulated in advance. Sometimes the question will be one simply of dialect markers, of the social rather than the referential or expressive information called for in the situation. (My own unrealistic preference would be to leave the dialect alone, insofar as markers are all that is involved). Sometimes the question will be one of added skills in the use of syntax or routines; sometimes a total style of communicative conduct; but it should be repeated that one major problem is with respect to the communicative patterns, attitudes, and consciousness of those whom the children encounter (on teachers of reading, cf. Labov 1967: 23-6); Labov, Cohen and Robins 1965: 52-5). One major need for change is in the schools and surrounding communities. (On intervention in communicative patterns, see work of Salvador Minuchin, now being extended from family to school systems (Minuchin and Montalvo 1966, Minuchin et al., 1967). And it must be repeated that the linguistic and communicative patterns are integral with values and motivations, so that only attention to their underlying social matrixes may be able to effect successful change.

(Ultimately I should hope that concern for language might get to the aesthetic and clarifying and truth-telling roles it plays in our lives, and that we might someday have a conference on the ways in which our middle-class verbally fluent individuals are disadvantaged. A critique of the use of language among the advantaged would indeed not be hard to mount (e.g., Orwell 1948), and there are even some who argue that a withdrawal from the ordinary uses of language altogether is in rebellion. But no government is about to spend much money to get government to use language in a more satisying, beautiful, clarifying, or truthful way.)

It is advisable to review and recognize explicitly a shift that has been taking place during the course of this paper. I began with the limitations of a linguistic theory, and introduced considerations to broaden it. With discussion of each of a number of topics--the priority of a functional perspective on the codes of a community, of rules relating sociolinguistic features to contexts, of competence for a plurality of communicative functions, of communicative conduct and patterns generally, and of practical concerns--the starting point of thought has momentarily shifted from language to social life. Such shift of starting point and orientation reflects a basic property of a broad theory of competence and description, whether sociolinguistic, or more generally communicative: it is essentially sociocultural. A linguistic theory in the narrow sense, in so far as it deals with use, starts with language and looks out from there; structure precedes, functions follow. Discussion that starts with such a theory tends to follow the same course. A theory of the sort needed here starts with social life and looks in at language; functions guide, structures follow. Communicative means generally are viewed in terms of the patterning of communicative acts and purposes.

The essentially sociocultural character of an adequate theory can be brought out by three assumptions such a theory makes:

(1) each social relationship entails the selection and/or creation of communicative means considered specific and appropriate to it by its participants;

(2) the organization of communicative means in terms of social relationships confers a structure that is not disclosed in the analysis of the means separately;

(3) the communicative means available in a relationship condition its nature and outcome.

These three assumptions are rather simple and obvious. (For a more adequate discussion of a sociological perspective, see Bernstein 1965). To take them seriously however is to define a kind of investigation almost wholly unsystematized and theoretically little understood. To take the first assumption: a social relationship gives rise to a use of communicative means that distinguishes it. Now it is probably a sociolinguistic universal that the speech of men and women can be distinguished in every society. Yet articles on men's and women's speech are few; they are also very revealing. They deal with men's and women's speech when markers of the distinction intrude themselves into the ordinary analysis of the language. For the vast majority of societies where the markers have not so intruded, we are largely ignorant.

The fact just cited is evidence of the second assumption: the way communicative means are organized in terms of a social relationship is unlikely to appear unless one begins with the social relationship, then looks for the means.

The third assumption is perhaps the simplest, the most obvious, and for some reason, the most resisted by some linguists. Put colloquially, it says with reference to language that what people have to work with affects what they can do. In it lies the heart of the element of truth in what is often called the Whorfian hypothesis.

With regard to children, the point is brought by Cazden (1966:): "When we shift...to the difference between the speech of a middle-class child and a lowe-class child, however, we are looking not at the total available in the language as a system of symbols, but at what is actually used by particular persons at the moment of constructing an utternace." In important part the question is one of a competence which is in part a personal matter (cf. Sapir, "every individual's language is a distinct psychological entity in itself" (1933 [1949]: 23)), and in part a matter of social group. Each child in a classroom has a competence definable in terms of what is available to it for utterance and comprehension, largely shared and predictable in terms of its social origins and experience, partially unique to it, and never identical with that of an ideally fluent speaker-listener.

IX

Let me conclude by summarizing and emphasizing in somewhat different terms the way in which concern with communicative competence and language use among children affects the present state of linguistic theory (and communicative theory).

First, it is of course not mandatory that the term "linguistic theory" be used in one particular way. If one wishes to reserve "linguistic theory" for the narrower sort of competence, then "sociolinguistic theory" (and communicative theory) will do for a broader sort of competence. What is essential is that concepts of the nature of language and its use not be preempted in the name of "linguistic theory" by a narrow view. The understanding of language use involves attention not only to participants, settings, and other extra-linguistic factors, but also attention to purely linguistic phenomena, and the discovery and statement of new features, organization, and relationships in the data of language itself, when viewed from the more general perspective of social relationships. What is essential is that conceptions of speakers, listeners, and competency, take into account as quite normal in the world the situations of diversity of codes; see the child as acquiring and indeed, achieving, narrlowly linguistic and broadly sociolinguistic (and communicative)competence together.

In this regard a sociolinguistic theory is not a departure from past linguistic insight. The theory earlier discussed has known how to *reculer pour mieux sauter*. It has found in traditional grammar in figures such as W. von Humboldt, Jespersen and Sapir, instances of fresh insight into the structuring of language which it wishes to renew and to capitalize. Sociolinguistic (communicative) theory is in an analogous position. It finds traditional grammar associated with traditional rhetoric, poetics, dialectic, and ethics, as sources of insight into the uses of language, modes of speaking and speech acts and their structuring, which it wishes to renew and to capitalize (cf. Hymes 1968). In von Humboldt it finds not only a generative conception of rules, but also a concern with the individual worlds created in and through language; a concern not only with universals, but concern also with the particulars in which they are embodied; a concern with the infinite capacity of man that implies also the determinate form such capacity requires for realization in each person; an understanding of human nature, the human essence, as not so much a state of being, as in each case a unique existential achievement (Cassirer 1961: 19-26, discussing Herder, Goethe, W. von Humboldt). In Jespersen it finds a grammarian who devoted himself to universals, productivity, and to understanding mankind, nation and individual from a linguistic point of view. In Sapir it finds a pioneer of structuralism, the autonomy of linguistic form, and proper insight into phonology, who also urged that (1929: 214):

> It is peculiarly important that linguists, who are often accused, and accused justly, of failure to look beyond the pretty patterns of their subject matter, should become aware of what their science may mean for the interpretation of human conduct in general. Whether they like it or not, they must become increasingly concerned with the many anthropological, sociological, and psychological problems which invade the study of language.

It should be clear that I have not discussed generative grammar as such. Of current models for the writing of grammars, those of generative theory are the most important and most nearly satisfactory. I teach one version. Moreover, the goals of linguistic theory, as set forth by Chomsky, parallel in important part the goals of ethnographic theory with which I have identified myself, and the dialectical perspective, restored in certain respects to anthropology by Levi-Strauss (1945: 44-45; 1964: 61-62), with which I am much concerned. My disagreement is with certain limitations of policy and priority. It is true that grammatical analysis is necessary, if one is to study speaking, and sociolinguistic and communicative competence competence cannot be studied adequately without reference to grammatical competence. These truths become transvalued in some hands into a denial of the interest, or even possibility, at present, of the study of sociolinguistic and communicative competence. And the intrusiveness of facts of the latter sort, having to do with levels of speech, sociologically governed shifts in phonological and grammatical features (Labov, 1966, 1967), culturally standardized acceptance of an ungrammatical syntactic relation as marking a humorous speech act (e.g., "Ben sure looks after Ben", both "Ben's" referring to the same person), and the like, is to simplify by discarding the inconvenient data (cf. Labov 1967: 3) or explaining it away (Cazden 1967).

The dialectic of much transformational grammar, as of Levi-Strauss, is strongly a dialectic of reduction, seeking the deeper levels to which phenomena of experience can be reduced and in terms of which they can be explained. Thus, for Chomsky the adequacy of linguistic work is to be judged in terms of three successively higher levels of success: presentation of the observed primary data correctly (observational adequacy); a correct account of the linguistic intuition (intrinsic competence) of the native speaker, specifying the observed data in terms of significant generalizations that express underlying regularities in the language (descriptive adequacy); provision of a principled basis, independent of any particular language, for selection of the descriptively adequate grammar of each language, which is taken to be equivalent to explanation of the intuition of the native speaker on the basis of an empirical hypothesis concerning the innate predisposition of a child to develop a certain kind of theory (grammar) (Chomsky 1964, 1965). That is, explanatory adequacy is concerned with accounting for characteristics of human nature (innate capacity, an inborn language acquisition device). This concern, considered the main interest of linguistics by Chomsky, fits with important general trends in science. For many concerns, however, such as those of the place of language in education particularly, the movement from experience toward its biological basis is of marginal help. One is concerned with movement from biological basis toward experience, toward the ways in which potentialities of human nature are actualized in concrete persons, situations, and histories; the ways in which linguistic means succeed or fail, are available or not, change adequately in response to needs or do not; the ways in which what does get said is commonly in fact the adequate means of accomplishing what it does (cf. Garfinkel ms). One's dialectic must in effect be one of emergence as well. One's goal of explanatory adequacy for a linguistic theory must comprehend both the essential adequacy sought in human nature and an existential adequacy sought in experience, history, social structure, and social life.[9] Explanation of the form and content of linguistic, and communicative, competence, must come from both. It is in this fuller sense of explanatory adequacy that one can agree that

> "It is not necessary to achieve descriptive adequacy before raising questions of explanatory adequacy. On the contrary, the crucial questions, the questions that have the greatest bearing on our concept of language and on descriptive practice as well, are almost always those involving explanatory adequacy with respect to particular aspects of language structure" (Chomsky 1965: 36).

(For examples of such considerations, see the work of Labov and questions raised in Hymes (1964a, b)).

There is underway now, I think, a shift in emphasis in linguistics that comprehends both kinds of explanatory adequacy and their corresponding concerns. It is a shift that work with the place of language in the education of children may help to complete. The emphases can be shown in terms of two dimensions. The vertical dimension distinguishes between language structure and function (use), and the horizontal dimension dsitinguishes between the study of a single language or community from a comparative, or cross-cultural perspective.

[Fig. 2 about here]

The earlier set of emphases (given before the slash) can be said to have been (from left to right, and first top, then bottom), with regard to the structure of a single language, find the invariance; with regard to structures comparatively, find diversity; with regard to functional aspects in a single case, assume diversity, and the variation of parole (and assign anything that interferes with the invariance and system of structure to this category); with regard to functions comparatively, assume invariance (the functions of language are universal; all languages are functionally equal).

The emerging set of emphases (given after the slash) can be said to add, with regard to the structure of a single language, find the diversity (consider language as a system of systems, or of subcodes; as an organization of diverse styles, levels, registers, varieties, etc., and as implementing a system of communicative acts and functions; with regard to structures comparatively, find the invariance (formal and substantive universals). The relationships of emphasis in other words are reversed. Both these emphases are well established now in the new interest in social dialect, linguistic varieties, styles, and levels, on the one hand, and the different approaches to universals of language on the other. The rest of the new set of emphases, reversing the former set, is only

Figure 2

	Single Case	Comparative
Structure	Invariance / Diversity	Diversity / Invariance
Function	Diversity / Invariance	Invariance / Diversity

coming to be realized: with regard to functional aspects of a single case, find the invariance (the sociolinguistic system); with regard to functions comparatively, find the diversity (take the functions of language, or of a language, as problematic for any given group).

It is precisely with regard to these last two sectors that the problems of the study of the place of language in education, both of disadvantaged children in American society and of children in societies throughout the world, converge with the needs of theory. The understanding of sociolinguistic systems as a basis for handling interference between them, and the nonidentity of the functioning of language in different social groups, are problems common to them both. Perhaps this common interest can help to end the division between linguistic theory and the concrete, existential human world, the world of actual human relationships, that has dogged the study of language for so long.

FOOTNOTES

[1] This paper is revised from one presented at the Research Planning Conference on Language Development Among Disadvantaged Children, held under the sponsorship of the Department of Educational Psychology and Guidance, Ferkauf Graduate School, Yeshiva University, June 7-8, 1966. The original paper is included in the report of that conference, issued by the Department of Educational Psychology and Guidance (pp. 1-16). I wish to thank Dr. Beryl Bailey and Dr. Edmund Gordon of Yeshiva University for inviting me to participate, and Dr. Courtney Cazden, Dr. John Gumperz, Dr. Wayne O'Neill, and Dr. Vera John for their comments at that time.

[2] A continuity with more recent American structuralism is perhaps reflected in the concern with what linguistics is taken not to include, as reflected in attitudes toward terms that tag the external. In the heyday of Bloomfieldian linguistics "meaning" and "mentalism" became dirty words; today, for some, it is "context".

[3] For a development of the Menomini example, modelled on Sapir (1938), see Hymes (1967c). Sapir uses the example of an Omaha, Two Crows, to show the need to transcend a mode of analysis that abstracts from diversity and "the experienced realities of communication...the actual interrelationships of human beings" (1938 [1949]: 575).

[3a] As in certain narrative or rhetorical skills. Recent research in Baltimore has also indicated that urban slum ("inner city") children may at one stage surpass others in maturity of word-association responses (Entwhistle 1966, ms.). Baltimore first-grade slum children exceed rates for first-grade suburban children matched for I.Q. (then lag in third-grade, are equivalent in fifth). Entwhistle raises a series of important questions for obtaining and assessing data, regarding race of interviewer in relation to grade of child, health, confounding of social class and I.Q.,

inadequate specificity of ability tested.

4. E.g., "L'accession rapide de l'élite de la société polonaise à l'humanisme, dans la seconde moitié du 16e siècle, posa de facon aiguë le problème des moyens d'expression. Pour les nouvelles aspirations artistiques, seul le latin convenait avec ses ressources de vocabulaire, de syntaxe, de métrique et ses qualités d'abondance et de précision, tandis que le polonais demeurait l'apanage d'un univers spirituel médiéval qui n'avait trouvé jusqu'alors qu'une expression fragmentaire et qui commencait tardivement à prendre un essor encore timide. L'auteur analyse les aspects de ce bilinguisme et son évolution jusqu'à la fin du 16e siècle, évolution au cours de laquelle un humanisme créateur a présidé à l'élaboration de la langue littéraire en Pologne (Backvis 1958).

5. A further instance is analyzed in IV with regard to "what might be expected from anthropological research".

6. Some may want to extend the notion of linguistic to this broad competence, although present formulations of transformational generative grammar would not permit it. In the latter case, the broader kind may be called sociolinguistic when the focus is verbal. In any case, interdependence with other modes of communication ultimately require communicative competence as the most general term.

7. Three recent discussions of these sorts of notions should be reviewed: Cazden (1967), McIntosh (1967), and Quirk (1966), the first working in educational psychology, McIntosh and Quirk in the British tradition of theoretical and practical linguistics. Cazden notes the strong reasons for rejecting the idea of absence of differences in competence during the developmental period (138-140), and explores differences in terms of a three-way distinction between competence, performance A, and performance

B (136-138). The distinctions parallel those made here, but are still constrained by the competence = grammar, performance = behavior contrast. Competence is an individual's knowledge, or, the infinite set of sentences the knowledge makes possible (as here, with respect to grammar). Performance A is the subset of the possible sentences an individual can encode or decode, given intrapersonal psychological constraints (attention, memory, etc.). Performance B is the utterance actually spoken in a particular situation. Thus, the discussion of B specifies interpersonal factors such as setting, topic, and the like, as investigated by sociolinguists, and once refers to patterns of use; but B still is identified with observed behavior, as if a "surface structure" approach to it were sufficient. B is what a person *does* do, neither what a person *can* do, nor what a person *knows*. Cazden's own insights point to the necessity of reinterpreting her "Performance B" category in terms of underlying abilities and knowledge, as does the general psychological distinction between learning (knowledge) and performance (behavior) that she cites (136). McIntosh proposes the notions of linguistic *appropriacy* and *adequacy*. His "appropriacy" and "appropriateness" here seem to have identical intent. His "adequacy" would designate degrees of, of judgments of, appropriacy with respect to the purpose and outcome of a situation. McIntosh insists that true linguistic event has conditions both of grammaticality and appropriacy (86-87). This view, and his discussion as a whole, clearly agree with the standpoint of the present paper. Quirk takes "acceptability" as the general term. His investigations (described more fully in Quirk and Svartvik 1966) face squarely the necessity of specifying linguistic norms (82) (cf. Akhmanova 1965). With regard to formal written usage of educated native speakers of English, two tests were given, the first the performing of certain grammatical changes on sentences and the second the judging of the acceptability of the sentences thus obtained. Very few sentences struck all the subjects as either wholly acceptable or wholly unacceptable. The results of the two tests were related to obtain, first, an overriding dichotomy as between lexical and grammatical acceptability, and, second, a comprehensive categorization of acceptability. The criteria can be restated in idealized form, marking + for ease in accomplishing the grammatical change (Operation test), or for high acceptability (the Judgment test).

		OPERATION TEST	JUDGMENT TEST
Lexical	(a) congruous	+	+*
	(b) obscure	+	-
	(c) incoherent	-	-
Grammatical	(a) established	+	+
	(b) divided	+	+/+ **
	(c) ill-established	-(+/+?)	+
	(d) dubious	moderate	moderate
	(e) unacceptable	-	-

* (-+) (and perhaps (+, +/+) results seem to be grouped here, Quirk taking as crucial the absence of any trouble with lexical items per se apart from grammatical problems (86).

** "competing forms of more or less equal acceptability" (86).

The general significance of the results of clear. There is not a sharp, simple dichotomy between acceptable and unacceptable, but a complex and graduated series of judgments. Obviously, one must go further and relate such results to detailed grammatical and lexical analysis, on the one hand, and to detailed analysis of verbal and social contexts on the other (cf. Labov 1966). In particular, the effects of contexts can not really be assumed to be controlled until studied beyond the range of a single postulated norm.

A more radical exploration of ability to interpret and judge linguistic forms might be simply to take sentences (e.g., English *We just had breakfast*, Sedang *ngian nde ka hme* ("We (inclusive)are eating (rice)" (Sedang is a Mon-Khmer language of Vietnam); number the elements 1 2 3 4; form all possible sequences (1, 2, 3, 4; 12, 13, 14, 21, 23, 24,...; 123, 124.....; 1234, 1243...); and test response to each. In Sedang, for example, *nde* could occur only as a response to a metalinguistic question (e.g., "What is the second word in the sentence?"); the other three words could each occur as a response in conversation. In general, several types of response (for which symbols can be suggested) are found. A few sequences are grammatical sentences (S), and a few are irretrievably ungrammatical (*). Some are grammatical and incomplete (-), the spontaneous response being to expect more to follow. Some are grammatical and marked, e.g., for emphasis (!), word order being the feature. One or two are grammatical and marked, if intonation (here, stress) is changed or added (!). Some are first rejected as ungrammatical (complete or incomplete), but accepted if reflection supplies a possible context (?). These odd sentences are almost always marked (?!). The same series arises for the semantic and sociocultural. Sequences are also sometimes irretrievably rejected, or rejected at first, as semantically incongruous, or culturally or socially inappropriate (*sem, *soc, ?sem, ?soc).

By such exploration, one could begin to isolate the parameters of judgment in the community, discovering the existence and range of acceptability from the unquestioned through the marked and the odd to the irretrievable. One could probe the basis of response, as purely syntactic, or lexical, or semantic; purely one feature of use (setting, participant in the event, purpose, topic, the kind of speech act, the genre of the message-form, manner, channel, code-variety, special knowledge or norms of interpretation, etc.); or a particular set of such bases. Some such exploration would more certainly test the full scope of ability to interpret and judge sentences, and the full scope of conditions of success. Automatic generation of sequences might reveal both limits and extensions that were not expected.

8 Labov (1965) distinguishes six levels of the acquisition of spoken English. His sixth, full range, would be maximal with respect to switching within repertoire and among domains, but perhaps admit degrees with respect to routines. His fifth, consistent standard, seems to define a medial area of some flexibility short of complete facility.

9 No one description can fit the varied ways in which the term existential has been used. The best concise characterization of the spirit of the term known to me (admittedly rough) is as follows (Harvey 1964):

> (existentialism) begins with the conviction that Western philosophy since the Greeks has been preoccupied with the idea of ESSENCE, the general and universal features of anything, rather than with the concrete, individual human EXISTENCE, the former being counted more real (because unchanging) than the latter. Consequently Western philosophy has been intellectualistic and rationalistic. It has not only been irrelevant so far as illuminating life is concerned but has actually obscured the truth about human existence. The fundamental categories of classical philosophy...are all impersonal and fail to do justice to the basic character of human life as change, consciousness, process, movement, passion, and decision. In short, they fail to inindicate the historical nature of human existence".

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